Time does not admit of any following out this train of thought, as exemplified in more recent times and I return to the internal development of our jurisprudence and the interesting field of inquiry which it presents to the legal historian. In the department of common law, we may investigate the growth of our mode of trial from the inquisitors of the Frankish kings, through the recognitors of the Anglo-Norman period, down to the jurors of our own day-the histories of the actions of debt, assumpsit and case - the gradual simplification of pleading the development of the law relating to promissory notes and bills of exchange--the systematization of the law of insurance-the successive alterations of the rules of evidence from the time when no interested person could, even in a civil cause, be called as a witness on his own behalf, down to the passing of several measures in the United States and the Australian colonies (England herself cannot yet be included) by which such evidence is admissible in all cases, whatever the cause of action or the nature of the crime charged.

In the department of equity we may trace the stages by which the chancellor emerging from his original position as secretary to the king, came to be the head of an independent court, administering relief in cases not within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. We may watch the long line of clerical chancellors from the reign of Richard II to the 21st of Henry VIII conspiring to form a distinct code of rules, by which the enjoyment and alienation of property should be regulated on principles vary ing in many essential particulars from the system recognized by the lay judges of the king's bench or common pleas. We may distinguish the different means by which in spite of the statute of uses, the jurisdiction of the court of chancery continued unimpaired, and note how the judges who promulgated the dogma that "there could be no use on a completely defeated their own ends.

use

We may watch the notion of the existence of a general equity in a mortgagor to redeem the mortgage after forfeiture, gradually but surely gaining ground from the middle of the 14th century until it became completely established in the reign of Charles I. We may notice in the reign of James I the earliest recognition of the capacity of the wife to enjoy property apart from her husband by virtue of an ante-nuptial deed, and the independence thus gained further secured by the restraint on anticipation said to have been invented by Lord Chancellor Thurlow in the reign of George III. The doctrines of specific performance, of the relief against penal ties and forfeitures, of mistake, of election, of executory trusts, and numerous others, we can refer in like manner to their original sources; and so estimate the value of the labors of a Nottingham,

a Hardwicke, and an Eldon, according to the contributions they each have made to the fabric of our equity jurisprudence.

Again, in the history of the way in which devises came into vogue we shall find the only true theory of wills of realty, from their first legislation in the reign of Henry VIII to their assimilation in England to wills of personalty at the commencement of Queen Victoria's reign. We may note how the Statute of Wills gave effect at law to what had previously been mere declarations of uses in equity, and how precedents which before the statute was passed had served for the latter purpose only were resorted to, after the statute, for disposing of the legal estate upon death. From this two important consequences will be seen to follow. The first was that the will was regarded as a present conveyance of land limited to take effect at a future date, and therefore not to include after acquired property, a view which prevailed in England down to 1837, and in Scotland for many years later; the second that the legal limitations of devises came to be interpreted with the same latitude as the uses from which they had sprung. This is the explanation of the fact that

wills of lands retained their elastic character dominion of equity, and continued subject to a after they had been taken out of the exclusive

different code of rules from that which by the rigor of the feudal system was required for the construction of deeds.

Studying our law in this way, first in its general studying English history as well. outlines, then in its special departments, we shall be We shall also be liberalizing and expanding our ideas. If engaged in the practice of our profession, we shall escape being made its slave; if about to enter it, we shall be laying a broad foundation, which will aid us in grappling with its details, because the historic clue will be in our hands. Each principle we apply will carry with it the association of the time when it was first enunciated, while an insight will be gained into the social and political life of the past as reflected in the mirror of the present. For in the world of law. as in the physical world, every commotion and

conflict of the elements has left its mark behind in some break or irregularity of the strata. Every struggle which ever rent the bosom of society is apparent in the disjointed condition of the field of law which covers the spot, and the several products of the several ages of English history may be seen there side by side, not interfused but heaped one upon another, as many different ages of the earth may be read in some perpendicular section of its surface.

With this expressive simile, which I am indebted to John Stuart Mill, I might well conclude, but there is one other aspect of legal history which we cannot leave out of sight since it confronts us on

the property in them revested in their original owner and was divested out of the owner of the soil. In short, the authority relied on by the plaintiffs, when examined with the contest, proved the exact contrary of that for which it was cited, and absolutely destroyed the claim it was assumed to support.

The last illustration I shall trouble you with is a case of my own which was heard in the English Court of Appeal in the spring of the present year. I know it is dangerous to refer to one's own cases, because one is apt to magnify their importance, but this one is, I think you will say, pertinent to the argument I am urging. The question was whether a strip of land, part of the original bed of the Thames but from which the water of the river had receded, belonged to my client, the defendant, as owner of the bed, or to the plaintiffs as proprietors of the land and bank in close proximity to which the strip lay. The limits of the plaintiff's land, as defined by his bank and the trees growing on the edge of it, had never altered physically, but it was contended on their behalf that the jus alluvionis ap. plied, and that the dry bed had, in law, become annexed to the bank, although lying six feet below it. On the other hand, it was contended on the part of the defendant, for whom I was counsel, that when the original boundary of the property in dispute conld, as here, be clearly ascertained by inspection of the ground, the jus alluvionis had no application. In support of this latter proposition reference was made to Bracton, Britton, Fleta and Lord Hale, as well as to a case decided in the 22 Ed. III which we unearthed from the dusty archives of the Year Books. As the court was against the plaintiffs on grounds immaterial for the present purpose, but sufficient to dispose of the case, our contention with regard to the limitations of the jus alluvionis did not come up for actual decision. There was, however, a clear inclination of judicial opinion in its favor. Lord Justice Lindley agreed that the defendant's proposition might be true "if the boundary were a wall or something so clear and visible that it was easy to see whether the accretions as they became perceptible were on one side of the boundary or on the other;" while Lord Justice Smith was of opinion that the authorities cited pointed to the conclusion that wherever the metes and bounds were defined, as they were in the present case by a bank six feet high, the doctrine of accretion relied on by the plaintiffs could not be successfully invoked.

term for land which had been assigned to individuals by a public authority where a fresh territory was captured or a new colony founded. It was laid out by the agrimensores, and its limits were defined by boundary stones ealled termini, usually named after a Roman emperor. The antithesis to it was the "ager arcifinius," the boundaries of which were either natural, as mountain ridges or rivers, or artificial, as water conduits, ramparts of earth, and so forth.

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This distinction once appreciated, it is plain that the plaintiffs' land, the natural boundary of which was the bank, was really ager arcifinius," and not │"ager limitatus" at all. It is equally obvious that since there is no ager limitatus" in England, in the only proper sense of that term, the passage in Bracton (assuming that writer to have understood it himself, which Dr. Maitland doubts) forms no part of English law. Does not this show the importance of not trusting blindly to the dictum of a text-writer, however eminent he may be, and of going to the root of the matter in every case with which, in our daily practice, we may have to deal ?

Gentlemen, I have now finished. I am not going to indulge in any more personal reminiscences, or any more professional confidences. I have not, as I intimated at the opening, put these thoughts on paper with the object of imparting instruction. My aim has been rather to stimulate to stimulate the younger men to pursue legal history side by side with their strictly professional work, and to prove to any older ones who may be disposed to look at law only from its money-making side, that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of — I must not say in their philosophy, for they would probably scorn the word — but in their actual experience. I will not now detain you longer. I will only thank you all for giving me so attentive a hearing, and crave the indulgence of such of my legal brethren as may desire to exchange the forced attitude of listener for the fascinating rôle of candid critic.

Notes of American Decisions.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1896.

Current Topics.

[All communications intended for the Editor should be addressed simply to the Editor of THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. All letters relating to advertisements, subscriptions, or other business matters, should be addressed to THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.]

I

T is always pleasing to chronicle the success of a lawyer in the business world or in the political field. The recent nomination by the Republicans of this State of Hon. Frank S. Black for governor is the recognition of a distinguished and learned member of the bar of New York.

Frank S. Black was born March 8, 1853, in the town of Limington, York county, Me. His father was Jacob Black, a respected farmer of that township, whose death occurred about 12 years ago. Frank S. Black was one of the II children born to Jacob Black and his wife, Charlotte B. Black. and he received only those advantages which fall to the lot of a son of a poor New England farmer.

He taught his first school when he was only 17 years of age, and in the year following, with the money thus earned, together with other money secured by working on a farm, he entered Dartmouth college, at Hanover, N. H., with the class of 1875, scarcely more than a boy. Among his fellow students were George Fred. Williams and Samuel McCall, now congressmen from Massachusetts, and Charles R. Miller, now managing editor of the New York

Times.

Immediately after his graduation Mr. Black went to Johnstown, Fulton county, where he began the study of law. The necessity for gaining a livelihood forced the young student to accept the management of the Johnstown Journal. Mr. Black conducted this paper for several months, but an editorial slip, which committed the paper to a candidate in opposition to the political interest of the proprietor, abruptly terminated the young editor's journalistic career in Johnstown, and shortly afterward he found himself in Troy.

In Troy, Mr. Black became a reporter on the Troy Whig. For a time Mr. Black was connected with the registry department of the Troy VOL. 54 No. 10.

postoffice. The old determination to become a lawyer was still with him, and shortly after. his arrival in Troy, and when only 22 years of age, he became a student in the law office of Robertson & Foster, and in 1879 he was admitted to the bar. In the year following, Mr. Black, with the late Albert Smith and George B. Wellington, formed the firm of Smith, Welington & Black. This partnership continued. only a year, Mr. Black retiring.

One of Mr. Black's rules as a lawyer has been, never to take a criminal case, and only once has he appeared in a divorce trial. He was a stranger to all criminal proceedings until the Robert Ross tragedy, and his services in the inquest relative to the death of Ross brought him to the front as a prosecutor. Black was one of the speakers at the indignation meeting at the Second Presbyterian church, and appeared as counsel for the Troy Committee of Public Safety, and the hearings before the governor.

Mr.

Mr. Black is attorney for the receivers of the Troy Steel and Iron Company, and prepared the papers in the proceedings which effected the receivership. He also acted in the same capacity at the time of the appointment of a receiver for the Gilbert Car Company.

The industry and intelligent work which have marked Mr. Black's life, make him an interesting personage in the legal-political world.

We have read and re-read the address of Lord Russell at Saratoga and have each time gained added pleasure and information, while we have been greatly impressed with the easy, charming style in which the article is written. Among the distinguished and well known lawyers who gathered at Saratoga Lord Russell was a person of particular interest on many

accounts.

Whatever opinion one may in other respects entertain of the address of the Lord Chief Justice of England before the American Bar Association, no competent and 'careful reader will be disposed to deny that it accounts for its author's positlon at the head of the British bar, which in its turn accounts for his primacy on "the bench of British Themis." It is a very rare skill that can compress into the limits of an address at once so comprehensive a histori