of penmanship, while in the new, she writes a poor awkward hand, having not had time or means to become expert. During four years and upwards, she has undergone periodical transitions from one of these states to the other. The alterations are always consequent upon a long and sound sleep. Both the lady and her family are now capable of conducting the affair without embarrassment. By simply knowing whether she is in the old or new state, they regulate the intercourse, and govern themselves accordingly. A history of her curious case is drawing up by the Reverend Timothy Aldin of Meadville." Such cases as the foregoing, have led some persons to the inference, that the feeling of personal Identity is a primitive mental affection, connected with a particular organ, and hence liable separately to disease; and because we have ascertained that each of the other primitive feelings and intellectual powers is also manifested by a separate organ, the mind has appeared to them to consist of an aggregate of powers acting together. This view corresponds with the apprehension of mankind in general, for popular language is framed on the principle of the I of Consciousness being distinct from the other mental affections. We speak of evil thoughts intruding themselves into our mind; and of our having strong desires which we forbear to indulge. In such expressions, the our and we seem to mean the principle of personal identity; and the evil thoughts and desires appear to be regarded as affections of that principle, originating in sources distinct from it, and different from one another.

The more general opinion of philosophers is, that the mind is a simple and indivisible substance, and that the several faculties are merely different states of it. This view is espoused by my excellent friend the Reverend Dr. David Welsh, Professor of Church History in the University of Edinburgh, who successfully shows, that it is consistent with the phrenological doctrine of a plurality of organs. "The leading doctrine," says he, "of Phrenology is, that different portions or organs of the brain are connected with the primitive feelings of the mind. The truth of this position can obviously be ascertained only by observation. But taking it for granted that it is true, it may be asked, how it can be reconciled

with the great principle to which so frequent reference has been made, that the powers, thoughts, and feelings of the mind are not different from the mind, but merely the mind itself existing in different states ?

"It requires but little reflection to be satisfied that the introduction of cerebral organs does not in any degree affect Dr. Brown's leading principle. The cerebral organs are not the mind-nor is any state of these organs the mind. The mind we believe to be a simple and indivisible substance. And the only difference that the doctrines of Phrenology introduce in regard to Dr. Brown's principle is, that, instead of the feelings and thoughts being merely the relations of the simple substance mind, to its own former states or to external objects, they are the relations of the simple substance mind to certain portions of the encephalon.

"In looking upon any object-as snow-we have the notion of a certain color. Now, the notion is not in the snow but in the mind. That is, the notion of color is the mind existing in a certain relation to an external object. But it is allowed on all hands, that there is an intervening step between the snow and the mind. There is an affection of the optic nerve. The notion of color, then, is the mind existing in a certain relation to the optic nerve. It will be conceded, that this does not alter the question as to the simplicity of the mind. And if this is conceded, it is abundantly obvious, that another step in the process might be conceived, without taking away from the simplicity of the immaterial part, and that, instead of an affection of the optic nerve being the immediate antecedent of the notion of color, it might be a particular portion of the encephalon. As the notion of color, upon this supposition, is a relation of the mind to the organ of color, it follows, that, if that organ were changed in any respect, the state of the mind would also be changed. Thus, if it were larger, or of a finer structure, or more active, the perception of color would be more delicate, or quick, or pleasing. The same remarks might be extended to all the organs. Where the organ of Causality is large, as in the case of Dr. Brown himself, then there will be a tendency to reason; which tendency is a state of the mind in relation to a material

organ, which state would have been different had the organ been different.

"A multitude of organs may all be affecting the mind at the same instant, and in that case a variety of feelings will be experienced. But still the mind is simple, and it is only its relations to these different organs that are complex.

"When we say, then, that when we have any power, as, for example, of reasoning, we are not to suppose that the power is different from the mind. There is a material organ which is separate from the mind, but the perception of relation is a state wholly mental. One state of the organ may give the perception of relation, another the desire to perceive or discover it; but the perception and desire are both attributes, not of matter but of mind.— The effect of the organ being large or small, active or inactive, in different individuals, or upon the same individual at different times, is the subject to which I alluded in the chapter on Cause and Effect, as that which Dr. Brown had not considered."

It is not necessary in studying Phrenology to decide which of these views is the correct interpretation of nature, because the effects of the organs on the mind is the same, whichever of them be adopted. Holding the mind to consist of an aggregate of powers, then each acts by means of a particular organ, and is manifested with a degree of energy in proportion to its size. Viewing it as a simple substance, capable of existing in a variety of states, it enters into each state by means of a separate organ: when the organs are spontaneously active, they induce their relative states; without their influence these cannot take place: when they are large, the states are excited vigorously; when they are small, they exist feebly. The reader may therefore adopt whichever theory appears to himself preferable. In the following pages the faculties will be treated of as distinct mental powers, connected with separate organs, because this view enables me to bring out the doctrine more simply and luminously, than by considering them as merely particular states of the general power-the Mind; and this language, moreover, is correct even on the latter hypothesis, because, according to this view, when the organ of Causality, for example,

is largely possessed, the individual is capable of reasoning logically and acutely; of which mental acts he is incapable, when that organ is greatly deficient. The word faculty or power, therefore, is used to express the quality which is possessed in the one, and not in the other case, and which, being active, is legitimately designated, and universally recognised, by either of these terms.

"It has occurred to me," continues Dr. Welsh, "that another difficulty of a metaphysical nature may suggest itself in regard to the principles of Phrenology. It may be asked, What is the soul when deprived of the cerebral organs? But the system of Dr. Brown affords us no more light upon this point, than the system of Dr. Gall. Indeed, a passage which I have quoted from his Lectures shows, that he considered that those who engaged in such inquiries were ignorant of the limits of our faculties. It is only experience that can teach us in what state the soul exists when separated from the body. And in this sense the precept of the poet holds equally in a scientific and in a religious point of view,

"Wait the great teacher Death, and GoD adore."

DIVISION OF THE FACULTIES.

DR. SPURZHEIM divides the faculties into two orders, FEELINGS and INTELLECT, or into affective and intellectul faculties. The feelings are subdivided into two genera, PROPENSITIES and SENTIMENTS. He applies the name propensities to indicate internal impulses, which invite only to certain actions; and Sentiments designate other feelings, not limited to inclination alone, but which have an emotion of a peculiar kind superadded. Acquisitiveness, for example, is a mere impulse to acquire; Veneration gives a tendency to worship, accompanied with a particular emotion, which latter quality is the reason of its being denominated a Sentiment.

The second order of faculties makes us acquainted with objects. which exist, their qualities and relations; and they are called intellectual. They are subdivided by Dr. Spurzheim into four genera. The first includes the external senses and voluntary motion; the second, those internal powers which perceive existence; or make man and animals acquainted with external objects, and their physical qualities; and the third, the powers which perceive the relations of external objects. These three genera are named perceptive faculties. The fourth genus comprises the faculties which act on all the other powers, which compare, judge, and discriminate; and these are named reflective faculties.

The names of the faculties employed in this work are, with few exceptions, those suggested by Dr. Spurzheim. To designate propensity, the termination ive is added to a root or fundamental word, and indicates the quality of producing; and ness, the abstract state, as Destructiveness. The termination ous, characterizes a sentiment, as Cautious, Conscientious. To these is added ness, to express the abstract state, as Cautiousness, Conscientiousness. The names of the intellectual faculties are easily understood, and do not require any particular explanation.