Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub

MARCH, 1822.

out.

Maryland Contested Election.

the official seal of said county, that, during several years past, there has been a difference in some of the districts in said county, between the number of names on the poll-books of election and the ballots counted The law of Maryland, in relation to this subject, is, that every voter shall deliver to the judge or judges of the election, in which he offers to vote, a ballot, on which shall be written, or printed, the name or names of the person or persons voted for, and the purpose for which the vote is given plainly designated." This law further provides, that after the poll is closed, and whilst the ballots are opening and counting, that "if upon opening any of the said ballots there be found any more names written or printed on any of them than there ought to be, or if any two or more of such ballots or papers be deceitfully folded together, or if the purpose for which the vote is given is not plainly designated as within directed, such ballots shall be rejected and not counted."

H. OF R.

all the testimony on both sides, intended to be produced, or which will now be received, has been submitted to the committee, it seems proper that I should offer a few remarks upon the subject. This would have been earlier done, but for the impression that a partial discussion would rather retard than expedite the ultimate determination. In replying to the petition or memorial of General Reed, I must beg permission to invert the order adopted by him. He claims a seat in the House of Representatives upon the ground that he had a legal majority of votes ; and if such were the fact, his claim would not be resisted; but I will examine this fully, as the second branch of the present inquiry. In the latter part of the memorial the petitioner labors to show that the law of Maryland, under which the sitting member has been returned, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and therefore void. This law was passed in 1790, and not in 1791, as stated in the petition, about two years after the formation of the Constitution of the United In support of the allegation of the sitting member, States, and by some of those very men who just before that sundry illegal votes had been given to the me- had sat in the Convention which agreed to adopt that morialist which ought to be deducted from his poll, Constitution. It, moreover, was passed for the exhe produced the depositions of Edward Brown, George press, avowed purpose, of carrying that Constitution Copper, James Coleman, Josiah Massey, and the offi- into effect, and giving it full operation in Maryland. cial certificate of James Sewall, clerk of Cecil county. This is declared to be the object of the law, (see the On the propriety of entering into an investigation of act itself, 1790, chap. 16.) It must then appear strange this kind, when elections are by ballot, the committee indeed, if, under these circumstances, the law shall be entertain serious doubts. True it is that the decisions found to be at war with the Constitution, in one of of the House in the case of Kelly and Harris, and its most important provisions! I rather presume the Easton and Scott, may be considered as establishing Constitution was quite as well understood by the frathe principle; yet, it is believed that when the circum-mers of this law as it is now, and I beg leave to add, stances attending those decisions are examined, it that I further presume that there then existed quite as may be doubted whether they ought to be viewed as little disposition to violate the Constitution, or the establishing a precedent which shall govern all future rights of the people, as at this time. Upon turning to decisions. But as no desire is entertained to agitate the law, the following provision will be found in the this question at the present time, the testimony has first section thereof: "Whereas it is declared by the been received, and attentively examined, but decided Constitution of the United States that the House of to be insufficient to establish any of the facts con- Representatives, in the Congress of the United States, tended for. shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States; that the electors in each State shall have the requisite qualifications of electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislatures, &c. In order, therefore, to carry the said Constitution into effect, be it enacted," &c. It is presumed that this section will hardly be contended to be at variance with the Constitution. And similar sentiments and language are to be found in the third and eighth sections of this same law. Yet, in the thirteenth section, it is provided “that in case two or more persons shall have an equal number of votes, the Governor and Council shall determine by lot, from the candidates, who shall be the Representative." Are these several provisions inconsistent with each other? Can they not well stand together, and form parts of the same system of elections! The most rigid critic must admit that they may. Then they may as easily be reconciled to the Constitution of the United States. And when it is asked, What are the rights of individual voters? and what are the powers of State Legislatures in relation to elections? this very law furnishes a strong and clear illustration. Every person entitled to vote for Delegates to a State Legislature is also entitled to vote for a Representative to Congress; and he has as high a security for the one right as the other. But upon the presumption that all the voters of a given district have exercised this right, (and such is the presumption of law,) and a tie between two or more candidates is the consequence, then the State Legislature, under the power to regulate

From a full, attentive, and deliberate examination of the case, in all its points and bearings, the committee are impelled to the conclusion that the sitting member cannot, consistent with the Constitution of the United States, be allowed to retain a seat in this House, under the proceedings of the Governor and Council of Maryland. That the testimony in relation to the two votes rejected in district No. 1, of Kent county, proves that these tickets were not fraudulent, and that they ought to have been counted to the poll of the memorialist, for whom they were given; and that the vote allowed to him in district No. 2, in Cecil county, ought to be deducted from his poll, as being clearly an illegal vote. Therefore, by adding to the poll of Philip Reed, the memorialist, two votes improperly rejected in Kent county, and deducting one therefrom, for that improperly allowed in Cecil county, he will have a majority of one vote over the sitting member. The paper marked A, is the answer of the sitting member to the prayer and arguments of the memorialist.

The following resolutions are submitted: "Resolved, That Jeremiah Causden is not entitled to a seat in this House.

"Resolved, That Philip Reed is entitled to a seat in this House."

A-Letter of the sitting member.
SIR: In the contested election between General
Philip Reed and myself, as it may be presumed that

[blocks in formation]

the manner of holding elections for Representatives to Congress, may, if they think proper, provide by law for the determination of the tie, by lot, or otherwise. But in such a case the petitioner would object that the choice would not be by the people. Mr. Chairman, if we consult the phraseology of the Constitution, we shall perceive that the idea of representation pervades every part of it; that the Constitution itself, though it literally, and in express terms, is declared to be ordained by the people, is their act only upon this principle. It commences by saying, "We, the people of the United States," as if the people were personally assembled, and about to act together. It will be found, sir, that all acts done in the name of the people, or in virtue of authority derived from them, are truly and properly the acts of the people. The President of the United States, for the purposes of his appointment, is as truly and as literally a Representative of the people as a member of Congress. His election is not so immediately the act of the people, but still he is elected by them.

But, sir, the petitioner objects further, and asserts, respecting the first clause of the second article of the Constitution, (already quoted,) that "the command here is peremptory," &c. Now, with submission, I must insist that here is no command at all, either peremptory or not. The clause contains a general declaratory description of the House of Representatives; but more general it could not well be, and, without forcing its manifest meaning, it cannot be regarded as an authority for any particular mode of election by the people. And we have seen that it is perfectly consistent with the law of Maryland, of which it is made a substantial part. Upon the principles of this law, no popular right is violated, no voter has any ground for complaint, nor have the Legislature of the State transcended their powers in its passage. For I cannot subscribe to the doctrine of the petitioner, when he lays it down, "that the Constitution never intended that there should be any interference on the part of a State, as to the election of Representatives to Congress, further than is expressly declared." Sir, the very reverse of this doctrine is the true one.

The States may interfere in any and every case where they are not expressly or by necessary implication forbidden. The Constitution is no grant of power to the States or to the people; it is a grant by them; and all powers not expressly or by necessary implication granted are retained by them. Surely it cannot be necessary to press this subject further. But if this view of the subject should not meet the approbation of the committee and the House, and they should think the law unconstitutional and void, still the right of the petitioner to a seat is not established. He sets up a claim to a seat; and if in point of fact there was a tie, and the law of Maryland is void, then the petitioner has no more right to a seat than any other person in the community; and if there was a tie, and the Maryland law is a valid one, then too is there an end of the question. The claim of the petitioner rests wholly upon the fact of his having a majority of legal votes; and unless he can prove this fact to the satisfaction of the committee and the House, he must fail; and whatever opinion the committee and House may entertain of the law of Maryland, if it shall appear by proof that the sitting member had a legal majority of the votes, his seat will be confirmed as a matter of course. I will therefore proceed, Mr. Chairman, to an examination of the testimony which has been pro

MARCH, 1822.

duced and laid before the committee, remarking that in this as in all other cases of claim the onus probandi lies upon the claimant. But the sitting member will go further: he will endeavor to show by proof that there was a legal majority of votes given in his favor and that the majority is decidedly against the petitioner.

He

The petitioner rests his claim solely upon two tickets, rejected by the judges as a double ticket. states that these tickets were single, and not double, and that they contained his name for Congress. Mr. Chairman, both these positions are denied positively, and the evidence is appealed to with perfect confidence to settle the question. The petitioner produces several affidavits, mentioned in his petition, to prove that in the first or lower district of Kent county, at the time of counting out the ballots, one of the judges (Mr. John C. Hynson, the junior judge) drew from the ballot-box a ticket which at the time he declared to be a double ticket from its size. He passed it (say these deponents) to John Bradshaw, the presiding judge, unopened. Mr. Bradshaw they say opened the ticket and found it to be double, upon which it was rejected, but that each of those tickets contained the petitioner's name for Congress. The deponents further state that they were under the impression that these tickets were single, and not double, as supposed by the judges; and that their impressions were confirmed, when, upon finally comparing the number of tickets with the number of the names of the voters upon the poll-book, there was a difference of two.

This is the amount of all the testimony produced by the petitioner which is in his favor. His witnesses contradict each other, and are contradicted by those produced by the sitting member, in so strong a manner and to such extent that only a few facts are left undisputed between them. It is however certain that Judge Hynson drew a ticket from the ballot-box of such unusual size as to induce him to remark at the time, that from its size, he supposed it must be double; that it was only from the size of the ticket, and not from any other visible appearance, that he was

induced to make this remark. The ticket was so folded together that no one present-not even the acute Dr. Beckington Scott, who observed it when it was first drawn from the box-could determine whether it was single or double until it was opened. To this point the evidence is uncontradicted. There is no witness who denies this to be the character and description of the ticket. When the ticket was opened it proved to be double, and was very properly rejected by the judges. All the witnesses concur in stating the rejection of this ticket as the joint act of the judges. There was no dispute, no doubt, about it; no dissenting voice; not even a whisper among the warmest friends of the petitioner. Thus far the evidence may be safely trusted, because it all agrees. The question then is, was this properly a double ticket, or did two separate tickets thus enfold themselves by chance? If the committee and the House believe this was a double ticket, then there is an end of the petitioner's claim, whatever names may have been written upon the tickets. If tickets be loosely folded when deposited in the ballot-box, by pressing them together with a stick or quill, or by shaking the ballot-box itself, they may become partially enfolded in each other: but in such a case there can never be any difficulty in deciding, by sober judges, who possess common eyesight. But if a ticket so folded as to answer the description of the

[blocks in formation]

ticket in question be deposited in the ballot-box, none of these means or any instrument of chance will be sufficient to produce an enclosure of one ticket in another. The thing is, ordinarily speaking, impossible. It will be recollected that the judges acted upon oath in this case, and that, as to this matter, they fully and explicitly agreed. They signed a joint return in conformity to this determination, which has become a public record. If either of them had felt the smallest doubt, or had been under the slightest impression that the ticket was improperly rejected, he was bound to communicate it to the other judges, and to rectify the mistake before the return was made. But in point of fact (for the proof of this is also uncontradicted) Judge Hynson declared, after all the votes were counted out, and after the deficiency was discovered, "that he was certain that it was a double ticket, and could not be counted." This Judge Hynson also remarked, at the same time, "that he had acted as judge several years, and that the tickets counted out often disagreed with the book of polls." And I would refer to the certificate of the clerk of Kent county, which has been laid before the committee, for numerous instances in different years. By this document it will appear that the tickets counted out oftener disagreed with the book of polls than accorded with it. Sometimes there was a difference of one, at other times two and three, &c. This has been attempted to be explained by the deposition of Mr. Beck, produced by the petitioner, in a manner not a little singular, and to which I must request the attention of the committee. Mr. Beck States that it was the practice to throw away scattering votes, and not to count them; but that, in 1820, columns were raised for all scattering votes, &c. John C. Hynson is made to speak to the same effect; I say is made to speak. I shall have occasion to notice this more fully hereafter. Mr. Chairman, what proposition is this? What is its character? Has it been the practice for the judges to violate their oath? When votes are counting out, how is it possible to tell, when a ticket is produced in favor of an individual, how many more he will obtain? And how can a judge know who is a candidate, except by the tickets as they appear?

Mr.

But, sir, these gentlemen will admit that it was the practice to keep a column of numbers, if none was kept for scattering votes, and in this numerical column the number of the tickets was kept, independent of any or all the candidates. The object of keeping this numerical column was to ascertain, as far as possible, the correctness of the whole proceeding. But it is a fact that mistakes have frequently occurred in the hurry of an election. Names have been placed on the poll-book who did not vote, and others have been omitted who did vote. We have a very recent instance of a zealous and distinguished politician who voted, but his name, though as well known as any in the country, was not entered on the book. This is the true and natural solution of all the difficulty.

Only suppose, in the case before us, that one single name was entered upon the books by mistake, (a thing that happens every day, and in all bodies or assemblies of men,) and then we have additional proof that the ticket was double. And permit me to inquire whether this is not a much more probable supposition than that the judges should be deceived as to a fact of so plain, so palpable, and so simple a character. Even a slight attention to the different depositions is sufficient to show that no claim can be raised upon such

H. OF R.

evidence. Whether Hynson, for example, opened the ticket in question, or whether it was passed to Bradshaw, and opened by him, is asserted and denied most positively by different witnesses. But all the testimony is calculated to demonstrate that the ticket was truly a double one. It then only remains to explain the disagreement between the poll-book and the tally, which, it is presumed, has been satisfactorily done.

The deposition of Judge Bradshaw is entitled to entire confidence-a gentleman of high, respectable character, in every view of it, and a witness who has acted with the most perfect propriety throughout. When called upon, on the 2d of January last, to give testimony in presence of the petitioner and sitting member, he attended, and coolly and deliberately stated the facts, before them, in so clear and circumstantial a manner, as to leave no doubt of his veracity.

similar remarks as to Mr. Hynson; but this gentleman, It would give me pleasure to be able to indulge in though called upon in the same manner, and requested to attend at the same time, and give his evidence in the presence of the parties, refused, or neglected to do Brown, junior, who had requested the attendance of This is proved by the deposition of Morgan Mr. Hynson.

[ocr errors]

A letter was then sent to Mr. Hynson by the sitting member, requesting him to state in writing his knowledge and recollection upon the subject. Mr. Hynson, it is confidently believed, received this letter, but took no notice of it. Afterwards, in the absence of the sitting member, on the 10th of January, it seems he gave a deposition to the petitioner, which the latter states he lost on his way to this city. Subsequent to this, on the 12th of February last, Mr. Hynson, it guard against casualties, swore to two depositions, seems, made oath again for the petitioner, and, to signing one, and not signing the other; the latter is endorsed "a duplicate," and is produced; the former, which was signed by him, as stated by the petitioner, is not produced. All this operation of making depositions and duplicate depositions, on the part of this witness, was in the absence of the sitting member. This witness had refused to attend, he had refused to put pen to paper, he had refused to utter a word when the sitting member could be present, but in his absence he voluntarily furnishes depositions and duplicates to the petitioner, to his full satisfaction. And, in the duplicate produced, Mr. Hynson is made to say that "the two votes or ballots were thrown away, and not counted to the polls of General Philip Reed, as the deponent was satisfied they should have been." And was this deponent really satisfied that two tickets were thrown away which ought to have been counted to the poll of the petitioner? What! and he a judge, and say not one word about it, but declare publicly that the ticket was double, and could not be counted! And all this, even, after the whole of the tickets were counted out! Then to sign a return, under oath, which he knew was incorrect! Has Judge Bradshaw acted in this manner? I appeal to every bosom in which there may yet remain one solitary spark, one lingering trace of honorable feeling! From Judge Bradshaw's deposition, it appears that there must have been a mistake as to the names upon these tickets. He swears, positively, that he saw no name upon them; he only saw an eagle at the top on the inside. Now, as this was a mark of that ticket upon which the petitioner generally run at that election, it may be that the bystand

[blocks in formation]

ers who saw it might have inferred that the petitioner's name was upon it; for it must be remembered that the name of the petitioner was printed at the bottom of the tickets upon which it was printed at all, below the names of the county delegates, though, in some instances, it was stricken out. and the name of the sitting member inserted.

The deponents named in the memorial, or rather some of them, say that the double ticket had upon it "General Philip Reed, for Congress." I feel no disposition, Mr. Chairman, to cavil, or raise frivolous objections, but I hope to be pardoned for remarking that here is a striking proof of the incorrectness of the recollection of these deponents. There were no printed tickets used at that election containing this inscription! And, to prove the fact, sir, I submit to the inspection of the committee the whole of the tickets of one entire district in that county, as they were taken from the ballot box. The tickets are either stamped with an eagle at the top, or without one; but upon no one printed ticket can this superscription, inscription, or whatever you may please to call it, be found; yet these deponents use the same words, and in the same order precisely, and their words are carefully marked. What is the inference? These deponents saw what never existed! So much for these ex parte depo

sitions!

I am much mistaken, Mr. Chairman, if these views of the subject do not satisfy the committee that the petitioner has wholly failed to establish his claim to the benefit of these tickets.

But, sir, be this as it may, I will now proceed to show that there was a decided majority against him. I have hitherto called the attention of the committee to the pretensions of the petitioner, and the allegations and proofs offered by him. Now, I must claim the indulgence of the committee, while I present a brief and condensed view of the pretensions, allegations, and proofs, of the sitting member. First, it is in full proof that the petitioner was allowed by the judges of the Elkton district, in Cecil county, the benefit of a ticket containing five names, all for Congress. The ticket was carefully deposited with the clerk of Cecil county, by the judges, and a true copy, under his official seal, has been submitted to the committee, with the affidavits of the judges and clerk, stating that the petitioner was allowed a vote on account of that ticket.

The committee will observe that the judges, in this case, erred in a question of law, and not of fact, and that, upon every principle of law, and, indeed, of good sense, this ticket should have been rejected. By the election law of Maryland, it was an absolute nullity. But, in the nature of things, it must be so, even if no positive statute existed upon the subject.

MARCH, 1822.

dore Burr. This man had no residence in Kent county at all, except merely going there and undertaking to build a bridge, and being actually in the county part of his time, on that account.

His residence, if he had any in Maryland, was in Cecil county, and not in Kent, where he voted. He had been sued in Cecil, as his proper county, (and, by the law of Maryland, a person must be sued in his proper county,) and prosecuted to judgment, and an execution had been issued and served upon his body, returnable, and was returned, to the April court of that county in 1820. At that court, Mr. Burr was committed to jail, where he remained until late in June, or early in July. After this he went to Kent, and, on the first Monday of October in that year, voted for the petitioner. The certificate of the clerk of Cecil county, already laid before the committee, the law of Maryland referred to, and the deposition of James Coleman, fully prove this statement. This man had nothing in Kent county deserving the name of residence at the October election; but, whatever he had. it was not of six months' previous continuance as required by law to entitle to a vote.

I will also ask the attention of the committee to the vote of Thomas Glanvill, given in Kent, for the petitioner. Glanvill had no residence. That he had no residence, is fully proved by George Cooper, and that he voted for the petitioner, is proved by Morgan Brown, the present sheriff of Kent county. I refer to their depositions before the committee.

I will ask permission, Mr. Chairman, to present another case to the view of the committee.

Gideon Lusby voted for the petitioner, and was under age at the time. I refer to the deposition of Joseph Massey to prove this. Here then are four votes to be deducted from the poll of the petitioner, which will establish a decided majority against him. And it should not be forgotten that the depositions in these cases were not ex parte, but were taken in the presence of the petitioner, who cross-examined the witnesses. I am aware, however, Mr. Chairman, that objections may be made to this kind of testimony, and am prepared to support it, both upon principle and precedent. But no objection can properly now be made by the petitioner, because he entered into the evidence himself, by instituting a cross-examination, and it is believed that no serious difficulty can be raised by any one to this course of proceeding. It is as common as it is easy to make off-hand superficial objections to any thing.

What is the great difficulty in receiving this evidence? Sir, I have often felt surprised to hear the answer. It is said, by giving a man's declarations in evidence, you make him a witness against himself! Surely, if a man of any understanding ever advanced this proposition, it must have been without consideration. Is it not a principle of general law that you can give a man's declarations or acknowledgments in evidence against him, both in civil and criminal cases? You cannot give a man's declarations in evidence for him, nor can you compel him to be a witness against himself; but if he, without compulsion, confess or declare a matter which may operate against him, either civilly or criminally, this may be properly given in evidence against him. I said this was a principle of general, but perhaps I might have said of universal law. Such a confession, it is true, may affect a parI will next call the attention of the committee to a ticeps criminis to a certain extent, or it may have a vote given to the petitioner in Kent county, by Theo-qualified effect upon one having an interest in the

What would be done in the case of a ballot for a committee of seven, if, upon counting out, a ticket should be found with ten names upon it? or if, in balloting for a Speaker, a ticket should be found with two or three names upon it? We all know that such tickets must, upon the principles of reason and justice, be null and void. Mr. Chairman, I respectfully apprehend that it is altogether unnecessary to attempt further to illustrate or enforce this part of the subject, and feel the most entire confidence that the committee will deduct this ticket from the poll of the petitioner, to which it ought never to have been added.

MARCH, 1822.

The Bankrupt Bill.

H. of R.

subject to which the confession or declaration relates; The amendment was approved by Messrs. TRACY, WRIGHT, BALDWIN, and SERGEANT, on the ground that it was essentially similar to that proposed by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. TRACY,) and for various other reasons.

It was opposed by Messrs. MITCHELL, of South Carolina, Ross, and NELSON, of Virginia, and negatived.

ted the following amendment, to be inserted in the Mr. EDWARDS, of North Carolina, then submit47th line of the 1st section:

and certainly it ought to have these effects. Innu-
merable instances might be put to illustrate this prin-
ciple, but I fear I shall be tedious. In the State of
Maryland, two years ago, after much consideration,
it was solemnly determined that this kind of evidence
should be received and acted upon. Nor is it any an-
swer to this case to call it a high-handed measure of
party, &c. For such was not its character. And
only last winter the General Assembly of Maryland
issued a commission to three persons in Cecil county,
authorizing them to take testimony relative to illegal
votes. But, Mr. Chairman, the principle has been
sanctioned again and again by Congress; and, in ad-
dition to the cases heretofore named to the committee,
I will, on the present occasion, only notice one; it is
a case decided from Tennessee, in the thirteenth Con-
gress: Thomas and Kelly. The circumstances of
this case will be found applicable to the case before
the committee. If I have been able to make myself
understood by the committee, I presume there is a
final end of the petitioner's claim. It is less substan-lowing amendment:

tial than the shadow of a shade.

Perhaps I owe an apology to the committee for the trouble I have given them in this case; but I trust they will credit me when I assure them that my prevailing wish has been, from the beginning, to render their investigation as easy and agreeable as possible. In the present communication I have deemed it advisable, for the sake of brevity, to omit a number of circumstances which are of some importance to the different views which might be taken of this case. JEREMIAH CAUSDEN.

To the Hon. JOHN SLOAN,

Chairman of the Committee of Elections.

BANKRUPT BILL.

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States. The amendment moved by Mr. TRACY, on Saturday last, being under consideration,

Mr. NEALE, of Maryland, moved to strike out the part of the amendment which limits the privilege to others than merchants to take the benefit of the act, to a period "within twelve months from the time of passing this act."

This motion was assented to by Mr. TRACY, and supported by him and Mr. SERGEANT, Mr. NEALE, and Mr. WRIGHT, and opposed by Mr. CUTHBERT, Mr. TUCKER, of Virginia, and Mr. NELSON, of Virginia; when Mr. WOODSON, after some prefatory remarks, in which he expressed his dissent to the proposition before the House, submitted the following amendment, to be inserted next after the words, "and provided also."

"That all classes of the community, other than the description of persons before mentioned, shall have the privilege, at their election, of becoming voluntary bankrupts, with the consent and approbation of a major part in value of all the creditors of such voluntary bankrupt, previously obtained and duly certified, and that such bankrupt shall be subjected to the same proceedings, and liable to the same penalties, fines, and forfeitures, and be entitled to all the privileges, benefits, and advantages, as are provided for, and made applicable to, all other bankrupts by the regulations of this

bill."

"And provided, also, that the discharge which may be given to a bankrupt under this act, shall not operate so as to discharge the bankrupt from debts which may be due to merchants, bankers, brokers, factors, underwriters, or marine insurers."

The question was taken thereon, and the amendment was negatived.

Mr. KENT, of Maryland, then proposed the fol

"That no certificate of discharge, under the provisions of this act, shall operate to discharge any bankrupt from any debt or debts, except such as may be due or owing to persons who may be liable to become bankrupts under the said act."

This amendment was also negatived.

Mr. WOODSON then moved that the Committee rise and report, to the end that liberty to sit again be refused, and the subject finally disposed of: for he considered that the valuable properties of the bill had been destroyed by the vote of the Committee refusing the amendment which he had moved.

Mr. SERGEANT hoped the Committee would not rise, and he suggested to the gentleman from Kentucky, (Mr. WOODSON,) that when the subject should come before the House he would have an opportunity again to present for consideration that amendment, which he deemed so essential to the value of the bill.

The motion to rise and report was then taken and lost.

The second section having been read, Mr. WALWORTH submitted the following amendment, to be inserted in the 26th line:

[ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]
« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »