is there any, and what, limit to the period within which such proceeding must be commenced? III. If a legal estate be outstanding in an infant, or a person of unsound mind, as a trustee, state the nature and effects of the summary proceeding to be taken under the Trustee Act for getting in the legal estate. IV. Refer to any recent Act of Parliament under which the Court of Chancery (notwithstanding the absence of a power in the settlement) can authorise a sale or lease of settled estates without a special application to Parliament. V. State shortly the circumstances in which the Court is, by the Act referred to, authorised to exercise jurisdiction, and the mode of proceeding. VI. What are the several modes in which the parties, plaintiffs and defendants, in a suit in Chancery, may adduce evidence to verify their respective cases for the hearing of the cause? VII. How should an affidavit to be used in the Court of Chancery distinguish facts or circumstances which are within the deponent's own knowlege from those which are deposed to from his information and belief; and is it necessary to show, upon the affidavit, what are the deponent's means of knowledge or source of information. VIII. If no interrogatories be filed requiring an answer by a defendant to a bill, is he at liberty within any, and what, time to put in a voluntary answer? IX. Where a defendant is not required to answer interrogatories, what is considered to be the effect of not putting in a voluntary answer? X. State the respective amounts of principal money and in annual payments which, if payable out of a fund under the control of the Court, to a married woman, entitle her to elect whether the amount shall be paid to her husband, or be made the subject of settlement. XI. If the married woman elect that the amount shall be paid to her husband, what is the mode of proceeding, and what evidence is necessary to obtain the order for such payment? XII. If before distributing the residue of a deceased's estate, an executor or administrator be desirous of being indemnified from unascertained debts and liabilities, is there any, and what, summary proceeding which he can take for this purpose without instituting a suit? XIII. By what instruments can a father appoint a guardian to his children, and what are the ordinary powers and duties of such guardian?

XIV. In the absence of a guardian so appointed, what is the summary course of proceeding after the father's death for the appointment of a guardian, and procuring an allowance for the infant's maintenance. XV. State shortly the mode of proceeding by which a trustee may be relieved from the responsibility of administering trust-funds without instituting a suit?

BANKRUPTCY.

I. State briefly the principle of the bankrupt laws, and the relief which they afford. II. What are the three conditions necessary to constitute a bankruptcy? III. What persons have been deemed by the Courts liable to the bankrupt laws? IV. State the principle which determines whether a person is a trader within the meaning of the bankrupt laws. V. Distinguish those acts which constitute acts of bankruptcy only when coupled with an intention on the part of the debtor to defeat or delay creditors, from those which constitute acts of bankruptcy independent of such intention. VI. Distinguish those acts which are voluntary or active from those which are passive or merely omissions on the part of the debtor. VII. What is the course to be adopted for obtaining an adjudication of bankruptcy against a member of Parliament, and what constitutes his liability? VIII. What are the necessary facts regarding the bankrupt's estate to be ascertained, and steps to be taken, previous to filing a petition for adjudication? IX. What is the course of proceeding to obtain adjudication against a jointstock company? X. What are the facts necessary to be stated in the petitioning creditor's affidavit of debt? XI. How must creditors prove their debts, and at what meetings, in order to become entitled to a dividend? and what, if anything, must be given up to entitle a creditor to a dividend? XII. Is there any distinction between mortgages of land and mortgages of personal property, as respects the relative rights of the mortgagees and assignees? and if so, upon what principle is such distinction made? XIII. What proceedings must be taken by the assignees before commencing an action, or suit, or before a reference to arbitration? XIV. What are the general rules with regard to the property of others, in the possession of the bankrupt, at the time of the bankruptcy? XV. Can any, and what, number of creditors, and how, bind the rest to accept a composition, and by what different modes of proceeding?

CRIMINAL LAW.

I. Have all the superior courts at Westminster a concurrent jurisdiction in criminal matters, or is it confined to any, and which of them, and who is the supreme coroner of the realm? II. Over what places does the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court extend? III. State the nature and jurisdiction of the Court of Quarter Sessions. IV. What is the Court of Petty Sessions? and state what is the general nature of business transacted at petty sessions. V. How are offences, which are subject to indictment at the suit of the Crown, divided in the English law, and in what respects do they differ from

civil injuries? VI. What is felony in the general acceptation of the English law? VII. Define accurately and concisely the common law offence of perjury. VIII. What number of witnesses is necessary to obtain a conviction for perjury, and why? IX. What is subornation of perjury? X. State the course of proceeding against a person accused of an offence in order to bring him to trial. XI. Can one or more magistrates admit to bail persons accused of felony? XII. May the Court of Queen's Bench, or a judge in vacation, admit a prisoner to bail in any, and what cases? XIII. What is an indictment, and state the mode of preferring, and shortly the material parts of an indictment? XIV. What is the nature of a criminal information? and in what way or ways must it originate? XV. State what, if any, are the conditions which the Court of Queen's Bench requires before granting a rule in a criminal information at the instance of a private prosecutor?

EXAMINATION ANSWERS. (Trinity Term, 1857.)

COMMON LAW (ante, p. 5).

I. Actions of contract and of tort—Simple contracts and specialties.—Actions of contract and of tort are distinguishable in this respect: that the former arise out of some wrongful act in respect of an agreement between the parties, whilst the latter arise out of wrongful acts independently of contract. In each case there is a wrong committed which is sought to be remedied or compensated. Notwithstanding the abolition of forms of action, the distinction between actions ex contractu and ex delicto is of importance with reference to costs (1 Bac. Abr. 26; 3 Steph. Com. 431, 432, 2nd edit.) Debts by specialty or special contract are such whereby a sum of money becomes, or is acknowledged to be, due by deed or instrument under seal. Debts by simple contract are such, where the contract upon which the obligation arises is neither ascertained by matter of record, nor yet by deed or special instrument, but by writing not under seal, or by mere oral evidence (2 Black. Com. ch. 30; 2 Steph. Com. ch: 5; Princ. Com. Law, 38). A simple contract will merge in a specialty (see 2 Exch. Rep. 627). A distinguishing feature of difference between specialties aud simple contracts is, that the latter are not valid unless founded on a sufficient consideration, and they do not when in writing not under seal (with the exception of bills and notes) import a consideration; that is, the law will not presume a consideration till one appears. But where a security is under seal, it is binding on the party executing it, although there was no consideration for the making of it (4 East.

But

200; Fonbl. on Equity, Book 1, ch. 1, s. 1; Lowe v. Peers, 4 Burr. 2225; S. C. Wilmot, 364). though the law, from the deliberation and solemnity which accompany the execution of a deed, presumes a consideration, and delivers the covenantee from the necessity of proving it, yet that doctrine applies only where the deed is good on the face of it; for a consideration cannot be presumed to support a deed which is void on the face of it (Selw. N. P. 482, 11th edit.). Another difference between specialties and simple contracts is, that in administration of legal (though not of equitable) assets a specialty debt has priority in payment over a simple contract debt (2 Black. Com. 465; Selwyn's Nisi Prius, 793-796, 11th edit.).

II. Suing on bill or note.-In the case of a bill of exchange or promissory note not more than six months over-due, the plaintiff may sue out a special writ, upon which he must indorse the particulars of his claim. If the defendant do not obtain leave from a judge to appear, and appear accordingly within twelve days from the service of the writ, the plaintiff may sign judgment, tax his costs, and issue execution. To obtain leave, it must be made to appear by affidavit that there is a defence to the action, on the merits, or that it is reasonable that the defendant should be allowed to appear (2 Chron. 58, 63-65, 281, 296, 321; 3 Id. 99, 199, 281, 306).

III. Primary liability on bill; accomodation bill.— The acceptor of a bill of exchange is the party primarily liable to pay it. This liability exists, though the bill be an accommodation bill, with respect to parties who have bonâ fide (even with notice, Rosc. Evid. 226) given a consideration for the transfer. With respect to the drawer of the bill, the acceptor is not liable to him, the acceptance being for his accommodation. The rule is, that as between the immediate parties to the bill or note, want of consideration may be insisted on (Chit. Bills, 182; Byles' Bills, 114, 3rd edit.; Rosc. Evid. 226; Whittaker v. Edmunds, 1 Adol. and Ell. 638; Key, Exam. Quest. div. "Common Law," 43, 44; 1 Chron. 326).

IV. Libel and slander.-A libel is a malicious defamation expressed in printing or writing, or by signs, pictures, &c., tending to injure the reputation of another, and thereby expose such person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or whereby the party is liable to be prejudiced in the estimation of his friends and associates, and, consequently, suffers the damage incident to the loss of their friendship and support (2 Harr. and Edw. Nisi Prius, 1349; Princ. Com. Law, 210, 211; 3 Steph. Com. 447, 448, 2nd edit.; Bacon's Abridgm. tit " Slander;" 6 Rep. Crim. L. Com. 77). "If any man deliberately or

maliciously publish anything in writing concerning another, which renders him ridiculous, or tends to hinder mankind from associating or having intercourse with him, an action lies against such publisher" (perWilmot, 2 Wilson, 403). Slander differs from libel in its origin, inasmuch as it is by word of mouth, and not, like libel, by writing, &c. There is also a great difference in degree as to what constitutes a libel, and what slander. Many words which, if spoken, would not be actionable, are actionable if published in the way of libel. Hence the word swindler, if spoken of another, unless it be spoken in relation to his trade or business (1 Law Stud. Mag., N. S., 209), is not actionable (Savile v. Jardine, 2 H. Black, 531; Wilby v. Elston, 8 Com. Ben. Rep. 142); but if it be published in the way of libel, it is actionable (I'Anson v. Stuart, 1 Term Rep. 748). Communications fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, are denominated privileged communications, and for them no action lies (see Somervill v. Hawkins, 15 Jur. 450; S. C. 20 Law Journ., N. S., C. P. 131; Taylor v. Hawkins, 20 Law Journ., N. S., Q. B. 313). Another distinction between libel and slander is, that libels are punished criminally as well as civilly, but mere verbal slander, in general, is not punishable criminally, except it affects the Government or some magistrate, &c.

V. Replevin.-Replevins are now granted by the registrar of the county court of the district in which the distress is taken (19 & 20 Vic. c. 108, s. 63). The action of replevin may be commenced either in one of the superior common law courts, or in the county court of the district in which the distress was taken (19 & 20 Vic. c. 108, ss. 65, 66; Davis, Suppl. 144, 145; 3 Law Chron. pp. 55, 78, 79, 155, 213).

VI. Costs, where claim less than £20.—If a plaintiff sues in contract for less than £20, he should indorse a notice on the writ that he will, in case judgment goes by default, apply for the costs of the proceedings (see Rule of Easter Term, 1857, stated post, p. 19). If the defendant pleads, and the plaintiff obtains a verdict, the judge should be asked to certify on the back of the record that it appeared to him at the trial that the cause of action was one for which a plaint could not have been entered in the county court, or that there was a sufficient reason for bringing the action in the superior court. If this certificate be not obtained, the plaintiff may apply to the court or a judge at Chambers, and if he can show that such action was brought for a cause in which concurrent jurisdiction is given to the superior courts, or for which no plaint could have been entered in the county court, or that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the superior court, the court or judge will direct the allowance

of the costs, which will, of course, be taxed on the lower scale (13 & 14 Vic. c. 61, s. 11; 15 & 16 Vic. c. 54, s. 4; Davis, 14—16).

VII. Judgment on specially indorsed writ.-If the defendant does not appear to a specially indorsed writ, the plaintiff files an affidavit of personal service of the writ, or if personal service cannot be effected, a judge's order for leave to proceed, and a copy of the writ of summons, and then signs judgment. If some only of several defendants appear, the plaintiff may sign judgment against those defendants who do not appear, and, without declaring against the others, may issue execution thereon, which is to be considered as an abandonment of the action against the appearing defendants; or the plaintiff may, before issuing execution, declare against the appearing defendants, stating the judgment against the nonappearing defendants, when such judgment will have. the same effect as a judgment by default, for want of plea, formerly would have had (Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, ss. 27, 33).

VIII. Master's liability for injury by servant; fellow-servants.-A master is liable for the tortious act of his servant committed by his direction or with his assent, and this extends to the servant's negligent performance of the lawful orders of his master (Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. and Cr. 559; Key, "Com. Law," 52, 53; Patten v. Rea, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 161; 3 Law Chron. 155, 387). In general, a master is not responsible for the negligence of a servant occasioning an injury to a fellow-servant working at or engaged on the same work; and this extends to a mere volunteer who is so injured (Hutchison v. Newcastle Railway Company, 5 Exch. R. 343; Wiggett v. Fox, 11 Exch. R. 832; Dee v. Midland Railway Company, 26 Law Journ. Exch. 171; 3 Law Chron. pp. 130, 155, 321).

IX. Attorney suing for costs.-Before an attorney can bring an action on his bill he must have delivered to, or left for, the defendant, a calendar month previously, a signed bill of his costs (6 & 7 Vic. c. 73, s. 37; Pract. Com. L. 331; 1 Law Chron. 403 -407; 3 Id. 376).

X. Notice to quit.—When there is a tenancy from year to year subsisting, it can only be put an end to by a notice to quit, which may be given by either party, either in the first (Doe v. Smarridge, 9 Jur. 781) or any subsequent year. Except where there is a special agreement to the contrary, or a particular local custom controlling the general rule, the notice must be a half-year's notice. However, where the tenancy commenced at one of the usual quarterly feast-days, the half-year may be computed from one feast-day to another, though there be not 182 days between them (1 W. Black. Rep. 596; Harris. Woodf. Landlord and Tenant, 275, note k.;

2 Black. Com. 141, note 1, by Christian; 1 Steph. Com. 271, 1st edit. ; p. 278, 2nd edit.). The notice to quit must be given half a year previous to the expiration of the current year of the tenancy, so as to expire at the same period of the year as the tenancy from year to year commenced (1 Steph. Com. 271, 1st edit.; p. 278, 2nd edit.; Right v. Darby, 1 Term Rep. 159; see Doe v. Dobell, 1 Qu. Ben. Rep. 806; S. C. 5 Jur. 434; Berry v. Lindley, 9 Man. and Gr. 498; S. C. 5 Jur. 1061; Doe v. Lines, 12 Jur. 80). So where it is agreed that a quarter's notice shall be sufficient, the notice must expire with the end of the current year of the tenancy (3 Burr. 1019.; 2 Black. Com. 147, n. 3, by Christian; Doe v. Donovan, 1 Taunt. 555; Doe v. Dobell, 1 Q. B. Rep. 806).

XI. Judgment after verdict; execution.-On a verdict, judgment may be signed and execution issued in fourteen days, unless execution be ordered to issue at an earlier or later period (15 & 16 Vic. c. 76, s. 120; Rule, Hil. T. 1853, pl. 57).

XII. New trial, appeal, notice.-In all cases of rules to enter a verdict or a nonsuit, upon a point reserved at the trial, if the rule nisi be refused, or granted and then discharged, or made absolute, the party decided against may appeal. So, again, in all cases of motions for a new trial, upon the ground that the judge has not ruled according to law, the party decided against may appeal, provided one of the judge's dissent from the decision of the court, or the court think fit that an appeal should be allowed. No appeal is, however, to be allowed where the application for the new trial is upon matter of discretion only, as on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of evidence (Com. L. Proc. Act, 1854, pl. 34, 35; stated more fully, 3 Law Chron. pp. 386, 387). Notice of appeal must be given, within four days after the decision, to the oppositę party, and also to a Master of the Court (Com. L. Proc. Act, 54, pl. 37).

XIII. Execution against shareholder in joint-stock company. By the 7 & 8 Vic. c. 110, s. 66, execution may be issued against a shareholder of a completely registered company on an application for leave to issue it made either to the court or a judge without the necessity for any suggestion, or for a scire facias; the party applying must show that due diligence has been used to obtain satisfaction of the judgment by execution against the property and effects of the company (see 3 Law Chron. pp. 50, 54, 226, 264, 307, 325, 379, 380, 400). Somewhat similar provisions apply to the shareholders of other companies under the Clauses Consolidation Act (the 8 & 9 Vic. c. 16, s. 36), but the application is to be made to the court (1 Law Chron. pp. 243, 275, 309, 345, 410; 2 Law Chron. 270; 3 Id. 20).

XIV. Evidence-Husband and wife.-Husbands and wives may be witnesses for or against each other, except in proceedings of a criminal nature or for adultery; in no case are they to be compelled to disclose any communication during marriage (16 & 17 Vic. c. 83; Dav. County Court, 68, 2nd edit.; Key, "Com. Law," pp. 116, 117).

XV. Evidence-Attesting witness.-An attesting witness must be called (if alive, &c.), where to the validity of the document an attesting witness is necessary (1 Law Chron. pp. 158, 376, 415; 3 Id. 9, 386; Key, "Com. Law," p. 117).

CONVEYANCING (ante, p. 5).

I. Conveyances or transfers of property. — Real property cannot in general, since the 8 & 9 Vic. c. 106, be conveyed without deed; personal property in general passes by mere delivery of possession (2 Law Stud. Mag. N. S. Supp. p. 132). A freehold estate in possession of real property corporeal of freehold tenure was formerly said to lie in livery only, and was sometimes conveyed by livery of seisin, accompanied by a deed of feoffment, or at least, prior to 8 & 9 Vic. c. 106, by a written memorandum, signed by the vendor (29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 1); but the conveyance was usually made by deed of lease and release. But now the immediate freehold of lands lies in grant also, and may be conveyed accordingly. And a like freehold estate in remainder, or reversion, after an existing estate of freehold, is said to lie in grant, and cannot be conveyed without a deed (1 Steph. Com. 171, 474; Watk. Conv. by White, 182). But it would seem that a freehold remainder, or reversion, expectant on an estate for years, may, with the assent of the tenant, be conveyed also by a deed of feoffment and livery (see Burt. Com. pl. 42; Doe v. Lynes, 3 Barn, and Cres. 388; 2 Black. Com. 314, 315). A lease for years cannot (except in the case of a lease for a term not exceeding three years from the making, and reserving two-thirds of the annual value as rent) be created, nor can any lease be assigned or (except by operation of law) surrendered where it could not be created without writing, without a deed (29 Car. 2, c. 3, ss. 1, 3; 8 & 9 Vic. c. 106, s. 3). Incorporeal hereditaments lie in grant, and cannot, in general, be created or conveyed without deed (1 Steph. Com. 474; 2 Id. 54, 1st ed.; Bird v. Higginson, 6 Ad. and Ell. 824). Copyholds pass by surrender and admittance (2 Steph. Com. 52, 1st ed.). Equitable interests in real property cannot be created (except in the peculiar case of an equitable mortgage by deposit) or transferred without a writing (29 Car. 2, ss. 7, 9; 1 Steph. Com. 350); but even in the case of legal estates, where there has been a part performance, equity will frequently enforce the con

tract, although not put into writing (see 1 Sugd. V. and P. 10th ed. 198). A writing is sometimes requisite for the purpose of changing the property in personalty, as in the cases of a sale of goods of the value of £10, where there is neither payment, nor earnest, nor delivery (29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 17; 19 Geo. 4, c. 14); a bill or note payable to order; a copyright (12 Jur. 922, as to attestation), or patent right, &c. &c. A voluntary gift of goods unaccompanied by delivery must be evidenced by deed (2 Steph. Com. 102, 1st ed.; p. 41, 2nd ed.; Sharr v. Pilch, 4 Exch. Rep. 478. Certain formalities are required by statute on the grant or assignment of life annuities, or transfer of ships (1 Law Chron. 363— 366, 429, 411, 412; 2 Id. 160).

For

II. Conveyance not mentioning buildings, mines, &c. -A conveyance of freehold lands will, if the word "land" be in the deed of conveyance, pass buildings thereon, and minerals and mines thereunder. it is clear that the word "land" includes not only the face of the earth, but everything under or over it (Shepp. Touchst. 90; 4 Bing. 90; Raine v. Alderson, 1 Arnold, 329). And, therefore, it is said, “if a man grants all his lands, he thereby grants all his mines of metal, and other fossils-his woods, his waters, and his houses, as we' as his fields and meadows. By the name of land, which is nomen generalissimum, everything terrestrial will pass" (see Co. Litt. 4 a; 2 Black. Com. 18; 1 Burton's Elem. Convey. 3; 1 Ld. Raym. 737; 3 Wilson, 120; Barton's Comp. 1, 214, 216, 232; 1 Steph. Com. 158, 1st edit.; p. 161, 2nd edit.; 2 Law Stud. Mag. N. S. Supp. p. 51). But on a conveyance of copyhold lands, mines do not pass, at least the copyholder has no power to open new mines (2 Steph. Com. 46, 1st edit.; 1 Id. pp. 594, 595, 2nd edit. ; Dearden v. Evans, 5 Mee. and Wels. 11; 3 Jur. 705, S.C.; 17 Ves. 282. The dictum in Com. Dig. tit. "Copyholds" (M. 3), that it is not waste for copyholder in fee to dig or open mines, cannot be supported (1 Siderf. 152; 1 P. Will. 406; Doe v. Wilson, 11 East, 56; Lewis v. Brentwate, 2 B. and Adol. 438). It must be borne in mind that one person may have the right to the surface of the land, and another to the soil underneath, and, except by custom, &c., the owner of minerals, &c., underneath, cannot remove them without leaving sufficient support (Humfries v. Brogden, 15 Jur. 124), and, on the other hand, it has been held that an action of trespass may be maintained against the owner of the surface by the owner of the subsoil for any injury to such subsoil (Cox v. Glue, 12 Jur. 185).

III. Grant of piece of water.-By the grant of a piece of water, the water, together with the right of fishery, passes, but not the soil beneath: for the

it lies; unless, perhaps, in the case of salt pits or springs, where the interest of each owner is measured by bullaries or buckets of brine (Co. Litt. 4 b; 2 Black. Com. 18; Burton's Comp. pl. 550; 1 Siderf. 161; 1 Levinz, 114; 1 Bart. Elem. Convey. 3, 4; 1 Steph. Com. 157, 1st ed.; p. 161, 2nd ed.).

IV. Barring estates tail.-It is by virtue of the provisions in the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, that an estate tail may be barred. The bar is effected by the tenant in tail, with the consent, where there is one, of the protector of the settlement, unless, indeed, the tenant be also entitled to the immediate remainder or reversion in fee. The disentailment is effected by any assurance inter vivos by which estates in fee can be effected (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, ss. 15, 22, 34, 40-43; Key, div. “ Conveyancing," pp. 35-37; Hay. Conv. 157, 159, 614, 4th edit; 1 Steph. Com. 546).

V. Emblements-Lessee of tenant for life.--Where a man has an uncertain estate, as for his own or another's life, or at will, he is entitled, on the determination of his tenancy (if it be not by his own act), to the emblements or profits of his crop. The doctrine of emblements extends not only to corn sown, but to roots planted, or other annual artificial profits; but it is otherwise of fruit trees, grass, or the like, which are not planted annually at the expense and labour of the tenant, but are either a permanent or natural profit of the earth (Co. Litt. 55; Graves v. Weld, 5 Barn. and Adol. 105; Davis v. Eyton, 7 Bing. 154; 2 Black. Com. 122; 1 Steph. Com. 242, 269, 1st edit.; pp. 247, 275; Cro. Eliz. 461; Litt. s. 68; 3 Law Stud. Mag. N. S. Supp. p. 28). Emblements can be claimed only in a species of crop which ordinarily repays the labour by which it is produced within the year in which that labour is bestowed; and it seems that where (as in the case of clover) the vegetable is capable of yielding several crops, the tenant pur autre vie, having cut one crop, as emblements during the year, is not entitled to emblements of crops cut by the reversioner, more than one year having elapsed from the sowing. (Graves v. Weld, 5 B. and Adol. 105; S. C. 2 Nev. and Man. 725). And till lately, a lessee under a lease from a tenant for life was entitled to emblements, and that not only in those cases where a tenant for life was entitled-namely, where the estate was determined by the acts of God or of the law (2 Black. Com. 122; Com. Dig. tit. "Biens" (G); 1 Steph. Com. 242)-but likewise where the tenancy was determined by the act of the tenant for life (5 Coke's Rep. 116; 2 Black. Com. 122; 1 Steph. Com. 242, 269, 1st edit.). But if the tenant for years himself determined the tenancy by his own act, he was not entitled to cmblements (Co. Litt. 55 b; 3 Bart. Elem. Conv. 56; Davis v. Eyton, 7 Bing. 154; S.