NOTICE SUBSEQUENT TO PURCHASE.
3. Effect thereof in respect to unpaid purchase money. In order to the
protection of a subsequent purchaser who does not receive notice of prior
equities until after his purchase, it must appear that he has actually
paid the purchase money, or, if he has paid a part of the purchase
money before receiving notice, he will be protected to that extent, but no
further. Redden et al. v. Miller et al. 336.
PURCHASER FROM ONE WHO HELD WITHOUT NOTICE.
4. Effect of notice to such subsequent purchaser. See NOTICE, 5.
UNDER POWER OF SALE IN MORTGAGE.
5. How far purchaser protected against irregularities in the sale, and a
defective execution of the deed. See MORTGAGES, 11.
REGULATING THEIR CHARGES.
1. Power of the legislature. The act of May 2, 1873, to prevent extor-
tion and unjust discrimination in railroads, is a constitutional enact-
ment, and is not in violation of the contract between the State and
railroad companies, growing out of the granting and accepting their
charters containing power to establish such rates of toll for the convey-
ance of persons and property as they shall, from time to time, direct and
determine in the by-laws. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. The People,
313.
2. The charter of a corporation is, beyond a doubt, a contract, by
which the corporation acquires the powers and functions to transact its
business in the mode prescribed, but this is, by necessary implication,
subject, the same as in case of natural persons, to the legislative power
of the State to define, prohibit and punish extortion. Ibid. 313.
CERTIFICATE OF INDEBTEDNESS BY RECEIver.
1. Must be founded upon proper consideration. A certificate of indebt-
edness issued by a receiver of a railroad company, under an order of the
court appointing him, to pay debts and expenses incurred by his prede-
cessor, not on account of any indebtedness made by the former receiver,
or for which the receiver issuing it received any benefit from the payee,
or any one else, is not entitled to be paid out of any funds in the hands
of the receiver, either at the suit of the payee or holder for value. Tur-
ner et al. v. Peoria and Springfield Railroad Co. 134.
2. Of notice of right to issue, by writing on back. Where a court orders
a receiver of a railway company to issue certificates of indebtedness for
a specific purpose, to be made payable to the persons to whom delivered
or order, and one is issued to A B or bearer, which is negotiated by
CERTIFICATE OF INDEBTEDNESS BY RECEIVERS. Continued.
mere delivery, the holder will take the same subject to all equitable
defences against the payee, and the printed order of the court on its back
is notice to him that it was made payable to bearer contrary to the order
of the court authorizing the issue. Turner et al. v. Peoria and Springfield
3. As to the negotiable character of such certificates. See ASSIGN-
MENT, 3.
IMPROVIDENT ACTS OF RECEIVERS.
4. Protection afforded against them. While courts are zealous to protect
the rights of parties who may have furnished money for the preservation
of trust property, equal care and vigilance will be observed to see that
the property is not wasted by the improvident acts of receivers.
et al. v. Peoria and Springfield Railroad Co. 134.
AS TO MANAGEMENT OF PROPERTY.
5. Under control of the court. The circuit court may properly instruct a
receiver as to the management of property, on a petition filed by him in
the suit in which he is appointed, against others claiming the property;
and if the rights of such other party are established, there is no error in
ordering the receiver not to disturb their possession until the further
order of the court, upon the dismissal of the petition. Wilmington Star
Mining Co. et al. v. Allen et al. 288.
6. Where property of an insolvent corporation is placed in the hands
of a receiver, a bill by a third person against the receiver, and a cross-
bill by him, etc., may all be regarded as applications to the court having
jurisdiction over the receiver and the business respecting the adminis-
tration and management of the property. And where leasehold inter-
ests are involved, depending for their preservation upon the condition of
continued operations, as of a mine, whether it should be kept on foot, is
a matter of business economy as well as of law. The jurisdiction of
the court in such a case is largely discretionary, which will not be inter-
fered with, except in a case of flagrant error and injustice. Ibid. 288.
RECITALS IN RECORDED DEED.
AS NOTICE TO SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS. See NOTICE, 4.
1. As to matters growing out of contract sued on. A party subscribed a
written agreement binding himself, on a certain condition, to take five of
the bonds of a railroad company of $1000 each, for which he was to pay
$650 for each bond on demand of the secretary, he also to receive five
shares of stock for each bond so taken, which bonds were secured by a
first mortgage on the railroad property, and run for twenty years, and
bearing seven per cent interest, payable semi-annually in gold coin,
which mortgage provided that if any of the interest on the bonds was
not paid within ninety days after due, the entire principal and interest
coupons should become immediately due. He received and paid for two
of the bonds, upon which the company made default in the payment of
interest for more than ninety days before it brought suit to recover dam-
ages of him for refusing to receive and pay for the other three bonds:
Held, that the payment of interest on the bonds was a vital part of the
consideration, and that the failure to pay the interest for ninety days
made the bonds become due and payable, and that the party, when sued
for not completing his contract, might recoup the amount due on his two
bonds against the damages growing out of his refusal to accept and pay
for the other three bonds. Galena and Southern Wisconsin Railroad Co. v.
Barrett, 467
RELEASE OF LIEN OF PRIOR MORTGAGE.
In favor of a junior mortgage-of its operation as to third persons. See
MORTGAGES, 1, 2.
IN CASE OF THE COMMINGling of proPERTY.
As, where grain owned by different persons is stored in public warehouse,
and all mingled together—trover will lie in favor of each owner. See TROVER,
1, 2, 3.
REFUSAL OF DEFENDANT TO DELIVER PROPERTY.
1. Power of the court.
under an execution in his hands, and a party other than the defendant
in execution sues out a writ of replevin for the property against the con-
stable, the court issuing the writ of replevin has no right to require the
constable to deliver the property to the sheriff, and the constable is not
liable to punishment for a contempt of court in refusing to surrender the
property on demand to the officer having the writ of replevin. The
defendant in replevin is not bound to assist the officer in the execution of
his process. Horr v. The People ex rel. 169.
Where a constable has levied upon property
PROPERTY LEVIED ON UNDER EXECUTION.
2. Officer released from selling when taken from him on replevin. The
taking of property from a constable which he has seized on execution,
by a writ of replevin, is a full protection to him for failing to sell the
same, but he is not bound to part with the property by any affirmative
action of his own. Ibid. 169.
*See, also, Yott v. The People, 91 Ill. 11, as to the power of the court to
compel the defendant in replevin to surrender the property.
RIGHT TO ALLUVIAL FORMATIONS.
1. To entitle a party to claim the right to an alluvial formation, or
land gained from a lake by alluvium, the lake must form a boundary of
his land. If any land lies between his boundary line and the lake, he can
not claim such formation. Bristol et al. v. County of Carroll, 84.
2. Whether grantee takes to center of stream. Where the fee in a water
course does not belong to the grantor, no words of description in his grant
will convey to the center of it; and when the United States has passed
its title to land bordering on and covered by a lake, a subseqent grant
of adjoining land, purporting to bound it on the lake, will not invest the
grantee of the second grant with the right to take to the center of the
lake, and such grantee will have no right to alluvial formations therein.
Ibid. 84.
1. Liability of school directors. School directors are invested by the
statute with certain discretionary power in regard to the suspension or
expulsion of scholars from the public schools. In the exercise of that
power they must deliberate and judge and decide, and if they but err in
their judgments, without malice, or intention to wrong the scholar, they
can not be held liable in a suit for damages for their action in that regard.
Mc Cormick v. Burt et al. 263.
2. Requisites of declaration in suit against directors for alleged improper
suspension of pupils. See PLEADING, 1.
SELF-DEFENCE. See CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2.
LIEN OF SPECIAL ASSESSMENT.
1. Of its duration. See LIENS, 3.
2. Under act of January 27, 1869. See LIMITATIONS, 1.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See CHANCERY, 10.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
1. As to being retrospective. It is a doctrine applicable to all laws, that
it will not be supposed the legislature intended a law should have a
retrospective operation, except when that intention has been manifested
by the most clear and unequivocal expression. The People ex rel. Mc Crea
V. Thatcher, 109.
2. Conservators of insane married women-of the power to appoint, under
the statute. Gardner v. Maroney, 552. See CONSERVATORS, 1, 2, 3.
3. Interest on unpaid taxes. Amendatory act of 1879 not to be given a
retrospective operation. The People ex rel. Mc Crea v. Thatcher, 109. See
TAXATION, 5.
4. Lien as to special assessment—its duration. Under the legislation in
relation to the West Park and boulevard in Cook county. The People ex rel.
Mc Crea v. Atchison et al. 452. See LIENS, 3.
Limitation-as to special assessments. Under act of January 27,
1869. The People ex rel. Mc Crea v. Atchison et al. 452. See LIMITA-
TIONS, 1.
Official bonds—within what time to be filed—whether limitation in the
law is mandatory, or merely directory. City of Chicago v. Gage et al. 593,
See OFFICIAL BONDS, 2 to 5.
and Cawley et al. v. The People, 249.
7. Taxation in the city of East St. Louis-of the rate per cent allowed.
The various statutes on that subject construed in Weber v. Traubel, et al.
427. See TAXATION, 6 to 10.
8. Recovery of taxes on forfeited lands-
s—as to the requisite time of owner-
ship. The statute construed in The People v. Winkelman, 412. See
PLEADING, 2.
PROMISE TO PAY ONE'S OWn debt.
1. Where a party's promise is, in effect, to pay his own debt, though
that of a third person be incidentally guaranteed, it is not necessary that
it should be in writing. Darst v. Bates et al. 493.
CONTRACT AS FIXING SUM TO BE PAID.
2. The Statute of Frauds will be satisfied by such a statement in a
written contract as ascertains the price to be paid, although it mentions
no specific sum, as for instance, if to pay a price to be settled by arbi-
tration, or upon the valuation of appraisers to be selected by the parties.
Norton v. Gale, 533.
3. Where a lease of lots, executed by both parties, fixed the annual
rent for the first five years, and then provided that the amount of the
rent to be paid annually for the next five years should be six per cent on
the appraised value of the premises, to be ascertained by appraisers, one
to be selected by each party, and they to select another, in case they
could not agree, it was held that the contract was not within the Statute
of Frauds as to the rent to be paid for the second five years. Ibid. 533.
STOCKHOLDERS OF CORPORATION,
LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE DEBTS. See CORPORATIONS, 6, 7.
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