See INFANCY; PARENT AND CHILD.
CIRCUIT COURTS.
See OFFICES AND OFFICERS
COLLISIONS.
See RAILROADS, 12.
COLLOQUIUM.
See SLANDER, 13
1. NOTHING WILL RELIEVE COMMON CARRIER FROM LIABILITY for loss except
the act of God or of public enemies, or that which arises from some
event expressly provided for in the charter-party. Fergusson v. Brent,
582.
2 BY ACT OF GOD IS MEANT NATURAL NECESSITY, as the violence of winds
or seas, lightning, or other natural accident, which could not have been
occasioned by the intervention of man, but proceeds from physical causes
alone. Id.
& ACT OF GOD EXCLUDES ALL CIRCUMSTANCES PRODUCED BY HUMAN
AGENCY, so that if divers causes concur in the loss, the act of God being
one, but not the proximate cause, it does not discharge the carrier. Id.
PRIVATE CARRIER IS DISCHARGED FROM LIABILITY upon proof of loss by
inevitable accident; but to relieve a common carrier, he must prove that
an act of God was the immediate cause of the loss, without which it
would not have happened. Id.
& EVERY INEVITABLE ACCIDENT IS NOT ACT OF GOD, though every act of
God is an inevitable accident. Id.
6. PERILS OF SEA INCLUDE MANY DISASTERS not coming within the defini.
tion of an act of God, as losses occasioned by hidden obstructions in the
river, newly placed there, and of such character that human skill and
foresight could not discover and avoid them. Id.
7. WHERE LOSS IS OCCASIONED BY VESSEL STRIKING a rock, the locality of
which is marked by a buoy, this is not such act of God as to exonerate
the carrier from liability, as the fact that the buoy indicated the danger
ous spot is sufficient to establish that the existence of the rock was gen
erally known, and it was the duty of the master to have avoided it. Id.
& COMMON CARRIER MAY LIMIT HIS COMMON-LAW RESPONSIBILITY by special
notice of the extent of the liability which he means to assume; and
when his liability is so limited, the shipper must prove negligence or
fault on the part of the carrier, before he can recover the value of goods
lost or destroyed. Thomas v. Ship Morning Glory, 509.
9. RAILROAD COMPANY INCURS NO RISK AS TO MODE ADOPTED IN LOADING
CARS by shippers who hire the cars to be loaded with freight in such a
manner as they might choose. Ohio etc. R. R. Co. v. Dunbar, 291.
10. COMMON CARRIERS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR LOSSES OCCASIONED BY IN-
HERENT DEFECTS IN ARTICLE, causing its destruction; and this principle
applies to live stock, in so far as they are liable to decrease in weight in
transportation. Id.
11. COMMON CARRIERS MUST USE EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT TO DELIVER
Freight at DeSTINATION WITHOUT Delay, and are liable for the imme-
diate and proximate damages resulting from such neglect of duty. Id.
12. COMMON CARRIER'S CONTRACT TO TRANSPORT IS NOT PERFORMED WITHOUT
DELIVERY OF GOODS, and his responsibility does not cease until there is a
delivery. Michigan S. etc. R. R. Co. v. Day, 278.
13. COMMON CARRIER MUST OBEY INSTRUCTIONS OF OWNER OR SHIPPER OF
GOODS as to their delivery. Id.
14. DELAY OF TWELVE DAYS IN DELIVERING GOODS HELD SO UNREASONABLE
as to subject a railroad company, as a common carrier, to damages. Id.
15. COMMON CARRIERS BYy Railway are NEITHER BOUND TO DELIVER GOODS
TO CONSIGNEE PERSONALLY nor to give notice of the arrival of the goods,
in order to discharge themselves from liability as common carriers. Porter
v. Chicago R. R. Co., 286.
66. RAILROAD COMPANY'S LIABILITIES AS COMMON CARRIERS CEASE WHEN
GOODS HAVE REACHED DESTINATION and are there stored in a warehouse
belonging to the company; thereafter the company's liabilities are those
of warehousemen. Id.
17. RAILROAD COMPANY IS LIABLE AS COMMON CARRIER FOR LOSS OF GOODS
DESTROYED BY ACCIDENTAL FIRE while standing unloaded in a car at
their destination. Id.
18. DEVIATION FROM REGular Route AND LOSS OF GOODS CONSTITUTES CON-
VERSION IN CARRIER, and trover is a proper remedy. Phillips v. Brig.
ham, 227.
19. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS ARE BOUND TO USE UTMOST CARE AND DILI.
GENCE in providing for their safety; but the carrier is not liable if the
negligence of the passengers produces the injury without fault of the
carrier.
Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. George, 239.
20. TICKET ENTITLES PASSENGER TO HAVE HIS BAGGAGE CONVEYED. Hutch-
ings v. Western & A. R. R., 156.
21. BAGGAGE IS ORDINARY WEARING APPAREL CUSTOMARILY CARRIED BY
TRAVELERS, and also other articles for their comfort and amusement. Id.
22. BAGGAGE DOES NOT EMBRACE MERCHANDISE AND MONEY, except money
for the payment of expenses. Id.
23. PASSENGERS ARE BOUND TO PAY CUSTOMARY AND REASONABLE RATES FOR
TRANSPORTATION OF MONEY not included in the term "baggage," and
cannot defeat the claim for freight by a fraudulent concealment of the
money. Id.
24. WHATEVER IS CARRIED INTO PASSENGER-CAR OF RAILROAD as Baggage IS
SO FAR IN POSSESSION OF CONDUCTOR or agent of the road as to author.
ize him to exercise the right of retainer for dues for passage or freight on
the article itself. Id.
See AGENCY, 1; Railroads.
COMMON LAW.
See EVIDENCE, 12.
Bee CORPORATIONS, 24; OFFICES AND OFFICERS
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
See NEGLIGENCE, 9.
COMPETENCY.
See WITNESSES.
See POOR-LAWS, 2, 3; PLEADING AND PRACTICE; SLAYDER, 11-18.
COMPROMISE.
See CONTRACTS, 14.
CONDEMNATION.
See ATTACHMENTS, 8, 9; JUDGMENTS, 18,
Bee CORPORATION, 3, 7, 10, 11; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, &, &
See PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 36.
See ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS; CORPORATIONE, 12; MARRIAGH
AND DIVORCE, 2, 5; WILLS, 7.
CONNECTED ROADS.
See AGENCY, 1.
CONSANGUINITY.
See POOR-LAWS.
Bee BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY; CONTRACTS, 8-10, 14, 25; DzEDS, 1, 2;
MORTGAGES, 4, 6; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 21, 24, 25; USURY.
1. COURTS MAY DECLARE STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL Dennam v. Holeman,
198.
2. VESTED RIGHTS MAY BE DIVESTED not only by a change or destruction of
the title to property, but also by the destruction of the property itself.
Such destruction may be said to take place when the property is ren
dered unfit for the object for which it was intended. Cash v. Whitworth,
515.
LEGISLATURES HAVE AUTHORITY TO ENACT RETROSPECTIVE LAWS AFFECT-
ING REMEDIES ONLY, but if such laws impair vested rights or create per.
sonal liabilities, they are unconstitutional and void. Coffin v. Rich, 559.
▲ STATUTE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON GROUND THAT IT DOES NOT COR.
RESPOND WITH ITS TITLE, when entitled "An act amendatory to and
explanatory of the statute of limitations of 1805, so far as it regards
idiots, lunatics, and infants," and providing concerning non-residents in
addition to idiots, lunatics, and infants; for the title of the act is equiva
lent to "An act amendatory to the statute of 1805, and explanatory of
that act, as far as it relates to idiots, lunatics, and infants." Denham v.
Holeman, 198.
5. STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL WHICH PROVIDES THAT SERVICE OF PROCESS IN
ACTIONS on policies issued in the state by foreign insurance companies may
be made upon the agent of the company there, or the person, being an in-
habitant of the state, who issued the policy; and under such statute, ser-
vice upon
such person, if still an inhabitant of the state, though no longer
an agent of the company, will give the courts of that state jurisdiction of
such an action. Gillespie v. Commercial etc. Ins. Co., 743.
6. AUTHORIZATION BY LEGISLATURE TO COUNTIES AND CITIES TO AID CON.
STRUCTION OF RAILROADS, by lending credit or by taking stock, is consti-
tutional. Prettyman v. Supervisors, 230.
7. CHARTER GRANTED TO CORPORATION IS CONTRACT WITH STATE, OBLIGATION
OF WHICH CANNOT BE IMPAIRED by subsequent legislation; but, never
theless, corporations, like natural persons, are subject to remedial legis
lation, and are amenable to general laws. Coffin v. Rich, 559.
8. STATUTE PROVIDING THAT STOCKHOLDERS IN CORPORATION SHALL BE PER-
SONALLY LIABLE for corporate debts is constitutional and valid so far as
it applies to debts subsequently contracted. Id.
9. STOCKHOLDERS OF CORPORATION ARE PERSONALLY LIABLE TO CORPORATION
CREDITORS only by virtue of express provision of statute, there being no
privity of contract between them; and the repeal of such a statute does
not impair the obligation of any contract. Id.
10. CREDITOR HAS NO VESTED RIGHT AGAINST INDIVIDUAL STOCKHOLDERS OF
CORPORATION until he has recovered his judgment against them. Id.
See HABEAS CORPUS; STATUTES, 5.
See CONTRACTS, 21-24; CRIMINAL LAW, 33; DEEDS, 4; INSURANCE-MARINE,
4; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 4, 5; PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 28; RAIL-
ROADS, 1, 2; SLANDER, 6; STATUTES; WILLS, 15-17.
CONTINUANCE.
See PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 17.
1. RECEIPT IS NOT CONTRACT, AS GENERAL RULE. Pribble v. Kent, 327.
2. RECEIPT MAY BE SO DRAWN AS TO CONSTITUTE CONTRACT. Id.
3. PRINTED IMPRESSION OF SEAL IS NOT SEAL, and contract of insurance
having thereon such impression is not, therefore, a sealed instrument.
Mitchell v. Union Life Ins. Co., 529.
4. WHERE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CARRIED ON BY LETTER, BETWEEN PARTIES
RESIDING AT DISTANCE FROM EACH OTHER, the contract is completed
the moment the answer containing the acceptance of a distinct proposition
is deposited in the post-office, provided it be done with due diligence
after the receipt of the letter containing the proposal, and before any
intimation is received that the offer is withdrawn. Moore v. Pierson, 409.
5. AS SOON AS OFFER BY LETTER IS ACCEPTED, Consent is GIVEN AND CON-
TRACT IS COMPLETE, if the party making the offer is still alive. Of
course all the parties to a contract must consent to it, but it is not neces
sary that their minds should concur at the same instant. All that is
necessary is, that the will of the party accepting be declared before the
will of the party offering is revoked. Id.
6. WHERE COMPLAINANT WROTE THAT HE ACCEPTED OFFER CONTAINED IN
LETTER OF APRIL 3D, WHEN IN FACT OFFER was Made in letter of
March 30th, the mistake in date is immaterial where it appears that
there was only one letter containing an offer written, and this letter
complainant attaches to his bill, and avers that the proposition therein
contained was the one accepted by him.
7. WHERE LETTER HAS BEEN WRITTEN OFFERING TO SELL REAL ESTATE,
AND LETTER ACCEPTING OFFER HAS BEEN SENT, the contract is com.
plete, although in the letter containing the offer there is some mention of
debts to be paid, of which the writer says he will speak in another letter,
if the payment of these debts is not connected with the price to be paid
for the land or the terms of payment; and although the letter of accept-
ance says that the acceptor expects to receive some personal property,
about which there is some dispute, with the land. Id.
8. ADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION IS, IN ABSENCE OF FRAUD, PRESUMED TO
HAVE BEEN DETERMINED by the parties to the contract if they are capa-
ble of contracting, especially where the amount of the consideration is
a matter of doubt. Duffy v. Shockey, 348.
9. CONTRACT CANNOT, IN ABSENCE OF FRAUD, BE VACATED for inadequacy of
consideration, as any consideration, however small, is in such cases suf.
ficient to support a promise. It may arise from a benefit to the prom.
isor, or a loss or injury to the promisee. Goodspeed v. Fuller, 572
10. PERMISSION FOR THIRD PARTY TO ASSUME AND MANAGE DEFENSE IN
SUIT is sufficient consideration for his promise to save the defendant
harmless from and pay all costs which he therein incurred. Id.
11. CONTRACT IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE WILL BE ENFORCED where the re-
straint is not general, but applied to a particular person within prescribed
and reasonable limits. Duffy v. Shockey, 348.
12. CONTRACT NOT TO ESTABLISH SHOP FOR PARTICULAR BUSINESS WITHIN
PRESCRIBED TERRITORY is broken by the establishment of such shop
without the interdicted territory and making a business of soliciting and
supplying customers within it. Id.
13. WHETHER LIMITS PRESCRIBED IN CONTRACT IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
ARE REASONABLE OR NOT depends upon the kind of business about which
the contract is made. That the public interest will not suffer within
those limits may appear from evidence of the number of places where
such business is transacted therein. Id.
14. AGREEMENT OF COMPROMISE BETWEEN HEIR AND DEVISEE IN CONTRO-
VERSY AS TO SANITY OF TESTATOR is not against public policy, but is
entitled to the highest favor at the hands of a court of equity, and will
be supported without inquiry into the consideration on which it is
founded. Leach v. Fobes, 732.
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