he wished to maintain the established church, the hereditary house of lords, and the hereditary monarchy, and if any plans should be proposed inconsistent with those institutions they would have his most decided opposition. If any plans should be brought forward which, as he thought, tended to the establishment of a republic, to overturn the church, or to destroy the hereditary peerage, he should state his sentiments upon them in his place, and the grounds of his opposition to them; but it was not just to contend that resistance to the innovation of dangerous changes of this kind was a resistance to all improvement. (Hear, hear.) To any improvements that could be effected without the disturbance of the political system of the country he wished to be considered as the friend, and to such he would gladly lend his aid in carrying them into effect. He had now stated all he thought necessary at present as to the general views of the foreign and domestic policy of the government-there would be many other occasions upon which the opinion of the house would be taken upon those views. The government was ready to have the responsibility of all these matters, and while they continued ministers of the crown they would serve the crown faithfully and to the best of their ability." (Loud cheers.)

Mr. Milnes expressed his great disappointment at the omission of any expressions of regret on the rupture which had occurred between this country and France. He protested against the assumption that by the treaty of July the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire had been secured. The word "integrity," as it was

used, was a mere diplomatic fallacy. The independence of no state could be secured by foreign interference. No person could see in the recent transactions any thing more than a transfer of the Ottoman empire from the protectorate of the five powers to the protectorate of England and Russia. He did not believe that the noble lord (Palmerston) had really contemplated any accession of territory, or any exclusive advantages to England, but for that very reason he objected to the great expense and risk which had occurred without any compensating advantage. What had England gained by what had taken place since last year? No advantage whatever had been acquired, but the anger and jealousy of France had been aroused, and they had been brought to the verge of an European war. He accused the ministers of shortsightedness, of disregard of French history, and ignorance of the feelings of the French people. He thought, if France and Russia had combinedto the exclusion of England, as Russia and England had now combined to the exclusion of France, the people of this country would have risen as one man, and no ministry who submitted to such a combination could have maintained their power. They were now in a state of armed peace, which was peace without its profits, and war without its stimulants, than which nothing was more trying to a country. France was arming, and England, with all the embarrassments arising from the present state of her finances, would be obliged to arm also. He called on the government for some expression of regret on account of our present position towards France. He called on them to calm the effervescence of France,

true that we felt triumph at the supposed humiliation of France. Though she had been called our natural enemy, and we had been long and warmly engaged in conflict with her, he did not believe, that there was any wish on the part of this community to see her power or authority curtailed, or that there would be any rejoicing here at any reverses which might befal her. At the same time he was not prepared to say, that the policy which had been pursued, of attempting the settling of the eastern question was not justified by necessity. We could not disguise from ourselves the peculiar relative position of the Russian empire and of Constantinople. Now, if in the present instance we had refused to interfere, and if Russia really entertained the ambitious designs imputed to her, where was the security against her taking upon herself the exclusive protection of the Turkish empire? If, in consequence of this, she should gain possession of Constantinople, would the honourable member for London look on such an event with complacency? He would advocate, in that event, our dispossessing her by force; but was it not wise to adopt that policy which would prevent Russia from getting there, and prevent our being compelled to go to war with Russia on ground where she must have a great advantage over us? It might be no easy matter to make the evacuation of Constantinople by Russia one condition of peace with us. The cooperation of France in the settlement of this question would undoubtedly have been of inestimable value; but if four great powers of Europe, acting, as he might assume, with perfect integrity, were convinced that the geVOL. LXXXIII.

neral interests of Europe required active intervention, he was not prepared to say, that the refusal of one power to co-operate with them made it necessary for them to desist, otherwise that single power might acquire an undue preponderance in the affairs of Europe, and might be tempted to extend its influence beyond the due range. He would, therefore, suspend his opinion with respect to the convention, till the house received such further information as the ministers had to give; in the meantime it would be injustice to join in the censure pronounced by the amendment on the parties to that treaty. He could make every allowance for the sensitive and susceptible feeling with which the French people might naturally regard a revival of the alliance of 1814, though there was really no analogy in principle between the two treaties. The circumstances of the past history of France rendered it especially necessary that there should have been no want of courtesy shown her in the late negotiation. Now, there was one part of the proceedings which had given him great concern. It appeared, that up to the 14th July, the day before the treaty was signed, M. Guizot was kept in ignorance of what was going on. He thought, considering the character of M. Guizot, and his friendly disposition towards England, it would have been well to have apprised him, in the most temperate and conciliatory way, of what was about to be done. Such a course would have given much less offence than that which had been adopted, of first signing the treaty, and then communicating the fact. The right honourable baronet then protested against parliament having been allowed to [C]