bundle of other title deeds relating to the same property with B. as security for another advance, representing that the bundle contains the mortgage deed to himself. B. having neglected to examine the deeds, and to inquire for the absent one held to be affected with notice of A.'s charge. It being proved that an equitable mortgagee was the client of the mortgagor, but without reference to the particular transaction: Held, that the burden was thrown on the mortgagee of proving that the relation of solicitor and client did not exist in that transaction. Jones v. Williams, 5 Week. Rep. 540.

MORTGAGE OF TOLLS.-All mortgagees to be paid pari passa-Bill by a second mortgagee against mortgagors, co-mortgagees, and others-Accounts.Where there is an express provision in acts of Parliament to the effect that no mortgagee of a company is to have any benefit out of the tolls and rates, except that he is to be paid without any preference by reason of priority of date, there are strong reasons for holding that any mortgagee who finds that others are being paid, without having taken possession, in priority and in preference to himself (there being no covenant to pay by the company, and the only fund being that formed by the tolls, rates, and duties), might be entitled to file a bill to restrain payment of the other mortgagees in preference to himself, and to have himself and them put upon an equality; and that without being obliged to ask the court for a receiver, or putting himself in possession of the mortgaged property. Where the whole of the mortgagees, or some or one or more of them on behalf of the others of them, put themselves in possession of the property, a co-mortgagee who does not acquiesce in the proceeding (and he need not do so) may, under the acts, say, as between him and the company, and the receivers of the tolls, that he had a right to look upon the receivers as agents of the company; and that the co-mortgagees are entitled to share pari passu. Where, therefore, a plaintiff, a second mortgagee, subject to the above principles, filed a bill for an account on behalf of himself alone against his co-mortgagees and others as agents of the company, but failed to establish his case as to the agency, his bin was dismissed as to that, but he was held entitled to an account. Tripp v. Bridgwater and Taunton Canal and Stolford Railway and Harbour Company, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 176.

PUBLIC COMPANY [vol. 3, p. 322].-JointStock Companies Act, 1856, sec. 25-Rectification of register - Irregularity — Meeting for calls Other meetings.-The power given to the superior courts of law or equity by the 25th section of the JointStock Companies Act, 1856, to order the register to be rectified, was intended to avoid the inconvenience arising from capricious or frivolous objections on the

part of the company, but the court will not entertain such an application where there is an important question to be tried as to the right of the applicant to have the register rectified. At an adjourned general meeting of the shareholders of a company, of which adjournment notice was given by circulars sent to the several shareholders, but not by advertisement, as required by the deed of settlement, a proposition for a call was carried. A shareholder, who was present and voted at the adjourned meeting, held not entitled to take advantage of the irregularity of the notice. Semble, if the shareholders had, in effect, notice of the meeting, the want of compliance with the provisions of the deed by advertisement would not invalidate the proceedings at the meeting. The deed of settlement provided that in every notice convening a general meeting of the shareholders, the object of the meeting should be specified. The transaction of business at the meeting foreign to the objects specified in the notice will not. make the whole meeting irregular. Re The British Sugar Refining Company, 26 Law Journ. 369.

PUBLIC COMPANY. Railway company · Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, s. 92 - Part of building [vol. 1, pp. 449, 450].-Section 92 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act provides, "that no party shall at any time be required to sell or convey to the promoters of the undertaking a part only of any house or other building or manufactory, if such party be willing and able to sell and convey the whole thereof." It has been held, whatever will pass with a house or building in any ordinary conveyance is "part of a house, &c.," within the meaning of the above 92nd section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845. Lands were purchased for the purpose of building alms-houses thereon, with a stipulation that the central portion of the design, containing the hall, library, and rooms for twelve inmates, should be erected within five years. The central portion was erected, and it was proposed to complete the design by building two side wings. A railway company served notice of their requiring to take a portion of the land upon which one of the proposed wings would stand if the design were completed, the proposed line of railway passing close to the central part already built: Held, that the central building being an integral portion in itself, the land required by the company was not part of the building within s. 92 of the Lands Clauses Act, so that the company could be compelled to take the whole land or none. Grosvenor v. Hampstead Junction Railway Company, 5 Week. Rep. 614.

SETTING ASIDE DEED [vol. 3, p. 184],— Ignorance and mistake as to its purport-Reconveyance. In the following case, a deed was set aside upon the ground of ignorance and mistake as to its

purport and effect, no fraud or undue influence in obtaining its execution being allowed, and the deed itself being inconsistent with the effect contended for by the grantee under it as against the plaintiff. Cox v. Burton, 5 Week. Rep. 545.

SETTLEMENT. - Power of sale. Extinguishment-Consent to sale.-The union of a life estate under a settlement, with the reversion in fee, will extinguish a power of sale and exchange in the settlement. A power given by will to sell estates which are the subject of a settlement, which also contains a power of sale, is in abeyance, so long as the limitations and trusts of that settlement remain unperformed. A settlement was executed upon a marriage, by which large estates were settled to the use of J. A. G. for life, with remainder, to the intent that his wife, if she survived him, should receive a jointure of £600 a year; with remainder to the use of trustees for 500 years, to secure payment of the jointure; with remainder to the use of other trustees for 2,000 years, to raise portions, and subject thereto, to the use of all the children of the marriage (except an eldest or only son), with an ultimate remainder to J. A. G. in fee. Power was also given to the wife to appoint £2,000, after her decease, in aid of her personal estate, and to create a term for securing its payment. A power of sale and exchange was also given to the trustees, "during the life of J. A. G., with his consent, and, for twenty-one years after his decease, with the consent of the persons entitled to the rents." J. A. G. died without issue. By his will, he devised the estates to trustees, upon trust for sale. The trustees, under the power in the settlement, sold the estates, but the title was objected to: Held, that the power was confined by the limitations in the settlement, and that it was extinguished; that there was no person who could give any consent to the sale; and that, as the trusts of the settlement were unperformed, no present power of sale existed in any one. Wolley v. Jenkins, 26

Law Journ. Ch. 379.

SETTLED ESTATES ACT [vol. 3, pp. 105, 111, 196, 209, 214].-Leases and sales of—Examination of married women.- -By section 37 of the Settled Estates Act (vol. 3, p. 110), a married woman applying to the court is to be separately examined. It has been held, in two cases, by the Master of the Rolls, that the examination of a married woman, and her consent to any application intended to be made by her under the above act, must be obtained before the petition is presented. Semble, the solicitor appointed to take such examination must not be the solicitor acting in the matter. Re Brealy and Re Hadwen, 5 Week. Rep. 613, 614.

SOLICITORS [vol. 3, pp. 263, 404].-Partners -Liability of, for unauthorised use by one of the

partners of the name of a person as plaintiff in a suit. -It is clearly settled that to justify the use of a person's name as plaintiff in a suit in equity, a solicitor is bound to produce a written retainer, or to show by clear evidence a parol retainer unequivocally sufficient to bind the client; and that in the absence of a written authority, the oath of a solicitor without more is insufficient to prove the retainer, where it is contradicted by that of the client. The following decision shows that the court interferes summarily in such cases, and that a solicitor is answerable for his partner's act. M., a member of a firm of two solicitors, M. and H., in 1847, without any authority given by B., instituted a suit in B.'s name, as one of several co-plaintiffs, and carried it on for nine years, when B., on being served with a subpœna for payment of costs of some unsuccessful exceptions, became for the first time aware of the unauthorised use of his name: Held, upon petition by B. in the suit, that M. was responsible for the costs of the suit from beginning to end, and that H., though not personally cognisant of his partner's misconduct, was also liable, at all events, for costs incurred up to the time when, upon the dissolution, in 1849, of the partnership between himself and M., his name ceased to appear on the records of the Court as one of the solicitors for the co-plaintiffs in the suit. Semble, that if B. had, during the course of the litigation, become aware of the use of his name, his subsequently omitting to interfere actively to prevent its continuance would not per se have been sufficient to relieve the solicitors from liability to him for the costs. Re Manby, 26 L. J. 313, C.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS [vol. 3, index, tit.]— Agreement to answer the debt of another-Voluntary Agreement.-The Statute of Frauds, the 29th Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4, enacts, "that no action shall be brought whereby to charge any executor or administrator upon any special promise to answer damages out of his own estate, or whereby to charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereto by him lawfully authorised." The above provision statute does not apply to a case where the party giving the guarantee is himself liable to the demand which he is purporting to guarantee; it must be exclusive debt, default, or miscarriage of a third person to bring it within the statute. A testator appointed his son and three other persons his executors and trustees. The son disclaimed and renounced probate, and afterwards purchased a por

tion of the testator's property. The other legatees raised a claim for losses incurred by the trustees, and the son's solicitor wrote, on his behalf, to the claimants, agreeing to pay £3,000 in satisfaction of the alleged losses: Held, that this letter was not within the Statute of Frauds, as an agreement to answer the debt, default, or miscarriage of another; and that it was not invalid for want of consideration. The claim was, therefore, allowed against the son's estate. Orrell v. Coppock, 26 L. J. 269, C.

TRUSTEE.-Liability of trustee for acts of cotrustee [vol. 1, p. 90]-Joining in receipt for sake of conformity-Wilful default [vol. 1, pp. 408, 451].In Bruce v. Stokes (11 Ves. 324) Lord Eldon thus stated the doctrine as to the liability of a trustee for the acts of his co-trustee :-"At law, where trustees join in a receipt, primâ facie all are to be considered as having received the money; but it is competent to a trustee, and if he means to exonerate himself from that inference, it is necessary for him to show that the money acknowledged to have been received by all was in fact received by one, and the other joined only for conformity. In the case of executors it has been said, and well said, to be otherwise." The following case carries out this decision, V. C. Wood having held that the surviving trustee of a will cannot be made liable for wilful default in respect of purchase-money which was received from the sale of part of the testator's estate by a deceased co-trustee alone and misappropriated, though he joined in the receipt for the sake of conformity. Martindale v. Picquot, 5 Week. Rep. 552.

WILL. Condition-Dispensation by subsequent acts of testator Republication Confirmation. Where a prohibition is attached to a legacy, and dispensed with by the subsequent acts of the testator, by a codicil confirming the will generally, the legacy is confirmed, and the prohibition not revived. Violett v. Brookman, 26 Law Journ. 309, C.

WITNESS [vol. 3, pp. 221, 258].— Decree for administration-Affidavit of debt-Chancery Amendment Act-Cross-examination- - Costs.-A creditor's affidavit filed in support of his claim for a debt, under a decree in an administration suit, is one upon which, under the 40th section of the Statute 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, he can be cross-examined. One of the ViceChancellors having made an order exparte that a person ordered to attend as a witness should pay the costs, the order was discharged as irregular. Cast v. Poyser, 26 Law Journ. 353, C.; 3 Law Chron. 221.

EQUITY PRACTICE.

ACCOUNT.-Books of account, evidence [vol. 1, pp. 341, 376, 450]-Wilful default-15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, s. 54.—With respect to wilful default, V. C.

Wood said, in the following case, that it was not intended in Coope v. Carter (2 De G. M. and G. 292) to enlarge the general rule laid down by Lord Eldon, that to obtain an inquiry as to wilful default, a case for such inquiry must be alleged, and one act at least of wilful default proved, to the extent of entitling a plaintiff to an inquiry as to wilful default upon a mere general and sweeping allegation. In a suit to administer the estate of a testator who had died in Jamaica in 1825, an account was directed against the surviving executor, and the representative of the deceased executor. In taking the account, the books of account, which were proved to have been recorded in the Jamaica court, were allowed to be taken as primâ facie evidence of the truth of the matters therein contained under 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, s. 54, without production of vouchers. Inquiry as to wilful default refused upon a bill charging generally that assets to a certain amount had been received, and that, if they had not been received, the executors had been guilty of wilful default. Sleight v. Lawson, 5 Week. Rep. 589.

ADMINISTRATION.— Accounts Payment of charges upon real estate-Tenant for life—Remainderman—Application of capital and income to discharge debts and interest.—Upon taking the accounts in a suit to administer real and personal estate, if a question arises between the tenant for life and the remainderman, as to the proper mode of applying the personal estate, the court will, if the justice of the case require it, for the purpose of seeing to what extent and in what form the real estate is to be exonerated by means of the personalty, investigate the application of the personal estate, and proceed, as a general rule, upon the principle of applying the capital of the personal estate to pay the principal of debts, and the income of the personal estate to pay the interest of debts. Shore v. Shore, 26 Law Journ. 386, C.

ELECTION [vol. 1, p. 341].—Between proceedings at law and in equity-Specific performance-Action of trespass-Double remedy.—In general a party is not allowed to proceed at law and in equity at the same time in respect of the same matter: a suit for specific performance and an action for breach of a contract cannot proceed concurrently. A. B. having filed a bill for specific performance of an agreement to assign to him the lease of a house, obtained an interlocutory order for delivery up to him of possession and of the assignment. The assignment, which was thus obtained, was dated as of the time when possession was first claimed by the plaintiff. A. B. had, subsequently to this order, brought an action of trespass against the defendant, alleging, in other counts of the declaration, special damages arising from breach of the agreement. Held, that B., who

had obtained the benefit of the assignment by the interlocutory order, could not avail himself of it to bring an action of trespass at the time that he was suing the defendant in equity, and that he must elect, plaintiff not being allowed to sue in equity for specific performance of an agreement for the breach of which he has brought an action at law. Gedye v. Montrose, 5 Week. Rep. 537.

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INTERPLEADER BILL.-Time-Bill for new trial. A bill for an interpleader must be filed promptly and before verdict at common law: a bill cannot be filed for the obtaining of a new trial, though, in very distant times, this was permitted. The plaintiff was sued at law in December on an alleged contract with B.; the particulars of demand were delivered in January following; and the action came to trial in February, when a verdict was given for B. After the trial it was discovered that the contract was really with a third party, M., and that the plaintiff was liable to an action by M. The plaintiff, in April, applied for a new trial, which was refused; and he then filed a bill of interpleader against B. and M.: Held, on motion for an injunction, that the bill was filed too late. Larabrie v. Brown, 5 Week. Rep. 538.

INTERPLEADER BILL [vol. 3 pp. 281, 301]. -Affidavit of no collusion [vol. 3, p. 297].-A bill of interpleader must be accompanied by an affidavit (see vol. 3, p. 297). Leave given (valeat quantum) to file a bill of interpleader with an affidavit of no collusion by the plaintiff's solicitor, the plaintiff being out of the jurisdiction. Larabrie v. Brown,-5

Week. Rep. 538.

SETTLED ESTATES ACT [vol. 3, pp. 105, 111, 196, 209, 214, 286]—Leases settled in chambers.— Leases to be granted by trustees under the provisions of the Settled Estates Act, 1856, must be settled in chambers. Re Procter's Settled Estate, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 176; 3 Jur. N. S. 534; 5 Week. Rep.

643.

THREATENING LETTERS [vol. 3, p. 394].— Contempt of court-Committal.-A threatening letter, addressed and sent, pending the suit, to the defendant by the plaintiff, was held to be a contempt of court, upon which to found an order for committal. Smith v. Lakeman, 26 Law Jour. 305, C.

COMMON LAW.

ATTORNEY.-Bill of costs-6 & 7 Vic. c. 73Name of court in which business done-Part of bill bad does not vitiate residue, overruling vol. 3, p. 376.The following is a most important decision relative to the bills of costs of solicitors :- -Where an attorney's bill of costs, delivered under 6 & 7 Vic. c. 73, contained items which were plainly applicable to proceedings in some one of the superior courts, but did

not state in what court or courts in particular, the business was done, the Court of Queen's Bench, confirming Keene v. Ward (13 Q. B. 515), and Cook v. Gillard (1 Ell. and Bl. 26), held, that the bill of costs was sufficient, because it gave such information to the defendant as would enable him to obtain advice as to the expediency of taxation, which is all that was intended by the Legislature: Held, also, that the omission properly to designate a particular item, is not sufficient to disentitle an attorney to recover for that part which is open to no objections: Held, also, that if a part of the bill be insufficiently stated, the attorney may recover on that part which is sufficiently stated (Haigh v. Ousey, 5 Week. Rep. 523). As this case is so important, we give a portion of the judgment of Lord Campbell. His Lordship said, "I allow that a bill of costs ought to give to the client reasonable information, so that he may consult his attorney as to the fairness and reasonableness of the charges; but I adhere to the rule laid down in Keene v. Ward (13 Q. B. 515), and in Cook v. Gillard (1 Ell. and Bl. 26). I think that Patteson, J., in Keene v. Ward, takes the reasonable, sensible, and just view of the subject, when he says that the Legislature intended the client should have sufficient materials for obtaining advice as to taxation; and in Cook v. Gillard, we said that a client has no ground of objection to a bill who is in possession of all the information.that can reasonably be wanted for consultation on taxation. Now, applying this test to this case, I think the bill tells the defendant all that the Legislature intended that it should. By the act, attorneys and solicitors are put under such stringent regulations, that they cannot conduct their business as others do. It may be, and perhaps is, well that there should be some regulations for the protection of clients; but the attorneys would have great reason to complain of vexatious regulations tending to prevent their obtaining reasonable and just remuneration for their care and skill. I do not think the Legislature imposed upon them such a burden as it is contended for by counsel-viz., that another attorney, looking at the bill, may be able to say, without making any inquiry, whether the charges contained in it are reasonable and fair. With all respect for the authority of the Court of Exchequer, I prefer to adhere to the rule we have laid down in Keene v. Ward and Cook v. Gillard, that it is enough to show that the business was done in one of the superior courts. Formerly, indeed, that rule was not applicable, because there was a different scale of costs for the three courts, but now they are all alike. Looking at this bill, a considerable part of it is unobjectionable, and if such part stood by itself, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover. Then is the plaintiff's

right to recover for that part to be barred on account of the bill containing other items which it is said are objectionable? Such a doctrine would be most unjust. When an attorney brings in his bill for a long course of business, in which all the items are quite unobjectionable in themselves, is it to be said that because of an omission in a particular item he is to lose his action? That would be most unjust, because the information could be very easily supplied. If the Court of Exchequer alone had decided this to be the law of England, and that the defendant could make such a defence, I should have bowed to their decision; but there are conflicting authorities upon this point, and, therefore, I prefer to abide by what I think right. I find there is a case decided by Tindal, C. J., in the Common Pleas, Waller v. Lacy (1 M. and G. 54), in which it is held that there is no such rule, but that the attorney may recover that part of his bill which is unobjectionable; the same doctrine is laid down in Drew v. Clifford (R. and M. 280). The Court of Exchequer, in Ivimey v. Marks (16 Mees. and W. 843), and the other cases cited, have come to a different conclusion; but in this conflict of authority, I adhere to the decisions of the Common Pleas and of this courtnamely, that a bad item does not vitiate the whole bill, but that the plaintiff may maintain his action for that part of the bill which is not open to objection." Haigh v. Ousey, 3 Jur. N. S. p. 523. ATTORNEY.— Negligence Foreign bill. An attorney being instructed to take proceedings against the acceptor of a foreign bill of exchange, brought an action against him in the name of his client; the holder of the bill, without first ascertaining whether his client's title was complete by special indorsement, as required by the law of the foreign country, and it being afterwards ascertained that there was no such indorsement, the action was discontinued: Held, that the attorney was guilty of such negligence as disentitled him from recovering the costs of the abortive proceedings. Long v. Orsi, 26 Law Journ. 127, C. P.

BILLS OF SALE [vol. 3, pp. 45, 87, 259].— Registration Act—Instrument purporting to be a demise by the transferee of goods, a bill of sale within the act. -The following decision shows that the courts will not defeat the intention of the Bills of Sale Registration Act by allowing any colourable exception. An instrument reciting a sale of certain chattels by A. to B., of which sale, however, there was no other evidence, purported to be a demise of the chattels by B. to A. at a certain rent payable quarterly, with a proviso entitling B. to enter and take possession if the rent should be unpaid for ten days after any of the quarterly days of payment, or if execution should issue against the goods of A.: Held, that the

instrument was a bill of sale requiring registration under 17 & 18 Vic. c. 36. Phillips v. Gibbons, 5 Week. Rep. 527.

BUILDING SOCIETY [vol. 3, p. 395].-Construction of rules-Reasonable rule-Forfeiture of share by non-payment of subscription- Waiver of forfeiture. By the 33rd rule of a building society it was provided, that every member should pay 10s. per share subscription at every monthly meeting; and any member, not having executed a mortgage to the society, continuing to neglect payment of his monthly subscriptions for six consecutive monthly nights should thereupon cease to be a member of the society, and forfeit all his interest therein. By other rules, the entire management of the society was vested in twelve directors, five to be a quorum. The plaintiff, a member (not having executed a mortgage), for seven consecutive months made default in payment of his monthly subscriptions, but on a subsequent monthly meeting night paid them to two of the directors, who attended for the purpose of receiving subscriptions, and they accepted the arrears, in ignorance of the stringency of the rule, and gave receipts for them. At the first monthly meeting after that, the directors resolved that the plaintiff had on the sixth default ceased to be a member of the society, and had forfeited all his interest therein; and they erased his name from the list of members, and returned him the arrears paid by him to the two directors: Held, that, under the 33rd rule, the plaintiff had forfeited his interest in the society, and that the acceptance of the arrears by the two directors did not waive the forfeiture; and that the rule was not unreasonable. Carr, 26 Law Journ. 113, C. P.

Card v.

CARRIERS.-Railway company, special contruct -Party induced to sign in ignorance of terms.—If a person delivering goods to a railway company to be carried, is told by a clerk of the company that a paper is a mere form, and, being unable to read it, is so induced to sign a special contract for the carriage of the goods, he is not bound by it. Simons v. Great Western Railway Company, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 182.

CARRIER [vol. 3, p. 387].—Loss by leakage from casks-Negligence.—A carrier, who, by the terms of his contract, stipulates that he will not be liable for "leakage or breakage" is, nevertheless, liable if such leakage or breakage is occasioned by his own negligence. Phillips v. Clark, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 181.

CONTRACT.-Goods to be delivered ex first Parcel that arrives-Delivery at two different times.Where a party contracts for goods to be delivered at one time, he is not bound to accept part thereof at one time and part at another; but he must make his objection at the time of the first delivery. The