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husband's society, until now it is generally held that the right to society and not the right to services is the true basis of recovery, and that a woman as well as a man may maintain an action for deprivation of the right.

At common law a husband had a legal right in the services of his wife, and could recover damages for any injury to his right. The basis of recovery for the husband has been gradually changed, as in the wife's case, and now rests principally upon the right to the wife's society. So that now a husband may recover against one who, by artifice and fraud, alienates the affections of his wife even though she continue to reside with him and serve him. If one brings about the alienation of affection of another's wife, or a separation, it matters not how far the wife was blameworthy. The wrong to the husband is the same whether the wife consented or not. Mere giving shelter to a wife who has left her husband will not raise a liability. But if any influence is used over the wife to continue the separation, or if access is denied to the husband, he may have an action. If, however, the husband has given cause for divorce, he can not be heard to complain. And if the husband in any manner connived at the seduction of his wife he can not recover damages therefor.

Where a wife receives personal injuries which incapacitate her for her duties, there are two kinds of damage, (1) that suffered directly by the wife, (2) that consequentially suffered by the husband. At common law, for the former, being her pain and suffering, humiliation and the like, the suit was in the name of both; and for the latter, being the loss of society and services, the husband sued alone. In either case the amount recovered belonged to the husband. Now, however, it is generally the law that the damages in the former case inure to the wife, and only in the latter case to the husband.

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§ 565. Legitimacy.-Children may be either legitimate or illegitimate, according as their parents are or are not lawful husband and wife; or they may be adopted. Every child born to a wife during the continuance of the marriage relation is presumed to be the child of her husband. The presumption is not conclusive, however, and illegitimacy of the child may be established by proof, but only by clear and convincing proof. Illegitimate children born before marriage become legitimate upon marriage of their parents, but in England and a few states this is not the law. At common law, the children born of a void marriage were illegitimate, but it is generally provided by statute that if the marriage was entered into in good faith, the children shall be deemed legitimate. The common law did not recognize the adoption of children. Statutes in many states now make provision therefor and these must be scrupulously observed. Generally upon the adoption of a child, the adopting parent and the child have all the rights, duties and liabilities that exist between natural parent and child.

§ 566. Rights and duties of parent and child. The mother of a bastard has the right to custody and control, and she is under obligation to support it; its supposed father is not liable for its support, except under special proceedings provided by statute. At common law a bastard could not inherit either from his father or mother, but by statute the bastard now in most states inherits from the mother, and in some inherits from the father in the absence of other heirs.

As to legitimate children, the duty of the parent, first the father, or if he be dead the mother, is to protect, educate and maintain the child during minority. Just the exact status of this duty is uncertain, but most states hold the parent responsible for necessaries furnished to the child, where the parent has not been illegally deprived of the custody of the child. Direct suits by the child against the parent for support have never been allowed. In some states the duty is made clear by statute. No action is permitted by a child against a parent for any failure in these duties, even though the failure may be criminally punishable. By way of compensation for, and in aid of the parent's duties, the law gives to the parent the custody, control and services of his minor children. He may moderately and reasonably correct or restrain the child. So long as he is a fit person, he is entitled to the custody of the child. All rights and duties as between parent and child end with the majority of the child or emancipation, that is, the agreement, express or implied, of the parent and child that the child may be treated as an adult.

A parent is not liable for wrongs done by the child to other persons, unless done by the parent's direction, or in his service. Of course, a child can not be held liable for wrongs done by its parent.

§ 567. Wrongs as between parent and child.— Whether a parent will be civilly liable for personal wrongs done to a child is not wholly settled. By the weight of authority and the better opinion there is no civil liability, so far as assault and battery or imprisonment is concerned, it being deemed safer to rely upon the natural affection of a parent.

For any wrongs done by a parent to the property of his child, he is answerable the same as he would be to any other person.

For any injury done by a child to its parent the better view is that the child will not be civilly responsible. These rules are based upon the public policy that it is better for family discipline and peace that such controversies should not be brought into the court.

§ 568. Fraud between parent and child.-Inasmuch as an infant's dealings with his property are voidable, a parent can not acquire any advantage through his influence over the infant. The transaction would be invalid, simply from want of power in the infant. But after maturity of the child, there may still be an influence by the parent, and if such influence and relation of confidence be used to obtain an undue advantage in any transaction between the parent and child, the child may have redress by appeal to the courts. Such relation of confidence may also exist in favor of the parent in old age, and he will be protected in a similar way against the machinations of his mature offspring.

§ 569. Wrongs by third persons. Whenever a third person does an injury to a parent or a child, there is a double loss, direct to the one and consequential to the other, and the question is how are such wrongs

23-Elem. Law.

done, and for what loss is the wrongdoer held responsible. These will be considered separately.

§ 570. Child's interest in the parent.-In the relation of parent and child, the general rule applies that the inferior has no rights in the superior, hence a child has no such interest in the parent as will support a suit by the child to recover for injuries to the parent. The only exception is in cases of injuries causing death, when the statute gives a right of recovery to the personal representative for the benefit of wife or child. This has been considered elsewhere.

§ 571. Parent's interest in the child.-The parent is entitled to the services of his child, and all the profits to be derived there from until majority. Whoever incapacitates the child from rendering the service, causes legal damage to the parent, and is subject to an action. The right to recover is based on the right to services and the duty to protect. At common law the parent recovered only to the same extent that a master would recover for loss of services of his servant.

Damage to the parent may arise by injuries that diminish the child's ability to serve, or by wholly depriving the parent of its services; and the latter may occur by enticing the child away or by causing its death. The last-named wrong has been treated in a former section.

§ 572. Physical injuries to the child.—Any one who by a wrongful act injures the child so as to deprive the parent of its services, or to cause loss through care and attendance upon it, is liable to the parent therefor. If the injury is of a continuing nature, the parent recovers not only the value of the services actually lost, but for the deprivation or impairment of services up to the age

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