License Fees.

persons "operating a railroad in this state."

There seems to be

no good reason why the law should not be amended so as to include these companies.

A matter of difference arose between the State Treasurer and the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, as to the construction to be placed on the law regulating the licensing of railroads. The treasurer insisted that the company, coming within the first class of roads, should pay an annual license fee of four per cent. on the gross earnings of all lines operated by it within the state, whether main lines or branches and "feeders," built by the company, or lines acquired by purchase or operated under lease. The company on the other hand claimed that each of the several lines operated by it should be treated as a separate and independent road, and that the amount of license to be paid by each should be determined by the length of its line and the gross earnings thereof. The company made application for a writ of mandamus to compel the State Treasurer to issue the license, having first paid into the state treasury the amount which according to its construction of the law the license fees of its several lines aggregated. Upon demurrer to the petition for the writ, the supreme court after referring to the different acts bearing upon the subject, says:

"These several provisions pretty clearly evince an intention to allow the same corporation to operate several lines of railroad, provided they are not parallel and competing lines, but are capable of being connected so as to constitute one continuous main line, or when the road or roads so leased or purchased will constitute branches or feeders of the railroad of the purchasing corporation operating the same. Such being the legislative intent, it should not be frustrated by granting to such purchasing corporation a license to operate its main line, and then separate and independent licenses to operate each of the several branches and feeders so purchased and leased respectively, for such sums as the gross earnings and line of such operated roads respectively might indicate.

Here the relator operates, not only its main line, but the different branches and feeders named in the petition, and in view of the language of the statutes, we are clearly of the opinion that the State Treasurer was justified in refus. ing to issue the several licenses demanded for the money paid."

While the decision of the court in this case resulted to the benefit of the state, it is easy to conceive of a case where, applying the

Public Aid.

same rule, the state would be the loser. Suppose, for instance, that the gross earnings of a certain line are just, or slightly in excess of, $3,000 per mile, and it becomes the owner of additional roads, the earnings of which average considerably less than that sum, thus reducing the line as a whole from the first to the second class of roads; in such a case the state would be the loser, and having received the advantage of the present law, could not well be heard to complain. A more evenly graded scale would, perhaps, be morc just in all cases than the present law; and the subject is of sufficient importance to attract attention, although no definite improvement at present suggests itself.

PUBLIC AID.

Every county in the state except three-Adams, Door and Kewaunee can boast of railroad facilities. While the state was undeveloped, and securities for investments in railroads of more uncertain value than at present, it may have been wise to encourage and attract railroad enterprise by municipal aid. But the roads of Wisconsin have outlived their infancy. They no longer need the fostering care of the public, and as a rule do not ask it, except in the legitimate soliciting of business. In the pursuit of the carrying trade of our abundant forest products, the railroad has become the pioneer, piercing the untrodden wilds, and opening the almost impenetrable wilderness to sunshine and civilization. The voting of aid by counties and towns to railroads is not of as frefrequent occurrence as formerly, and it is very questionable whether the embarrassments and hardships, usually resulting in the end from thus mortgaging the future, counterbalances the temporary relief which would be pretty sure to come without aid when business warranted. While, in a community geographically small, the benefit derived is as universal as the burden imposed when applied to counties and in many instances to towns that is by no means true. While some portion of the municipality, perhaps containing a bare majority of the voters, may be benefited to an extent sufficient to warrant the imposition of the required tax, other portions, deriving no advantage, ought in justice not to be

Rates and Charhes.

made to share the burdens of those more fortunately located, simply because barely outnumbered in votes.

A great deal of animosity to railroads has grown out of the fact that communities found themselves compelled to pay aid voted, after they had come to the conclusion that the benefit derived was not equivalent to the tax imposed. In the opinion of the commissioner, the law giving counties and towns the privilege of voting. aid to railroads should be so amended as to require the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of all the voters in the district to secure its adoption, or be repealed altogether. Towns are included, for the reason that in the northern undeveloped portions of the state, where aid in the future will be asked, if anywhere, they are frequently of such large dimensions, that the argument applies to them equally with counties.

RATES AND CHARGES.

Very few complaints have been made to this office during the year, and none in regard to overcharges or discriminations. Those made were of a trivial nature and were promptly adjusted by the companies, when called to their attention. That unjust discriminations in some cases are practised as well between individuals as places, there is no doubt, but no complaints have been made thereof. The general questions of transportation and rates so extensively and variously discussed are of such magnitude, that it would be presumptuous after only a short and slight acquaintance and study of the subject to undertake its solution. After hearing elaborate and learned arguments of eminent counsel, pro and con, on the question of state regulation of traffic passing from points within to points without a state the supreme courts of Iowa and Illinois have come to conclusions diametrically opposed to each other. The former court in a late decision says:

"That an act of the state legislature, whose object and purpose is to control and regulate the shipment of freight to points in other states, is in violation of Art. I, Sec. 8, of the constitution of the United States, as being legislation on inter-state commerce, a subject which in its nature is national and requir ing the exclusive legislation of congress. An inter-state contract of ship. ment, entered into by a common carrier is an entire contract, and the laws of

Rates and Charges.

the state wherein it is made, so far as they attempt to regulate inter-state commerce, do not enter into it as a part of the contract, being repugnant to the federal constitution."

The following is the decision in extenso of the supreme court of Illinois on the same question, the facts upon which it was based sufficiently appearing from the opinion written by Judge Craig:

The declaration in this case contained several counts, but the substance of the averments in each was that the defendant carried the same class of freight from Peoria to New York City for a less sum of money than it carried similar freight from Gilman to New York, and that Peoria was a greater distance from New York than Gilman. The decision of the Court sustaining a demurrer to the declaration was no doubt predicated on the view either that the statute did not in terms apply to the transportation of property beyond the limits of the state, or that the legislature had no power to pass a law regulating charges for the transportation of property from a point within the state of Illinois to a point within the state of New York. The action was brought under section 87, R. S. 1874, page 817, which declares: "If any such railroad corporation aforesaid shall make any unjust discrimination in its rates or charges of toll or compensation for the transportation of passengers or freight of any description, or for the use and transportation of any railroad car upon its said road, or upon any of the branches thereof, or upon any railroads connected therewith, which it has the right, license or permission to operate, control or use, within this state, the same shall be deemed guilty of having violated the provisions of this act, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be dealt with as hereinafter provided."

In order to arrive at a proper construction of this section it should be read in connection with section 86, which precedes it. That section declares: If any railroad corporation organized or doing business in this state * * * shall charge, collect, demand or receive more than a fair and reasonable rate of toll or compensation for the transportation of passengers or freight of any description, or for the use and transportation of any railroad car upon its track, or any of the branches thereof, or upon any railroad within this state which it has the right, license, or permission to use, operate or control, the same shall be deemed guilty of extortion and upon conviction thereof shall be dealt with as hereinafter provided.

It will be observed that this section is not limited to railroads organized under the laws of this state, but includes all railroad companies which operate railroads in this state regardless of the state in which they may be organized, and the language of the first part of section 87, "if any such railroad corporation shall," etc., brings all railroad corporations which operate railroads in the state within the provision of the section, whether they may

Rates and Charges.

be organized under our law or under the laws of some other state. The statute seems to make no distinction whatever between a railroad organized in this state and a railroad organized in another state. And by the terms of the section the offense consists in an unjust discrimination in the rates charged, first for the transportation of passengers or freight of any description; second, for the use and transportation of any railroad car upon the road; third, for the use of any railroad car upon any of the branches of the road; fourth, upon any railroads connected with the road or its branches which it is authorized to use in the state. There is nothing here which would confine the unjust discrimination to charges for the transportation of property within the limits of the state. The use of the words "within this state" in the last part of the section, cannot by any fair construction be held to limit the unjust discrimination mentioned in the statute to charges for the transportation of freight wholly within the state. The language "within the state" has reference to the roads which a railroad company may operate in the state.

Reliance is placed upon the language of the first part of section 88, which declares: If any such railroad corporation shall charge, collect or receive for the transportation of any passenger or freight of any description upon its railroad for any distance within this state, etc.; but upon an examination of the whole section it will be seen that it was not intended for the purpose claimed, but its main object is to provide and declare that certain things shall be prima facie evidence to sustain a charge of unjust discrimination. The title of the act is referred to in order to sustain the position of the defendant. It is true, the constitution requires the subject of an act to be embraced in the title, but the title of an act is no part of the law and we do not under. stand that the title is to be regarded on a question as to the intent of the legislature. At all events it can have no controlling effect; it might have a slight bearing when considered in connection with the whole act, but that is all.

Again in arriving at a proper construction to be placed upon an act of the legislature, it is a legitimate inquiry to ascertain the purpose and object of the law, the evil to be remedied and the wrong to be righted by the passage of the law. Now, if the object was to provide a reasonable and uniform system of rates and one which would prohibit a common carrier from charging one person more than another, why should a system be established which would afford relief and protection when property is to be transported from one point to another in the state and make no provision whatever when property is to be shipped from a point within to some point without the state? It is a part of the history of the country, with which the Legislature was no doubt familiar, when the law was enacted, that a much larger per cent. of the property shipped by rail was transported out of the state, than from one point to another within the state. This being the case it is unreasonable to believe that the legislature would provide relief in the latter case and take no action whatever to avert the evil in the former.