courts for adjudication in so many different and perplexing ways and surrounded by such different circumstances and the different judges differ so in temperament and point of view, that to protect equally the property rights involved in each case there is required a definite and uniform standard by which the courts may be guided in their decisions. Otherwise, the state could not deal with each case in accordance with a general ideal or rule, and the equality demanded by one's sense of justice would be impossible.

Certainty and uniformity are not only necessary as a means to secure generality and equality in the administration of justice but also as a necessary condition to modern social and industrial development. All great movements require complex schemes of co-operation, minute division of labor, the investment of great amounts of capital, and cover extended periods of time. The promoter, the capitalist and the laborer to a certain extent pool their interests in this common effort and frequently must wait for years to secure the full profits of the undertaking. They put their labor and capital and effort into these great enterprises and receive in return certain rights. They are willing to do this because they have confidence that these rights will be enforced by the state, and that they will be enforced with such definiteness and uniformity that when their rights mature they will be of the same nature and content that they were when the undertaking was begun. People will not invest their capital or effort in any undertaking unless amply assured that the rights so acquired will be enforced by the state with a certainty and uniformity that is unquestioned. It is as Sir Frederick Pollock says: "The demand for certainty becomes more exacting as men's affairs become more complex, and the aid of the courts is more frequently sought. Trade and traffic in their increasing volume,

speed and variety of movement, raise new questions at every turn, and men expect not only to get their differences settled for the moment, but to have solutions which will prevent the same difficulties from giving trouble again."

§ 40. Courts of justice versus courts of law.From the preceding sections it appears that the effective and peaceful administration of justice can be obtained only by observing certain principles of equality and generality upon the one hand and of certainty and uniformity upon the other. We are now ready to consider which of the two—the administration of justice according to law or according to the dictates of right, natural justice and expediency will best observe the foregoing principles. A casual consideration will demonstrate the inefficiency of the latter. What is right, just, or expedient in a given case depends so much upon the personal point of view, the temperament of the presiding judge, his particular philosophy of life, his education and environment, that it is impossible that justice should be administered equally and generally by different judges if no other criterion be furnished them. There would be as many different principles and kinds of justice as there are judges in the realm. There could be no greater generality and equality in the administration of justice than there would be in the temperament, individual philosophy, and training and environment of the courts. Uniformity and certainty would be impossible. Whether or not contracts would be enforced would depend not upon their compliance with certain and definite established principles, but whether in the opinion of the court concerned it would do justice between the parties. People would indeed be slow to risk their labor and capital upon a guess as to what some future judge might consider just and right. The first English courts

were established as courts of justice, but the practical considerations above mentioned drove them into the role of courts of law. When equity courts were established in England they were not bound by any principles of law, but they could not withstand the constant pressure to yield to general principles of equality and certainty which they could observe only by substituting rules of law for principles of abstract justice. The law adopted by the courts generally represents the courts' ideas of justice and expediency, but when once adopted they then become the law to be followed scrupulously thereafter unless legally repealed, even though later judges may differ as to their wisdom and rightness. The public may then rely upon them. Law-abiding citizens may adjust their busi ness and conduct accordingly. The complicated cooperation necessitated by modern conditions is thus afforded a basis for effective operation. Great undertakings would be impossible if the protection of the rights of the various parties to the undertaking were to be made dependent upon the theories of abstract justice held by some judge, rather than upon their compliance with the established rules of law.

Professor Pound aptly sums up the situation as follows: "Division of labor can not exist without restraints on the liberty of each in the interest of the like liberties of all. But these limitations, to achieve their purpose, must be regulated definitely, and, as we have seen, that means for practical purposes, that they must be regulated by reason. In other words, they require law. They require that certainty in definition and application involved in the administration of justice according to law. Accordingly, the whole course of development of society has shown a movement away from justice without law and toward the working out of a scientific and complete body of rules for the administration of justice."

§ 41. Certainty frequently more important than justice. Another objection to courts of justice as distinguished from courts of law is that frequently the question of certainty and definiteness is the all-important consideration. There are many very important and valuable rules of law that have no basis in considerations of abstract justice. Laws requiring persons to drive on the right-hand side of the road or prescribing the forms of certain instruments are of that character. The important thing is not that they drive on the right side or the left side, but that all observe a uniform rule for their mutual convenience. These and all other rules may work hardship in individual cases, but it is argued that the benefits of having definite and uniform rules of conduct far more than offset the occasional injustice that may be done. Obviously these benefits could only be enjoyed where justice is administered by courts of law.

§ 42. Scientific character of the law.-To administer justice to all persons with equality and certainty requires not only a body of law for the guidance of the courts, but requires a body of law developed with scientific accuracy and precision. The function of the modern court is to apply the legal rules to the facts material to the controversy. The facts are frequently so complicated that this function becomes exceedingly delicate and requires great powers of analysis, discrimination and logical deduction. It furthermore requires the development of clear and definite technique of expression and use of language. This is true because it is only through language that the principles of the law can be applied. If they are to be applied with that certainty and definiteness that justice and expediency require then the language which is the instrument of the application must be capable of clear and discriminating use. A

technical terminology is just as necessary to the science of law as it is to the science of medicine or mathematics. The keen analysis, discrimination and logical deduction necessary to the consistent application of legal principles to complicated situations requires a technique of language that is equally definite, keen and refined. One of the worst evils of American legislation is that the drafting of the laws is done by men who have not mastered the technique of legal expression and who can not, therefore, formulate principles capable of exact and consistent application. It is very common to find the same word or expression used with several different meanings in the same statute. This would not happen if statutes were drawn up by men trained in legal reasoning and expression. A great many of the intelligent criticisms leveled at the courts and the legal system have their justification in decisions and rules resulting from a failure to recognize the scientific character of the law. It is because of its technical character that the administration of law has been confided to the legal profession, and consequently upon them rests the burden of its scientific perfection. At this point it is important to keep clear the distinction between the science of law and the science of legislation. The latter science has to do with the framing of new laws and the changing of old ones, and involves not only the science of the law, but also the fields of social science and philosophy. Its concern is with the question of what the law ought to be. As distinguished from this the science of law is concerned with what the law is and its accurate and faithful application.

§ 43. Law a protection against error and corruption. In the administration of justice a system of law will afford very effective safeguards against corruption and error. If, in the decision of controversies, the