ordered that the superintendent be authorized to return all boys who have been transferred from the reformatory to the Joliet and Chester penitentiaries to the reformatory, subject to the writs of habeas corpus already served, and that these boys' records be examined, and that they be allowed credit for all the good time made in the reformatory and good time earned in the penitentiaries."

The relators had been returned to and were in said reformatory when the petitions were filed in this court, and the returns to the writs show that they were detained there, in each case, by virtue of the mittimus issued in due form out of the court in which the relator was convicted. The grounds upon which the discharge of the relators is demanded are that said section 15 of the act to establish the Illinois State reformatory is unconstitutional and void, and that the transfer of the relators to the penitentiary was a voluntary escape; that the relators could not lawfully be retaken, and that therefore their subsequent detention by virtue of the mittimus became and was without authority of law.

Said section 15 is as follows: "The board of managers shall have the power to transfer, temporarily, to the penitentiary of the proper district any prisoner who, subsequent to his committal, shall be shown to their satisfaction to have been more than 21 years of age, or to have been previously convicted of crime, and may also transfer any incorrigible prisoner, whose presence in the reformatory appears to be seriously detrimental to the wellbeing of the institution. And such managers may, by written requisition, require the return to the reformatory of any person who may have been so transferred. Each prisoner so transferred to the penitentiary shall be held therein, subject to such rules and regulations provided by the commissioners of said penitentiary in harmony with this act, unless recalled to the reformatory, as herein provided by the board of managers." (Hurd's Stat. 1899, p1380.)

The question has been raised by the Attorney-General and by the state's attorney at the threshold, whether habeas corpus will lie to test the constitutionality of the law under which the detention of the relators is justified by the respondent. It is said that this court has decided in People v. Jonas, 173 Ill. 316, that it will not. The writ was refused in that case because the relator was imprisoned by virtue of a judgment of conviction rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction to decide all questions involved, including the constitutionality of the law under which the conviction was had, and because the relator in that case could have had all errors corrected by appeal, including any erroneous decision as to the validity of the statute; that it would be in contravention of the statute to allow parties convicted of offenses by courts having jurisdiction to determine all questions involved in the proceeding, to substitute the remedy by habeas corpus for the ordinary remedies for the correction of errors by appeal or writ of error. In the case at bar the question affecting the legality of the further detention and imprisonment of the relators did not arise before their conviction and sentence, but afterward, and in these applications the validity of the statute under the proceedings which were had in the Circuit court is not attacked and no question of error in those proceedings is attempted to be raised. Besides, the events which, it is claimed, entitle the relators to their discharge did not happen until after the time in which they could have sued out writs of error, and the cases of the relators fall within the second paragraph of section 22 of the habeas corpus act, which provides that "where, though the original imprisonment was lawful, yet by some act, omission, or event which has subsequently taken place, the party has become entitled to his discharge." The sole question in this case is whether the act or event set forth in the petition, and also in the return to the writ, and which took place after judgment and after the relators had been delivered into the custody of said reformatory, entitles the relators to their discharge.

The respondent justifies the said act of the board of managers and of himself by the authority attempted to be conferred by said section 15. While it may be, from the view we take of these cases, that they could be decided without considering the validity of section 15, still we cannot say here, as we did in People ex rel. v. State Reformatory, 148 Ill. 413, that the question of the constitutionality of said section is not properly before us. The relator in that case had not been transferred to the penitentiary under said section, while in these cases the relators have been so transferred, and that is the very ground of their application for the writ. It was, however, said in the case cited that “it may be difficult to say that the provisions of said section 15 are valid," and we have no doubt that the question is one which we should finally determine in the cases here presented. Since that case was decided, in 1894, the general assembly has amended said section by an act approved June 9, 1897, by omitting from the section so much of it as provided that the person so transferred should be held in the penitentiary at hard labor, and should be so held for the maximum term provided by law for the crime for which he was convicted, unless recalled to the reformatory. Some other minor changes also were made, but the question still remains whether the section as amended is in harmony with the constitution. Section 2 of article 2 of the constitution provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property

without due process of law." And article 3 provides that "the powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments-the legislative, executive, and judicialand no person or collection of persons, being one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted." And section of article 6 provides that "the judicial powers, except as in this article is otherwise provided, shall be vested in one Supreme court, circuit courts, county courts, justices of the peace, police magistrates, and in such courts as may be created by law in and for cities and incorporated towns." Other provisions are referred to, but the above are sufficient to dispose of the question as to the validity of said section 15.

It is contended on behalf of respondent that the transfer of the relators to the penitentiary because they were incorrigible and their presence in the reformatory appeared to be seriously detrimental to the well-being of the institution was merely an act of necessary discipline which the board had power to exercise in the management of the reformatory. We cannot so conclude. By the transfer to the penitentiary they surrendered all control and power of discipline over the prisoners placed in their control to another and independent administrative board or authority, which, by the judgment and process of the court, had no right of custody or control over such prisoners, and to whose custody and control the court, which had all the judicial power there was in the matter, had no power to commit such prisoners. There are material distinctions, under the laws of this state, between the penitentiary and the state reformatory. In the case cited (148 Ill. 413) we said (p. 418): "That in the enactment of this law it was the humane and benign intention of the general assembly to afford a means for the reformation of youthful criminals is manifest from the fact that the institution is devoted solely to the reception of minors between the ages of 10 and 21 years." And again, at page 423: "There is in the law of nature, as well as in the law that governs society, a marked distinction between persons of mature age and those who are minors. The habits and characters of the latter are, presumably, to a large extent as yet unformed and unsettled. The distinction may be well taken into consideration by the legislative power in fixing the punishment for crime, both in determining the method of inflicting punishment and in limiting its quantity and duration. An adult convicted of burglary would be sentenced to the penitentiary and to either solitary confinemet or hard labor therein, and the statutes which consign him to such punishment must be regarded as highly penal. A minor, however, instead of being sentenced to solitary confinement or hard labor in a penitentiary is committed to the state reformatory. The general scope and humane and benign purpose of the statute establishing the reformatory are clearly indicated in the act. ** It is manifest that the sentences provided for in the statute establishing the reformatory, although to be regarded as punishments for crime, are not of so purely a penal character as those imposed upon adults covicted of like offenses, but that the primary object of the statute is the reformation and amendment of those committed to the reformatory."

*

In Henderson v. People, 165 Ill. 607, we held that the Illinois State reformatory at Pontiac is not a penitentiary, and that a person under 21 years of age, who was shown to have been previously sentenced to the state reformatory, could not, under section 12 of said act, be properly sentenced to the penitentiary, but should have been sentenced to the reformatory. Among other things we there said (p. 610): "This section (sec. 12) authorizes the court to sentence to the reformatory where a criminal between the ages of 16 and 21 is not shown to have been previously sentenced to a penitentiary in this or any other state or country. The only penitentiaries in this state are the penitentiary at Joliet and the Southern Illinois penitentiary at Chester, and the state reformatory is distinguished from them by every clause of the section, and especially by the provision that existing laws should be applicable to the reformatory so far as to enable courts to sentence prisoners to said reformatory and not to the penitentiary. The state reformatory is nowhere designated by the legislature as a penitentiary. * * * The reformatory is different in its object and purpose from the penitentiary, and it cannot be called a penitentiary. The main object and purpose of the reformatory, although confinement there is a punishment for crime, are the reformation of those who, from immature age, are presumably proper objects of efforts at reformation."

It seems clear that there is a material difference in the grades of punishment provided for in the two institutions. The penitentiary is a state's prison, but while those sentenced to imprisonment in the reformatory are imprisoned in a state institution, still the object, purposes, and management of the institution are so different from those of a penitentiary or a mere prison that the reformatory cannot properly be designated as a state's prison, as that term is usually understood and used. It follows, as we think, that a sentence to the penitentiary, involving, as it does, infamous punishment, is a severer grade or degree of punishment than a sentence to the reformatory, and involves consequences to the convict of a much more serious character.

The question then is, has the general assembly the power to authorize the board of managers of the reformatory, a mere

executive or administrative board, to send to the penitentiary persons committed to their custody in such reformatory for a breach of discipline prescribed by such board for the government of the institution, or because the presence of such persons is detrimental to the well-being of such institution? We are of the opinion that such power is denied to the general assembly by more than one provision of the constitution. The power so attempted to be conferred is judicial, and not executive or administrative. It is not merely disciplinary, and it can only be exercised by a court vested with judicial power by the constitution. It must be observed that such transfer is not within the judgment and sentence of the court, and the act of the board is not simply a determination of the condition or circumstances under which the prisoner may be committed to the penitentiary, but it is outside of and beyond such judicial determination, and is the exercise of a judicial power which the legislature has even withheld from the courts. Doubtless, legislation might be so framed as to make the order of transfer by the board a mere determination of the conditions on which, in executing the judgment of the court, the prisoner could lawfully be transferred from the reformatory to the penitentiary; but section 15, as before said, cannot be so construed.

In the administration of the criminal laws of the state there is no power outside of the courts to authorize the punishment of persons for crime by confinement in the penitentiary, and the constitution expressly inhibits any person or collection of persons of one department of government from exercising any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as expressly permitted by the constitution, and it cannot, of course, be claimed that this case falls within any such exception. Nor can it be said that the relators were so transferred and imprisoned in the penitentiary in accordance with the law of the land or by due process of law. The transfer was made by the board, as we have seen, without lawful authority, and it was made without any hearing and without trial, but by mere resolution passed and entered upon its records. We have no doubt of the power of the board, in the exercise of its powers of discipline, to determine in that manner that the relators were incorrigible and that their presence with other inmates of the institution was seriously detrimental to the well-being of the reformatory, and to do and perform all proper disciplinary acts in the premises to punish such refractory inmates, and to obviate, as far as practicable, the injurious effects of their association with other inmates, but it is meant only to be said that the board could not commit the offenders to a state's prison to which they had not been committed by the judgment of conviction, or without trial according to the law of the land. The statute purports also to confer power on the board to disregard the finding and judgment of the court, and to ascertain and determine for itself, independently of such judgment, whether the prisoner had been properly sentenced to the reformatory and whether he should not have been sentenced by the court to the penitentiary. The statute purports to confer power upon the board to determine, from its own sources of information, to its

satisfaction, that the prisoner was more than 21 years of age when he was convicted or that he had previously been convicted of crime, and upon such determination, without regard to the judgment of the court, to transfer the prisoner to the penitentiary. But the statute makes it the duty of the courts to adjudicate upon and determine those questions, and their final judgments cannot be made subject to review and reversal by an administrative board having no judicial power. The constitution, and statutes enacted under it, provide for courts of appeal and review, and they alone have power to set aside or annul the final judgments of the trial

courts.

We are referred to the case In re Murphy, 62 Kan. 422, as an authority in conflict with the views we have expressed. The statute there reviewed is very similar to the one here under consideration, but as we understand the law to be in that state, the advantages of the reformatory over the penitentiary are not conconfined to minors and the same distinctions do not exist between the two institutions as they do in this state, and the person convicted may by the court be sentenced directly to the penitentiary instead of the reformatory, a thing which the courts in this state cannot do. But whether these distinctions are sufficient or not to account for the different views which we entertain, we must determine in accordance with our own laws and decisions the question at issue.

We are clearly of the opinion that said section 15 is unconstitutional and void, and it must be so declared. But it does not follow that the relators are entitled to be discharged from detention and confinement in the reformatory, to which they were committed by the final judgment and process of the courts in which they were convicted. We cannot give our assent to the view that because they were unlawfully transferred to the penitentiary and have been returned to the place of confinement to which they were lawfully committed, they are now, or were when the petitions were presented, entitled to their discharge altogether.

The point is made that the case is one of a voluntary escape, and that in such case the party cannot be retaken and continued in imprisonment. We cannot hold that that doctrine has any appliIcation to criminal cases. In civil cases, as in imprisonment for debt, the creditor, and not the People, is interested in the prisoner's detention, but in criminal cases the People of the whole state have an interest in the due and proper detention and punishment of the violators of the criminal law, and public interest cannot be made subservient to the illegal acts of those officers having charge of persons convicted of crime, and whose duty it is to execute the sentence of the court in accordance with its final process. (Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 313.) The return shows that the relators are, and were when the petitions were presented, held in the reformatory under the mittimus issued by the courts which convicted them, and not otherwise. They are therefore remanded to the custody of the authorities of said reformatory and the writs of habeas corpus herein are dismissed at the cost of the petitioners. Writs dismissed.

As a means of bringing the problem of neglected childhood to a focus a juvenile court is probably unexcelled. The court in Milwaukee is teaching many things as to conditions and consequent needs, and as to causes and effects.

The number of cases brought in under the new law is so small that to the casual observer of to-day it might seem that the former evil had been overestimated. If the problem seems small now, the more shame to us if we do not fully meet it before it is appalling, but old facts and figures cannot be forgotten. problem is not small, nor has it been faced too soon.

The

For the incorrigible child and the serious offender, the old system always had some little real help to offer, but under the new system the duty of stopping the supply of serious offenders by giving careful attention to the beginning of delinquency is most strongly impressed upon all the workers. Even now we have a little help to offer the slight offender when home conditions defy probation. With an excellent state industrial school for boys it is yet apparent that another institutional provision of some kind must be made to fulfill the preventive, protective aims of the court. Girls' cases are few and are more easily disposed of in existing institutions.

For a time in the fall truant children were brought in and another view of delinquency was given. The custom of admitting truant cases in the Juvenile court has been discontinued. Truancy does not come under the law as it stands, nor can it well do so until Wisconsin has an effective compulsory education law and a school to receive truants when necessary. lesson in regard to truancy has been added to the rest.

But the

Since July 175 children have passed through the court. A few came from good homes on petty charges, and probably will never again be subjects for state interference. To the majority the occasion was a danger signal, an indication of something seri

ously wrong. Seventeen have gone to industrial schools; and inasmuch as they were most carefully selected by the judge with all the facts before him, it is certain that each one will have a better opportunity than at home. Five have, through probation, been given the advantage of care in new surroundings. The remaining number have been suspended, placed on probation at home, or discharged.

Some children still pass through the court without being bettered, but the evil is negative. The positive evil of jail commitment no longer confronts us, and even the opponents of the new law do not undertake to defend that custom. Every one who has looked into the matter at all knows that the children formerly in jail were as a rule victims of ignorance or poverty. When children must be detained they are now kept on the upper floor of the jail, but few are detained there, as the method of permitting them to go home in charge of parents until Juvenile court day is used in most cases.

At least fifteen boys have appeared who have been in a criminal court previous to this year. On the other hand, except for cases returned by probation officers, only three boys have reappeared in the Juvenile court since July. Many circumstances may account for this fact, and only time will prove its meaning. Be the cause what it may, one in every eleven boys arrested in 1900 under the old system reappeared that very year once, twice, or three times, whereas only one in every fifty-six boys has reappeared during the nine months of the new system. Too much stress cannot be laid upon the value of probation if it can forestall the necessity of repeated arrests, by going to the root of matters at once.

As a whole it may be that the class of cases brought has changed. Cases of petty theft are common, incorrigible cases brought on the petition of parents or at their request are frequent, and the proportion of disorderly cases is greatly reduced.

Visitors to the St. Louis jail in past summers could hardly fail to notice the large number of children confined there. At that season of the year, when the grand jury is not in session for four months, the number of prisoners awaiting their action is very large. In the case of adults this long period of confinement works a hardship. For children it is harmful and cruel.

To prevent as far as possible the unnecessary confinement of children with older criminals, to provide a system of investigation which enables the court to decide juvenile cases on their merits, the juvenile probation law was framed and adopted. It confers upon a judge larger discretionary powers and enables him to consider the best interests of a child.

The juvenile probation law of St. Louis provides for the appointment of probation officers, whose duty it is as soon as a child under 16 years of age is arrested to investigate its "social environment, past conduct, and general character," and also to ascertain the names of parents and relatives and such other kindred facts. This information "reduced to a concise statement," is filed in the court. Printed blanks are used and their contents are quickly gathered.

The probation officer must be present at the trial of each child to "represent its interests," answer any questions addressed to him by the judge, and take charge of the child if committed to his care on parole.

We can best illustrate the working of the probation system by citing a few instances: A. was arrested for a first offense. His previous character was good, but he had fallen under the influence of evil associates, all of whom escaped. His parents are respectable, industrious people. He is an only child. He was held for the grand jury on bond, which was furnished as soon as his father learned where he was. Since his release, for two months, he has been steadily employed, earning $5 a week. His conduct during this period had so improved that when the case came up for trial in the Circuit court he was paroled to the probation officer.

B., 11 years old, has a wretched home. On this account the case was a difficult one. He was visited by our officers forty times during the six months of his probation. He was furnished a suit of clothes and attended school for five months. He then became a messenger boy. He is now selling papers. He is not bad, but neglected.

C. was arrested for disturbing the peace and bad conduct, the fault of parents who quarreled and separated. He was paroled to the probation officer and has since "been working steadily and improved much in his conduct."

D. was in the habit of running away from home. His father desired to send him to the reform school. He was placed in charge of the probation officer. His father reports that "a great change for the better has come over the boy, who is working steadily."

In the period of time, nine months, covered by this report there have been 919 arrests of children under 16 years of age; 546 of these cases were reported to the probation officer for investigation; the remaining 373 juveniles were arrested on suspicion or parties refused to prosecute, and the children were released after a few hours' confinement. Hereafter all arrests will be reported to the probation officer.

In the 546 arrests of juveniles reported to the probation officer, the largest number, 165, are 15 years of age, with twelve boys of doubtful age, but probably 16. In Massachusetts the age limit of the law is 17 years. According to sex, there were 502 boys and forty-four girls, and to race, 429 white and 117 colored.

Among the causes of arrest "petit larceny" figures most conspicuously, there being 207 arrests for this cause reported. "Disturbing the peace" comes next, 108 cases.

Three hundred and twenty of the entire number of juveniles under 16 arrested were brought before the courts, the others being variously disposed of outside. Of the 320 cases, 152 were in the

three police courts, 148 in the court of criminal correction, and twenty in the two circuit courts, criminal division.

From the police courts 61 juvenile offenders have been placed on probation, 4 sent to the house of refuge and I to the workhouse.

From the circuit court, criminal division, 13 boys out of a total of 20, were placed on probation, and 4 sent to Boonville; 3 were discharged.

From the court of criminal correction boys only were placed on probation, 3 by Judge Miller; 59 boys were sentenced to the house of refuge, 7 to Boonville, and 9 to the workhouse.

In summing up, we quote from the report of the probation officer: "Although 320 children under 16 years of age were brought before the courts, only 94 were actually sentenced to the reform school, house of refuge or workhouse, and the great majority of these, 75, were from the court of criminal correction; 104 were either discharged, that is, found not guilty, or their cases were nolle prossed. And, again, in 9 cases the fines were paid, while in 14 cases execution was stayed on good behavior or defendant dismissed on payment of costs. This leaves 78 children paroled by the courts, and, adding the 35 paroled by the police captains, makes a total of 113 boys and girls under our supervision, 109 boys and 4 girls; 86 of these are white and 27 colored; 49 children have been released from parole, their period of probation having expired; 6 boys had to be returned to court, their. conduct not warranting further leniency; 58 children remain under the supervision of the probation officers; 10 girls were sent to the House of the Good Shepherd by police captains, with the consent or at the request of parents."

One impelling motive in effecting the passage of a probation law was to keep boys out of jail. A wise provision inserted in the bill by Judge Thomas Harvey has accomplished much in this direction. It gives the court discretionary power to release a boy on his own recognizance in the absence of bail, while awaiting action by the grand jury. The circuit judges have availed themselves of this power whenever the character of the boy warranted such procedure. The results have been very gratifying.

When, as in Boston, boys are brought into court the morning after arrest, the number confined in the jail will be very much lessened.

In answer to our request for an expression of opinion regarding the success of the juvenile probation law, we have received from those judges who have availed themselves of its discretionary power replies from which we quote:

"So far as I have been able to observe, I am heartily in favor of the law. I believe that it is being intelligently administered in this city, and I have no doubt that it will save many boys from a criminal career."-Judge Franklin Ferris, Circuit court.

"Where a child is young and in ignorance of the grave nature of an act, commits an offense against property rights, there are many instances bound to arise where the ends of justice may be fully subserved by applying the provisions of the probation law." -Judge Horatio D. Wood, Circuit court.

"So far as my experience goes, the juvenile probation system is a very successful solution of a difficult proposition. It places in the hands of the judge information which he would not otherwise have, and which enables him to make a just disposition of the case. In my court the system has worked admirably, and I take pleasure in giving it my hearty indorsement.”—Judge George B. Sidener, first district police court.

"I think well of the system, and, to my mind, it should be encouraged and supported."-Judge Zimmerman, police court south of Arsenal street.

"I am satisfied that the enactment of the juvenile probation law is a too long delayed step in advance in our treatment of juvenile offenders. Its actual operation is of great assistance to me. *** I believe most of the cases against juvenile offenders should be passed on by juvenile courts, as is the case in other communities more progressive in their criminal legislation."Judge Adolph Wislizenus, second district police court.

The success of the probation system depends largely upon the agents employed. Those we now have are faithful and earnest in their desire to reform wayward youth. When the system includes all the criminal courts we shall be able to show larger numerical results. We have given statistics, and desire later to discuss amendments to the probation law which will enlarge its scope and increase its efficiency. We desire the support of St. Louis and its representatives in the general assembly of Missouri when we appear again before that body to request further legislation. We are anxious to establuish a juvenile court.

In one respect the Denver Juvenile court leads the children's courts of the country. To the usual and necessary equipment of probation officers, bailiffs and policemen it has added a shower bath for the boys. No boy will appear a second time before Judge Lindsey unless he has taken the bath that day. Dirty boys who are brought in from the street will be "treated" as soon as their cases are heard. Judge Lindsey says that in the few times that court has met since the bath was installed he has noticed a wonderful and unexpected change in the boys. The effect of the bath has been to increase the boys' self-respect and assurance in a surprising manner. Boys who formerly came to report, hesitatingly and with tears trickling down their grimy cheeks, now come up after a bath in the basement with an independent carriage and smiles on their faces. They instinctively

down by Probation Officer E. G. Shaffer at 3 o'clock, after the weekly reports of the boys have been received by Judge Lindsey, On the first day it was used, March 29, some of the lads were delighted and eager while others were doubtful and looked askance at the showers protruding from the sides of the wall as they entered the bath-room. The more forward were soon enjoying themselves. A few retused to bathe until shoved under the showers by the janitor. Every degree of boy was present. It was a study in human nature worth going miles to see. Boys from the bottoms and boys trom the families in better circumstances were there. To many of the boys it was truly an innovation. Some of them previously had only a vague idea of what a bath really was

About fifteen boys were sent into the shower bath at one time, and the water was turned on full tilt. They splashed around

realize that the change gives them the appearance of respectability and they endeavor to act to carry out the impression.

This bath-room is now a necessary adjunct to the work Judge Lindsey is doing among youthful truants and boys guilty of misdemeanors. The county court is thronged with these youngsters every other Saturday afternoon, the boys presenting their report cards from school showing that they attended regularly and that they are not subject to a sentence to the State Industrial school. Many of the boys are very dirty and sadly in need of the beneficient influence of soap and water. So Judge Lindsey decided that the best plan would be the establishment of a bath-room in the basement of the courthouse, believing that cleanliness would be an important factor in the reform of the boys.

The bath is equipped with twelve showers. The floor is cemented and is deeply concaved so that the water forms in a pool in the center to the depth of about two feet. Twenty boys can bathe at one time. The first batch of youngsters is brought

merrily, assaulted each other with wet towels, and threw the soap at each other to their heart's content. They were not too particular about who they hit with the towels and the water, and more than one of those gathered about the sides of the room Iwas hit with a towel or drenched with water. Sanderlin, the heavy-weight janitor, was hit with a towel in the head and his hat knocked into the water. He made a spring after it, his feet slipped and his 250 pounds went into the deepest depths of the pool with a splash, while the onlookers shouted with laughter. He picked himself up and struggled out, not much the worse for his ducking, and went on with his work.

It is believed that a much larger number of boys will be bathed in the shower bath as soon as it is in full working order. The bath will be open every Saturday. Each boy is compelled to report to the Juvenile court once every two weeks, and all whose homes are not equipped with baths will be required to appear at the courthouse at 9:30 o'clock to bathe and at 2 o'clock to report.

The Governor of Maryland signed the bill providing for a juvenile court in Baltimore on Friday, April 11. The bill, after being lost at the first vote, was reconsidered, and passed on the second ballot. The law provides for the appointment by the Governor of a "magistrate for juvenile cases" at a salary of $2,100 a year. He is to have jurisdiction over all offenders under the age of 16 years. Before trial children are not to be kept in police stations. Provision is made for probation officers. The law provides for the establishment of a special court for young offenders, and is in response to a general demand that these children be kept out of jail and entirely away from association with criminals. Under the present laws this has been impossible, though a vast improvement has been made of late years, and the number of children sent to the prison has been reduced to a minimum. The Charity Organization society, the Henry Watson Children's Aid society, and the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor are deserving of the largest credit for fathering the bill and securing its passage.

The bill further provides that a special justice of the peace, who hears and disposes of any charges against children and has exclusive jurisdiction in all such cases, must be a lawyer and sit daily from 8 to 10 o'clock and from 3 to 5 o'clock. He is not to sit at the station houses, but in a room devoted to juvenile causes only, and will be, it is hoped, selected because of his interest in enlightened philanthropy, as well as his high character and competency. The choice of the right man to fill this place is, indeed, absolutely vital to the success of the entire scheme; and it is to be earnestly hoped that all friends of children will unite in the advocacy of one worthy candidate; more especially is it clear that the position must not be deemed a fit means to secure support for anybody, however deserving or influential.

This bill is probably not perfect, and the immediate fruits of its passage will perhaps disappoint its more sanguine supporters; but, if enacted without injurious amendments, and administered honestly and in sympathy with its spirit and aims, it can hardly fail to work for righteousness and happiness in Baltimore. It follows:

Section 1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of Maryland, That the following section be added to article IV. of the Code of Public Local Laws, Title: "City of Baltimore, Sub-Title: 'Justices of the Peace and Constables,' to follow section 623, as now enacted and to be known and numbered as section 623A, of the said article."

623A. In addition to the justices of the peace mentioned in section 623 of this article, the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint from the city of Baltimore at large an additional justice of the peace, who shall be appointed from such ward as the Governor may elect, shall be known as "the Magistrate for Juvenile Causes," and shall receive from the mayor and city council of Baltimore a salary of twentyone hundred dollars per annum, payable monthly, and the additional justice provided for in this section of this article shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all cases of trial, or commitment for trial, or of commitment to any reformatory or other institution, of all minors under 16 years of age in all cases where jurisdiction thereof is given by law to any justice of the peace in Baltimore city, and such justice shall hear and dispose of all such cases at such place as shall be designated by the board of police commissioners of Baltimore city. Whenever any such child shall be arrested, it may be taken to such place other than one of the station houses as may be designated by the board of police commissioners, but in the absence of such designation, such child may be held at a station house as heretofore until he shall be brought before the magistrate. When such justice shall commit any such child for the action of the grand jury, such commitment may be to any suitable reformatory institution, having due regard to the sex of the said child and the wishes of its parent or guardian, if it have any, instead of to the Baltimore city jail. In the absence of the additional justice provided for in this section, either from sickness or other cause, the board of police commissioners shall designate one of the police justices to act in his place.

Section 2. And be it enacted that the sub-title before section 881 of said article be amended so as to read "Vagrant, Dependent, and Vicious Children."

Section 3. And be it enacted that the following new sections be

added to said article to follow after section 886 thereof, and to be numbered and known as sections 887 and 888 of the said article respectively.

887. The Supreme bench of Baltimore city shall have authority to appoint and at pleasure remove, in such number as the said Supreme bench shall, from time to time, deem advisable, persons of either sex of good character to serve during its pleasure, but without compensation from the city or state, as probation officers for minors, as hereinafter provided. Whenever any child under, or apparently under, the age of 16 years shall have been arrested, or shall be charged with a crime or incorrigible or vicious conduct, or whenever application is made under the provisions of the law of this state for the commitment of any such child to any reformatory or other institution, it shall be the duty of one or more of the said probation officers designated by the court or magistrate hereinafter next mentioned to make such investigation as may be required by the court or magistrate having jurisdiction of the case, to be present at the hearing of the case in order to represent the interests of the child, and to furnish to the court or magistrate such information and assistance as may be required, and before and after trial, in the discretion of the court or magistrate, to have control and custody of the child, subject to the order of the court or magistrate.

888. At the trial of any such child charged with crime or with incorrigible or vicious conduct, whether before a court or magistrate, due investigation shall be made into the circumstances of the case and the surroundings of the child, with special reference to its future welfare. The court or magistrate either before trial, with the consent of the child, or its parent, or guardian, or after conviction, may, in its discretion, suspend further proceedings during the good behavior of the child, and place it in the care of any of the Probation Officers for Minors, appointed under the preceding section, for such time and upon such conditions as may seem proper. Such probation officers shall have the power to bring such child before the court or magistrate at any time during the period for which it was committed to his care. A bill providing for compulsory education also passed the Maryland legislature at this session. It applies to only Baltimore city and Allegany county. It does not seem to be extreme in its provisions, nor a law that can possibly entail any hardship on those who come within its provisions. Under it every child between eight and twelve years of age shall attend some day school regularly during the entire period the public day schools are in session, unless it can be shown that the child is receiving similar instruction elsewhere. There is a provision that grants school superintendents or principals the right to excuse cases of necessary absence. Attendance officers are to be appointed, not to exceed twelve in number, who shall be authorized to arrest, without warrant, truants or those who persistently fail to obey the law. The mayor and city council of Baltimore are given authority to establish parental schools for children who are habitual truants. It will not be an easy task to enforce this law, but some of its provisions seem to allow a wise discretion on the part of school officers, and they can be liberally interpreted in such a way as to prevent any hardship or wrong to the very poor in this city.