subscriber should be written on a card, and the name of each of the horses written on another, and then the two sets of cards placed respectively in a box, and the cards should be drawn by chance from each of the boxes, and the person whose name should be drawn next after the name of the winning horse, should be entitled to receive 1001. from the entire fund: Held, an illegal lottery within 10 & 11 Wm. 3, c. 17, and 42 Geo. 3, c. 119, and therefore, that the plaintiff, who was the winner, could not recover the amonnt from the stakeholder; also, that if not an illegal lottery, it was an illegal bet also, that the plea did not amount to the general issue, but was a good plea in confession and avoidance. Allport v. Nutt, 233

LUNATIC.

The return to a habeas corpus to bring up the body of an alleged lunatic, stated that, "on, &c., under the authority and in pursuance of the act of Parliament," &c. (2 & 3 Wm. 4, c. 107,)" R. F. in the said writ named was committed under our custody, and was received into and detained in the Newcastle Lunatic Asylum," &c., and that "on the day and year aforesaid," an order and medical certificates were received, which were as follow:

It then set out the order for the reception of the lunatic, with the signature of the patient himself at the foot of it, instead of that of his wife, who was the party named in it as giving the order, and who had also signed the order in a different place; and also medical certificates. It likewise set out a subsequent order under the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 100, and medical certificates, and justified the detainer of the lunatic under the latter order.

Held, that it sufficiently appeared, on the face of the return, that the first order and medical certificates

were received at the same time with the lunatic; that under the 2 & 3 Wm. 4, c. 107, the first order was a sufficient justification of the detainer; that it was not necessary to obtain an order for his detainer under the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 100; and that the return need not shew who delivered the first order.

Semble, that a medical certificate under the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 100, s. 46, should state specific facts on which the opinion of insanity has been formed; and that therefore the statement that the patient has a general suspicion of the motives of every person" is insufficient. In re Fell, 373

MAGISTRATE.

66

See CERTIORAri, 1.
ORDER OF REMOVAL, 1.

MANDAMUS.

See ORDER OF REMOVAL, 2.

QUARTER SESSIONS, 2.

1. By the Norwich and Brandon Railway Company Act, 7 Vict. c. 15, (local personal and public) s. 221, the company were empowered to build and repair a bridge over a certain river, keeping a certain height above the water, and a certain width of waterway. They had proceeded in the construction of the bridge, leaving a less width and height than prescribed; whereupon the proprietors of a mill on the river whose flow of water was injured thereby, wrote requiring them. to make it of the width and height prescribed by the act. To this the solicitors of the railway company replied that the company would make it of the required height, but as to the other matter referred to in the letter, they were instructed to accept service of any process with the parties might think proper to issue. A second, and then a third letter were written requiring compliance, to which the com

pany returned no answer. It however appeared that the company had since proceeded to make some of the alterations required: Held, that under these circumstances, there had been a sufficient refusal to warrant the issuing a mandamus.

The same section which empowered the company to build and repair the bridge, enacted that in the event of the bridge not being built, maintained and repaired, it should be lawful for the owner of adjoining lands to do so, and for a justice of the peace to order the company to pay him the expenses of doing: Held, that the parties were not compelled to take the course pointed out by this section: but might proceed by mandamus. Regina v. The Norwich and Brandon Railway Company, 385

2. By the London and Blackwall Act, 6 & 7 Wm. 4, c. 123, (local and personal public) sect. 27, the costs, &c. of a jury to assess compensation are, where the jury find a greater sum by their verdict than that offered by the company, to be borne by the company, and "such costs, charges, and expenses shall be settled and determined by the sheriff," &c., with a power of distress, in case the same shall not be paid within a limited time. By the 37th sect. the costs of deducing title are to be borne by the company; and by sect. 38, in case the parties cannot agree as to the amount of such costs of deducing title, &c., they are to be ascertained by one of the Masters of the Court of Exchequer, and that Court may order their payment accordingly: Held, that the Court would not grant a mandamus to the company to pay the costs of an inquiry, and of deducing title to premises injured by the proximity of the railway, where the amount of such costs had not been first ascertained in the mode pointed out by the act. Regina v. The London and Blackwall Railway Company,

399

MANOR.

See FALSE JUDGMENT.

MATERIAL EVIDENCE. See VENUE, 2.

MEMORANDUM.

TRINITY TERM.

In this Term, in pursuance of an arrangement made by the Court in last Easter Term, certain enlarged rules were for the future to be selected, and to be taken in the Bail Court; and two, or any other small number, were to be called on each day, till the whole were disposed of, 91

MISCARRIAGE.

See NEW TRIAL, 1.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

АСТ.

See VENUE, 1.

MUTUAL PROMISES.
See DECLARATION, 4.

NE UNQUES EXECUTOR.
See PLEA, 16.

NEW ASSIGNMENT.
See REPLICATION, 10.

NEW TRIAL.

1. Upon the trial of a cause, in which three issues were raised, each going to the whole cause of action, it was agreed on both sides that the verdict should be taken by the associate in the absence of the Judge, who, before he retired from the Court, directed the associate to take the verdict upon each of the issues separately. Upon the return of the jury,

the associate asked them whether they found for the plaintiff or the defendant; and the foreman answered "for the plaintiff." The defendant's counsel requested the associate to put the questions left to the jury by the Judge, to which the plaintiff's counsel objected; whereupon the associate refused to put the questions, and ultimately a general verdict was entered for the plaintiff: Held, that the neglect to take the verdict upon each of the issues, was a miscarriage on the part of the officer of the Court in taking the verdict; and the Court, therefore, made a rule absolute for a new trial, without costs on either side. Bentley v. Fleming, 23

2. Where a verdict has been found for one of several defendants, and against the others, and the latter apply to set it aside; the rule should call on the successful defendant, as well as the plaintiff, to shew cause. Belcher v. Magnay and Others,

70

NOTICE (OF APPEAL).

commenced on the 7th of January, on which day appeals were entered, but not heard till a subsequent day: Held, first, that the notice was insufficient, as both the day of giving the notice, and the day of holding the sessions, must be excluded; and that the day of bringing an appeal is the day on which it is entered, not that on which it is heard secondly, that the fraction of a day cannot be taken into consideration in such a case. Regina v. The Justices of Middlesex,

109

2. Where by the practice of sessions twenty-eight days' notice of trial was required to be given in the case of respited appeals, and where that notice had not been given, and the sessions therefore refused to hear the appeal, and confirmed the order of removal: Held, that the practice was not so unreasonable as to induce this Court to grant a mandamus, commanding the sessions to enter continuances and hear the appeal.

The quarter sessions are the judges of their own rules of practice; and this Court will not interfere with their determination respecting them, unless the rules on which they have acted are so unreasonable as to be illegal. Regina v. The Justices of Montgomeryshire,

119

3. A notice of appeal, against an order of removal, beginning "We the undersigned, being a majority of the churchwardens and overseers of the parish of," &c., and signed by one churchwarden and four overseers, (there being six altogether in the parish), is sufficient; without stating that they were the majority at a meeting duly convened. Regina v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire. (St. Pancras v. Bradford), 152

4. A notice of appeal against an order of removal was in the following terms "take notice, that we being a majority of and acting for and on behalf of the churchwardens and over

NOTICE (OF INQUIRY) 859

66

seers of," &c., "and that the grounds of our appeal," &c., and was signed by one person, "churchwarden of," &c., and by four persons, Overseers of," &c. It appeared that there were two churchwardens and four overseers of the appellant parish, and no more. The quarter sessions having decided that the notice was insufficient, and refused to hear the appeal: Held, that the notice was good, as sufficiently shewing that it was an appeal by and on behalf of the whole body of parish officers; and that the decision of the quarter sessions on the point was a decision on a preliminary objection, and, therefore, that this Court would grant a mandamus, commanding them to enter continuances and hear the appeal. Regina v. The Justices of Surrey. (St. Anne, Westminster, v. St. Mary, Magdalen, Bermondsey), 573

5. The 8 & 9 Vict. c. 10, s. 3, requires notice of the entering into recognizances to try a bastardy appeal, to be "forthwith" given to the mother of the child, and it also provides that the sending such notice by post shall be sufficient: Held, that the sessions were right in refusing to hear an appeal, where an interval of seventeen days had been suffered to elapse between the entering into the recognizances and serving the notice on the mother; although it was shewn that the delay that had occurred, was owing solely to the appellant having sought to effect a personal service on the mother. Ex parte

London: Held, on motion to set aside the execution of the writ of inquiry, on the ground of the insufficiency of the notice of continuance, that the defendant's affidavit was sufficient which described him as " of Ragland," in the county of Monmouth, and which stated that he had received no other notice of continuance than the one so given, and that Ragland was one hundred and thirty-six miles from London; although it did not state in positive terms that he resided at Ragland. Saunders and Another Assignees v. Jones,

NOTICE (TO PRODUCE).

770

NOTICE (OF TRIAL).

In a London cause, which stood for trial for the first sittings in Michaelmas Term, the plaintiff, on the 24th of November, gave notice of continuance to the first sittings after Term: Held, that although this was virtually a notice for the adjournment day, the 15th of December, and the plaintiff had therefore full time to countermand the first notice, and give a fresh notice of trial; that he was not bound to do so, and that the notice of continuance was sufficient. Toulmin v. Elgie,

NUL TIEL RECORD. See REPLICATION, 12.

558

On plea of nul tiel record, it is no objection that the award of the venire and the distringas are cancelled by

"We have considered the means best calculated to prevent parties from fraudulently obtaining Judges' orders for signing judgment, and recommend that the following precautions be adopted :

That all written consents, upon which such orders are obtained, shall he preserved in the chambers of the respective Courts.

"That in actions where the defendant has appeared by attorney, no such order be made, unless the consent of defendant be given by his attorney or agent.

"That where the defendant has not appeared, or has appeared in person, no such order be made, unless the defendant attend the Judge, and give his consent in person, or unless his written consent be attested by an attorney acting on his behalf; but we think that these precautions unnecessary, where the defendant is a barrister, conveyancer, special pleader, or attorney.

"We think that Sunday ought to be counted as one of the four days between the delivery of paper books and the day of argument, except it be the last, when it is to be omitted, according to the general rule." 243