yet as to the right of recovery the English authorities still adhere to the idea on which the action is founded; and where there is no loss of service, there can be no relief: Grinnell v. Wells, 7 Man. & Gr. 1033. Our statute has so far swept away these fictions as to provide a remedy, not for the father only, but for the daughter also; and not only may she prosecute an action in her own name for her seduction, but where she is at the time of the seduction a minor, her father, mother, or guar dian may maintain an action, though she be not living with nor in the service of the plaintiff, and though there be no loss of service: Code, secs. 1696, 1697. The providing the remedy for the daughter should not be construed as taking away that of the father, or as restricting his damages to the loss of service, or actual expenses incurred; especially since the relation of master and servant need not be shown to exist, and there may have been no actual loss of service proved.

Upon the question whether the father may not maintain the action, though the daughter be of full age, if living in his family and rendering him service, we do not wish to be understood as expressing any opinion: See Clark v. Fitch, 2 Wend. 462 [20 Am. Dec. 639]; Nickleson v. Stryker, 10 Johns. 117 [6 Am. Dec. 318]; Sargent v. 5 Cow. 115.

It is urged, as a further reason why the plaintiff should not recover in this action for more than the loss of service and actual expenses incurred, that defendant is still liable to an action for seduction by the daughter; and if the father may recover exemplary damages, it may result in their being twice claimed against him in a civil suit, and the defendant is in danger of being twice punished for the same injury. It is not necessary for us to inquire at this time what the rule of damages should be in an action by the daughter as plaintiff. If actions are brought by both the father and the daughter, we suggest that the jury may consider every fact which goes to the injury of the plaintiff, whether in mind, body, or estate, and may give damages commensurate with the injury sustained. The proof

will be confined in each case to the damages resulting to the plaintiff alone, and not to another; nor to the plaintiff jointly with another. The injury to the father is distinct from the injury to the daughter. They are different in character, and there is nothing incompatible or inconsistent in the idea of both resulting from the one wrongful act of defendant. In the present cause we see no good reason why the rule as to plaintiff's damages should be changed. When the action was based upon

the mere loss of service, the damages were very much at large, and in the discretion of the jury; and exemplary damages might always be given: Ingersoll v. Jones, 5 Barb. 661; Sedgwick on Damages, 542. Much more may exemplary damages be now given when the jury are to look, not to the loss of service, but to the damages resulting from all that the father can feel from the nature of the injury.

The court charged the jury that "if the defendant visited the daughter of plaintiff as a suitor, and used arts, flatteries, persuasions, and promises of marriage to induce her to have connection with him, these facts may be considered by them in aggravation, and to increase the plaintiff's damages." We think there was no error in this instruction. The objection taken to it by defendant, that plaintiff was not entitled to give in evidence a breach of promise of marriage in order to enhance the damages, is made under a misapprehension of the language and tenor of the instruction. The language does not necessarily refer to a promise of marriage, nor to a breach thereof by the defendant. No proof of such promise was sought to be given to the jury. The law is well settled, as claimed by defendant, that no evidence can be given of any such promise either as the basis of the action or the measure of damages. It is permitted, however, to ask the daughter whether the defendant was paying his addresses to her in an honorable way: Dodd v. Norris, 3 Camp. 519. And plaintiff may give in evidence the terms on which defendant visited his house, and that he was paying his addresses to the daughter upon the promise and with the intention of marriage: Elliott v. Nicklin, 5 Price, 641; Tullidge v. Wade, 3 Wils. C. P. 18; Caprond v. Balmond, 3 Steph. N. P. 2356; Greenl Ev., sec. 519.

In Gover v. Dill, 3 Iowa, 337, which was an action by the female to recover damages for her seduction, it was held by this court that it was not sufficient for the plaintiff to show alone that defendant had sexual intercourse with her; but she must show that he had accomplished his purpose by some promise or artifice, or that she had been induced to yield to his embraces by his flattery or deception. If, without being deceived, and without any false promises, deceit, or artifice, she voluntarily submits to the improper connection, the law affords her no remedy. Upon these considerations, the court held that when offered with a view of showing the manner in which the defendant accomplished his purpose, there was no error in suffering plaintiff to prove a promise of marriage.

We believe that all

the authorities concur that seduction is generally made out by a train of circumstances; among which may be enumerated, courtship, or continued attentions for a length of time, and the practice of arts and managements, promises and persuasions, calculated to deceive and mislead the too-confiding female.

The court further charged the jury that "damages may be given, not only for the loss of service and actual expenses, but also on account of the wounded feelings of the plaintiff, and his anxiety as the parent of other children whose morals may be corrupted by the example." It is contended by defendant that the charge of the court enlarges the measure of the plaintiff's damages to an extent not warranted by the authorities; and while it is conceded he may recover for the wounded feelings, yet it is urged that he cannot recover for anxiety of mind caused him as the parent of other children, whose morals may be corrupted by the example set before them in the family. This question may be considered as long since settled, on the authority of Lord Eldon, while chief justice of the common pleas, in the case of Bedford v. McKnowl, 3 Esp. N. P. 119. "In point of form," he says, "the action only purports to give a recompense for loss of service; but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that this is an action brought by a parent for an injury to her child; in such case, I am of opinion that the jury may take into consideration all that she can feel from the nature of the loss. They may look upon her as a parent losing the comfort, as well as the services of her daughter, in whose virtue she can feel no consolation; and as the parent of other children, whose morals may be corrupted by her example." So in Clark v. Fitch, 2 Wend. 461 [20 Am. Dec. 639], Savage, C. J., says: "The action is supported, not so much to remunerate in damages for the loss of service and expenses incurred, as to punish the offender for his dishonorable and disgraceful conduct, by way of atonement for the injury inflicted upon the subject of his seductive acts, and upon her parents and their family." See also Grable v. Margrave, 3 Scam. 373 [38 Am. Dec. 88].

The old idea of the loss of menial services, which lay at the foundation of the action, has gradually given way to more enlightened and refined views of the social relations. The services of the child are not regarded as alone of value to the parent. The society and attentions of a virtuous and innocent daughter are come to be properly appreciated; and the loss sustained by the parent from the corruption of her mind, and the defilement of her person, by the guilty seducer, is considered ground for

damages consistent even with the first principles of the action: Hewitt v. Prime, 21 Wend. 82. It was held by Lord Eldon in Chambers v. Irwin, 1800, cited in note to Andrews v. Askey, 8 Car. & P. 7, that the jury were to look not merely to the loss of service, but to the wounded feelings of the party; and by Lord Ellenborough in Southernwood v. Ramsden, 1805, cited in the same note, that damages may be given for the loss which the father sustained by being deprived of the society and comfort of his child, and by the dishonor which he had received: Andrews v. Askey, supra; and Sedgwick on Damages, 542. The same learned judge held that where the plaintiff had adopted and bred up the daughter of a friend and comrade, from her infancy, standing as he did to her in the relation of parent, he was entitled to recover damages beyond the mere loss of service, aggravated in this instance by the injury done to the object on whom he had placed his affections: Irwin v. Dearman, 11 East, 23. In Andrews v. Askey, supra, the jury were directed that they might give damages for the distress and anxiety of mind felt by the plaintiff, and in Illinois it has been held that the jury may award him compensation for the dishonor and disgrace cast upon him and his family, and for being deprived of the society and comfort of his daughter; the court saying that "in vindictive actions-and this is now regarded as one-the jury are always permitted to give damages, for the double purpose of setting an example, and punishing the wrong-doer:" Grable v. Margrave, 3 Scam. 373.

As to the rule of damages by which the jury are to be governed in making up their verdict, we remark, as before, that the damages are very much in the discretion of the jury; where the act of seduction is proved, all the aggravating circumstances that follow come in by way of increasing the damages: Hewitt v. Prime, supra. We think the court did not err in charging that the defendant's attentions to the daughter as a suitor, and the arts, flatteries, persuasions, and promises made use of by him to accomplish his ends, may be taken into consideration by the jury in estimating the damages. These go to make out, not merely the fact of seduction, but the guilty motive of the act, which enters so largely into the question of damages, and which may influence to so great an extent the verdict of the jury, where, as in this action, they are permitted to give as damages more than simple compensation for the actual injury sustained. As resulting from the difficulty in laying down any fixed rule of damages, it has been held that the action for

seduction is exempted, by peculiar considerations, from the interference of courts, on the ground of excessive damages; and unless under extraordinary circumstances, as where the verdict is so great as to raise the suspicion of partiality or pas sion, the finding of the jury will not be disturbed. It is their judgment, and not that of the court, which is to determine the amount of damages: Sargent v. Dennison, 5 Cow. 106; McCon nell v. Hampton, 12 Johns. 234: Walker v. Smith, 1 Wash., sec. 152.

Judgment affirmed.

SEDUCTION. This question is presented at length in note to Weaver v. Backert, 44 Am. Dec. 164-179, and the following questions raised in the principal case discussed: Right of female to sue for her own seduction: Id 165. Parent's right to sue for seduction of his daughter: Id. 166. The wrong to the father is distinct from the wrong to the daughter, and a former recovery by one is no bar to an action by the other: Id. 171. Admissibility of evidence of promise of marriage: Id. 175. Measure of damages. Exem plary damages should be allowed. Also damages are recoverable for injury to reputation of plaintiff's family, and on account of his wounded feelings as a parent: Id. 178.

ACTION BY FATHER FOR SEDUCTION OF HIS DAUGHTER WILL NOT LIB when the daughter is of full age, and not living in the father's family, but in the actual employment of another person, though working under a con tract made by her father, who was to receive her wages: McDaniel v. Ed. wards, 47 Am. Dec. 331. But if the relation of master and servant exista between a parent and his daughter over twenty-one years of age, he must maintain the action, and the slightest act of service will be held to consti. tute this relation: Vossel v. Cole, Id. 136. A father may maintain an action for the seduction of his minor daughter whom he has emancipated and who is living away from home, with defendant, with no intention of returning: Boyd v. Byrd, 44 Id. 740.

ACTION FOR SEDUCTION IS FOUNDED UPON SUPPOSED Loss OF SERVICE BY PLAINTIFF: Bartley v. Richtmyer, 53 Am. Deo. 338; Vossell v. Cole, 47 Id. 136.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES MAY BE ALLOWED IN ACTIONS FOR SEDUCTION: McAulay v. Burkhead, 55 Am. Dec. 427.

THE PRINCIPAL CASE IS CITED in Smith v. Milburn, 17 Iowa, 35, as hav. ing been a previous decision of the Iowa courts upon the question of seduc tion; but the questions discussed in the two cases are in no wise similar. It is also cited in Delvee v. Boardman, 20 Id. 448, to the point that the fact of illicit intercourse between the plaintiff and defendant, if proved, would not of itself establish the charge of seduction, but that it is also necessary for plaintiff to prove that her consent thereto was obtained by flattery, promises, or other artifices used by the defendant.