THE

CORRESPONDENCE

OF

C. A. DE LA LUZERNE.

SUBSTANCE

OF A CONFERENCE BETWEEN M. DE LA LUZERNE AND GENERAL WASHINGTON AT HEAD QUARTERS, WEST POINT.*

September 16th, 1779.

The Minister opened the conference by observing, that the Council of Massachusetts had represented to him the disadvantages, which their commerce was likely to suffer from the late misfortune in Penobscot, and the advantages which would result if his Excellency, Count d'Estaing, could detach a few ships of the line and frigates to be stationed upon their coast for protecting their commerce, and countenancing the operations of their cruisers against that of the enemy. But before he should propose such a measure to Count d'Estaing, he wished to know from the General, what purposes the detachment would answer to

* The Chevalier de la Luzerne arrived at Boston on the 2d of August, and on his way to Philadelphia visited General Washington at West Point. Hence this conference took place before his public introduction to Congress as Minister Plenipotentiary.

his military operations, and whether it would enable him to prosecute any offensive enterprise against the enemy. That if he could accompany the request of the Council with assurance of this kind, a motive of such importance would have the greatest influence in determining the concurrence of Count d'Estaing, and might the better justify him in deranging or contracting his plans in the West Indies, by making a detachment of his force.

The General answered, that if Count d'Estaing could spare a detachment superior to the enemy's naval force upon this continent, retaining such a force in the West Indies, as would put it out of the enemy's power to detach an equal force to this continent without leaving themselves inferior in the Islands, the measure would have a high probability of many important and perhaps decisive advantages; but these would depend upon several contingencies; as the time in which the detachment can arrive, and the position and force of the enemy when it arrives. That the season proper for military operations was now pretty far advanced, and to make a winter campaign would require a disposition of our magazines peculiar to it, which could not be made without a large increase of expense, a circumstance not to be desired in the present posture of our affairs, unless the arrival of a naval succor was an event of some certainty. That with respect to the position and force of the enemy, they had now about fourteen thousand men at New York and its dependencies, and between three and four thousand at Rhode Island; that to reduce the former, if it should be concentered on the Island, would require extensive preparations beforehand, both as to magazines and aids of men, which could not with propriety be undertaken on a precarious expectation

of assistance. But that if the garrison of Rhode Island should continue there, we should have every reason to expect its reduction by a combined operation; it might, however, be withdrawn; he added, that the enemy appear to be making large detachments from New York, which the present situation of their affairs seems to exact; that there is a high probability of their being left so weak as to give us an opportunity, during the winter, of acting effectually against New York, in case of the arrival of a fleet to co-operate with us, even with the force we now have and could suddenly assemble on an emergency; that, at all events, the French squadron would be able to strike an important stroke, in the capture and destruction of the enemy's vessels of war, with a large number of transports and perhaps seamen.

He concluded with observing, that though in the great uncertainty of the arrival of a squadron, he could not undertake to make expensive preparations for co-operating, nor pledge himself for doing it effectually, yet there was the greatest prospect of utility from the arrival of such a squadron, and he would engage to do everything in his power for improving its aid, if it should appear upon our coast; that if the present or future circumstances should permit Count d'Estaing to concert a combined operation with the troops of these States against the enemy's fleets and armies within these States, he would be ready to promote the measure to the utmost of our resources, and should have the highest hopes of its success; it would, however, be necessary, to prevent delay and give efficacy to the project, that he should have some previous notice.

The Minister replied, that the General's delicacy upon the occasion was very proper, but as he seemed unwilling

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to give assurances of effectual co-operation, in conveying the application to the Admiral he would only make use of the name of the Council, which would, no doubt, have all the weight due to the application of so respectable a body.

The General assented, observing, that occasional mention might be made of the military advantages to be expected from the measure.

The Minister next informed the General, that there had been some negotiations between Congress and M. Gerard, on the subject of the Floridas and the limits of the Spanish dominions in that quarter, concerning which, certain resolutions had been taken by Congress, which he supposed were known to the General. He added, that the Spanexpedition against the Flo

iards had in contemplation an ridas, which was either already begun, or very soon would be begun, and he wished to know the General's opinion of a co-operation on our part; that it was probable this expedition would immediately divert the enemy's force from South Carolina and Georgia, and the question then would be, whether General Lincoln's army would be necessary elsewhere, or might be employed in a co-operation with the Spanish forces. That the motive with the French Court for wishing such a co-operation was, that it would be a meritorious act on the side of the United States towards Spain, who, though she had all along been well disposed to the revolution, had entered reluctantly into the war and had not yet acknowledged our independence; that a step of this kind would serve to confirm her good dispositions, and to induce her not only to enter into a treaty with us, but, perhaps, to assist with a loan of money. That the forces of Spain in the Islands were so considerable, as would in all appearance make our aid unnecessary;

on which account the utility of it, only contingent and possible, was but a secondary consideration with the Court of France; the desire to engage Spain more firmly in our interests, by a mark of our good will to her, was the leading and principal one.

The General assured the Minister, that he had the deepest sense of the friendship of France, but replied to the matter in question, that he was altogether a stranger to the measures adopted by Congress relative to the Floridas, and could give no opinion of the propriety of the co-operation proposed in a civil or political light; but considering it merely as a military question, he saw no objection to the measure, on the supposition that the enemy's force in Georgia and South Carolina be withdrawn, without which it would, of course, be impossible.

The Minister then asked, in case the operation by the Spaniards against the Floridas should not induce the English to abandon the Southern States, whether it would be agreeable that the forces, either French or Spanish, employed there, should co-operate with our troops against those of the enemy in Georgia and South Carolina.

The General replied, that he imagined such a co-operation would be desirable.

The Minister inquired in the next place, whether in case the Court of France should find it convenient to send directly from France a squadron and a few regiments attached to it, to act in conjunction with us in this quarter, it would be agreeable to the United States.

The General thought it would contribute much to advance the common cause.

The Minister informed us, that Dr Franklin had purchased a fifty gun ship, which the King of France intended