nullity by the introduction of the conveyance by lease and release. See Hargr. n. (3), Co. Lit., 48, a. So that now, as Lord C. J. Vaughn observed, the principal use of the statute of 27 [Hen. VIII.] is not to bring together a possession and use which at one time were separate, the one from the other, but to introduce a general form of conveyance by which persons may execute their intents and purposes at pleasure, either by transferring their estates to strangers, by enlarging, diminishing, or altering them to and among themselves at their pleasure, without observing that rigour and strictness of law for the possession, as was requisite before the statute. Vaugh. 50. Lord Hardwicke has observed that by means of trusts this statute, made upon great consideration, introduced in a solemn and pompous manner, has had no other effect than to add, at most, three words to a conveyance. 1 Atk. 591. It is inaccurate to say that the statute introduced several sorts of conveyances (see the text). The old conveyances continued, but had a legal operation given to them by the statute. It may here be observed that if an estate would be executed by the statute, as a good use, it would be equally within the statute if limited in words as a trust. Therefore a conveyance to A. and his heirs, in trust for B. and his heirs, would be executed as effectually as if the words had been to the use of B. and his heirs.-Sugden's note.

Digby, HIST. REAL PROP., Ch. VII., § 1. The object of that Statute was, by joining the possession or seisin to the use and interest (or, in other words, by providing that all the estate which would by the common law have passed to the grantee to uses should instantly be taken out of him and vested in cestui que use), to annihilate altogether the distinction between the legal and beneficial ownership, to make the ostensible tenant in every case also the legal tenant, liable to his lord for feudal dues and services-wardship, marriage, and the rest. As will be pointed out in the next chapter, by converting the use into the legal interest, the Statute

did away with the power of disposing of interests in lands by will, which had been one of the most important results of the introduction of uses. Probably these were the chief results aimed at by the Statute of Uses. A strange combination of circumstances the force of usage by which practices had arisen too strong even for legislation to do away with, coupled with an almost superstitious adherence on the part of the courts to the letter of the Statute-produced the curious result, that the effect of the Statute of Uses was directly the reverse of its purpose, that by means of it secret conveyances of the legal estate were introduced, while by a strained interpretation of its terms the old distinction between beneficial or equitable and legal ownership was revived. What may be called the modern law of Real Property and the highly technical and intricate system of conveyancing which still prevails, dates from the legislation of Henry VIII.

ID., § 2. It will be easily seen that the Statute at once enabled a tenant in fee simple to deal with his lands in ways which would have been impossible at common law. For instance, at common law a man cannot convey to himself any interest in lands. Thus, suppose A. and B. are jointly seised of lands as trustees, and A. dies, whereby the whole estate vests in B., and it is desired to appoint C. a new trustee, and to vest the lands in B. and C. jointly. Before the Statute it would have been necessary for B. to make a feoffment with livery to D. and his heirs, so that D. might make a feoffment with livery to B. and C. and their heirs; after the Statute the same object might be effected by one conveyance, namely, to D. and his heirs to the use of B. and C. and their heirs. This is the ordinary mode of vesting trust-estates in a new trustee. So, by bringing the Statute into operation, a man may convey a legal estate to his wife, which is impossible. at common law.

LEAKE, LAND LAW, 115. The statute executes the use, that is to say, invests it with the seisin or legal title, and

subjects it to all the incidents of a legal estate. The grantee to uses is divested of all estate and interest in the land, and the cestui que use becomes seised or possessed in law of the same estate and interest which is limited to him in the use. The possession transferred by the statute is equivalent, for most purposes, to that acquired by livery of seisin, or, in case of leaseholds, by entry.

CHAPTER II.

TRUSTS.

(a) Their Origin.

I EQ. CAS. ABR., 383. Notwithstanding this statute (27 Hen. VIII., c. 10) there are three ways of creating an use or a trust which still remains as at common law, and is a creature of the Courts of Equity, and subject only to their controul and direction. Ist. Where a man seised in fee raises a term of years and limits it in trust for A., etc., for this the statute cannot execute, the termor not being seised. 2ndly. Where lands are limited to the use of A. in trust to permit B. to receive the rents and profits, for the statute can only execute the first use. 3rdly. Where lands are limited to trustees to receive and pay over the rents and profits to such and such persons, for here the lands must remain in them to answer these purposes: and these points were agreed to. Trin. 1700.-Symson and Turner, per Curiam.

DIGBY, HIST. REAL PROP., Ch. VII., § 4. The object of the framers of the Statute of Uses was undoubtedly to do away with the distinction between the legal estate and the beneficial interest in lands which had given rise to the mischiefs recited in the preamble of the Statute. The properties which before the Statute had gathered round the beneficial interest or use under the judicial legislation of the Chancellors now with some modification attached to the legal interest in lands. The modifications which the legal interest in lands consequently underwent, the increased powers of disposition and control which the owner in fee acquired, have already been traced. But in some points the Statute fell

short of what was required. The principle that a conscientious obligation unrecognized by the law might be enforced by the Chancellor was not affected by the Statute. If therefore there still were found cases of the creation of legal estates upon trust for certain purposes, which estates could not be executed or transferred from the common law grantee to the beneficiary by the force of the Statute, it would be still within the power of the Chancellor to decree that the conscientious obligations should be carried out.

This occurred principally in three cases. In the first place an active duty might be imposed on the grantee of the land to do certain acts in reference to it for the benefit of somebody else. Land might be granted to A. upon trust to collect and pay over the rents to B. Here it would be evidently intended that A. should be legal owner, but a conscientious obligation would bind him to carry out the trust upon which he had received the land. Where, therefore, an active duty was imposed on the common law grantee, the use or trust was not executed by the Statute, but it was left to be enforced by the Court of Chancery. It is not always in practice an easy matter to say when the trust which is imposed on the legal owner is in the nature of an active duty, or when it is a use, trust, or confidence executed by the Statute. If lands are conveyed to A. upon trust to allow B. to receive the profits, no active duty being imposed on A., this use is within the Statute and is executed, the legal estate vesting in B.

The second case was where a trust was declared upon a leasehold interest. It has already been seen that this case is not provided for by the Statute. If, therefore, a term of ten years be given to A. in trust for B., the legal estate vests in A., and the trust could (before November 1, 1875) only be enforced by the Court of Chancery.

But the most important defect, to remedy which the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery was ultimately called into action, arose from the strange doctrine laid down in Tyrrell's case.1

1 Dyer, 155, a; Digby. 375.