such levee was not necessary originally to prevent his lands from inun-
dation, but was rendered necessary by the closing of a bayou for the pur-
pose of reclaiming lands belonging to the state or individuals. Cash v.
Whitworth, 515.
See EASEMENTS, 1; NEGLIGENCE, 7, 8.
1. TESTATOR MUST KNOW CONTENTS OF WILL, but ordinarily the law will take
his bare signature as proof of such knowledge. Hughes v. Meredith, 127.
2. WHERE WRITER OF ANOTHER'S WILL TAKES LARGE BENEFIT under it,
the testator's knowledge of its contents must be shown by proof that it
was read to or by him, or that he gave instructions for it, or by proof of
some other fact or facts of equal force. Id.
3. DOCUMENT As Follows, being Written, Signed, and Dated entirely by
the hand of the testator, is valid as his olographic will or codicil: "$100,-
000. New Orleans, January 25, 1848. Four years from and after my
death, I hereby authorize and direct (and will) my executors to pay unto
Francis Pena one hundred thousand dollars. John McDonogh." Pena
v. New Orleans and Baltimore, 506.
4. POSTERIOR WILL CANNOT BE REJECTED because inconsistent with a previous
one, nor for inconsistency with expressed sentiments of the testator, and
suspicions are not permitted to counterbalance the testimony of numer-
ous and uncontradicted witnesses. Id.
5. PARTICULAR LEGATEE IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST upon his legacy before suit
brought to recover the same, only when his case is within the provisions
of article 1624 of the Louisiana code.
6. PAPER DULY SIGNED AND ATTESTED IS WILL entitled to probate, which
declares that it is the maker's last will and desire respecting his property,
and that he has made a previous will which is contrary to his present
wishes, but which is now out of his possession, so that he cannot destroy
it, revokes all former wills, and leaves the distribution of his property
under the laws of the state. Lucas v. Parsons, 147.
7. WILL DISPOSING OF PROPERTY ACCORDING TO LAWS OF DISTRIBUTION is
valid in Georgia, though not in England, and the heirs take under the
will, and not by descent. Id.
8. PAPER WHOSE VALIDITY AS WILL IS CONTESTED MAY BE READ TO JURY
on appeal from the ordinary, but such reading gives it no validity. Id.
9. ATTESTING WITNESSES TO WILL MAY TESTIFY TO SIGNING IN TESTATOR'S
PRESENCE, where the attestation clause states only that the will was
signed, sealed, etc., in the presence of the witnesses. Id.
10. WILL IS INVALIDATED BY DELUSION, where it is the result of the delu.
sion, but not otherwise, as a general rule. Id.
11. UNDER CAVEAT CHARGING WILL TO BE RESULT OF DELUSION AGAINST
CAVEATOR specially, the jury's attention should be particularly called to
that issue. Id.
12. RESENTMENT OF TESTATOR AGAINST SON NOT AMOUNTING TO DELUSION
will not vitiate a will prejudicial to the son, made in accordance with
previously declared intentions. Id.
13. TO CONSTITUTE VALII ATTESTATION OF WILL, TESTATOR MUST BE SO PRES-
ENT to witnesses and they to him that he might and probably did see the
attestation, and it will not suffice that he might have seen the attestation
by changing his situation, or causing it to be changed, or by removing any
intervening obstruction. Reed v. Roberts, 210.
14. ATTESTATION OF WILL MADE BY TESTATOR IN EXTREMIS, TO BE IN HIS
PRESENCE, must be made so as to be within the scope of his vision with-
out his changing his position or removing any intervening obstruction. Id.
15. TESTATOR'S CHILDREN LIVING AT TIME OF HIS DEATH BECOME HIS DEV-
ISEES, under a will devising his property to trustees to hold until his
youngest child should, if a male, attain the age of twenty-one years, or
if a female, eighteen years; and providing that upon the determination of
the trust all property should be divided amongst the surviving children
of the testator, their heirs and assigns, as tenants in common. Hemp-
stead v. Dickson, 260.
18. CHILDREN LIVING AT DEATH OF TESTATOR TAKE VESTED FEE-SIMPLE ES-
TATE, subject to the trust, under a will devising the land to trustees to
hold until the youngest child of the testator should attain majority, and
then to divide it among the surviving children of the testator, their heirs
and assigns; and this estate may be alienated, is descendible, and may
be taken on execution. Id.
17. ESTATE-TAIL, AND NOT ESTate for Life, PASSES BY DEVISE OF LAND to
be equally divided among three persons, with a subsequent provision that in
case one of them shall die without lawful issue, the property given to
him shall descend to the testator's heirs in fee. Hayward v. Howe, 734.
18. ORPHANS' COURT OF MARYLAND, IN ADMITTING TO PROBATE the will of a
married woman, disposing of her separate property, does not decide upon
the right of disposal, but merely the factum of the instrument. The
question of power of disposal belongs to the courts of law and equity.
Michael v. Baker, 593.
See CONTRACTS, 14; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2; MARRIED WOMEN, 5-8; PRO-
BATE COURTS, 3,
WILL, ESTATE AT.
See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2, 3.
1. TESTIMONY OF WITNESS SHOULD BE EXCEPTED TO, as a general rule, as soon
as a party is made aware of the witness's incompetency; and where the
counsel at the trial has in his possession the proof of his interest, he
ought not to allow the case to proceed without disclosing the objection.
This rule does not prevail in its strictness where the examination com-
menced under a reservation of the right to object. Andre v. Bodman,
628.
2. INTEREST OF WITNESS BEING OF DOUBTFUL NATURE, he is not incompetent
to testify, as an objection goes to his credit, and not to his competency.
Id.
3. WITNESS INTERESTED ON EITHER SIDE of a controversy is competent to
testify. Id.
4. CONTRACTOR IS COMPETENT WITNESS IN ACTION BY WORKMEN against the
owner of the property for services, to prove their value, although he was
originally hired by the contractor, where the contract has been aban-
doned, and the owner agreed to pay the workmen if they would go on
with the work.
& IF ONE CO-DEFENDANT, BEING PROPER PARTY TO ACTION, CEASE, DURING
PROGRESS OF PLEADING and before he is offered as a witness, to be adverse
to plaintiff, such defendant cannot be examined as a witness on the plain-
tiff's behalf, under the statutes of Indiana, where, as to the matters put
in issue by the pleadings, the real controversy is between the two de-
fendants. Though a party in his complaint name himself plaintiff and
other persons defendants, it does not follow that all the defendants
named will necessarily continue their adverse relations to him throughout
the action. Swift v. Ellsworth, 316.
WITNESS MAY GIVE OPINION AS TO CAPACITY OF PERSON AS MILLWRIGHT,
founded on work done by such person, where the witness is a mill-owner
of twenty-five or thirty years' experience. Doster v. Brown, 157.
7. WITNESS MAY BE IMPEACHED ON TRIAL OF Indictment by proof that he
testified differently before the grand jury, and the testimony of grand
jurors is admissible therefor. Commonwealth v. Mead, 741.
& IF WITNESS CONSENTS TO TESTIFY AT ALL, SO AS TO CRIMINATE HIMSEL
AS WELL AS DEFENDANT, he must answer all questions legally put to
him concerning that matter. He cannot be allowed to state such facts
only as he pleases to state, and to withhold other facts. Commonwealth
v. Price, 668.
9. ERRONEOUS CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE FROM ANSWERING QUESTIONS, BY WIT-
NESS, in which he is sustained by the court, is cured by the subsequent
offer of the witness to answer the questions. Id.
10. IN ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR INJURIES, PERSON NOT PHYSICIAN MAY
TESTIFY Whether it was necessary for a party to receive medical assist-
ance, and the length of time such assistance was necessary. Chicago etc.
R. R. Co. v. George, 239.
11. WITNESS CANNOT TESTIFY AS EXPERT, NOR AT ALL, as to whether cer-
tain specified facts would increase the rates of insurance upon property
insured, as the question involved is not one relating to matters of science
or skill, but calls for the opinion of the witness upon the influence which
certain facts would have upon others, and whether they would be
induced thereby to charge higher rates of premium. Joyce v. Maine Ins.
Co., 536.
12. EXPERT-IT REQUIRES NO SPECIAL SKILL OR EXPERIENCE TO ANSWER
whether the master of a vessel would "probably know that his foremast
was sprung, his trysail split, and his standing rigging in such condition
as to need replacing," and a question to that effect to an expert is conse-
quently inadmissible. Perkins v. Augusta Ins. & B. Co., 654.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 8, 46; EVIDENCE, 21-23, 25; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 8;
WILLS, 9.
WRITS OF ENTRY.
See EXECUTIONS, 14, 15.
WRIT OF ERROR.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 21-23.
See HABEAS CORPUS; REPLEVIN,
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