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a business of supreme necessity to the public. The leading case is that of Munn v. Illinois, already mentioned in the preceding section. It has so important a bearing upon the question under discussion, that we will quote again Chief Justice Waite's statement of the rule laid down in that case. He says: “Looking, then, to the common law, from whence came the right which the constitution protects, we find that wben private property is affected with a public interest, it ceases to bo juris privati only. This was said by Lord Chief Justice Hale, more than two hundred years ago, in his treatise De Portibus Maris, and has been accepted without objection as an essential element in the law of property ever since. Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control." 3 Although the application of these principles to the case in question only constitutes a precedent for justifying the regulation of prices in those cases, where the business is a virtual monopoly and of great necessity to the public, yet the language is broad enough to justify almost any case of regulation of prices. Under this rule, the attainment of the object of all individual activity, viz. : to make oneself or one's services indispensable to the public, furnishes in every case the justification of State interference. Only the more or less unsuccessful will be permitted to enjoy his liberty without governmental molestation. We feel with Mr. Justice Field, who dissents from the opinion of the court, that “if this be sound law, if there be no protection, either in the principles upon which our republican government is founded, or in the prohibitions of the constitution against such an invasion of private rights, all property and all business in the State are held at the mercy of a majority of its legislature.”' i For the same reasons, we find the Supreme Court of Alabama justifying an act of the legislature which authorized the town council of Mobile to license bakers, and regulate the weight and price of bread. In declaring the act to be constitutional, the court said: “ There is no motive, however, for this interference on the part of the legislature with the lawful actions of individuals or the mode in which private property shall be enjoyed, unless such calling affects public interests, or private property is employed in a manner which directly affects the body of the people.”

1 Munn o.

People, 69 Ill. 80; 8. C., 94 U. S. 113. 3 1 Harg. Law Tracts, 78. 3 Munn o. Illinois, 94 U. S. 125, 126.

• In the case in question, the use of the Chicago elevator was necessary to all dealers in grain in that city, and was controlled by nine firms, who annually established rates of charges for the regulation of the business. Says Chief Justice Waite: "Thus it is apparent that all the elevating facilities through which these vast productions of seven or eight great States of the West' must pass on the way to four or five of the States on the seashore' may be a virtual monopoly.” p. 131.

1 “The public has no greater interest in the use of buildings for the storage of grain than it has in the use of buildings for the residences of families, nor, indeed anything like so great an interest; and, according to the doctrine announced, the legislature may fix the rent of all tenements used for residences, without reference to the cost of their erection. If the owner does not like the rates prescribed, he may cease renting his houses. He has granted to the public, says the court, an interest in the use of the buildings, and he may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control.' The public is interested in the manufacture of cotton, woolen and silken fabrics, in the construction of machinery, in the printing and publication of books and periodicals, and in the making of utensils of every variety, useful and ornamental; indeed, there is hardly an enterprise or business engaging the attention and labor of any considerable portion of the community, in which the public has not an interest in the sense in which that term is used by the court in its opinion; and the doctrine which allows the legislature to interfere with and regulate the charges which the owners of property thus employed shall make for its use, that is, the rates at which all these different kinds of business shall be carried on, has never before been asserted, so far as I am aware, by any judicial tribunal in the United States.” Dissenting opinion of Justice Field in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 136.

Upon this principle, in this State, tavern keepers are licensed and required to enter into bond, with surety, that they will provide suitable goods and lodgings for their guests, and stabling and provender for their horses. The county court is required, at least, once a year, to settle the rates of innkeepers, and upon the same principle is founded the control which the legislature has always exercised in the establishment and regulation of mills, fences, bridges, turnpike roads and other kindred subjects.” 1

Chief Justice Waite relies upon Lord Hale as an authority for his recognition of the rule as of common-law origin. But there is nothing in Lord Hale's writings to support the broad application which the Chief Justice makes of his language. In every case to which Lord Hale applies this doctrine, there is a grant of a special privilege or franchise, and the enjoyment of it is regulated by law so that the public may derive from it the benefit which constituted the consideration of the grant. Thus, in respect to ferries, he says, the king “has a right of franchise or privilege, that no man may set up a common ferry for all passengers, without a prescription time out of mind, or a charter from the king.” And he proceeds to make the claim that "

"every ferry ought to be under a public regulation, viz. : that it give attendance at due times, keep a boat in due order, and take but reasonable toll.” So, also, in respect to wharves and wharfingers, the same writer says:

A man, for his own private advantage may, in a port or town, set up a wharf or crane, and may take what rates he and his customers can agree for cranage, wharfage,

1 Mayor v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137 (36 Am. Dec. 441). See Page v. Fazack. erly, 36 Barb. 392; Guillotte v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 432.

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housellage, pesage ; for he doth no more than is lawful for
any man to do, viz., make the most of his own.
If the king or subject have a public wharf, unto which all
persons that come to that port must come and unlade or lade
their goods, as for the purpose, because they are the only
wharves licensed by the king,

or because there is no other wharf in that port, as it may fall out where a port is newly erected; in that case there cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive duties for cranage, wharfage, pesage, etc., neither can they be enhanced to an immoderate rate; but the duties must be reasonable and moderate, though settled by the king's license or charter. For now the wharf and crane and other conveniences are affected with a public interest, and they cease to be juris privati only; as if a man set out a street in new building on his own land, it is now no longer a bare private interest, but is affected by a public interest.” 1 At common law, the right of property in a wharf or pier was a franchise. Lord Hale, therefore, cannot be cited in support of the doctrine that the State may regulate the prices charged in a business which from the circumstances becomes a virtual monopoly. And even if he did justify such regulations, his opinions can hardly be set up in oppo-sition to the rational prohibition of the American constitution. By all the known rules of constitutional construction the conclusion must be reached that the regulation of prices in such a case is unconstitutional; and while the common law is still authority for the propriety and justification of laws, which antedate the American constitutions, it cannot be cited to defeat the plain meaning of the constitution in respect to laws subsequently enacted.

§ 94. Usury and interest laws. - It has long been the custom in England and in this country to regulate the rate of interest.

· De Portibus Maris, 1 Harg. Law Tracts, 78.

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The regulation of interest may be of two kinds. So far as the legislature undertakes to determine what rate of interest can be recovered on contracts for the payment of money, in the absence of the express stipulation of the parties, it is a reasonable police regulation, the object of which is to aid the parties in effecting settlements, when they have not previously agreed upon any rate of interest. If the parties are not satisfied with the statutory rate, they cap agree upon any other rate. But it is different when the legislature undertakes to prescribe what rate of interest the parties to a contract may agree upon. The rate of interest, like the price of merchandise, is determined ordinarily by the relation of supply and demand. Free trade iu money is as much a right as free trade in merchandise. If the owner of the property in general has a natural right to ask whatever price he can get for his goods, the owner of money may exact whatever rate of interest the borrower may be willing to give. For interest is nothing more than the price asked for the use of money. No public reason can be urged for imposing this restriction upon the money lender, and the utter futility of such laws, in attempting to control the rate of interest, is, or should be, a convincing proof of their unreasonableness. It has been suggested that originally these laws were based upon the fact that the lending of money was a special privilege. “ The practice of regulating by legislation the interest receivable for the use of money, when considered with reference to its origin, is only the assertion of a right of the government to control the extent to which a privilege granted by it may be exercised and enjoyed. By the ancient common law it was unlawful to take any money for the use of money; all who did so were called usurers, term of great reproach, and were exposed to the censure of the church, and if, after the death of a person, it was discovered that he had been a usurer while living, his chattels were forfeited to the king, and his land escheated to the

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