ADAPTATION OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD TO THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES OF MAN. THE human mind and the external world, having emanated from the same Creator, ought, when understood, to be found wisely adapted to each other; and this accordingly appears in an eminent degree, to be the case. If the reader will direct his attention to any natural or artificial object, and consider, 1st, Its existence; 2d, Its form; 3d, Its size; 4th, Its weight; 5th, Its locality, or relations in space to other objects; 6th, The number of its parts; 7th, The order or physical arrangement of its parts; 8th, The changes which it undergoes; 9th, The periods of time which these require; 10th, The analogies and differences between the individual under consideration and other individuals; 11th, The effects which it produces; and, lastly, If he will designate this assemblage of ideas by a name, he will find that he has obtained a tolerably complete notion of the subject. This order ought to be followed in teaching the sciences. Botany and Mineralogy are rendered intolerably tedious and uninteresting to many persons, who really possess sufficient natural talents for studying them, by names and classifications being erroneously represented as the chief ends to be attained. A better method would be, to make the pupil acquainted with his own mental powers, to furnish him with experimental knowledge, that these stand in definite relations to external objects, and feel a positive pleasure in contemplating them. His attention ought then to be directed to the existence of the object, as in itself interesting to Individuality; to its form, as interesting to the faculty of Form; to its color, as pleasing to the faculty of Color; and so on with its other qualities; while the name, order, genus, and species, ought to be taught in the last place, as merely designative of the qualities with which he has become conversant. Practice in this mode of tuition will establish its advantages. The mind which, unexercised, regarded all forms, not extravagantly ugly or beautiful, with indifference, will soon experience delight in discriminating minute degrees of elegance and expression; and the same effect will be produced by following a similar process of cultivation in regard to the other powers. The larger the organs the greater will be the delight, but even with a moderate developement much may be attained. Nor is it necessary to resort to schools and colleges for this exercise of the intellect. Objects of nature and art every where surround us, calculated to stimulate our faculties; and if the reader, as he walks in the country or in the town, will actively apply his various powers in the manner now pointed out, he will find innumerable sources of pleasure within his reach, although he should not know scientific names and classifications. MODES OF ACTIVITY OF THE FACULTIES. ALL the faculties, when active in a due degree, produce actions good, proper, or necessary. It is excess of activity that occasions. abuses; and it is probable that Phrenology has been discovered only in consequence of some individuals, in whom particular organs were very largely developed, having yielded to the strongest propensities of their nature. The smallness of a particular organ is not the cause of a faculty producing abuses. Although the organ of Benevolence be small, it will not occasion cruelty; but, as it will be accompanied with indifference to the miseries of others, its deficiency may lead to the omission of duties. When, also, one organ is small, abuses may result from another being left without proper restraint. Thus, large organs of Acquisitiveness and Secretiveness, combined with small organs of Reflection and Conscientiousness, may, in certain circumstances, lead to theft. Powerful Combativeness and Destructiveness, with weak Benevolence, may produce cruel and ferocious actions. Every faculty, when in action, from whatever cause, produces the kind of feeling, or forms the kind of ideas, already explained as resulting from its natural constitution. The faculties of the PROPENSITIES and SENTIMENTS cannot be excited to activity directly by a mere act of the will. For example, we cannot conjure up the emotions of Fear, Compassion, Veneration, by merely willing to experience them. These faculties, however, may enter into action from an internal excitement of the organs; and then the desire or emotion which each produces will be felt whether we will to experience it or not. Thus, the cerebellum being active from internal causes, produces the corresponding feeling; and this cannot be avoided if the organ be excited. We have it in our power to permit or restrain the manifestation of it in action; but we have no option, if the organ be excited, to experience, or not to experience, the feeling itself. The case is the same with the organs of Fear, Hope, Veneration, and the others. There are times when we feel involuntary emotions of fear, or hope, or awe, arising in us, for which we cannot account; and such feelings depend on the internal activity of the organs of these sentiments. "We cannot Nature by our wishes rule, CRABBE. In the second place, these faculties may be called into action independently of the will, by the presentment of the external objects fitted by nature to excite them. When an object in distress is presented, the faculty of Benevolence starts into activity, and produces the feelings which depend upon it. When an object threatening danger is perceived, Cautiousness gives an instantaneous emotion of fear. And when stupendous objects are contemplated, Ideality inspires with a feeling of sublimity. In all these cases, the power of acting, or of not acting, is dependent on the will; but the power of feeling, or of not feeling, is not so. "It seems an unaccountable pleasure," says Hume,* which the * Essay 22. spectators of a well-written tragedy receive from sorrow, terror, anxiety, and other passions, that are in themselves disagreeable and uneasy. The more they are touched and affected, the more are they delighted with the spectacle. The whole art of the poet is employed in rousing and supporting the compassion and indignation, the anxiety and resentment of his audience. They are pleased in proportion as they are afflicted, and never are so happy as when they employ tears, sobs and cries, to give vent to their sorrow, and relieve their hearts, swollen with the tenderest sympathy and compassion." Many volumes have been written to solve this problem. Those authors who deny the existence of benevolent and disinterested feelings in man, maintain, that we sympathize with Cato, Othello, or King Lear, because we conceive the possibility of ourselves being placed in similar situations, and that then all the feelings arise in us which we would experience, if we were ourselves suffering under similar calamities. Mr. Stewart, who, on the other hand, admits the existence of generous emotions in the human mind, states it as his theory, that we, for an instant, believe the distress to be real; and under this belief feel the compassion which would naturally start up in our bosoms, if the sufferings represented were actually endured. A subsequent act of judgment, he says, dispels, in an almost imperceptible portion of time, the illusion, and restrains the mind from acting under the emotion; which, if the belief of reality continued, it would certainly do, by running to the relief of the oppressed hero or heroine; but still he considers that a momentary belief is necessary to call up the emotions which we experience. The phrenological doctrine just delivered appears to me to furnish the true explanation. Each propensity and sentiment may be called into activity by presentment of its object, and, when active, the corresponding feeling or emotion attends it, in virtue of its constitution. Happiness consists in the harmonious gratification of all the faculties; and the very essence of gratification is activity. Thus the muscular system," says Dr. A. Combe, "is gratified by motion, and pleasure arises; the eye is gratified by looking at external objects; Combativeness, by overcoming opposition; Destructiveness, by the sight of destruction, and the infliction of pain; Benevolence, by the relief of suffering; Hope, by looking forward to a happy futurity; Cautiousness, by a certain degree of uncertainty and anxiety, &c. As the degree of enjoyment corresponds to the number of faculties simultaneously active and gratified, it follows, that a tragic scene, which affords a direct stimulus to several of the faculties, at the same moment, must be agreeable, whatever these may be;-1st, If it does not at the same time, outrage any of the other feelings; 2dly, If it does not excite any faculty so intensely as to give rise to pain; just as too much light hurts the eyes, and too much exertion fatigues the muscles." In the play of Pizarro, for example, when the child is introduced, its aspect and situation instantly excite Philoprogenitiveness, and individuals possessing this organ largely, feel an intense interest in it; the representation of danger to which it is exposed rouses Cautiousness, producing fear for its safety; when Rolla saves it, this fear is allayed, Philoprogenitiveness is highly delighted, Benevolence also is gratified; and the excitement of these faculties is pleasure. All this internal emotion takes place simply in consequence of the constitution of the faculties, and the relation established by nature betwixt them and their objects, without the understanding requiring to be imposed upon, or to form any theory about the scenes, whether they are real or fictitious. A picture raises emotions of sublimity or beauty on the same principles. "The cloud-capped towers and gorgeous palaces" are fitted by nature to excite Ideality, Wonder, and Veneration; and these being active, certain emotions of delight are experienced. When a very accurate representation of these towers and palaces is executed on canvass, their appearance in the picture excites the same faculties into action, which their natural lineaments would call up, and the same pleasures kindle in the soul. But what would we think, if Mr. Stewart assured us that we required to believe the paint and the canvass to be real stone and lime, and the figures to be real men and women, before we could enjoy the scene? And yet this would be as reasonable as the same doctrine |