3. According to the ancient doctrine of the common law, a parol au-
thority was not adequate to authorize an alteration or addition to a
sealed instrument, the authority must have been of equal dignity with
the instrument itself;-so that a paper signed and sealed in blank, even
with verbal authority to fill the blanks, which should afterwards be
done, was void as to the parties so signing and sealing, unless they
afterwards delivered, or acknowledged or adopted it. Upon this doctrine
was based the case of The People v. Organ, 27 Ill. 29.
nical rule has yielded in operation, in this respect,
blanks in official bonds, to the application of the more modern doctrine
of estoppel in pais. City of Chicago v. Gage et al. 593.
But this old tech-
at least, of filling
4. As to the name of the office in respect to which a bond is proposed
to be given, and which was in blank in the paper when signed by the
sureties, it might be rendered certain by reading the blank bond in
the light of surrounding circumstances, which is always admissible to
ascertain the meaning of a written instrument. In this case the blank
bond itself recited that the office was one "in the city of Chicago," to
which the "above bounden" had been elected or appointed; and it was
to the office of treasurer of that city which the "above bounden" party,
who had already signed the bond, had just been elected. Thus, there
could be no uncertainty in the minds of the sureties what office was in-
tended. Ibid. 593.
5. Furthermore, by the law the amount of the penalty in the city
treasurer's bond was to be determined upon by the common council, to be
fixed by them in such amount, not less than a given sum, that they should
deem the safety of the city required. This provision of law was deemed
to strengthen the inference of an implied authority to fill the blank for
the penal sum,-it not being one to be fixed by agreement of parties, as
in the case of ordinary bonds. Ibid. 593.
6. Of notice to the obligee as to sureties signing upon condition.
mere fact that the obligee in a bond has knowledge at the time he receives
it that there were blanks in the instrument which had been filled subse-
quent to the signing by the sureties, and in their absence, will not operate
to affect the obligee with notice of any secret conditions upon which the
sureties may have signed the bond. Ibid. 593.
7. It is not every defect on the face of a bond which has been signed
in blank, which will operate as notice to the obligee, or put him upon
inquiry in respect to conditions upon which the sureties may have signed
it. The imperfection upon the face of the bond which is to have such
effect, must be of such a character that it points towards, indicates, and
excites suspicion of, the particular matter of defence alleged against the
instrument, and, as an ordinarily prudent man, to put the obligee to make
inquiry as to the existence of the very thing which is set up in defeat of
the instrument. Ibid. 593.
8. But in the case of an official bond, in which the blank had refer-
ence to the penal sum, and that penal sum was, by law to be fixed by the
municipal authority who were to approve and receive the bond, the fact
that the obligees knew that the instrument, at the time it was signed, was
in blank in respect to the penalty, would not operate to put them upon
inquiry to learn whether the sureties had signed the paper upon condi-
tion that the penal sum should not exceed a certain amount. City of
Chicago v. Gage et al. 593.
9. In such case, knowledge on the part of the obligees of the unfilled
blank for the penalty would be but knowledge of the apparent implied
authority with which the law clothes the principal obligor to fill it, and
consequently could afford no ground of suspicion of any want of author-
ity, nor indicate any bad faith on the part of the obligees in receiving the
bond with such knowledge. Ibid. 593.
AS TO LAND UPON A WATER COURSE OR LAKE.
Whether a grantee takes to the center of the stream or lake. See RIPA-
RIAN OWNERS, 2.
1. Whether a bill is multifarious. Three brothers, desiring to purchase
certain tracts of land, procured a third person to make the purchase in
his own name, they to pay the purchase money as it should become due.
Other tracts were purchased in the same way, the legal title being in the
names of several persons. Different portions of the land so purchased
were taken possession of severally by the three brothers, who farmed the
lands, made payments on the purchase money, and verbally agreed upon
the mode of division among them. Pending these transactions one of
the brothers absented himself from that part of the country and remained
away several years, until finally, the two remaining brothers, on the
supposition the absent one was dead, procured the conveyance of the
legal title to all of certain parcels of the lands to be made to them, agree-
ing, however, in the event of the return of the absent brother, to convey
his portion to him. A mistake was made in conveying some of the
tracts. There was an outstanding mortgage upon others. The legal
title to a portion still remained in the original vendors. One of the
brothers who remained at home, and in whom was vested in the manner
mentioned the legal title to a parcel of the land which, by their verbal
agreement, was to belong to the one who had absented himself, died,
leaving a widow and several children. While matters were in this con-
dition the absent brother returned, and filed his bill in chancery, making
the surviving brother and the representatives of the deceased brother
parties, in order to procure the conveyance to him of the legal title to
the portions of the lands belonging to him. The holder of the outstand-
ing mortgage was made a party; also the grantor in the deed in which
the mistake had occurred, and the holders of the legal title to such por-
tions of the land as had not yet been conveyed. The bill sought to have
all these various matters adjusted in the one suit. It was held, the bill
was not multifarious, as containing dissimilar and disconnected matters.
The court having jurisdiction to decree a partition, might well retain the
case to adjust all the other questions affecting the same property. Rann
et al. v. Rann, 433.
2. Of the answer. Although, in stating a defence in an answer, there
must be such a degree of certainty as will inform the complainant of
the nature of the defence, yet it is not necessary that there should be
the same degree of accuracy as is required in a bill. Jenkins, assignee,
v. Greenbaum et al. 11.
3. Answer to bill praying an account.
Where a bill to forclose a deed
of trust prays for an account to be taken and stated of what is due on the
notes secured, the defendant will not be required to set out in his answer
with precision each item of his account, with a detail of all the particu-
lars connected therewith. Such particularity is not required in bills to
redeem or to have a mortgage satisfied. In such cases the party calling
for an account only makes a general statement of his case, leaving the
itimized accounts to be presented and stated by the master. Ibid. 11.
4. Of an answer setting up the defence of usury—of its requisites-and
whether the answer is sufficient. See USURY, 2, 3, 4.
RELIEF AGAINST ONE'S OWN VOLUNTARY ACT.
5. Where one of two joint grantees of land consents that the joint
deed may be surrendered, and that the grantor may convey the premises
to the other party alone, the party so assenting must abide by what
may be done in the way of changing the title, and can have no equitable
right to the interposition of a court of equity to enable him to retract, no mat-
ter whether the arrangement was because the land before really belonged to
the party receiving the new deed, or the interest of the other party yielding
up the title was disposed of to him, or it was done in order to shield the
land from apprehended pecuniary liability. Dinwiddie v. Bell et al. 360.
RELIEF AGAINST ONE'S OWN FRAUDULENT ACTS.
6. As to fraudulent conveyance. Where a conveyance has been made for
the purpose of defrauding the creditors of the grantor, equity will not
interpose to restore to the grantor the title to the property so fraudulently
conveyed. Dunaway v. Robertson et al. 419.
7. For the same reason that there would be no interference by equity
to set aside such conveyance when perfected, equity will not lend its aid
CHANCERY. RELIEF AGAINST ONE'S OWN FRAUDULENT ACTS. Continued.
to undo anything which has been done toward the making of such a con-
veyance. Dunaway v. Robertson et al. 419.
8. So, where the owner of land, in apprehension of embarrassment
from anticipated litigation, and to protect his land against the result of
such expected embarrassment, executed deeds for the same to another,
and put the same upon record, but never delivered the deeds, a court of
equity refused to interpose in any way to aid the party thus intending to
defraud his creditors, in doing away with the deeds or the record of them,
but left him in the position in which he saw proper to place himself.
TRUST-CLOUD UPON TITLE-IMPROVEMENTS.
9. On bill filed to establish a trust in certain real estate, and to remove
a cloud upon the title of the complainant, it appeared that the father of the
complainant executed a deed for the property in controversy, the deed
being recorded, but never delivered to the grantee named therein. The deed
was not executed upon any contract of bargain and sale, but was really
designed as a conveyance in trust for the benefit of the family of the
grantor, but, never having been delivered, it passed no title. The grantee,
after the death of that grantor, executed a deed for the same property to
the mother of the complainant, who thereupon executed a deed of trust
upon the same to secure a sum of money which she had borrowed, and
which was used in making valuable improvements in the erection of
buildings on the land. The lender of this money was notified by the
grantor in the deed of trust, before the consummation of the transaction,
that the property really belonged to the complainant. It was this series
of conveyances which the bill sought to have set aside. Upon decreeing,
in that regard, in favor of the complainant, it was considered equitable
that, to the extent his estate had been reasonably improved, and he him-
self personally benefited from the money of the grantee in the deed of
trust, his estate should be charged with its payment. Union Mut. Life
Ins. Co. et al v. Campbell. 267.
10. Laches. Where time is made of the essence of a contract for the
sale of land, and no payment has been made on it for a period of twenty-
five years, except a portion of the first year's interest in advance, and no
tender has been made, a specific performance of the contract will not be
decreed, or a rescission of it and a return of the money paid, on account
of such inexcusable and long delay. Gibbons et al. v. Hoag. 45.
DETERMINING SUCCESSION TO AN ESTATE.
11. Jurisdiction in chancery. Where a person has assumed to take pos-
session of an estate under a claim of heirship, a court of chancery has
jurisdiction, at the suit of another claimant, to inquire and determine
as to the true succession, and to direct the proper distribution. It is one
CHANCERY. DETERMINING SUCCESSION TO AN ESTATE. Continued.
of the usual grounds of equity jurisdiction to discover and compel an
account of funds wrongfully concealed and withheld from the real
owner. Russell et al v. Madden, 485.
RETAINING CASE TO ADJUST ALL MATTERS.
12. Relief according to the scope of the pleadings. One of the children
and heirs at law of a deceased person exhibited his bill in chancery,
claiming a one-half interest in certain of the lands of which the ancestor
died seized of the legal title, the claim being based upon an alleged
joint ownership between the complainant and his father in the lifetime of
the latter. On error, upon a dismissal of the bill, it was insisted by the
complainant that as he was at least a tenant in common with the other
heirs in the lands, the court, having jurisdiction of the subject matter and
of the parties, should have retained the bill, and done complete justice
between the parties by making partition. But it was held otherwise, as
the bill was not framed with any view to a partition, and no partition was
asked. Dinwiddie v. Bell et al. 360.
Of the character of relief granted, and upon what terms. See USURY,
5 to 8.
LACHES AS A BAR TO EQUITABLE RELIEF.
Generally. See LIMITATIONS, 3, 4, 5.
MISTAKE. See MISTAKE, 1.
GRANTING NEW TRIALS AT LAW. See NEW TRIALS, 3 to 6.
CLOUD UPON TITLE. See CHANCERY, 9.
EFFECT UPON THE PRINCIPAL DEBT.
1. The acceptance of collateral security on the making of a loan, or
afterwards, has no effect whatever on the original debt, either to impair
or suspend the right of action. Darst v. Bates et al. 493.
DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY OF PRINCIPAL.
Right of factor to pledge goods of his principal for his own debt. See
FACTOR, 1, 2.
TRANSFER OF REAL ESTATE FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
1. By what law governed-as to its validity. The validity of a deed of
assignment of property, although executed in another State, so far as it
attempts to convey real estate situate in this State, must be determined
by the laws of this State. Gardner et al. v. Commercial National Bank of
Providence, 298.
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