He takes a canister a made of tin or other suitable material, inserts an isolated conductor d, fills it with gunpowder, and closes it up so as to prevent access of the water. The cylinder a is then lowered on the rock, from a boat or float, and by means of a rope or chain c. Sliding along the guiderod, b, it is placed exactly on the spot to be blasted, after which the guiderod b is withdrawn, the boat or float moved away far enough not to be injured by the agitation of the water consequent upon the explosion, which is effected by connecting the conductor d with a galvanic battery, e, also placed at a suitable distance.

The explosion throws up a considerable body of water to a hight of from thirty to one hundred feet, breaks and scatters part of the rock, and sometimes makes the ground tremble at a distance of more than half a mile.

As soon as the agitation of the water has subsided, the boats resume their station above the rock, which is carefully examined and sounded, by means of one or more sounding-rods, and another charge is then lowered down and fired on any spot discovered to require additional concussion.

We cannot here go into detail about the depth of water required, the quantity of rock broken down by every explosion, the rules for choosing the spots on which to place the charge, the time required for the firing of a charge, etc., all of which depends entirely upon the character of the rock, the velocity of the current, and a great many other circumstances, which vary according to the locality.

The above-mentioned results, obtained in Hell-Gate, where nearly sixteen hundred cubic yards of the hardest rock (Gneiss) have been broken down and removed under very difficult circumstances, as an experiment, in less than seven-and-a-half months, are sufficient to indicate what is to be expected from this method of blasting, which offers the following great and peculiar advantages:

It can be applied under all such circumstances which would render the establishment or the working of a drilling apparatus entirely impracticable, or extremely difficult and expensive, as f. i. in open roads, and even in the open sea, all along the seacoast, in the most frequented thoroughfares, etc., etc. It is in such cases the only available method for the breaking down of rocks, reefs, and shoals formed by hard agglomerations, because either the depth of water or the violence of the current, the swell of the water, and the frequent passage of vessels, would render it impossible, or almost se, to establish and work a drilling or any other permanent apparatus.

The charges can be prepared either on shore or on board a vessel moored in the vicinity of the field of operations. The operation itself, therefore, requires no other apparatus than a float or two boats, which can readily be brought to the spot, and again withdrawn at the shortest notice. This makes it possible not only to profit of almost every favorable opportunity, either in regard to the tide or the weather, but also to carry out the operation in the most frequented thoroughfares, without in the least interfering with or impeding the navigation.

It furnishes a very excellent and easy method for removing boulders such as obstruct and endanger, more or less, the navigation of almost all our rivers and maritime thoroughfares. One or two charges properly applied being in most instances sufficient to remove even the heaviest boulders out of the channel, this mode of operation proves not only less expensive, but also infinitely more expeditious than the one hitherto used, viz: drilling the boulder,

blasting it to pieces, and subsequently picking up the pieces and carrying them on shore or into deep water.

It is a cheap method, both on account of its economy in labor and of its extreme expeditiousness. The greatest improvements to be made by this mode of operating, will hardly ever require more than one season to carry them to a successful end.

It can be very advantageously connected or combined with other submarine operations, as f. i.:

With drilling, as an auxiliary operation towards facilitating and quickening the removal of those rocks, etc., which are so located that breaking them by blasting in connection with drilling, will involve less expense than the blasting without drilling.

With dragging and dredging, for the special purpose of breaking such obstructions as snags, or other solid objects, hard agglomerations, etc., which could not be overcome by the apparatus used for those operations, and by which, therefore, a considerable dragging or dredging operation might be stopped in its progress.

It can be most effectually used for the opening of navigation in thoroughfares obstructed by ice; and acting as well upon the bottom as upward, it will, in many instances, be the means of preventing the formation of bars in rivers, where such obstructions very often will accumulate under or against the ice bar.

This short account will be sufficient to indicate the many applications that may be made of Mr. Maillefert's invention, and to show that it is destined to take a prominent place among the agencies of those submarine operations upon which we must depend for the improvement of our maritime highways. It is calculated to overcome all the difficulties in the way of those grand improvements which could not hitherto be thought of, and we venture to say that, by its liberal application, the greater part of those dangerous rocks, reefs, and ledges, by which the navigation of the waters along our coast, and in our rivers and lakes, is made extremely perilous, causing every year numerous and most melancholy shipwrecks, can be removed in the course of a few years, if the necessary means (small when compared to the terrible losses which would thereby be obviated) can be obtained for such improvements, which the voice of humanity and the interests of the country loudly

call for.

JOURNAL OF MERCANTILE LAW.

ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT FOR GOODS SOLD AND DELIVERED.

In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk County, March term, 1852. Judge Fletcher presiding. The Frostburg Mining Company, vs. The New England Glass Company.

This was an action of assumpsit for goods sold and delivered. At the trial the plaintiff's produced one Child as a witness, who testified that he was the agent of the plaintiffs, who did their business in Baltimore, Md.; that about the 19th March, 1849, he received from the agents of the defendants, who do their business in Cambridge and Boston, a verbal order for a cargo of coal to be shipped by the plaintiff's from Baltimore in a vessel drawing not over ten feet of water, at a freight not over $2 25 per ton. This order the witness forwarded to the

agent of the plaintiffs in Baltimore, and on the 14th April, 1849, the cargo was shipped on board a schooner which drew, when fully loaded, nine feet nine inches only. The bill of lading was forwarded by the plaintiffs to Mr. Child, and received by him in due course of mail on the 16th or 17th April, and specified the freight to be $2 25 per ton. On the day it was received, it was indorsed by Mr. Child, and together with a bill of the coal left by him in the counting room of the defendants' agent, who was at that time absent. As soon as the defendants' agent returned, he sent back the bill of lading and refused to receive the coal. The bill for the coal reduced the price twenty cents per ton, so that the freight on the coal to be paid by the defendants would not exceed the limits of $2 25 per ton. On the passage from Baltimore to Boston the vessel in which the coal was shipped, foundered. After being raised and repaired, she arrived in Boston, where the plaintiffs, by their agent, tendered the coal to the defendants, who refused to receive it.

It was proved at the trial that by the usage of the coal trade between Baltimore and Boston, when coal is ordered in Boston from Baltimore, the delivery of it on board a vessel consigned to the person ordering it, is a compliance with the order, and the coal is thereafter at the risk of the party ordering it.

Fletcher J. delivered the opinion of the Court. The defense was, that according to the provisions of the statute of frauds, this being a contract for the sale of goods, wares, and merchandise for the price of fifty dollars or more, and there being no note or memorandum of the bargain in writing, the contract was not binding unless the purchaser should accept and receive part of the goods, or give something in earnest to bind the bargain or in part payment. There was nothing given in part payment, or in earnest, and the only question was, whether the defendants did accept and receive the goods, or any part of them? That there was no actual taking or acceptance of the coal by the defendants, is quite clear. So soon as the defendants' agent had knowledge that the bill of lading was left at his counting-room, he forthwith sent it back to the plaintiff's agent, and expressly refused to receive the coal. When the coal itself arrived, and was tendered to the defendants' agent, he at once refused to receive it. So that the defendants had promptly repelled all attempts to make an actual delivery of the vessel to them, and had promptly refused to accept and receive the coal or any part of it. But it was contended by the plaintiffs' council that it is not necessary that there should be an actual manual taking or occupation of the coal, but that there may be a constructive accepting and receiving, and that the receiving on board the vessel was a sufficient accepting and receiving by the defendants. The proposition of the plaintiffs that there may be a constructive accepting and receiv ing, or a receiving without the actual manual occupation by the purchaser, seems to be well sustained by the authorities. Therefore, in many cases it is made a question to the Jury whether the purchaser by his mode of acting or forbearing to act, or by some acquiescence, has not accepted the goods though there has been no actual manual taking and occupation of them by him. The further proposition of the plaintiff, that the acceptance and receipt to satisfy the statute of frauds are not such as to preclude the purchaser from afterwards to the quantity or quality of the goods is certainly fully sustained by the case of Morton vs. Tibbett (15 Adol. & Ellis.) This case in this particular differs from many previous cases, which are all carefully referred to and commented on by the Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench, in delivering the opinion of the Court. In Morton vs. Tibbetts, the receipt of the goods is considered as a substitute for writing, leaving to the purchaser the same right to object that the contract has not been complied with, which he would have if the contract had been in writing. The other and most material proposition on behalf of the plaintiffs, that the coal when delivered on board the vessel was accepted and received by the defendants, within the provision of the statute, remains to be considered.

That a delivery to a carrier is not sufficient to satisfy the statute, as a general proposition, is undoubtedly true, and is very properly admitted by the plaintiffs' council. But it is maintained that the master of the vessel under the particular circumstances of this case, was an agent to accept, to satisfy the statute, because in the first place he was a carrier nominated by the defendants. But the facts

show that the verbal order of the defendants was merely to transmit the coal shipped by the plaintiffs, from Baltimore, in a vessel drawing not more than ten feet of water, at a freight not over $2 25 per ton. No reference was made to any particular vessel or master. Even this very general order was not complied with by the plaintiffs, as the freight was $2 45 per ton, instead of $2 25, as was ordered. This departure in the price of the freight would, perhaps, of itself be sufficient to exempt the defendants from the liability to take and pay for the coal. But it is not necessary to put the case on that ground, or attach any importance to that fact. The order as to a vessel was very general, referring to no particular vessel, or master, specifying only the draft of water and price of freight. The master was merely a carrier, and the taking by him would in no sense, and upon no principle, be regarded as a receipt by the vendee. The case of Morton vs. Tibbetts was much stronger than the present one. There, the defendant himself sent a particular lighterman to receive the wheat. But the delivery to the lighterman was not considered to be a receipt by the vendee, though other acts of the vendee, tending to show an acceptance by him, were regarded as sufficient to justify a verdict for the plaintiff. So also in Bushel vs. Wheeler, in the same volume, the vendee ordered the goods to be forwarded by a particular sloop, yet the delivery on board the sloop was not regarded as a receipt by the vendee within the statute, though the subsequent acts, and forbearing to act, on the part of the vendee, were held to be sufficient to go to the jury, to find an actual receipt by the vendee. It is therefore quite clear that a delivery on board the vessel, in this case, cannot be regarded as a receipt, within the provision of the statute, by the vendee, on the ground that the defendants ordered the coal to be forwarded in that way.

But it is further maintained by the plaintiffs, that the master of the vessel was an agent to accept, within the statute, because the usage of trade made him such in the coal trade between Boston and Baltimore. The usage, as shown, was that when coal is ordered in Boston from Baltimore, the delivery of it on board a vessel consigned to the person ordering it, is in compliance with the order, and the coal is thereafter at the risk of the party ordering it. It does not in terms appear whether or not this usage applies to mere verbal orders which are intended by the statute of frauds. Nor is it shown upon what ground this usage can be set up and maintained against established provisions and principles of law? Upon general principles of mercantile law, where a person accepts a written order, and delivers goods on board a vessel according to the order, consigned to the person ordering them, in common form, they are then of course at the risk of the consignee. When orders have been received and executed, and delivery has been made to the master of the ship and bills of lading signed and forwarded, the seller is functus officio, and can do nothing more, except so far as he may have a right of stoppage in transitu.

It is unnecessary to consider how far there could be any usage affecting the rights of the parties in this case, as it is quite clear that the case is not within the usage set up and relied upon. The usage is said to be, that when coal ordered is delivered on board a vessel consigned to the party ordering it, that is a compliance with the order, and the coal is thereafter at the risk of the party ordering it. But in the present case, the coal was not consigned to the party ordering it, but on the contrary was consigned to the plaintiffs' own agent. By the bill of lading the coal was to be delivered to Addison Child or his assigns. But the bill of lading expressed that it was to be delivered to Addison Child for the New England Glass Co., and when the bill of lading was received by the consignee he indorsed it and offered it to the defendants' agent, which it is said was a substantial compliance with the alleged custom. The supposed custom required the coal to be consigned to the defendants, but it was in fact consigned to the plaintiffs' agent. This, so far from being a substantial compliance with, was the widest possible departure from the custom. The bill of lading gave the defendants no right to, or control over the coal, and when indorsed and offered to defendants' agent, were promptly rejected. There was, therefore, no acceptance of the coal by the defendants, to satisfy the statute of frauds, and the plaintiffs must become nonsuit.