(3) Retrial of main case on rebuttal. (4) Preventing attack on claimant's credibility. (7) Excessive verdict. 1. Counsel argue under this head that: "(a) Decedent was not affirmatively shown to have been guilty of negligence with respect to the work done by Friedman. "(b) In the absence of proof of negligence on the part of decedent, he is not liable for any negligence of Friedman or of the latter's contractors or workmen. "(c) The testimony shows beyond dispute that the architects and contractors employed by the Friedman Company were competent and experienced. "(d) The relation between Gulliford & Richens to Mr. Luce was that of independent contractors. And the like relation existed between the Friedman Company and Gulliford & Richens. The entire work and the method of carrying it out was left entirely to the judgment of the contractors. "(e) Decedent had no knowledge of any alleged acts of negligence of Friedman's contractors or the latter's employés. (f) There is no evidence of any negligence on the part of either Mr. Luce or Mr. Friedman in their personal conduct." This is not a suit by one tenant against a landlord for damages suffered because of the negligence of another tenant of the same building in making the usual repairs of his part of the premises in consequence of the duty resting upon him to make them; nor for damages in consequence of the wrongful use of his part of the premises; nor for acts unknown to the landlord. This record presents a case of altering and reconstructing premises, work which the tenant had no right to perform at all without the permission of the landlord, which the landlord alone could do or authorize. In the first instance, the landlord took charge of the making of the alterations in the building himself. Having made such alterations as were at first contemplated, he turned over to the tenant the mak ing of the additional changes which he desired. The additional changes were as much made by authority of the landlord as the original changes. If the landlord had directed the tenant to make the repairs at the landlord's expense, in whole or in part, the men who carried out the work would have represented the landlord, whether they were independent contractors or not. The duty to so reconstruct the building as not to injure the plaintiff would be an absolute duty, resting upon the landlord, which he could not delegate to another, and thereby escape liability. Wilkinson v. Spring Works, 73 Mich. 405; Peerless Manfg. Co. v. Bagley, 126 Mich. 225; Lauer v. Palms, 129 Mich. 671 (58 L. R. A. 67); Riley v. Simpson, 83 Cal. 217 (7 L. R. A. 622); Case v. Minot, 158 Mass. 577 (22 L. R. A. 536). Whatever the rule might be as to a stranger, it can make no difference in principle as to plaintiff, who occupied under a covenant for quiet enjoyment, whether the expense of reconstruction was borne by the landlord or another acting by his authority. In. either event, the invasion of plaintiff's possession would be due to the authority of the landlord, who had agreed to protect it, and, in either event, the landlord should be held liable for the negligent execution of the work, the result of which, directly attributable to the authority of the landlord, was an eviction of the tenant. Coulter v. Norton, 100 Mich. 389. Excluding fire as a cause for the fall of the building, such fall, under the circumstances of this case, was prima facie evidence of negligence. Barnowsky v. Helson, 89 Mich. 523 (15 L. R. A. 33); Huggard v. Refining Co. (Iowa), 109 N. W. 475. Apart from the inference which might properly be drawn from the collapse of the building in process of reconstruction, there was abundant evidence of negligence for the consideration of the jury. 2, 3. The only occurrences during the trial, lasting from October 3d to November 3d, which might form the basis of a charge of prejudicial conduct on the part of claimant, are wholly unsupported by exceptions taken on the trial, and generally without formal objections. The argu ment for a reversal is predicated upon exceptions to the refusal to grant a new trial. Even if we disagreed with the circuit judge in his conclusion that these occurrences were not prejudicial to contestants, which we do not, we should not be inclined to overrule his exercise of his discretion under such circumstances. The order of proofs and the permitting of testimony on rebuttal which was part of the original case are, to a certain extent, matters of discretion, and do not justify a reversal, except where such course deprives the complaining party of a fair trial or occasions a miscarriage of justice. We think that contestants were afforded an eminently fair trial and have no just cause for complaint. 4. It is said under this head: "One of the most palpable errors of the court was in refusing to give contestants' request No. 27, and removing from the consideration of the jury the action of claimant in suing the insurance companies." Request No. 27 was as follows: "And you may also in considering Mr. Blickley's testimony take into account the fact that he has sued the insurance companies, claiming that the building was destroyed by fire.' Claimant testified: "I commenced suit simply to protect my interests. * * * I found the policies stated that if there was any fire loss the companies must be notified within 60 days and I so notified them. At that time I did not know what I found out later. "Q. Now, further than that, there is a provision in your policies that suit must be brought within one year. "A. To keep the policy alive; yes, sir. That was the main reason for commencing suit." Counsel say in their argument: "The question of valuation was a difficult one to meet, under the circumstances, and we were entitled to question claimant's credibility by all fair means. "The insurance suits by third persons were not proper to be considered here, and as far as the charge of the court 148 MICH.-16. covered those cases, it was no doubt correct. But the court went further and took from the jury's consideration the action of claimant in suing his companies and assuming an inconsistent position. * "The court had admitted evidence of the suits to be introduced and claimant himself attempted to explain his reasons therefor. We had the right to question Mr. Blickley's credibility both on account of his interest, and on account of his inconsistent position. The following had taken place when claimant testified on his main case: Redirect: Q. Why did you commence suits against the insurance companies when you did? "Mr. Tatem: That is objected to. "The Court: I rather think the whole matter is immaterial. In what way do you claim it is material to show that any suits were begun? "Mr. Wolf: To show the inconsistent position. "Mr. Tatem: To show that he proceeded against the fire companies on the supposition that there was a fire in the building and that the companies would be liable. If the building collapsed, they would not be liable. Now, there is the act of the party to this suit, and everything he says or does is admitted. Now, we claim that at that time he was looking to the fire companies for his damage. "The Court: If it is material at all, the inference that is sought to be drawn from it, I think the question now asked by the claimant is proper, if the other is to stand. I am inclined to let the testimony stand under the claim of counsel, what they claim for it.' "After warning the jury about considering the results of the insurance cases, the court below called attention to the amount of claimant's insurance. And in that connection he made the following charge: "You may consider the amount of the claimant's insurance as bearing upon the value of his stock of merchandise. But that fact that he [claimant] has brought suit against the insurance company, which suit is pending, is not a matter for your consideration in arriving at a verdict in this case. You have no responsibility for any case but this, and should not consider any other.' "We submit this error in refusing to give this request was harmful to contestants and entitles them to a new trial." The insurance policies were not put in evidence, nor any proofs of loss on the part of claimant, nor the files in the suits against the companies. All that appeared was that claimant had sued some insurance companies on policies aggregating $7,000, which was the total amount of insurance. In the absence of evidence as to the proofs of loss and declarations in the suits, the jury could not be instructed to infer, from the fact that a standard form of policy is prescribed by statute, that the proofs of loss and declarations contained appropriate charges to enforce liability on such a policy and, therefore, might be considered as bearing upon the consistency of claimant's conduct and the credibility of his testimony. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the request was properly refused. 5. Contestants' twenty-first, twenty-second, and twenty-eighth requests, which were refused, were as follows: "(21) The fact that no formal written building permit was issued by the building inspector for the second work is no evidence of negligence. The question to be determined is whether there was in fact negligence on the part of Mr. Luce. "(22) The fact that no new plans were made for the second girder construction, is in itself no evidence of negligence. The question as before stated being whether in fact there was negligence on the part of Mr. Luce. (28) The evidence shows that no further specifications for the changes in question were necessary in this instance than was had here, and therefore you cannot find Mr. Luce guilty of negligence in this respect." Section 2 of the building ordinance is as follows: "SEC. 2. When any person or corporation shall be desirous of erecting, constructing, or repairing any building or buildings within the fire limits of said city, or any public building, public hall, concert room, theatre, church, schoolhouse, lodge room, armory, factory or warehouse, or any building where people habitually convene for religious worship or amusement, he or they shall make application at the office of the building inspector for a permit for that purpose, and shall be required to furnish and deposit permanently in the office of said inspector a written statement of the proposed location and the estimated cost and the contract time for the completion of the work, together |