SECT. X. Objections to the System of Ma- ΙΙΟ OBJECT. I. From the Difficulty of conceiving how OBJECT. III. From the Influence of Reasons, OBJECT. IV. From the Unity of Consciousness, 115 OBJECT. V. From a feparate Consciousness, not belonging to every Particle of the Brain, 116 OBJECT. VI. From the Comparison of Ideas, &c. 119 OBJECT. VII. From the Nature of Attention, 121 OBJECT. VIII. From the Difference between the Ideas and the Mind employed about them, 122 OBJECT. IX. From the Expreffion, my Body, &c. ibid 1.50 SECT. XIII. Of the Connexion between Senfation and Organization, SECT. XIV. Of the Principles of Human Nature according to the Scriptures, 153 SECT. XV. Of the Divine Effence, according to the Scriptures, 173 SECT. XVI. Of the Arguments for the Being and Perfections of God, on the System of Materialism, 194 186 SECT. XVII. Obfervations on perfonal Identity with respect to the future State of Man, SECT. XVIII. Of the Origin of the popular Opinions concerning the Soul, SECT. XIX. A View of the different Opinions that have been held concerning the Divine Effence, especially with a View to the Doctrine of Immateriality, 206 215 SECT. XX. An Account of the different Opinions that have been maintained concerning 232 the Soul, PART I. The Opinions of the Heathens and Jews, 233 PART II. The Opinions of the Chriftian Fathers to the fixth Century, 245 PART III. The State of Opinions from the fixth Century to the Time of Defcartes, 251 257. PART IV. The State of Opinions from the Time of Descartes to the present, SECT. XXI. A brief Hiftory of Opinions, concerning the State of the Dead, SECT. XXII. An Account of Opinions concerning the fentient Principle in Brutes, 271 281 The The Hiftory of the Philofophical Doctrine concerning the Origin of the Soul, and the Nature of Matter, 289 The INTRODUCTION, containing the Outlines of the Philofophical Doctrine concerning the Origin of the Souls of Men, &c. 291 SECT. I. Of the Indian, or the proper Oriental Philofophy, 302 SECT. II. Of the Religion of the ancient Perfians and Chaldeans, 315 SECT. III. Of the Introduction of the Oriental Philofophy into Greece, 317 SECT. IV. Of the Mixture of the Oriental and Greek Philofophy with Christianity, 326 SECT. V. Of the Influence of the Philofophical Syftem on the Chriftian Doctrine concerning the Perfon of Chrift, 347 SECT. VI. General Arguments against the Pre-existence of Chrift, 356 SECT. VII. Of the Opinions that have been held concerning Matter, and their Influence with respect to Chriftianity, ADVERTISEMENT. 388 The lefs metaphyfical reader may, without any inconvenience, intirely omit the three firft fections of this work, and begin with fection IV. For whatever be the effential properties of matter, man, according to the doctrine contended for in this work, is wholly compofed of it, and his hope of a future life is only derived from revelation. DÍ S QUIS IT Í ON S ING RELATING TO MATTER AND SPIRIT. LE The INTRODUCTION. EST any perfon fhould haftily mifapprehend the nature, or importance, of the questions difcuffed in this treatise, or the manner in which I have decided for myself with respect to them, I fhall here state the feveral fubjects of inquiry as concifely, and with as much diftinctnefs; as I can, and also inform the reader what my opinions concerning them really are. It has generally been fuppofed that there are two diftinct kinds of fubftance in human nature, and they have been diftinguished by the terms matter and spirit. The former of these has been faid to be poffeffed of the property of extenfion, viz. of length, breadth, and thickness, and alfo of folidity or impenetrability, but it is faid to be naturally deftitute of powers whatever. The latter has of late all B been been defined to be a fubftance intirely deftitute of all extenfion, or relation to space, fo as to have no property in common with matter; and therefore to be properly immaterial, but to be poffeffed of the powers of perception, intelligence, and felf-motion. Matter is that kind of fubftance of which our bodies are compofed, whereas the principle of perception and thought belonging to us is faid to refide in a spirit, or immaterial principle, intimately united to the body, while the higher orders of intelligent beings, and efpecially the Divine Being, are faid to be purely immaterial.. It is maintained in this treatise, that neither matter nor Spirit (meaning by the latter the fubject of fenfe and thought) correfpond to the definitions above-mentioned. For that matter is not that inert fubftance that it has been fuppofed to be; that powers of attraction or repulfion are neceffary to its very being, and that no part of it appears to be impenetrable to other parts. I therefore, define it to be a fubftance poffeffed of the property of extenfion, and of powers of attraction or repulfion. And fince it has never yet been afferted, that the powers of fenfation and thought are incompatible with thefe (folidity, or impenetrability only,. having been thought to be repugnant to them) I therefore maintain, that we have no reafon to fuppofe that there are in man two fubftances fo diftinct from each other, as have been reprefented. It |