begin presently, though in the deed it is limited to begin after the expiration of the first lease so recited; because the jury do not actually find the first lease, but only a recital of it in another deed, which recital may be false for aught that appears to the Court: and then the second lease shall begin presently, as if no such first lease were at all, since the not finding it effectually is as if there were none such made (a).

With regard to the date of a lease, it was formerly held that a lease to commence a datu included the day of the date, but that a die datus excluded the day (b).

But it has since been held, that the word "from" may mean either inclusive or exclusive, according to the context and subject-matter (a); though this decision has been much questioned.

A lease "from the day of the date," and "from henceforth," is the same thing (c).

If a lease be made to begin from an impossible date, it shall take effect from the delivery: because it could not be any part of the agreement between the parties, as from the 30th day of February, or the 32d day of April next (d):—but where the limitation is uncertain,as a lease made the 10th day of October, habendum from the 20th day of November, without saying what November was meant, whether last past, or next ensuing, or what other November, the lease is thereby vitiated, because the limitation was part of the agreement, but the Court cannot determine it, not knowing how the contract was (e).

So, where a lease is made to begin from the nativity of our Lord last past, without saying from the feast of the nativity, this lease shall begin presently; because it could be no part of the agreement between the parties that the lease should begin from the nativity itself, which is past so many hundred years ago; and therefore for this impossibility of relation, the lease shall begin presently (a):—but if it were to begin from the nativity of our Lord generally, or next ensuing, omitting the word "feast," Twesden was of opinion that such a lease should be void for the uncertainty of the commencement; but Siderfin in reporting the case, makes a quære, if it shall not begin presently; and in truth, this seems the most reasonable opinion, for as to impossibility of relation, there is the same in this as there is in the other, and therefore by the same reason, it shall begin presently. The editor of Bacon asks what sound reason can be assigned why it should not commence from the Christmas intended by the parties?

heritance; so, they are created, as has been before mentioned, by way of mortgage (a). Lands are often conveyed in the nature of a lease for long terms, as five hundred years, &c. in order to raise portions, and for other purposes, in family settlements, and such are not accounted leases, but terms to attend the inheritance; no man has a lease, for example, of two thousand years, as a lease, but as a term to attend the inheritance (6). Half the titles in the kingdom are so (c).

An estate for a thousand years is only a chattel, and reckoned part of the personal estate (d).

Therefore, if a lease be devised to one, and the heirs male of his body, yet his executors shall have it for a term is but a chattel, which cannot be entailed, and such devisee may well alien the term to whom he pleases (e).

If, however, it be limited to attend the inheritance, it may be entailed; though the entail of the inheritance and of the term be by different clauses, or deeds executed at different times (ƒ).

Commencement of a Lease for Years.—With respect to the commencement of a lease for years, as it is a mere chattel, it may be made to commence either in præsenti or in futuro: according to the agreement of the parties; and the lease that is to commence in futuro, is called interesse termini, or future interest (g).-A lease for years, therefore, may begin at a day to come, as at Michaelmas next, or for three or ten years after, or after the death of the lessor, or of J. S. and is as good as where it doth begin presently (g).

So a lease to commence ad festum Annunciationis, after the determination of a former lease, is as good as if it had been à festo, &c. (b).

A lease to commence after the determination of a prior lease, shall begin presently, if the prior lease were void at law (b).

So a lease intended to commence in futuro, which misrecites the prior lease on which it depends in a material point, shall begin immediately (b).

This rule, that if the former lease be misrecited in the date, &c. and a new lease made, to begin after the expiration of the said recited lease, that such new lease shall begin presently, holds as well in the lease itself, as where the jury find an indenture of lease, whereby it is recited, that the lessor made such former lease of such date and under such rent without finding it in fact, but only by way of recital in the deed, such second lease shall in construction of law be adjudged to

(a) Best v. Stamford. I Salk. 154. (4) Denn d. Tarzwell v. Barnard. Cowp. 595.

() Doe d. Wyndham v. Halcombe. 7 T.R. 713-23.

(d) 2 Bl. Com. 143.

(e) Lovies's Case. 10 Co. R. 78-87. (f) Bovy's Case. I Vent. 193-95. (g) 2 Bl. Com. 144. Shep. Touch. 267. (4) Miller v. Maynwaring. Cro. Car. 397-8.

begin presently, though in the deed it is limited to begin after the expiration of the first lease so recited; because the jury do not actually find the first lease, but only a recital of it in another deed, which recital may be false for aught that appears to the Court: and then the second lease shall begin presently, as if no such first lease were at all, since the not finding it effectually is as if there were none such made (a).

With regard to the date of a lease, it was formerly held that a lease to commence a datu included the day of the date, but that a die datus excluded the day (b).

But it has since been held, that the word "from" may mean either inclusive or exclusive, according to the context and subject-matter (a); though this decision has been much questioned.

A lease "from the day of the date," and "from henceforth," is the same thing (c).

If a lease be made to begin from an impossible date, it shall take effect from the delivery: because it could not be any part of the agreement between the parties, as from the 30th day of February, or the 32d day of April next (d):—but where the limitation is uncertain,as a lease made the 10th day of October, habendum from the 20th day of November, without saying what November was meant, whether last past, or next ensuing, or what other November, the lease is thereby vitiated, because the limitation was part of the agreement, but the Court cannot determine it, not knowing how the contract was (e).

So, where a lease is made to begin from the nativity of our Lord last past, without saying from the feast of the nativity, this lease shall begin presently; because it could be no part of the agreement between the parties that the lease should begin from the nativity itself, which is past so many hundred years ago; and therefore for this impossibility of relation, the lease shall begin presently (a):—but if it were to begin from the nativity of our Lord generally, or next ensuing, omitting the word "feast," Twesden was of opinion that such a lease should be void for the uncertainty of the commencement; but Siderfin in reporting the case, makes a quære, if it shall not begin presently; and in truth, this seems the most reasonable opinion, for as to impossibility of relation, there is the same in this as there is in the other, and therefore by the same reason, it shall begin presently. The editor of Bacon asks what sound reason can be assigned why it should not commence from the Christmas intended by the parties?

(a) Bac. Abr. tit. Leases. (L. I.)

(d) Llewelyn v. Williams. Cro. Jac.

(6) Hatter v. Ash. 1 Ld. Ray. 84. S. C. 258.

2 Salk. 413.

(6) Pugh v. Duke of Leeds. Cowp. 714.

(e) Anon. I Mod. 180.

which well applies to the lease to begin from the nativity of our Lord next ensuing if not to the former (a).

Where a lessee for an hundred years made a lease for forty years to B. if he should so long live, and after leased the same lands to C. habendum for twenty-one years from the end of the term of B. to begin and be accounted from the date of these presents: and the question was, if the lease to C. should be said to begin presently, or after the term of B.? the judges were clearly of opinion that the lease to C. should not be accounted from the time of the date, but from the end of the term of B. because by the first words it is a good lease in reversion in that manner, and then it shall not be made void by any subsequent words, or as Coke said, the last words ought to be construed to give an interest as a future interest presently, and the actual possession after the expiration of the first forty years is well granted by the first words (b)

A lease may commence at one day, in point of computation, and at another in point of interest (c).

Therefore, a lease "to hold from a day past for fifty years then next ensuing, the said term to commence and begin immediately after the determination of an existing lease in the same premises," was not esteemed uncertain as to its commencement (c).

So, a lease habendum to the lessee for his life, which term shall begin after the determination of a previous term for three lives, is good (d).

So, if an indenture of demise bear teste 25th March, 15 Car. and is delivered the day of the date, and the habendum is from and after the day of the date of these presents, for and during the time and term of seven years from henceforth next and immediately following, fully to be complete and ended, this lease begins in computation from the delivery of the deed, which was the day of the date, and in interest the next day after the date, and so all the words will have an operation: for it appears that he was not to have the possession till the next day after the date, by the words habendum from and after the day of the date, which excludes the day of the date: but that the seven years should commence by computation from the delivery, viz. from henceforth, which refers to the limitation of the seven years (b).

A lease of lands by deed, since the new style, to hold from the feast of St. Michael, must be taken to mean from new Michaelmas ; and cannot be shewn by extrinsic evidence to refer to a holding from old Michaelmas (e).

But all leases for years, whether they begin in præsenti, or in futuro,

(a) Foot v. Berkley. Sid. 460.

(b) Bac. Abr. tit. Leases. (L. 1.)

(c) Enys v. Donnithorne. ♣ Burr. 1190.

(d) Underhay v. Underhay. Cro. Eliz

269.

(e) Doe d. Spicer v. Lea. II East, 312,

must be certain; that is, they must have a certain beginning, and certain ending, and so, the continuance of the term must be certain; otherwise they are not good (a).

Yet if the years be certain, when the lease is to take effect in interest or possession, it is sufficient, for until that time it may depend upon an uncertainty, viz. upon a possible contingent precedent before it begin in possession or interest, or upon a limitation or condition subsequent; but in case it is to be reduced to a certainty upon a contingent precedent, the contingent must happen in the lives of the parties and though there appear no certainty of years in the lease, yet if by reference to a certainty it may be made certain, it is sufficient (a).

As, if a lease be granted for twenty-one years after three lives in being; though it be uncertain at first when that term will commence, because those lives are in being, yet when they die it is reduced to a certainty (b).

So if A. seised of lands in fee, grant to B. that when B. shall pay to A. twenty shillings, that from thenceforth he shall hold the land for twenty-one years, and after B. pays the twenty shillings; in this case, B shall have a good lease for twenty-one years from thenceforth (c).

So if A. grant to B. that if his tenant for life shall die, that B. shall have the land for ten years, this is a good lease; and if one make a lease for years after the death of C. if C. die within ten years; this is a good lease if C. die within the ten years, otherwise not (c).

So if a lease for years be made of land in lease for life, to have and to hold from the death of the tenant for life;- or to have and to hold from Michaelmas next after the death of the tenant for life -or from Michaelmas next after the determination of the estate of the tenant for life: these are good leases (c).

Even if one make a lease to be begin after the death of 7. S. and to continue until Michaelmas, which shall be anno Domini 1650, this is a good lease (c).

So, if a man make a lease to B. for ninety years to begin after the death of A. on condition to be avoided upon the doing of divers acts by others; and afterwards make another lease of the land, habendum after the determination or redemption of the former lease; it seems this is a good lease and certain enough (d).

So, if a man have a lease of land for an hundred years, and he make a lease of this land to another, to have and to hold to him for forty years, to begin after his death; this is a good lease for the whole forty years, if there shall be so many of the hundred years to come

(a) Shep. Touch. 272.

(6) Goodright d. Hall v. Richardson. 3 T. R. 463.

(c) Shep. Touch. 273.

(d) Ibid. 274.