The same principles would govern in their application to cases of a similar character. It cannot be doubted, for example, that the State may directly, or through a municipal corporation, establish a public slaughter-house, where butchers must bring their cattle to be slaughtered, and prohibit the slaughtering of cattle elsewhere. Compelling persons to pursue such callings in public places, established and regulated by the State, is looked upon as reasonable. But when the State, instead of establishing a public market or slaughter-house, and placing it under the management and control of State officials, grants to a private individual or corporation the exclusive privilege of maintaining a public market or slaughter-house, serious objections are raised to the constitutionality of the legislative act, and the franchise is often claimed to be void because it creates a monopoly. - § 105. Monopolies. As a general proposition, it may be conceded that the creation of a monopoly out of an ordinary calling is unconstitutional. But it will not do to say that all monopolies are void. Every man has, under reasonable regulations, a right to pursue any one of the ordinary callings of life, as long as its pursuit does not involve evil or danger to society. And a law which granted to one man, or a few individuals, the exclusive privilege of prosecuting the trade, would be in violation of the constitutional rights of those who are prohibited from pursuing the same calling. This is clear. On the other hand, when the State bestows upon one or more the privileges of pursuing a calling, or trade, the prosecution of which is not a common natural right, a monopoly is created, but no right of the individual is violated, for with the abolition of the monopoly thus created would disappear all right to carry on the trade. The trade never existed before as a lawful calling. Such and universally submitted to by the residents of the country." Wartman v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. St. 202. monopolies are valid, and free from all constitutional objections.1 The grant of exclusive franchises is a matter of relatively common occurrence, and is rarely questioned. As long as the question is confined to the case of exceptional franchises, as for example, railroads, bridges, ferries, and the like, there seems to be no doubt of the power of the State to grant an exclusive franchise. But when the same principle is applied to the more common and numerous franchises, as for example, a more or less extraordinary use of the streets of a city, the cases do not always support the distinctions that have been made. On the one hand it has been held to be reasonable to grant to one or more the exclusive right to remove the carcasses of animals and other offal of a city. But, on the other hand, it has been held in some States, although a different conclusion is reached in other States, that the exclusive grant to a company of the right to furnish the city with gas, was unlawful and void, as being a monopoly: "As, then, no consideration whatever, either of a public or private character, was reserved for the grant; and as the business of manufacturing and selling gas is an ordinary business, like the manufacturing of leather, or any other article of trade in respect to which the government has no exclusive prerogative, we think that so far as the restriction of other persons than the plaintiffs from using the streets for the purpose of distributing gas by means of pipes, can fairly be viewed as intended to operate as a restriction upon its free manufacture and sale, it comes directly within the definition and description of a monopoly; and although we have no direct constitutional provision against a monopoly, yet the whole theory of a free government is opposed to such grants, and it does not require even the aid which may be derived from the Bill of Rights, the first section of which 1 Cooley on Torts, pp. 277, 278. 2 Vandine, Petitioner, 9 Pick. 187 (7 Am. Dec. 351); River Rendering Co. v. Behr, 7 Mo. App. 345. declares that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments' to render them void." 1 2 Certainly it is a franchise to make excavations for the laying of pipes for the distribution of the gas, very different from the manufacture of leather;" and being a franchise, the enjoyment of it may be made an exclusive privilege. In Tennessee it has been held that even if monopolies in general are prohibited, it is nevertheless competent to grant the exclusive right to a company to supply a city with water for a term of years. In Iowa, in a case involving much doubt, it was declared to be unreasonable to grant to one person the exclusive right to run omnibuses in the city. It is often stated, that the copyright and the patent of an invention are monopolies, which are permissible by law. But it seems to me that they are monopolies only so far as they make the right of manufacture exclusive. If the common-law theory in respect to these subjects be correct, that there is no natural right to the exclusive manufacture of one's own inventions and intellectual productions, then the grant of the exclusive right to manufacture is a monopoly, and cannot be better sustained than a monopoly of the manufacture of sugar or any other product. But the products of mental labor, when they take the shape of a book or an invented machine, ought to be as secure to the producer, as the products of manual labor, and it is the possible unconscious recognition of the justice of these claims, which brings about popular justification of these so-called monopolies. Notwithstanding the contradictions of the authorities, it is not difficult to determine on principle, as enunciated above, that the grant of privileges may be made a monopoly, but 1 Norwich Gas-light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19; State v. Cincinnati, etc., Gas Co., 18 Ohio St. 292 But, see contra, State, v. Milwaukee Gas-light Co., 29 Wis. 454. 2 Memphis v. Water Co., 5 Heisk. 492. Logan v. Payne, 43 Iowa 524 (22 Am. Rep. 261). that a monopoly cannot be made of the ordinary lawful occupations. But the difficulty becomes almost inexplicable, when the exclusive privilege is granted of carrying on a business, which is prohibited to others, because the unlimited pursuit of it works an injury to society. There is no doubt that a trade or occupation, which is inherently and necessarily injurious to society, may be prohibited altogether; and it does not seem to be questioned that the prosecution of such a business may be assumed by the government and managed by it as a monopoly. If it is lawful for the State to prohibit a particular business altogether, or to make a government monopoly of it, the pursuit of such a business would, if permitted to any one, be a privilege or franchise, and like any other franchise may be made exclusive. This is but a logical consequence of the admission, that the State has the power to prohibit the trade altogether. Such an admission is fatal to a resistance of the power to make it a monopoly. Not only is this true in respect to the prosecution of the prohibited trade, but the same principle applies to those cases, where the law provides that a particular trade shall be conducted in certain buildings or localities. We have seen that it is reasonable to prohibit the prosecution of certain trades except within a certain area, or in certain public buildings, owned and managed by the State or town. But the same objection is raised, if the State or town, instead of constructing and maintaining these public buildings, authorizes a private individual or corporation to erect and conduct them under police regulations. The monopoly, thus created, is not any more objectionable on principle, because it does not interfere to any greater degree, or in any different way, with the liberties of others who are prohibited, than the erection and maintenance of such buildings by the government. If the State has the constitutional power to 1 For example, in the regulation of the liquor trade, it was held to be constitutional to prohibit the sale of liquor, except by the agents of the town. State v. Brennan's Liquors, 25 Conn. 278. prohibit the prosecution of such a trade in all other buildings, the prohibition is equally irksome, whether the buildings are owned by the public or by private individuals; and the grant of the right to prosecute an otherwise prohibited trade in the buildings of a private individual or corporation would create a privilege, and may therefore be made a monopoly. If there is any valid objection to this regulation, it will be found to apply equally to all like cases, whether the buildings in which the trade is required to be conducted belongs to the State or private persons; and the regulation is unconstitutional, because the prosecution of the business anywhere will not produce an injury to the public. This doctrine has been established and applied to the case of slaughter-houses. The legislature of Louisiana provided for the erection by a certain private corporation of slaughter-houses on the Mississippi, near New Orleans, to which all butchers within a certain area were required to bring their cattle for slaughtering. The law compelled the corporation to provide convenient accommodation for all butchers, who applied, upon the payment of a reasonable compensation, and the slaughtering of animals elsewhere was absolutely interdicted. Suits were brought to resist the enforcement of the law, on the ground that it interfered with the constitutional rights of those interdicted and created a monopoly, not allowed by the constitution. The cases finally reached the Supreme Court of the United States, and the law was declared, by a divided court, to be constitutional. In delivering the opinion of the court Justice Miller said: "It cannot be denied that the statute under consideration is aptly framed to remove from the more densely populated part of the city the noxious slaughterhouses, and large and offensive collections of animals necessarily incident to the slaughtering business of a large city, and to locate them where the convenience, health and comfort of the people require they shall be located. And it must be conceded that the means adopted by the act for |