summary, accompanied with extracts of papers, which he had recently received.*

The Minister of France informed the Committee, that he had it in command from his King to impress upon the minds of Congress, that the British Cabinet have an almost insuperable reluctance to admit the idea of the independence of these United States, and will use every possible endeavor to prevent it That they have filled several of the Courts of Europe with negotiations, in order to excite them to a war against France, or to obtain succors; and are employing the most strenuous endeavors to persuade the several powers, that the United States are disposed to enter into treaties of accommodation. That many persons in Europe are actually employed in bringing such treaties to perfection; and that they have no doubt of their That the objects which the British Cabinet hope for from those measures are, to destroy the superiority, which France has now at sea, by diverting her powers and resources from naval to land operations, and by engaging her in a land war, where she must risk very important interests, while England would risk nothing but money; or to break, or weaken the alliance, by destroying the confidence, which the allies ought to have in each other.

success.

That his Most Christian Majesty gives no credit to the suggestions of Britain, relative to the disposition of the United States; and it is necessary, that measures be taken for the preventing of other powers from being deceived into a belief of them. That the negotiations of Britain, as far as could yet be learned, had not succeeded. That the

* These extracts were the same as had been sent to General Washington, and are printed above, in connexion with M. de la Luzerne's letter to him, dated January 23d, 1780.

dispositions of all the European powers are, as far as can be known, very friendly to France; but some of them may be engaged in secret treaties with Britain, which may oblige them, in some event, to assist her with troops even against their inclinations. That such event may arise, and if it should, it is probable it will produce an armed mediation, the consequences of which would be, that the allies must accept of the terms proposed by the mediator, or continue the war under the disadvantage of having the forces of the mediator united with those of their enemies. That in such event, it is possible the terms proposed will be such as Spain offered, and Britain rejected, in the last proposed mediation.

That, though the powers who may be under such engagements by treaty to Great Britain, from their friendly disposition towards his Most Christian Majesty, may be very unwilling to give assistance to his enemies, yet they may find it indispensably necessary in compliance with their engagements; but it is not improbable that their reluctance, or the distance of their dominions, may delay such assistance, if granted at all, so as to be too late for the next campaign. That should the enemy be in possession of any part of the United States at the close of the next campaign, it will be extremely difficult to bring Great Britain to acknowledge their independence; and if a mediator should be offered, while the enemy is in possession of any part, an impartial mediator could not easily refute the arguments, which might be used for its retaining such possessions. And, probably, a mediator well disposed towards Great Britain might insist on her holding them; and if not agreed to, the hostility of such a mediator would the necessary consequence. That should Great

be

Britain form such alliances, or procure such aids, as are the objects of her present negotiations, there will be every reason to fear a long and an obstinate war, whereof the final event may be doubtful.

That this view of affairs plainly points out the necessity for the greatest possible vigor in the operations of the next campaign, in order to dispossess the enemy of every part of the United States, and to put them in condition to treat of peace, and accept of a mediation with the greatest advantage; and the preparations for it ought to be as speedy and as effectual as possible. That France and Spain are prepared to make a very powerful diversion, and will exert themselves most strenuously for preserving and improving their naval superiority, and for employing the powers of the enemy in Europe and the West Indies. The Minister declared, as from himself, that he doubted not his Most Christian Majesty will spare some ships to the United States, if it can be done without endangering his superiority at sea; and that an application made to the Minister informally is more eligible than to the King, because it would give his Majesty great pain to refuse the request, though he might be in no condition to grant it. That at all events, supplies should be prepared on a supposition that the ships will be granted; and such supplies should be put into the hands of the Agent for the Marine of France, and considered as the King's property.

He desires to be informed, as far as Congress may deem proper, what force the United States can bring into the field next campaign? On what resources they rely for their maintenance and necessary appointments? And what shall be the general plan of the campaign, on supposition either of having, or not having the aid of ships of war?

He gives it as his opinion, that an application for clothing may be made to his Most Christian Majesty with prospect of success; and although measures have been taken for sending arms and warlike stores to America, yet it would be prudent in Congress not to neglect any other means for procuring those supplies, or supplies of clothing.

ANSWER OF CONGRESS TO THE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE FRENCH MINISTER.

In Congress, January 31st, 1780.

Congress taking into consideration the communications of the French Minister, as reported by the committee on the 28th instant,

Resolved, That the following answer be given to the communications of the honorable the Minister Plenipotentiary of France;

That Congress entertain the most grateful sense of the unremitting attention given to the interests of the United States by their illustrious ally; and consider the communications made to them by his Minister under his Majesty's special command as equally wise and interesting. That the confidence which they repose in his Majesty, in consequence of his so generously interesting himself in the affairs of these United States, and the wisdom and magnanimity of his councils, determine them to give the most perfect information in their power of their resources, their views, and their expectations.

That to this end, they state as follows; that the United States have expectations, on which they can rely with confidence, of bringing into the field an army of twentyfive thousand effective men, exclusive of commissioned

officers. That this army can be reinforced by militia so as to be in force sufficient for any enterprises against the posts occupied by the enemy within the United States. That supplies of provisions for the army in its greatest number can certainly be obtained within the United States; and the Congress, with the co-operation of the several States, can take effectual measures for procuring them in such manner as that no operation will be impeded. That provisions, also, for such of the forces of his Most Christian Majesty, as may be employed in conjunction or co-operation with those of the United States, can be procured under the direction of Congress; and such provisions shall be laid up in magazines, agreeably to such instructions as his Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary shall give; and the magazines shall be put under the direction of the Agent of the Marine of France.

That Congress rely on the contributions of the States by taxes, and on moneys to be raised by internal loans, for the pay of the army. That supplies of clothing, of tents, of arms and warlike stores, must be principally obtained from foreign nations; and the United States must rely chiefly on the assistance of their ally for them; but every other means for procuring them are already taken, and will be prosecuted with the greatest diligence.

That the United States, with the assistance of a competent naval force, would willingly, during the next campaign, carry on the most vigorous offensive operations against the enemy in all the posts occupied by them within the United States. That without such naval force, little more can be attempted by them than straitening the quarters of the enemy, and covering the interior parts of the country. That their forces must be disposed in such