afterwards ratified by the other party with the declaration attached to it, and the ratifications duly exchanged, the declaration thus annexed is a part of the treaty, and as binding and obligatory as if it were inserted in the body of the instrument. Ibid. A treaty giving certain rights of succession to realty to subjects of a foreign sovereign, is not retroactive so as to affect the succession of a person who died before the treaty. Prevost v. Greenaux, 19 How., 1. In the fulfillment of treaty stipulations a liberal spirit should be observed. U. S. v. Auguisola, 1 Wall., 352. A treaty will be so construed as to give full operation to rights granted by it, and when there are two constructions equally applicable to it, the most liberal will be preferred. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S., 483. The term "validity," as applied to treaties, admits of two descriptions-necessary and voluntary. By the former is meant that which results from the treaties having been made by persons authorized by, and for purposes consistent with, the Constitution. By voluntary validity, is meant that validity which a treaty, voidable by reason of vio lation by the other party, still continues to retain by the silent acquiescence and will of the nation. It is voluntary, because it is at the will of the nation to let it remain or to extinguish it. The principles which govern and decide the necessary validity of a treaty are of a judicial nature, while those on which its voluntary validity depends are of a political nature. Jones v. Walker, 2 Paine, 688. By a principle of international law, on a transfer of territory by one nation to another, the political relations between the inhabitants of the ceded country and the former Government are changed, and new ones arise between them and the new Government. The manner in which this is to be effected is ordinarily the subject of treaty. The contracting parties have the right to contract to transfer and receive respectively the allegiance of ali the native-born citizens; but the naturalized citizens, who owe allegiance purely statutory, are, when released therefrom, remitted to their original status. Tobin v. Walkinshaw, McAllister, 186. That construction of a treaty most favorable to its execution, as designed by the parties, will be preferred. U. S. v. Payne, 2 McCrary, 289; 8 Fed. Rep., 883. A construction of a treaty acted on by the Executive Department will be accepted by the judiciary, when relating to matters political, unless such construction be plainly inadmissible. Castro v. De Uriarte, 16 Fed. Rep., 93. Tonnage dues do not fall within a provision that goods imported in vessels of one contracting nation shall not be higher than those imported in vessels of the other contracting nation. 1 Op., 155, Breckenridge, 1806. Technical rules of construction ought not to be applied to treaties with the Indians. 2 Op., 465, Taney, 1831. In the construction of treaties, the general doctrine is that any special advantage conceded by a party under any one article is in consideration of all the advantages enjoyed by the same party under that and all other articles of the treaty. 6 Op., 148, Cushing, 1853. Articles of reciprocity, constituting mutual and correlative engagements, do not come within such expressions as "favor," or "freely if the concessions were freely made," or "if the concessions were conditional on allowing the same compensation." Ibid. A treaty to whose operation, in whole or in part, legislation is on its face a prerequisite, does not bind, so far as concerns such provisions, - until the requisite legislation takes place; though, from the time it is proclaimed, it may take effect as a national compact. 6 Op., 750, Cushing. See supra, § 132. When a river is the line of arcifinious boundary between two nations, by a treaty, its natural channel so continues, notwithstanding any changes of its course by accretion or decretion of either bank; but if the course be changed abruptly into a new bed by irruption or avulsion, then the river-bed becomes the boundary. [The principle applied to the report of the commissioners for determining the boundary between the Mexican Republic and the United States.] 8 Op., 175, Cushing, 1856. Where, by a convention, it was agreed that all moneys awarded by the commissioners under that convention on account of any claim should be paid by one Government to the other, the moneys found due from the foreign Government to claimants who were citizens of the United States were properly paid to the Secretary of State, whose duty it was to have the same paid to those entitled to receive them. 10 Op., 31, Bates, 1861. The words "confirmed by law" mean confirmation by the act of that power which under our system enacts laws. A confimation by treaty is a confirmation by law, inasmuch as a treaty is to be regarded as an act of the legislature, whenever it operates without the aid of a legislative provision. 10 Op., 507, Coffey, ad int., 1863. Treaties are subjected to the following general rules which govern all contractual engagements: (1) There must be a concurrence of minds to one and the same thing. (2) The interpretation of obscure terms in a treaty is a matter of fact, as to which extrinsic evidence may be taken for the purpose of explaining objective obscurity. (3) Construction of treaties is a matter of law, to be governed by the same rules mutatis mutandis, as prevail in the construction of contracts and statutes. (4) As contracts may be modified and rescinded, so may treaties. (5) Immoral stipulations are as void in treaties as they are in con tracts. (6) "Construction" is to be distinguished from "interpretation." "Construction" gives the general sense of a treaty, and is applied by rules of logic; "interpretation" gives the meaning of particular terms, to be explained by local circumstances and by the idioms the framers of the treaty had in mind. (7) If two meanings are admissible, that is to be preferred which the party proposing the clause knew at the time to be that which was held by the party accepting it. Treaties are distinguishable from contracts as follows: (1) Contracts (unless we regard marriage as a contract) are, in all cases, the subjects of a suit for debt or damages, or for a specific thing. But no such suit lies on breach of treaty. (2) Contracts can only be vacated or rescinded by consent, or by the action of a court. But this is not necessarily the case with a treaty. There is no court which can be appealed to to dissolve it, and when one party violates its terms the practice is for the other party to declare it not to be any longer binding. (3) While a contract may be annulled on the ground of fraudulent influence exercised by strength over weakness, such a reason cannot be set up for regarding a treaty as a nullity, since all nations are supposed to stand on the same footing, with equal opportunities of detecting fraud, and there are many cases of finesse and false coloring or sup pression of facts which would avoid contracts, which would not, mutatis mutandis, avoid a treaty. If suppressio veri abrogated treaties to the extent it abrogates contracts, few treaties would stand. (4) A treaty based upon a war accepts the results determined by the war, unless otherwise provided, while a contract does not necessarily assume the existing relations of the parties as a basis. "The uti pos sidetis is the basis of every treaty of peace, unless it be otherwise agreed. Peace gives a final and perfect title to captures without condemnation, and, as it forbids all force, it destroys all hopes of recovery (of vessels) as much as if the vessel was carried infra praesidia and condemned." 1 Kent's Com., 173, citing The Legal Tender, reported in Wheat. Dig., 302; The Schooner Sophie, 6 Rob. Ad., 138. (5) A consideration is essential to give effect to a contract, but it is possible to conceive of a treaty which has no consideration. Whart. Com. Am. Law, § 157. As to the position of the United States in reference to the effect of silence in treaties, see 3 Phill. Int. Law (3d ed.), 799. On the question of repugnancy, the following rules are laid down by President Woolsey (Int. Law, § 109): "1. That earlier clauses are to be explained by later ones, which were added, it is reasonable to suppose, for the sake of explanation, or which at least express the last mind of the parties. So also later treaties explain or abrogate older ones. 2. Special clauses have the preference over general, and for the most part prohibitory over permissive. "In treaties made with different parties the inquiry in cases of conflict touches the moral obligation as well as the meaning. Here the earlier treaty must evidently stand against the latter, and if possible, must determine its import where the two seem to conflict. "In general, conditional clauses are inoperative, as long as the condition is unfulfilled; and are made null when it becomes impossi ble. Where things promised in a treaty are incompatible, the promises may choose which he will demand the performance of, but here and elsewhere an act of expediency ought to give way to an act of justice. "A-treaty of cession is a deed of the ceded territory by the sovereign grantor, and the deed is to receive an equitable construction. The obligation of the new power to protect the inhabitants in the enjoyment. of their property is but the assertion of a principle of natural justice." See Mr. J. C. B. Davis's Notes, &c., citing Soulard v. U. S., 4 Pet., 511; Delassus r. U. S., 9 Pet., 117; Mitchel v. U. S., ibid., 711; Smith v. U. S., 10 Pet., 326. The effect of coercion in vacating a treaty is discussed in another section, infra, § 130. V. FAVORED NATION. § 134. "It may fairly be considered as the rational and received interpretation of the diplomatic term gentis amicissimæ (most favored nation) that it has not in view a nation unknown in many cases (as was the United States at the time when the older treaties containing the phrase were used) at the time of using the term, and so dissimilar in all cases as to furnish no ground of just reclamation to any nation." Mr. Jefferson, Sec. of State, Report to the President, Mar. 18, 1792. 7 Jeff. "Though treaties, which merely exchange the rights of the most favored nations, are not without all inconvenience, yet they have their conveniences also. It is an important one that they leave each party free to make what internal regulations they please, and to give what preferences they find expedient, to native merchants, vessels, and productions. And as we already have treaties on this basis with France, Holland, Sweden, and Prusia, the two former of which are perpetual, it will be but small additional embarrassment to extend it to Spain. On the contrary, we are sensible it is right to place that nation on the most favored footing, whether we have a treaty with them or not, and it can do us no harm to secure by treaty a reciprocation of the right." Report of Mr. Jefferson, Mar. 18, 1792. 7 Jeff. Works, 587; 1 Am. St. Pap. (For. Rel.), 256. Mr. J. Q. Adams, in his note to Mr. Hyde de Neuville of December 23. 1817 (MSS. Notes, France, Cong. Doc. 91, 18th Cong., 2d sess), took the ground that the "favored nation" clause in the treaty of 1803 with France only covered gratuitous favors, and did not touch concessions for equivalents, express or implied, and that any other view would be inconsistent with the provision of the Federal Constitution which prescribes that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform in the United States, and that no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another.' Lawrence's Wheaton, 494. See at large, 2 Lyman's Dip. U. S., chap. vi. "The mutual stipulation of being treated as the most favored nation is not, in all the treaties between France and the United States, accompanied by the express declaration that the favor granted to a third party shall be extended to France or the United States gratuitously if the grant is gratuitous, and upon granting the same compensation if it be conditional." Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. de Neuville, Mar. 29, 1821. MSS. Notes, For. "The rule of the most favored nation may not be, and scarcely ever is, equal in its operation between two contracting parties. It could only be equal if the measure of voluntary concession by each of them to the most favored third power were precisely the same; but as that rarely happens, by referring the citizens of two contracting powers to such a rule, the fair competition between them, which ought always to be a primary object, is not secured, but, on the contrary, those who belong to the nation which has shown least liberality to other nations are enabled to engross almost the entire commerce and navigation carried on between the two contracting powers. The rule of the most favored nation is not so simple as the proposed substitute (that of a treaty of reciprocity, which Mr. Poinsett was instructed to negotiate). In order to ascertain the quantum of favor which, being granted to the commerce and navigation of one nation, is claimed by another in virtue of a treaty stipulation embracing that principle, it is necessary that the claimant should be accurately informed of the actual state of the commercial relations between the nation on which the claim of equal favor is preferred and all the rest of the commercial world. A knowledge of those relations must be sometimes sought after in numerous treaties, |