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already complete and perfect, in every such ease to present a petition in writing to the said court," which is authorized, after notice to any adverse possessor or occupant, and to the attorney for the United States, and full legal proof and hearing, to enter a decree confirming or rejecting the claim.

By § 7, "all proceedings subsequent to the filing of said petition shall be conducted as near as may be according to the practice of the [87] courts of equity of the United States;"*and the court is authorized "to hear and determine all questions arising in cases before it, relative to the title to the land the subject of such case, the extent, location, and boundaries thereof, and other matters connected therewith fit and proper to be heard and determined, and by a final decree to settle and determine the question of the validity of the title and the boundaries of the grant or claim presented for adjudication, according to the law of nations," the stipulations of the treaties between the United States and Mexico of 1848 and 1853, “and the laws and ordinances of the government from which it is alleged to have been derived, and all other questions properly arising between the claimants or other parties in the case and the United States."

By 88, "any person or corporation claiming lands in any of the states or territories mentioned in this act under a title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government, that was complete and perfect at the date when the United States acquired sovereignty therein, shall have the right (but shall not be bound) to apply to said court, in the manner in this act provided for other cases, for a confirmation of such title; and on such application said court shall proceed to hear, try, and determine the validity of the same, and the right of the claimant thereto, its extent, location, and boundaries, in the same manner and with the same powers as in other cases in this act mentioned." "And no confirmation of claims or titles in this section mentioned shall have any effect other or further than as a release of all claim of title by the United States; and no private right of any person, as between himself and other claimants or persons, in respect of any such lands, shall be in any manner affected thereby."

the questions stated in such petition or aris ing in the matter, and determine the matter according to law, justice, and the provisions of this act, but subject to all lawful rights adverse to such claimant or possessor, as between such claimant and possessor and any other claimant or possessor."

By 9, either party against whom the court of private claims decides may appeal to this court.

By § 13, all the foregoing proceedings and rights are to be conducted and decided subject to several provisions, among which are the following:

"First. No claim shall be allowed that shall not appear to be upon a title lawfully and regularly derived from the government of Spain or Mexico, or from any of the states of the Republic of Mexico having lawful authority to make grants of land, and one that, if not then complete and perfect at the date of the acquisition of the territory by the United States, the claimant would have had a lawful right to make perfect, had the ter ritory not been acquired by the United States, and that the United States are bound, upon the principles of public law, or by the provisions of the treaty of cession, to respect and permit to become complete and perfect if the same was not at sail date already complete and perfect."

"Fourth. No claim shall be allowed for any land the right to which has hitherto been lawfully acted upon and decided by Congress, or under its authority.

"Fifth. No proceeding, decree, or act under this act shall conclude or affect the private rights of persons as between each other, all of which rights shall be reserved and saved to the same effect as if this act had not been passed; but the proceedings, decrees, and acts herein provided for shall be conclusive of all rights as between the United States and all persons claiming any interest or right in such lands."

con

"Eighth. No concession, grant, or other authority to acquire *land, made upon any [89] condition or requirement, either antecedent or subsequent, shall be admitted or firmed unless it shall appear that every such condition and requirement was performed within the time and in the manner stated in any such concession, grant, or other authority to acquire land."

That section further provides that the United States may "file in said court a pe- The only authority given by this act to tition against the holder or possessor of any the surveyor general of a territory or state claim or land in any of the states or terri- is by § 10, which requires him, after a final tories mentioned in this act, who shall not decree of confirmation by the court of prihave voluntarily come in under the provi-vate land claims, and under the directions of sions of this act, stating in substance that the title of such holder or possessor is open to question, or stating in substance that the boundaries of any such land, the claimant or possessor to or of which has not brought [88] the matter into court, *are open to question, and praying that the title to any such land, or the boundaries thereof, if the title be admitted, be settled and adjudicated; and thereupon the court shall, on notice to such claimant or possessor as it shall deem reasonable, proceed to hear, try, and determine

the Commissioner of the General Land Office, to make a survey and return it to said commissioner, by whom it is to be transmitted to that court for its approval or correction. And § 15 expressly repeals § 8 of the act of July 22, 1854, "and all acts amendatory or in extension thereof, or supplementary thereto, and all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act."

The effect of these provisions of the act of 1891 is that all prior acts of Congress providing for the assertion, whether in a judi

cial tribunal or before a surveyor general | above stated, is of opinion that the courts of and Congress, of either complete or incom- the territory of Arizona had jurisdiction, as plete Mexican grants, are repealed, except between these parties, to determine whether as to claims previously acted upon and de- the grant was complete and perfect before cided by Congress or under its authority; the cession by Mexico to the United States. that all incomplete claims against the United States, coming within the provisions of the act, must be presented to the court of private land claims; that anyone claiming Îand under a Mexican grant, which was complete and perfect at the time of the cession of sovereignty "shall have the right (but shall not be bound) to apply to said court," as in cases of incomplete grants; that the United States, however, may file a petition in that court "against the holder or possessor of any claim or land," which would doubtless include titles claimed to be complete, as well as those which were incomplete, at the time of the cession; and that all decisions under this act shall be conclusive between the claimants and the United States

Those courts having held otherwise, the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Terri tory of Arizona, *affirming the judgment of [91] the District Court of Pima County, is reversed, anu the case remanded for further proceedings.

only, and shall not affect the private rights of any person, as between himself and any other claimant.

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller dissented.

In No. 2, Ainsa, Administrator of Ely, v. New Mexico & Arizona Railroad Company and others, a similar case submitted by the same counsel at the same time, judgment was likewise reversed, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller dissenting.

HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COM-
PANY et al., Petitioners,

บ.

RAILWAY COMPANY.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 91-108.)

Contract to exempt from negligence in setting fire-lease for warehouse on railroad right of way.

In short, the United States, at their election, may have the validity of any Mexican CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, & ST. PAUL (0] grant, whether complete or incomplete, *determined by the court of private land claims, so far as concerns the interest of the United States; and proceedings to establish against the United States private titles claimed under incomplete Mexican grants are within the exclusive jurisdiction of that court; but the private holder of any complete and perfect Mexican grant may, but is not obliged to, have its validity as against the United States determined by that court; and no rights of private persons, as between themselves, can be determined by proceedings under this act.

The result is that the United States, by the act of 1891, have prescribed and defined the only method by which grants incomplete before the cession can be completed and made binding upon the United States, but have neither made it obligatory upon the owner of a title complete and perfect before the cession to resort to this method, nor declared that his title shall not be valid if he does not do so.

A grant of land in New Mexico, which was complete and perfect before the cession of New Mexico to the United States, is in the same position as was a like grant in Louisiana or in Florida, and is not in the position of one under the peculiar acts of Congress in relation to California, and may be asserted, as against any adverse private claimant, in the ordinary courts of justice.

In the present case, the Mexican grant in question being asserted by the plaintiff to have been complete and perfect by the law prevailing in New Mexico before the cession of the country to the United States, and it being agreed that this grant had neither been confirmed nor rejected by Congress, and that no proceedings for its confirmation were pending before Congress or before the surveyor general at the time of the commencement of this suit, this court, for the reasons

1.

2.

3.

A stipulation in a lease of a strip of land on a railroad right of way for a storage warehouse, by which the railroad company is exempted from any liability for damage by fire from its locomotive engines, even though caused by the negligence of the company or its servants, is not vold as against public pol icy, where the lease contains no provisions which in any way involve any relation of the railroad company as a common carrier to the lessee or to the public.

Questions of public policy as affecting the liability for acts done or upon contracts made and to be performed within one of the states of the Union, when not controlled by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, or by the principles of the commercial or mercantile law or of general jurisprudence, of national or universal application, are governed by the law of the state as expressed in its own Constitution and statutes or declared by its highest court.

A decision of the highest court of a state, holding that a contract exempting a railroad company from liability for negligence in setting fire to a storage warehouse on the railroad right of way is not against public policy, is conclusive upon a Federal court sitting in that state.

[No. 5.]

NOTE. That stipulations similar to the one in this case do not violate public policy has been decided in several recent cases. See Griswold v. Illinois C. R. Co. 90 Iowa, 265, 24 L. R. A.

647, 57 N. W. 843; Stephens v. Southern P. Co.

109 Cal. 86, 29 L. R. A. 751, 41 Pac. 783.

Such a stipulation does not bind an agent of the lessee in charge of the property, a stranger to the lease, who stores his own property in the warehouse. King v. Southern P. Co. 109 Cal. 96, 29 L. R. A. 755, 41 Pac. 786.

Argued November 11, 12, 1897.
November 6, 1899.

Decided

Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20-35, 27 L. ed. 359-365, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10; Clark v. Bever, 139 U. S. 116, 35 L. ed. 96, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468; Carroll County v. Smith, 111 U. S. 502, 28 L. ed. 919, 1 5up. Ct. meth, 31,

N WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the United O`States CoF Eighth Circuit to review a decision affirm- Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 365, 29 L. ing a decision of the Circuit Court in favored. 636, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413; Bolles v. Brimfield, 120 U. S. 762, 30 L. ed. 788, 7 Sup. Ct. of the validity of a contract exempting a Rep. 736. railroad company from liability for negligence in setting fire to a warehouse on its right of way. Affirmed.

See same case below, 62 Fed. Rep. 904; 36 U. S. App. 152, 70 Fed. Rep. 201, 17 C.

C. A. 62.

The facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs. Charles A. Clark and Richard
W. Barger argued the cause and filed a
brief for petitioners:

When contracts and transactions have been

entered into and rights have accrued thereon in the absence of any authoritative decision by the state courts, the courts of the United States properly claim the right to adopt their own interpretation of the law applicable to the case, although a different interpretation may be adopted by the state courts after such rights have accrued.

East Alabama R. Co. v. Doe ex dem. Vis

It is the duty of railway companies to furnish warehouses and elevators at their sta-scher, 114 U. S. 352, 29 L. ed. 140, 5 Sup. Ct.

tions.

Hutchinson, Carr. 2d ed. by Mechem, 295d; Mason v. Missouri P. R. Co. 25 Mo. App. 473; McCullough v. Wabash Western R. Co. 34 Mo. App. 23; Covington Stock Yards Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128, 35 L. ed. 73, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 461.

One of the duties of a railway company is to furnish facilities in the form of side tracks and premises for grain elevators and ware houses, and it cannot discriminate between its patrons in this particular.

State ex rel. Board of Transportation v. Missouri P. R. Co. 29 Neb. 550, 45 N. W. 785;

Farwell Farmers' Warehouse Asso. v. Minne

apolis, St. P. & 8. S. M. R. Co. 55 Minn. 8, 56 N. W. 248; Vincent v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 49 Ill. 33; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. V. People cx rel. Hempstead, 56 Ill. 365, 8 Am. Rep. 690; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Suffern, 129 Ill. 274, 21 N. E. 824; Railroad Commission

ers v. Portland & O. Cent. R. Co. 63 Me. 269, 18 Am. Rep. 208.

Railway companies will not, by indirection, be permitted to impose additional burdens or hardships upon the public, and all

contracts between themselves and third par ties having that effect will be void.

472.

Rep. 869; Buncombe County Comrs. v. Tommey, 115 U. S. 127, 29 L. ed. 306, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 626, 1186; Ober v. Gallagher, 93 U. S. 207, 23 L. ed. 831; Johnson County Comrs. v. Thayer, 94 U. S. 642, 24 L. ed. 135; Mohr v. Manierre, 101 U. S. 421, 25 L. ed. 1054; Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 582, sub nom. United States ex rel. Butz v. Muscatine, 19 L. ed. 493; Venice v. Murdock, 92 U. S. 501, 23 L. ed. 585; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co. 119 U. S. 623, 30 L. ed. 522, 7 Sup. Ot. Rep. 398; Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116

U. S. 365, 29 L. ed. 636, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413; Bowles v. Brimfield, 120 U. S. 762, 30 L. ed. 788, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 736; Liverpool & G. W.

Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 129 U. S. 443, 32 L. ed. 792, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469; New York C. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 368, 21 L. ed. 636; Delmas v. Merchants' Ins. Co. 14 Wall. 667, 20 L. ed. 759.

Messrs. Charles B. Keeler and George R. Peck argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent:

The decision of a state court of last resort

of any state upon the question of the public policy of that state is conclusive upon this

court.

Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 10 Woodstock Iron Co. v. Richmond & D. Ex. ed. 274; Vidal v. Philadelphia, 2 How. 127, tension Co. 129 U. S. 657, 32 L. ed. 824. 911 L. ed. 205; Tcal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 242, 28 L. ed. 415, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 420; Detroit v. Sup. Ct. Rep. 402; Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492, 34 L. ed. 260, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1012; Bucher v. Cheshire R. Co. 125 U. S. 555, 31 L. ed. 795, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 974; Etheridge v. Sperry, 139 U. S. 266, 35 L. ed. Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Cravens, 57171, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 565; Union Nat. Bank Ark. 112, 18 L. R. A. 527, 20 S. W. 803, 7 Am. v. Bank of Kansas City, 136 U. S. 235, 34 L. R. & Corp. Rep. 284, note 4.

A railway company cannot, by contract or otherwise, limit its liability for negligence in any degree.

A statute attempting to exempt railways from liability for damages caused by fires negligently set out would be unconstitutional and void.

Cooley, Const. Lim. 3d ed. *pp. 351-354; Thirteenth & F. Street Pass. R. Co. v. Boudrou, 92 Pa. 481, 37 Am. Rep. 707; Park v. Detroit Free Press Co. 72 Mich. 566, 1 L. R. A. 599, 40 N. W. 731.

Federal courts are not concluded by the decisions of state courts made after a contract is entered into, or made after a suit is pending in the Federal courts.

ed. 345, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1013; Brown v. Grand Rapids Parlor Furniture Co. 16 U. S. App. 221, 58 Fed. Rep. 286, 7 C. C. A. 225, 22 L. R. A. 817; Swann v. Swann, 21 Fed. Rep. 299.

The exemption contained in the lease is not contrary to public policy, and is therefore valid.

Stephens v. Southern P. Co. 109 Cal. 86, 29 L. R. A. 751, 41 Pac. 783.

A railway company's right of way is its private property, held for the public use, and it cannot be compelled to lease portions thereof to others, even for the purpose of

85

[92]

erecting elevators for storage of grain pre- | States for the district of Iowa; and in that paratory to shipment. To compel such occu- court, on September 12, 1893, filed an answer pancy against its will would amount to a admitting that the parties to the action were taking of private property without due proc- corporations, and that the partnership was ess of law. doing business at Monticello, as alleged, but denying all the other allegations of the petition.

Missouri P. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 414, 41 L. ed. 494, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 130.

Not all contracts which seek to relieve one party from legal liability for its own negli gence or that of its servants are contrary to public policy and void.

On April 2, 1894, by leave of court, an amended answer was filed, alleging that the land on which the warehouse stood belonged to the defendant as part of its depot grounds at Monticello; and that the sole right and occupancy of the partnership therein were by virtue of an indenture of lease, dated Feb

by the partnership, under which the partnership entered into and thenceforth occupied the land, and which was set forth in the answer, and was as follows:

The defendant leased the land (describing by metes and bounds, showing it to be a strip 130 feet long and 55 feet wide, part of its depot grounds, and by the side of its track) to the partnership, "to hold for the term of one year from the date hereof for the

Bates v. Old Colony R. Co. 147 Mass. 265, 18 N. E. 633; Hosmer v. Old Colony R. Co. 156 Mass. 507, 31 N. E. 652; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Keefer, 146 Ind. 21, 38 L. R.ruary 1, 1890, executed by the defendant and A. 93, 44 N. E. 796; Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1. sub nom. Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Southern Exp. Co. 29 L. ed. 791, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542. 628; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Wallace, 24 U. S. App. 589, 66 Fed. Rep. 506, 14 C. C. A. 257, 30 L. R. A. 161; Coup v. Wait bash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 56 Mich. 111, 56 Am. Rep. 374, 22 N. W. 215; Robertson v. Old Colony R. Co. 156 Mass. 525, 31 N. E. 650; Forcpaugh v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 128 Pa. 217, 5 L. R. A. 508, 18 Atl. 503; Pied-purpose of erecting and maintaining therement Mfg. Co. v. Columbia & G. R. Co. 19 S. C. 353: New York C. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 377, 21 L. ed. 639; Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 129 U. S. 440, 32 L. ed. 791, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469; Hutchinson, Carr. 2d ed. §§ 40, 44, 73; Wells v. Steam Navigation Co. 2 N. Y. 204; Alexander v. Greene, 3 Hill, 9.

*Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court:

on a cold-storage warehouse, the said lessee yielding and paying therefor the annual rent of $5 in advance; and upon the express condition that the said railway company, its successors and assigns, shall be exempt and released, and said parties of the second part, for themselves and for their heirs, executors and administrators and assigns, do hereby expressly release them, from all liability or damage by reason of any injury to or destruction of any building or buildings now on, or This was an action brought May 10, 1893, which may hereafter be placed on, said premin the district court of Jones county, in the ises, or of the fixtures, appurtenances, or state of Iowa, against the Chicago, Milwau-other personal property remaining inside or kee, & St. Paul Railway Company, a railroad outside of said buildings, by fire occasioned corporation of Wisconsin, by seven fire in-or originated by sparks or burning coal from surance companies, corporations of other states, to recover for the loss by fire, owing to the defendant's negligence, of a warehouse and goods, belonging to the partnership of Simpson, McIntire, & Company, and insured by the plaintiffs, who had paid the loss.

the locomotives, or from any damage done by
trains or cars running off the track, or from
the carelessness or negligence of employees
or agents of said railway company; *and fur- [94]
ther, that the said parties of the second part
will in no way obstruct or interfere with the
track of said railway company in using said
premises.

The petition alleged that on November 11, 1892. and long before, the partnership was doing business at Monticello in that county, "And the parties of the second part agree and there owned a cold-storage warehouse, to keep said premises in as good repair and situated upon railroad ground by the side of condition as the same are in at the comthe railway track of the defendant in Mon-mencement of said term; to pay, as the same ticello, and containing a valuable stock of become due and payable, all taxes and assessbutter and eggs; that on that day the de-ments, general and special, that may be lev fendant, while running its engines and cars on its railway track alongside of the warehouse, negligently set fire to and destroyed the warehouse and its contents to the value of $27,118; that at the time of the fire the partnership held policies of insurance against fire on this property from each of the plaintiffs, and was afterwards paid by them, under those policies, the aggregate sum of $23,[93]450; and that the plaintiffs thereby *became, to that extent, subrogated to the partnership's right against the defendant, and were entitled to judgment against it for the sum so paid, with interest.

The defendant, on May 23, 1893, removed the case into the circuit court of the United

ied or assessed thereon during the time they remain in possession thereof; and to quit and surrender said premises at the expiration of said term, on demand of said railway company; and, in case such demand shall not be made at the expiration of said term, to pay said rent, at the rate and in the instalments aforesaid, as long as they remain in possession thereof; and that they will not underlease said premises without the written consent of said railway company.

"And said parties of the second part further agree to quit and surrender said premises at any time before the expiration of said first-mentioned term, or at any time when default shall be made in the payment of said

rent or taxes as aforesaid, within thirty days | after demand of said railway company; and that upon the expiration of said thirty days it shall be lawful for said railway company to expel them therefrom.

"The parties of the second part may (and hereby agree that they will, if said railway company shall so require) remove from said premises, within thirty days after any termination of this lease, all structures owned or placed thereon by them."

The amended answer concluded by alleging "that from the first day of February, 1890, down to and including the time of said fire, Simpson, McIntire, & Company remained in possession and occupancy of said premises under the terms and conditions of said original lease, and not otherwise; and were and continued to be tenants holding over under the lease aforesaid, and subject to all its provisions; and that, as to the alleged destruction by fire of the building and property mentioned in the plaintiffs' petition, all such risks and the loss therefrom were assumed by said Simpson, McIntire, & Company, and this defendant company was re[95] leased therefrom, as one of the express conditions of said lease and occupancy, and plaintiff cannot now recover therefor. Wherefore the defendant prays judgment herein."

opinion (Judge Caldwell nonconcurring in this respect) that the decision of the state court was not conclusive upon this question. 36 U. S. App. 152, 70 Fed. Rep. 201, 17 C. C. A. 62. The plaintiffs thereupon applied for and obtained this writ of certiorari.

*This action against a railroad corpora- [96] tion for the loss by fire, owing to its negligence in running its engines and trains, of a cold-storage warehouse and the goods therein, owned by a commercial partnership, is brought by insurers of the property, who had paid to the partnership the greater part of the loss, and whose right, thereby acquired by way of subrogation, to recover against the railroad company to the extent of the amount so paid, is but the same right that the partnership had. Phonia Ins. Co. v. Erie & W. Transp. Co. 117 U. S. 312, 29 L. ed. 873, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 750, 1176.

It is important, therefore, in the first place, to ascertain exactly what were the relations between the railroad company and the partnership.

The warehouse stood upon a strip of land belonging to the railroad company, by the side of its track, and part of its depot grounds at Monticello, in the state of Iowa. The sole right of the partnership in that strip was by virtue of an indenture of lease thereof, dated February 1, 1890, by which the railroad company leased it to the partnership for a year from that date, "for the pur

The plaintiffs demurred to the amended answer, on the ground that the stipulation in the lease, by which it was sought to exoner-pose of erecting and maintaining thereon a ate the defendant from loss by fire caused by the negligence of itself or its servants, was void as against public policy.

At the argument of the demurrer in the circuit court of the United States at April term, 1894, before Judge Shiras (as is shown by his opinion copied in the record, and printed in 62 Fed. Rep. 904), it appeared that a case between other parties, involving the question at issue in this case, was then pending before the supreme court of the state of Iowa, under the following circumstances: In that case, entitled Griswold v. Illinois C. R. Co., that court, on October 19, 1892 (by an opinion reported only in 53 N. W. 295), had held a similar stipulation to be void as against public policy, but on February 3, 1894, upon a rehearing, had held to the contrary, and had sustained the validity of the stipulation, two judges dissenting. 90 Iowa, 265, 24 L. R. A. 647, 57 N. W. 843. A second petition for rehearing was then filed, and was still pending in that court. Under those circumstances Judge Shiras suspended action on the demurrer, awaiting the final decision of the supreme court of the state. That court afterwards denied the second petition for rehearing, thereby finally affirming the validity of the stipulation; and thereupon Judge Shiras, at September term, 1894, overruled the demurrer, and, the plaintiffs declining to plead further, rendered judgment for the defendant.

cold-storage warehouse," at an annual rent
of $5 payable in advance, "and upon the ex-
press condition that the said railway com-
pany, its successors and assigns, shall be ex-
empt and released," and the lessees "do here-
by expressly release them," from all liability
or damage by reason of any destruction or
injury of buildings then upon or afterwards
placed on the land or of personal property
inside or outside of those buildings, "by fire
occasioned or originated by sparks or burn-
ing coal from the locomotives, or from any
damage done by trains or cars running off
the track, or from the carelessness or negli
gence of employees or agents of said railway
company;" and the lessees covenanted in no
way to obstruct or interfere with the track
of the railroad company. The rest of the
indenture consisted of covenants of the les-
sees to keep the premises in repair; to pay
the rent and taxes so long as they remained
in possession; to surrender possession to the
lessor, at the expiration of the term, if then
demanded, or before its expiration, or on de-
fault in payment of rent or taxes, *within [97]
lease without the lessor's consent; with a
thirty days after demand; and not to under-
further agreement that the lessees might.
and, if required by the lessor, would, remove
from the premises, within thirty days after
any termination of the lease, all structures
owned or placed thereon by them.

That judgment was unanimously affirmed The indenture, in short, is a lease by the by the circuit court of appeals upon the railroad company of a strip of its land by ground that the stipulation was valid, and the side of its track to the partnership, for was not against public policy; Judges San- the purpose of erecting and maintaining a born and Thayer, however, expressing the cold-storage warehouse thereon, for one year

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