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days to the commissioner, who is thereupon empowered to grant a protection from arrest to the petitioner under that section. It seems to me, therefore, that the commissioner can have no difficulty in calculating the time which will necessarily elapse, before he can be in a situation to grant the further certificate of protection under the sixth section; and in making his first order accordingly. The words of the seventh section are, "that it shall be lawful for such commissioner as aforesaid, upon the examination of such petition as aforesaid, to grant to such petitioning debtor a temporary and limited protection from arrest." It gives no power at any other time or times. Where it is the intention of the Legislature to do so, it is expressed in terms; as in the sixth section, where he is authorized "from time to time to indorse on such certificate his protection of such petitioning debtor from arrest." The intention of the seventh section is, that the debtor may be free from the fear of arrest during the time he is taking the proceedings, under the preceding section, to obtain the assent of his creditors to his proposition; and with this view, the protection thus given is to be binding as against all his creditors, whether having notice of the proceedings or not: whereas the certificate granted under the sixth section protects him as against such creditors only as have had due notice of the meetings. I do not think it is material to consider whether the creditor in this instance had notice; inasmuch as this order of protection, if valid at all, can only be so as an order made under the seventh section, which, as before stated, applies equally as against all creditors, whether having notice or otherwise. For the above reasons, I am of opinion that the arrest was proper, and that this rule must, consequently, be discharged; but under the circumstances without costs.

Rule discharged without costs (a).

(a) This case was decided in Michaelmas Term, 1845.

1845.

MAZEMAN

v.

DAVIS.

1845.

A notice of

an order of

REGINA V. The Justices of the WEST RIDING of YORKSHIRE.

(ST. PANCRAS D. BRADFORD.

PICKERING had obtained a rule nisi in Michaelmas appeal, against Term last, for a mandamus to the justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire, commanding them to enter continuances, and to hear an appeal against an order of two a majority of justices for the removal of George Hill and Hannah his

removal, beginning "We the under

signed, being

the church

wardens and overseers of

the parish of," &c., and signed by one church. warden and

four overseers, (there being six altogether in

wife, from the township of Bradford, in the said Riding, to the parish of St. Pancras, in the county of Middlesex.

The affidavit in support of this rule stated that on the appeal coming on to be heard before the sessions, an objection was taken, that as no notice and grounds of appeal had been given within twenty-one days after service of the order of removal, and as it did not appear that any actual without stating removal had taken place, the parties had no right to appeal. The sessions decided that this was a valid objection, and therefore refused to hear the appeal (a).

the parish,) is sufficient;

that they were

the majority
at a meeting
duly convened.

In opposition to this rule an affidavit was made, shewing that another objection had also been taken at the Court of Quarter Sessions. That upon the respondents requiring the appellants to prove that they had regularly given their notice and grounds of appeal required by the statute, a witness was called by the appellants, who proved that there were six churchwardens and overseers of the appellant parish, and that the notice given was in the following

terms:

"St. Pancras, Middlesex v. Bradford. "Touching the settlement of George Hill, and Hannah his wife.

،،

، Take notice, that we the undersigned, being a majority of the churchwardens and overseers of the parish of, &c., do intend, &c., to prosecute an appeal," &c.

(a) See Regina v. Justices of West Riding, ante, vol. 2, p. 488.

That it was signed by one churchwarden and four overseers. That it was then objected that the notice was not duly signed; as it was not shewn that it was signed by the whole of the churchwardens and overseers of the appellant parish, or by a majority of that body, duly constituted, and assuming to act in the name of the body. That the sessions pronounced this objection also to be fatal.

Hall and Pashley now shewed cause. If the objection stated in the affidavit on which this rule was obtained, had been the only one on which the Court of Quarter Sessions had acted, it is conceded that their decision could not have been upheld (a). But as our affidavit shews that another objection was also entertained by the Court of Quarter Sessions, the question arises not only whether that objection was not decisive against the hearing of the appeal; but also whether a party against whom a decision has been given in a Court below upon two grounds, can come to this Court, and ask to reverse that decision, without acquainting this Court with both those objections. It is submitted he ought not to be permitted to do so; as such a practice would have the effect of bringing the justices here to support a decision, which this Court, upon hearing the whole facts of the case, might perhaps have no hesitation in confirming. But if the Court should be of opinion that the appellants, notwithstanding this defect in their affidavit, are entitled to be heard in support of this rule; then it is submitted that the objection disclosed in our affidavit is a fatal one, and that the quarter sessions acted rightly in dismissing the appeal. If the ultimate decision of the Court of Quarter Sessions be right, although perhaps founded on wrong reasons, this Court will uphold it. Upon this principle were decided the cases of Rex v. Skeffington (b), and Reg. v. The Justices of the West Riding (c). The decision of the sessions in the present case,

(a) See Regina v. Justices of West Riding, ante, vol. 2, p. 488. (b) 3 B. & A. 382.

(c) 2 Q. B. 705; See S. C. 1 G. & D. 630.

1845.

REGINA

v.

Justices

of the WEST RIDING.

1845.

REGINA

v.

Justices of the

WEST RIDING.

it is submitted, was correct. The statute of 9 Geo. 1, c. 7, 8. 8, required that no appeal from any order of removal should be proceeded upon in any Court of Quarter Sessions, "unless reasonable notice be given by the churchwardens or overseers of the poor of such parish or place, who shall make such appeal unto the churchwardens or overseers of the poor of such parish or place, from which such poor person or persons shall be removed." This statute, therefore, did not authorize a majority of the churchwardens and overseers to give the notice. By the subsequent statute, 4 & 5 Wm. 4, c. 76, s. 81, it is enacted that "the overseers or guardians of the parish appealing against such order,” (i. e. an order of removal) "or any three or more of such guardians, shall, with such notice, or fourteen days at least before the first day of the sessions at which such appeal is intended to be tried, send or deliver to the overseers of the respondent parish a statement in writing under their hands of the ground of such appeal;" or otherwise that it shall not be lawful for them to be heard in support of the appeal. This statute authorizes "any three or more" of the guardians to give the notice, but says nothing about a majority of the parish officers. It is true that in the case of Rex v. The Justices of Warwickshire (a), the Court there says, in giving judgment, that they think the notice by a majority of the officers without fraud is good; but it would seem that in that case the notice did not purport, as in the present case, to be signed by the majority. It was signed in point of fact by two churchwardens and four overseers; and the objection there really was that it had not also been signed by an assistant overseer of the parish. The same remark applies to the subsequent case of Rex v. The Justices of Derbyshire (b), where, however, the decision of the Court turned also upon another point. The principle upon which these decisions must be taken to have proceeded, is to be found in

(a) 6 A. & E. 873; See S. C. 2 N. & P. 153.
(b) 6 A. & E. 885; See S. C. 1 N. & P. 703.

the case of Grindley v. Barker (a); namely, that where a power of a public nature is committed to several, who all meet for the purpose of executing it, the act of the majority will bind the minority. That case was acted on in Cortis v. The Kent Waterworks' Company (b) and Rex v. Whitaker (c). Where a majority has the power to act, it is not quâ the majority of the corporate body, but quâ the corporate body itself. If the notice in this case were good, and had to be averred in pleading, it must be averred to be a notice by the churchwardens and overseers, and not a notice by the majority of the churchwardens and overseers. In Robinson v. James (d), which was an action for the recovery of poor-rates, the declaration averred that the vestrymen at a certain meeting made a certain poor's rate; and it was objected in arrest of judgment, that as the consent of the majority of the vestry meeting was necessary to impose a valid rate, the declaration should have shewn the rate to be made by a majority; but Mr. J. Coleridge, in giving judgment in that case, says:— "Unless a majority concurred, it is not true that the vestrymen made the rate, and the form adopted is the correct mode of stating in pleading, that the majority, or whatever number were necessary to make a valid rate, have, in fact, concurred in making it." A binding majority must be a majority at a meeting convened for the purpose; Rex v. Kynaston (e); Rex v. Theodorick (f). This is the case of a quasi corporation acting by their wrong name; Ex parte The Overseers of Harnley (g), and Ward v. Clarke (h).

Pickering, contrà, was not called upon.

WILLIAMS, J.-I think that this rule must be made absolute. I agree with the principle which has been laid down, that a party who seeks to obtain a mandamus to

(a) 1 B. & P. 229.

(b) 7 B. & C. 332.

(c) 9 B. & C. 648.

(d) 1 Dowl. 756, N. S.

(e) 2 Selw. N. P. 1143, 6th Ed.

(f) 8 East, 543.

(g) Ante, vol. 1, p. 673.

(h) 12 M. & W. 747; See S. C.

ante, vol. 1, p. 1027.

1845.

REGINA

v.

Justices

of the

WEST RIDING.

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