EJECTMENT-Continued.

to the facts respectively affirmed and denied by the
parties, the defendant sets up an adverse possession of
land, which apparently falls within the lines of the
plaintiff's brief, he may show the lines on the ground
to which his possession extended. Ireland v. Bagaley,
240.

Judgment confessed in an amicable action of eject-
ment is not within the Act of April 4, 1877, allowing
an appeal to the Supreme Court, where the record does
not show that judgment was entered by virtue of a
power of attorney. Limbert's Appeal, 20.

So, whether the authority to confess be in writing
or not. Swartz's Appeal, 150.

In ejectment the question whether the premises in
dispute are included within a certain tract, is for the
jury, although there has been no dispute as to the
inclusion prior to the litigation before the court.
Putnam v. Tyler, 33.

EQUITY-Continued.

the condition that the redemption must be within a
reasonable time, and where three years have elapsed,
and the property has greatly increased in value, will
not decree a re-conveyance. Salsbury v. Black, 145.

Where the owner of bonds, which have been fraud-
ulently transferred by his bailee to the defendant,
seeks to recover the same, he must show that the
bonds in the defendant's hands are identical with those
delivered to the bailee or he cannot recover. Klein's
Appeal, 479.

The equitable doctrine that one seeking the aid of a
Court to obtain possession of his land must, as a con-
dition of recovery, compensate one who has, in good
faith and in belief that he has a valid title, made per-
manent improvements, does not apply to actions of
ejectment at law; in such proceedings payment for
improvements can be obtained only by way of set-off
or in mitigation of damages. Putnam v. Tyler, 33.

A sheriff's sale of certain land having been adver-
tised was postponed two days. Two hours before the
second time fixed, the lessees of the land tendered the

EMINENT DOMAIN. Rules governing the as-
sessment of damages for land taken or injured through
the exercise of the right of eminent domain, laid down
by the Supreme Court. Baltimore & Phila. R. R. Co.
v. Springer, 143.

Advantages and disadvantages to the property as a
whole are to be considered, not the advantage and
disadvantage of each separate field as a separate
property. Id.

dition of an assignment of the judgment. This was
refused. The lessees then obtained a stay for two days,
and applied to the Court for an order of subrogation
setting forth the date of their lease, which was sub-
sequent to the lien, that they had made large expendi-
tures, and that the sale was without notice to them.
They did not, however, set forth any particulars of the
expenditures, annex a copy of the lease, or deny that
they knew the sale was to take place: held, subrogation
was properly refused on the ground that the tender
was conditional, the petition evasive, and the petition-

Id.

An owner cannot arbitrarily divide his property so
as to exclude from the consideration of the jury the
advantage secured in one place while recovering for
disadvantages suffered in another. Id.

Application of Statute of Limitations in cases of in-
jury arising from exercise of right of eminent domain.
Landes v. Borough of Norristown, 212.

Evidence of the value of minerals under the surface
of land taken, cannot be given. Reading & Pottsville
R. R. Co. v. Balthaser, 253.

To show advantage to a piece of land from the es-
tablishment of a railroad, the fact that additional fa-
cilities for the transportation of products of the land
are afforded may be shown, but not the amount of re-
duction of rates on a railroad used by the plaintiff and
existing before the building of the defendant's road,
consequent upon such building. Id.

EQUITABLE EJECTMENT. See EJECTMENT.
McCullough v. Staver, 213; Reno v. Moss, 357; Hess
v. Calender, 374.

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. See ESTOPPEL.
EQUITY. A., a man of advanced years, made a
conveyance to his son-in-law B. for the consideration
of support. A. filed a bill to set aside the conveyance
on the ground of undue influence and failed, and had
a decree made against him for $400 costs. A. and B.
then agreed that B. should pay A. $150 per annum in
lieu of support. B. issued execution for costs, which
was returned nulla bona. He then filed a bill to set
off the costs against payment; held, that as A. was
destitute, and would be entitled to have the payments
due him appraised, if attached, the prayer of the bill
should not be granted. Thall's Appeal, 224.

See LUNACY. Meurer's Appeal, 107. See SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE.

EQUITY PRACTICE. Where a bill is filed by
A. in right of his wife B., and A. is joined in the
pleadings and the prayer, if granted, would be partly
in B.'s right as assignee of A., and partly in A.'s right,
the bill may be taken as a joint bill, and a decree
made against A. and B. jointly. Miller's Appeal, 311.

A bill cannot be maintained in the Common Pleas
to compel payment of a legacy charged on land.
Brotzman's Appeal, 318.

Where a bill charges facts constituting constructive
fraud, and also an actual fraud, it may be sustained,
although the proofs fail as to the actual fraud charged.
Ricketts's Appeal, 229.

A defendant in equity cannot both answer and demur
to the whole bill or to the same part of the bill; in
such case the answer overrules the demurrer. Bar-
bey's Appeal, 226.

A general denial by answer will not excuse the de-
fendant from answering specific interrogatories at-
tached to the bill. (C. P.) Paper Co. v. Hincken, 227.
A decree pro confesso should be vacated when the
default in making answer in time is satisfactorily ex-
plained. Thall's Appeal, 224.

Where after an answer and reference to a Master,
the defendant moves to amend on the argument of ex-
ceptions to the Master's report so as to interpose the
Statute of Limitations, the motion may be refused at
the discretion of the Court. Ricketts's Appeal, 229.

On an appeal from an interlocutory decree the Su-
preme Court will not discuss the merits of the case.
Barrett's Appeal, 139.

EQUITY PRACTICE-Continued.

The findings of fact by Master not reversed by the
Court below, will be given the same weight as a verdict.
Appeal of Harris et al., 189.

ERROR. The Supreme Court will not reverse for
a trifling error committed during a jury trial which is
not the actual or probable cause of injury. Trego v.
Peirce, 568.

Where binding instructions are not requested, the
Supreme Court will not reverse for a failure to give
such instructions, even in case where if asked it would
have been error to have refused them. Pa. R. R. Co.
v. Page, 52.

Comments or remarks of a Judge having a tendency
to unduly weaken the effect of the evidence, are grounds
for reversal. Bughman v. Byers, 494.

Erroneous exclusion of evidence cured by admission
of the same in another form. See EVIDENCE. Webber
v. Commonwealth, 413.

See PRACTICE.

EVIDENCE-Continued.

levied on as her husband's. (C. P.) Suplee v. Laflin
M'f'g Co., 557.

An inexpert witness may not testify that a person
has a particular disease, but he may be asked whether
he observed any symptom thereof, ordinarily visible
to the inexpert eye. U. B. Mutual Aid Society v.
O'Hara, 381.

The testimony of a witness taken at a former trial of a
case, since which trial he has died, is admissible on a
second trial of the case when the witness, if living,
would have been competent. Berg v. McClafferty, 547.
Communications to an attorney-at-law, while pre-
paring a paper at the instance of all the parties there-
to, and made by a party in the presence of all the
other parties, are not privileged. Appeal of the Good-
win Gas Stove and Meter Co., 1.

On a trial for murder, it appeared that the quarrel
between the defendant and the deceased, terminating
in the murder, originated by a reference to a conversa-
tion with the witness; held, not proper cross-examina-

Where the predecessor in title of a plaintiff has
made representations that he was not the owner of
certain land which the defendant was about to pur-
chase, and before purchasing the defendant has refer-
red the question of title to counsel, it is proper to
instruct the jury that the plaintiff is estopped if the
defendant was induced to purchase by the predeces-
sor's representations, but not if the inducement was
the opinion of counsel. Putnam v. Tyler, 33.

One who is ignorant that he has title to land is not,
by standing by and permitting the land to be im-
proved by another, estopped from asserting his title.
Id.

A guardian by consent to a sale made under an or-
der of the Orphans' Court in excess of its authority,
and accepting the purchase-money, cannot estop the
ward from attacking the validity of the sale. (C. P.)
Miller v. Spear, 554.

A member of a board of directors by which a plan of
reorganization is passed, by which, if accepted, certain
securities held by him would be reduced, and who
does not concur in the action of the board, is not estop-
ped by his mere membership from proceeding in his
individual rights upon his securities. (C. P.) Love v.
Phila. & Reading R. R. Co., 573.

Estoppel of bank to deny ownership of depositor.
See BANKS AND BANKING. Citizens' National Bank v.
Alexander, 473.

Estoppel of owner of stock as against innocent
transferee who holds certificate and power in blank.
See STOCK. Linnard's Appeal, 40.

ESTREPEMENT. A writ of estrepement will lie
at the suit of lien creditors against the owner of land
subject to their liens, to prevent waste by him. Duff's
Appeal, 491.

A writ of estrepement protects the interest of all
having liens on the wasted premises, whether par-
ties to the issue of the writ or not. Id.

EVIDENCE. Where a witness has an interest in
the question involved in a case, but the result of the
case itself cannot affect any action to be brought by
or against him, he is not disqualified on the ground of
interest. Berg v. McClafferty, 547.

A wife may testify in support of her claim to goods

On a issue of insanity, it is irrelevant to show that
the defendant's father had failed in business, and the
wages formerly received by the defendant. Id.

In an action to recover for goods furnished, the
plaintiff cannot, to show the amount furnished, give
in evidence the books of a third person charging the
plaintiff with goods furnished to him and shipped
directly to the defendant by the third person. Holt
v. Pie, 475.

To prove drunkenness, the conduct of the alleged
drunken person is material, even to abuse of his
family, for from his conduct the jury must to a great
extent draw its conclusion as to the truth of the
allegation. U. B. Mutual Aid Society v. O'Hara, 381.

Course of dealing may be evidence to explain the in-
tent with which the check of a third person was given
by a debtor to his creditor. Briggs v. Holmes, 10.

Neither a letter nor the envelope containing it, nor
an inclosure therein is admissible to prove that on
the day of its date the writer was at the place from
which the letter was written and mailed. Jackson v.
Emmens, 199.

Bills filed with a mechanic's lien, and whose correct-
ness is denied by the affidavit of defence, are not ad-
missible in support of the plaintiff's claim. Weaver
v. Sheeler, 22.

In an action for negligence against a contractor for
blasting, testimony of what the workmen said about
the amount of blasting material employed is not evi-
dence. McFadden v. Raush, 290.

In an action on a bond given by A. to protect the
obligees from the claims of A. and B. on account of
certain personal property bought by A. and B. at a
sheriff's sale as the property of C., and levied on again
and sold by the obligees as C.'s property, evidence
that A. has brought an action against the sheriff to
recover damages for the sale is admissible. Avery v.
Layton, 329.

Where testimony has been given tending to show
that a conveyance is the result of a combination to
defraud creditors, the declarations of either party to
the conveyance may be given in evidence to affect
both, although the combination is not conclusively
shown, and the evidence of it is circumstantial. Lowe
v. Dalrymple, 545.

Declarations of a party to a fraudulent conveyance
made after delivery of the deed, but before possession
of the premises has been given, are admissible to
affect the other party to the deed. Id.

EVIDENCE-Continued.

Evidence cannot be given of parol understanding
that a note drawn in the usual form was to be paid
only on a contingency. (C. P.) Dyott v. Williams,
226.

Oral proof to vary or affect a written instrument,
must be confined to what occurred at the execution
of it. Heydt v. Frey, 265.

Parol evidence cannot be given that a note for a
certain sum, payable at a certain time after date, with
interest, was in reality a contract to pay to the payee
interest only, and the principal either not at all or to
a third person who should receive it as advancement.
Id.

Parol evidence to contradict a judgment note should
be admitted only when it is such as would require a
chancellor to give relief against the instrument. Eng-
lish v. Hager, 297.

Where a contract was read and explained to a per-
son, who alleged he could neither read nor write, where-
by a piano was leased to him with the privilege of
purchase within a certain period, and the person exe-
cuted it, it is error to admit testimony that at the
time of execution the lessor or his agent told him he
would have a longer time within which to pay. North
v. Williams, 369.

Where letters refer to and confirm a verbal contract,
but do not profess to set out all its terms, the verbal
ageement may be given in evidence. Holt v. Pie, 475.
Silence, when a person is asked to make a contract,
is not evidence of assent, even if the request is heard.
Royal Ins. Co. v. Beatty, 59.

When evidence is excluded, but afterwards admit-
ted in another form so that no injury is done, the Su-
preme Court will not reverse for exclusion, even in a
capital case. Webber v. Com'th, 413.

Evidence affecting claim of easement. See EASE-
MENT. Zell v. First Universalist Society, 221.
Evidence in ejectment. See EJECTMENT.
Bagaley, 240.

Ireland v.

Evidence of notice of want of repair. Township of
North Manheim v. Arnold, 218.

Application to be attached to policy to render it evi-
dence. See INSURANCE. New Era Life Ass'n v. Musser,
445.

Evidence of value of property taken by virtue of
eminent domain. See EMINENT DOMAIN. Reading and
Pottsville R. R. Co. v. Balthaser, 253.

Evidence to prove foreign judgment. See FOREIGN
JUDGMENT. (O. C.) Pearson's Estate, 559.
Evidence of illegitimacy. See ILLEGITIMACY. Meu-
rer's Appeal, 109.

EXECUTORS. An executor who has suffered
devisees to take possession of land charged with a
certain sum payable by instalments, before the time
at which, by the will, they are entitled to possession, |
and at which the charge begins to be payable, and
who has not exacted instalments prior to the said time,
is not to be surcharged with the amount of instal-
ments which would have fallen due had the charge
been payable from the time of taking actual posses-
sion of the land. Rhoad's Appeal, 251.

An executor, except in a case of great negligence,
will not be surcharged with assets of the decedent
which never came into his hands. Dabney and Ver-
rier's Appeal, 449.

An executor who has exercised due care in the
selection of an agent to collect rents which were to be
paid to the executor under an agreement which it was
proper to make, will not be surcharged with rents
misapplied by the agent. Id.

FACTOR. Where goods are consigned for sale
and no price is fixed, the factor has a right to exercise
his discretion as to the price to be taken. Conway v.
Lewis, 386.

Where a factor writes for instructions as to price,
and before receiving an answer determines to accept a
price offered, his determination, if made in good faith
and as the result of the exercise of his judgment, is
within the scope of his authority. Id.

FEE BILL. See SHERIFF. (C. P.) Krouse v.
Hart, 466.

FEE SIMPLE. See DEED. Warden v. Lyons,
129.
A locomotive engi-
neer and a telegraph operator and station agent are
fellow-servants within the rule that an employer can-
not be held liable for injury caused to an employé
through the negligence of a co-employé. Dealey v.
Phila. and Read. R. R. Co., 45.

FELLOW-SERVANTS.

A car inspector and a brakeman are fellow-servants
within the same rule. Phila. and Read. R. R. Co. v.
Hughes, 166. See MASTER AND SERVANT.

FENCE VIEWERS. The Act of March 11,
1842, providing for fence viewers to examine and reg-
ulate party fences, apportioning their cost, is a sum-
mary remedy to prevent the dilapidation of such
fences; boundary lines cannot be established in a pro-
ceeding under the Act. Trego v. Peirce, 568.

FERRY. The Act of Assembly giving the exclu-
sive right of maintaining a ferry does not require the
grantee to acquire landings in fee. Appeal of Doug-
lass, 13.

Where such a grantee endeavors to restrain others
from interfering with his right, the latter cannot set
up as a defence that the grantee has not complied with
the provisions of the Act of Assembly conferring the
right. Id.

The maintenance of a ferry in such condition that
it affords all the accommodation required by the neigh-
borhood is a sufficient commencing business in good
faith within Art. XVI. § 1, of the Constitution of 1874.
Id.

FOREIGN ATTACHMENT. A motion to
quash a writ of foreign attachment is directed to the
discretion of the Court, and its decision thereon is not
reviewable on error or certiorari. Holland v. White,
393.

FOREIGN CORPORATION. The State may
prescribe conditions on which foreign corporations may
do business within its boundaries. See CORPORATIONS.
Etna Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Reading, 209.

FOREIGN JUDGMENT. An office copy of a
decree pro confesso of an English Court and a copy of
an allocatur of a taxing master not shown to have
been confirmed by the Court, do not prove a judgment
upon which a recovery can be had in Pennsylvania.
(Ó. C.) Pearson's Estate, 559.

An office copy of a record not certified by an official
or sworn to have been examined and compared, can-
not be received as a proof of the record. ld.

FRAUD. A conveyance of the real estate of a dece-
dent, father of the grantor, obtained under the im-
pression that the grantee was a brother and for an
inadequate consideration, set aside on proof that the
grantee was an illegitimate son of the grantor's
mother, and that the grantor was illiterate and unable
to attend to business. Appeal of E. F. I. Meurer, 109.
A mortgage or conveyance given to defraud certain
creditors is fraudulent and voidable as to all creditors
existing at the time of the transaction. Barrett v.
Nealon, 104.

It is a constructive fraud for a trustee to become the

FRAUD-Continued.

purchaser of the subject of the trust, for a price less
than the value thereof, at a sheriff's sale, brought about
by his own procurement. Ricketts's Appeal, 229.
Whether a deed was given in fraud of creditors, is
a question for the jury. Benson v. Maxwell, 446.
A deed given by a husband to his son as considera-
tion of, and in payment of a debt due to the wife, is
not fraudulent as to creditors. Id. See ATTACHMENT
UNDER ACT OF 1869. (C. P.) Leunig v. Senior, 379.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See STATUTE of
FRAUDS.

GARNISHEE. Garnishee entitled to $10 coun-
sel fee, although att chiment be discontinued. See
PRACTICE (C. P.) Schwartz v. Hall, 406.

GROUND-RENT. The Act of April 25, 1855,
providing that where no payment, claim, or demand
had been made on account of a ground-rent, and there
has been no declaration or acknowledgment thereof
within that period by the owner of the premises, a
release or extinguishment shall be presumed, is not
unconstitutional. Biddle v. Hooven, 390.

An action of covenant sur ground-rent is not within
the Act of February 24, 1834, § 34, requiring the widow
and heir or devisees of a decedeht to be made parties
to an action to charge his real estate with his debts.
Rushton v. Lippincott, 47, 97.

But if the plaintiff desire to enforce the judgment
in a covenant sur ground-rent against any land of the
decedent other than that out of which the rent issues,
notice must be given to the widow and heirs or devi-
sees. Id. See MORTGAGE.

GUARANTY. Individual guaranty in articles
of co-partnership not a portion of the contract of
partnership. See PARTNERSHIP. McIntire's Appeal,

564.

GUARDIAN AND WARD. A guardian who
in investing his ward's money does not act with ordi-
nary business prudence, is liable for the consequent
loss, and the fact that he has acted under the advice
of counsel will not relieve him. Lechler's Appeal, 505.
Where a guardian desires to make a loan of his
ward's money upon the security of property already
subject to a lien, he should apply to the Orphans'
Court for leave to do so. Id.

Where a guardian has invested the funds of his
ward in property which the latter is justified in refus-
ing to accept, on the ground that to do so would entail
a loss, an inquiry will not be ordered to determine
whether the guardian should bear a proportionate part
of the loss only. Id.

Where a guardian turns over the fund of his wards
to their father, and in consideration of the latter
agreeing to keep him clear of liability for such trust
funds, agrees not to charge any commission, he is not
precluded from claiming compensation for other ser-
vices rendered as guardian to the wards. Williams's
Appeal, 551.

A ward is not estopped by his guardian's consent to
a sale made without authority. See ESTOPPEL. (C. P.)
Miller v. Spear, 554.

HABEAS CORPUS. Discharge upon habeas
corpus will enable the relator charged with a crime to
bring an action for a malicious prosecution. Zebley
v. Storey, 68.

HIGHWAY. An owner of land abutting on a
highway may use a portion of the highway in a rea-
sonable manner for temporary purposes, but may not
use it for a quasi permanent purpose, e. g., piling lum-
ber. Township of North Manheim v. Arnold, 218.

HIGHWAY-Continued.

Negligent driving upon highway. See NEGLIGENCE.
Schmidt v. McGill, 485.

Liability of borough for consequences of negligently
leaving highway out of repair. See NEGLIGENCE. Bor-
ough of Shenandoah v. Erdman, 553.
See STREETS.

HIRING. Damages for breach of contract of hir-
ing. See CONTRACT. (C. P.) Smiley v. Brownfield,
528.

HUSBAND AND WIFE. Under the Act of
May 4, 1855, it is only where a husband neglects to
provide for his minor children that the wife is en-
tiled to the earnings of such children; it is not suffici-
ent that he has not provided for the wife. Eustice
v. Plymouth Coal Co., 430.

In addition to the above, the wife must afford a good
example to her children and properly educate them.
It is therefore a defence to an action for such wages
that she is of a bad character for chastity. Id.

A husband who borrows from his wife money which
she has obtained from other sources and which is not
the proceeds of her wages during coverture, may give
to her, as to any other creditor, a preference. Benson
v. Maxwell, 446.

A wife may bind her separate estate and property
by any obligation given by her as security for the
protection of remaindermen, where, by virtue of the
Act of May 17, 1871, she takes possession of personalty,
to which she is entitled as life tenant. (O. C.) Oak-
ford's Estate, 575.

A husband who offers to provide proper physicians
for his wife, and who notifies the physician called in
by the wife that he will not be responsible for the cost
of the medical attendance rendered by said physician,
is not liable to pay for services rendered after such
notification. (C. P.) Remick v. Crabtree, 31.

Under the Act of June 3, 1887, § 6, a husband taken
upon a capias for his wife's tort is entitled to be dis
charged on common bail. (C. P.) Reader v. Rosen-
dale, 153.

The Act of June 3, 1887, does not render a married
woman liable to be arrested on ca. sa, upon a judg-
ment for a tort committed during coverture. Vocht v.
Kuklence, 518.

Or to be arrested upon a capias ad respondendum.
Whalen v. Gabell, 522.

Since the Act of June 3, 1887, a husband is not lia-
ble for the torts of his wife committed during cover-
ture. Kuklence v. Vocht, 521.

A wife may testify in support of her claim to goods
levied on as her husband's. (C. P.) Suplee v. Laflin
Manufacturing Co., 557.

Decree made against husband and wife where bill is
by husband in right of wife. See EQUITY PRACTICE.
Miller's Appeal, 311.

Husband of an heir as purchaser at sale of property
for arrears of ground-rent descended to his wife. See
MORTGAGE. Rushton v. Lippincott, 97.

When husband's disclaimer is to be filed in joint ac-
tion by himself and wife for the latter's use, for in-
juries done to her. See PRACTICE. DuBois Borough v.
Baker, 384.

See PARENT AND CHILD. Ulrich v. Arnold, 394.

ILLEGITIMACY. A. and B. were reputed sons
of C., lived with him and regarded each other as
brothers. After C.'s death B. filed a bill charging that
A. was not the son of C., but an illegitimate son of D.,
C.'s wife; it was admitted that both A. and B. were
born before the marriage of C. and D. in France, and
it appeared that at the time of the marriage C. and D.