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Mr. Frank E. Smith argued the cause and, with Mr. Thomas F. Conway, filed a brief for plaintiff in error:

The questions which in Turner v. New York, 168 U. S. 90, 42 L. ed. 392, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 38, were assumed to have been correctly decided because they were questions of state law must now be decided by this court for itself.

Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511, 19 L. ed. 997; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 40 L. ed. 91, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80; Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. ed. 369, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56.

The act in question does not attempt to cure "jurisdictional defects." A tax sale void by reason of such defect remains void notwithstanding the statute.

Ensign v. Barse, 107 N. Y. 329, 14 N. E. 400, 15 N. E. 401; Joslyn v. Rockwell, 129 N. Y. 334, 28 N. E. 604; People v. Turner, 145 N. Y. 451, 40 N. E. 400; Ne-ha- sa ne

Park Asso. v. Lloyd, 7 App. Div. 359, 40 N. Y. Supp. 58; Marsh v. Ne-ha-sa-ne Park Asso. 18 Misc. 314, 42 N. Y. Supp. 996, Reversed in 25 App. Div. 34, 49 N. Y. Supp.

384.

A sale of land for taxes must, we think, be wholly good or wholly bad. It is indivisible, and unless it can be sustained as a whole it cannot be sustained in part. It is also manifest that the sale of the 1,215-acre parcel for the unpaid taxes of five years cannot, independently of curative legislation, be justified because as to two of those years it was legally liable.

People v. Hagadorn, 104 N. Y. 516, 10 N.

E. 891.

The sale of the whole quarter for taxes which were not a lien upon the whole quarter was illegal and void. It is not different in principle from the case of the assessment of an entire tract, followed by payment of a proportionate part of the tax upon a specific part of the land, and a sale of the entire tract for the unpaid balance. Such a sale is void in toto.

Black, Tax Titles, 2d ed. § 258; Marsh v. Ne-ha-sa-ne Park Asso. 18 Misc. 314, 42 N. Y. Supp. 996, Reversed in 25 App. Div. 34, 49 N. Y. Supp. 384.

A sale of land for unpaid taxes must be made as the land has been assessed and taxed; and the practice of bunching into one

of the two years allowed by law to redeem, were regular and were regularly given, published and served according to the provisions of this act, and all laws directing or requiring the same, or in any manner relating thereto, and all other conveyances or certificates heretofore or hereafter executed or issued by the comptroller, shall be presumptive evidence of the regularity of all the said proceedings and matters hereinbefore recited, and shall be conclusive evidence thereof from and after the expiration of two years from the date of recording such other conveyances, or of four years from and after the date of issuing such other certificates. But all such conveyances and certificates and the taxes and tax sales on which they are based shall be subject to cancelation, as now provided by law, on a direct application to the comptroller or an ac

parcel two or more lots which have been separately assessed, and selling them as one for the aggregate tax, has been uniformly condemned.

Blackwell, Tax Titles, 5th ed. § 526; Cool. ey, Taxn. 2d ed. p. 493; National F. Ins. Co. v. McKay, 5 Abb. Pr. N. S. 445; Thompson v. Burhans, 61 N. Y. 52; Turner v. Boyce, 11 Misc. 502, 33 N. Y. Supp. 433; Marsh v. Ne-ha-sa-ne Park Asso. 18 Misc. 314, 42 N. Y. Supp. 996, Reversed in 25 App. Div. 34, 49 N. Y. Supp. 384.

Certainty of description is indispensable. in all proceedings to devest the title of a citizen for nonpayment of taxes, or otherwise in invitum.

Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y. 66; Re New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 70 N. Y. 191; Re

New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 90 N. Y. 342;

Zink v. McManus, 121 N. Y. 259, 24 N. E.

467.

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Blackwell, Tax Titles, 5th ed. § 224; Black, Tax Titles, 2d ed. § 112; Stout v. Mastin, 139 U. S. 151, 35 L. ed. 121, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 519; Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y. 66; Greene v. Lunt, 58 Me. 518.

A description which would be sufficient in a voluntary deed, as between grantor and grantee, may be wholly insufficient in tax proceedings.

Blackwell, Tax Titles, 5th ed. § 226; Devlin, Deeds, § 1405; Stout v. Mastin, 139 U. S. 151, 35 L. ed. 121, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 519; Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y. 66.

Tax proceedings must be certain in them. selves, and cannot be aided by extrinsic proof.

Black, Tax Titles, 2d ed. §§ 406, 407; Blackwell, Tax Titles, 5th ed. § 227; Stout v. Mastin, 139 U. S. 151, 35 L. ed. 121, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 519; Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y. 66; Curtis v. Brown County Supers. 22 Wis. 167; Orton v. Noonan, 23 Wis. 102; People v. Mahoney, 55 Cal. 286; Bowers v. Andrews, 52 Miss. 596.

When in tax proceedings the officials at. tempt to exclude from their operation a specific part of the tract otherwise proceeded against, the part excepted must be described

tion brought before a competent court therefor, by reason of the legal payment of such taxes, or by reason of the levying of such taxes by a town or ward having no legal right to assess the land on which they are laid."

Sec. 2. The provisions of this act are hereby made applicable only to the following counties, namely: Clinton, Delaware, Essex, Franklin, Fulton, Greene, Hamilton, Herkimer, Lewis, Saratoga, St. Lawrence, Sullivan, Ulster, Warren, and Washington, but shall not affect any action, proceeding, or application pending at the time of its passage; nor any action that shall be begun, proceeding taken, or application duly made within six months thereafter for the purpose of vacating any tax sale or any conveyance or certificate of sale made thereunder.

1899.

SARANAC LAND & TIMBER Co. v. ROBERTS.

with certainty, or the proceedings will be void.

Black, Tax Titles, 2d ed. § 405; Marsh v. Ne-ha-sa-ne Park Asso. 18 Misc. 314, 42 N. Y. Supp. 996, Reversed in 25 App. Div. 34, 49 N. Y. Supp. 384; Johnson v. Ashland Lumber Co. 52 Wis. 458, 9 N. W. 464.

The description was fatally defective because neither of the excepted parcels was so described that it could be located.

Zink v. McManus, 121 N. Y. 259, 24 N. E.

467.

Such a description has been sustained in some states, where by statute land sold for taxes must be laid out in a square form. Newby v. Brownlee, 23 Fed. Rep. 320. There is no such statute in New York. Treating the land as already the property of the state, and denying opportunity for competitive bidding, was a jurisdictional defect.

Turner v. Boyce, 11 Misc. 502, 33 N. Y. Supp. 433; Andrus v. Wheeler, 18 Misc. 646, 42 N. Y. Supp. 525, Reversed in 22 App. Div. 596, 48 N. Y. Supp. 118; Meigs v. Roberts, 42 App. Div. 290, 59 N. Y. Supp. 215.

Mr. Theodore E. Hancock argued the cause and, with Mr. John C. Davies, filed a brief for defendant in error:

The validity and constitutionality of this particular statute is res judicata.

er v. Bleckwenn, 55 Hun, 169, 7 N. Y. Supp.
914; Re Lamb, 51 Hun, 633, 4 N. Y. Supp.
858.

The United States courts will follow the
decisions of the state courts in the construc-
tion of the state statutes relating to the
forms of assessments and methods of proce-
dure in making sales.

Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660, 33 L.
ed. 772, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324; Amy v. Du-
buque, 98 U. S. 470, 25 L. ed. 228; Lamborn
v. Dickinson County Comrs. 97 U. S. 181, 24
L. ed. 926; Harpending v. Reformed Protes
tant Dulch Church, 16 Pet. 455, 10 L. ed.
1029; Green v. Neal, 6 Pet. 291, 8 L. ed. 402;
De Wolf v. Rabaud, 1 Pet. 476, 7 L. ed. 227;
Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 264, 8 L. ed.
120; Beryman v. Bly, 27 U. S. App. 650, 66
Fed. Rep. 40, 13 C. C. A. 319; Sanford v.
Poc, 37 U. S. App. 378, 69 Fed. Rep. 546, 16
C. C. A. 305; Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall.
196, 18 L. ed. 322; Lane County v. Oregon,
7 Wall. 71, 19 L. ed. 101; State Railroad Tax
Cases, 92 U. S. 618, sub nom. Taylor v. Se-
cor, 23 L. ed. 675; Witherspoon v. Duncan,
4 Wall. 217, 18 L. ed. 342.

There is no uncertainty in the descrip-
tion, as the 1,000 acres would be in the form
of a square.

Marsh v. Ne-ha-sa-ne Park Asso. 25 App. Div. 40, 49 N. Y. Supp. 384; Dolan v. TrePeople v. Turner, 117 N. Y. 227, 22 N. E.levan, 31 Wis. 147; Bowers v. Chambers, 53 1022; People v. Turner, 145 N. Y. 451, 40 N. E. 400; Turner v. New York, 168 U. S. 90, 42 L. ed. 392, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 38.

Similar statutes have been repeatedly construed as not in contravention of the Federal Constitution, and as valid for the purpose of limiting the time within which actions similar to this shall be commenced.

Geekie v. Kirby Carpenter Co. 106 U. S. 379, 27 L. ed. 157, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 315; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 24 L. ed. 365; Williams v. Albany Supers. 122 U. S. 163, 30 L. ed. 1090, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1244; Re Brown, 135 U. S. 701, 34 L. ed. 316, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 972; Townsen v. Wilson, 9 Pa. 270; Bronson v. St. Croix Lumber Co. 44 Minn. 348. 46 N. W. 570: Coulter v. Stafford, 48 Fed. Rep. 266; Land & River Improv. Co. v. Bardon, 45 Fed. Rep. 706; Ensign v. Barse, 107 N. Y. 329. 14 N. E. 400. 15 N. E. 401: Ostrander v. Darling, 127 N. Y. 70, 27 N. E. 353; Allen v. Armstrong. 16 Towa, 508; Smith v. Cleveland, 17 Wis. 563: Freeman v. Thayer, 33 Me. 83: Raley v. Guinn, 76 Mo. 270: Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How. 472. 14 L. ed. 228.

A departure from the strict letter of a
statute, which, had it been directed by stat-
ute. would not have rendered it unconstitu-
tional, cannot be said to be a jurisdictional
defect in a constitutional sense: and a cura-
tive statute may validate acts which the leg-
islature might originally have authorized.
and limit the time within which actions to
set aside tax sales based upon irregularities
shall be commenced.

Ensign v. Barse, 107 N. Y. 339, 14 N. E.
400, 15 N. E. 401; People v. Turner, 117 N.
Y. 238, 22 N. E. 1022; People v. Turner, 145
N. Y. 451, 40 N. E. 400; People ex rel. Flow-
U. S.. BOOK 44.
177 U. S.

|

Miss. 259; Doe ex dem. Hooper v. Clayton,
81 Ala. 391, 2 So. 24; Walsh v. Ringer, 2
Ohio, 328; Prior v. Scott, 87 Mo. 308;
Enochs v. Miller, 60 Miss. 19; McCready v.
Lansdale, 58 Miss. 877; Bybee v. Hageman,
66 Ill. 519; Colcord v. Alexander, 67 Ill.
581; Major v. Brush, 7 Ind. 232.

The defects complained of by plaintiff in
error were simply irregularities, and not of
a jurisdictional nature.

Marsh v. Ne-ha-sa-ne Park Asso. 25 App. Div. 36, 49 N. Y. Supp. 384; Ensign v. Barse, 107 N. Y. 329, 14 N. E. 400, 15 N. E. 401.

*Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the [328] opinion of the court:

con

If chapter 448 is constitutional, its limitation attached some years before this action was commenced. It was held constitutional by this court in Turner v. New York, 168 U. S. 90, 42 L. ed. 392, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 38. The contention now is, however, that our It is said that to clusion depended upon reasoning not applicable to the case at bar. the validity of a statute of limitations a remedy precedent to and during the period of limitation must exist, and that a remedy did exist we assumed was decided by the state court as a state question, and that on a writ of error to its judgment we were bound by the ruling, and for that reason affirmed the judgment. But the pending case being on error to a United States court, we[323] not only may, but must, exercise an indefollow the state court-whether pendent judgment-decide for ourselves, remedy existed.

50

not

a

But was the conclusion in the Turner Case 789 as dependent as contended? The question is best answered by the case itself.

The action was brought in the state court, and was replevin for logs cut upon wild forest lands. The state claimed title through sales for delinquent taxes and deeds executed in pursuance of them. The defendant attacked the deeds, alleging the invalidity of the taxes for 1867 and 1870, and offered evidence to show that the oath of the assessors to the assessment roll of 1867 was taken on August 10, instead of on the third Tuesday of August; and that the assessors omitted to meet on the third Tuesday to review the assessment for that year.

The state objected to the evidence as immaterial because the comptroller's deed was made conclusive evidence of those matters by the statute of the state of 1885, chap. 448,the statute now in controversy. To the objection it was replied that the statute infringed the 1st section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The state's objection, however, was tained, and judgment was directed and entered for the state, which was affirmed by the court of appeals, 145 N. Y. 451, 40 N.

E. 400.

sus

Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of

this court. He stated the law of 1885 establishing a forest preserve and the creation of a forest commission and its duties, and that at the date of the passage of the statute the time for redemption from tax sales was two years. He then stated the enactment and provisions of the law whose constitutionality was attacked, the time of the tax sales, the time for redemption and its expiration, the period the comptroller's deeds were on record, and the time that they became conclusive, and said:

"The statute according to its principal intent and effect, and as construed by the court of appeals of the state, was a statute of limitations. People v. Turner, 117 N. Y. 227, 22 N. E. 1022; People v. Turner, 145 N. Y. 451, 40 N. E. 400. It is well settled that a statute shortening the period of limitation is within the constitutional power of the legislature, provided a reasonable time, tak[324]ing into consideration *the nature of the case, is allowed for bringing an action after the passage of the statute and before the bar takes effect. Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 632, 633, 24 L. ed. 365, 366; Re Brown, 135 U. S. 701, 705-707, 34 L. ed. 316-318, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 972.

"The statute now in question relates to land sold and conveyed to the state for nonpayment of taxes; it applies to those cases only in which the conveyance has been of record for two years in the office where all conveyances of lands within the county are recorded, and it does not bar any action begun within six months after its passage. Independently of the consideration that before the passage of the statute the plaintiff had had eight years since the sale and three years since the recording of the deed, during which he might have asserted his title, this court concurs with the highest court of the state in the opinion that the limitation of six months, as applied to a case of this kind, is not

repugnant to any provision of the Constitution of the United States.

"It was argued in behalf of the plaintiff in error that the statute was unconstitutional because it did not allow him any opportunity to assert his rights even within six months after its passage. But the statute did not take away any right of action which he had before its passage, but merely limited the time within which he might assert such a right. Within the six months he had every remedy which he would have had before the passage of the statute. If he had no remedy before, the statute took none away. From the judgments of the court of appeals in the case at bar, and in the subserel. Millard v. quent case of People ex Roberts, 151 N. Y. 540, 45 N. E. 941, there would appear to have been some difference of opinion in that court upon the question whether his proper remedy was by direct application to the comptroller to cancel the sale troller or the forest commissioners. But or by action of ejectment against the comp as that court has uniformly held that he had a remedy, it is not for us to determine what

that remedy was under the local Constitu

tion and laws."

The decision establishes the following propositions:

the constitutional power of the legislature of 1. That statutes of limitations are within

a state to enact.

*2. That the limitation of six months was[325) not unreasonable.

3. That the statute took away no remedy which the landowner had before its passage.

4. That the state court held he had a remedy, although there was difference of opinion whether it was by direct application to the comptroller to cancel the sales or by action of ejectment against the comptroller or forest commissioners.

5. That as the state courts decided he had

a remedy it was not for us to determine what that remedy was under the local Constitution and laws,—that is, whether it was either a direct application to the comptroller or by action of ejectment.

What, then, did this court assume, that it did not decide or ought now to decide? Counsel for plaintiff in error say that

"The Turner Case established the suffi

ciency of the time allowed by the law now in question, but it treated the existence of a court competent to try the disputed rights and of a person liable to be sued for that purpose as questions of state law, and foreclosed by the judgment of the state court. These things ought now to be decided and not assumed."

The case, however, as we have seen, was not so limited. It decided more than that the time allowed by the statute was reasonable and sufficient. It also decided that the statute took away no remedy the landowner had before its passage, and that the law of the state gave him a remedy. What it precisely was,-which of the three enumerated ones it was, was not decided. Not, however, because of the assumption of anything, but because it was not demanded. And why? The

to someone else. "We take it to be settled law," counsel say, "that the constitutionality of a statute is to be tested, not so much by what is done as what may be done under it. The present record is silent as to the actual ownership of the different parcels of the quarter in question during the years 1866-1870, but plainly they might have been the subject of separate ownership." And counsel proceed to show how a separate owner, if he had existed, would have been embarrassed in his right of re

question presented was the constitutionality a possible severalty of ownership of the difof the statute. That depended upon the ex-ferent parcels, and claims a cause of action istence of a remedy in the landowner during from an injury which might have resulted the period of its limitation, and whether a remedy existed what better evidence or authority could there be than the decisions of the courts interpreting the laws of the state? To accept them as such was not to assume anything without deciding it. It was to ascertain a necessary element of decision, and then exercising decision. This was our duty then, and it is our duty now, and the fact that the case comes for review from the circuit court of the United States neither enforces nor justifies different considerations. If a precedent or coincident remedy is neces-demption by the necessity of paying some 326]sary *to the constitutional validity of a statute of limitations, the existence of such remedy is necessary to be decided, and it depends upon the same considerations, and must be upon the same examination, no matter in what court it may be presented or may

come.

The reasoning of the Turner Case was therefore complete, and we think it is decisive against the contention of the plaintiff in error. The sufficiency of the remedies enumerated was not contested. It is not contested now. The existence of remedies is denied, but to the reasoning which attempts to support the denial we reply by repeating what we said in the Turner Case-that as the New York court of appeals has uniformly held that the landowner had a remedy, "it is not for us to determine what that remedy was under the local Constitution and laws." The defects which plaintiff in error claims to have been in the assessments and to have been jurisdictional are stated as follows:

"1. The sale of the whole tract of land in question for the aggregate unpaid taxes of several years when, during one or more of those years, a part of the tract sold was not assessed or taxed at all.

"2. The sale as one tract of two or more parcels separately assessed.

"3. The assessment of taxes by a description so uncertain as not to identify the parcel of land taxed.

"4. Treating the land on the sale as already the property of the state, and denying opportunity for competitive bidding."

The first two are treated by counsel as similar and dependent upon the same grounds of objection. The specification of those grounds is that at the sale of 1877 the whole quarter, containing 7,500 acres, was sold as one parcel for the aggregate unpaid taxes of 18661870 inclusive, amounting, with interest and costs, to $2,756.40, but that it was not assessed as a whole except for the years 1866 and 1867; that for the years 1868, 1869, and 1870 it was assessed in two parcels: (1) the northwest quarter of township 24, "excepting 1,000 acres lying in the northwest corner; also 1,315 acres which is water;" and (2) "1,000 acres lying in the northwest corner of the northwest quarter." And that [327] 1,215 acres was not assessed at all for those years. The plaintiff in error, however, does not show that it was in any way injured by the manner of selling. Its counsel supposes

other person's taxes besides his own, and of which he had not been notified during the pendency of the tax proceedings.

The

We are not concerned with what might have been, but only with what was. plaintiff in error now sues as owner of the whole tract, and if there was a several ownership of it, or of parts of it, such ownership should have been shown if anything can be claimed from it. We may not suppose it from this record. It is manifest that the manner of sale could do no injury to the owner of the whole tract. Its separation in parcels on the assessment roll would be artificial and mere description. It would not affect its value, would not require the owner to pay someone's else taxes, would not make him pay more than was justly due from him, either before a sale or after a sale, if he then desired to exercise the right of redemption.

But even if we should suppose a several ownership of the lands at the time of the assessment or sale, we do not think that the defects in the latter were jurisdictional, and certainly of all other defects the law of 1885 is not curative only-it is one of limitation, It matters not, therefore, what the rights of any predecessor of the plaintiff might have been if seasonably asserted. They were not seasonably asserted, and they are therefore now precluded.

The law is like any other statute of limitations. It is not affected by what the[328] rights of plaintiff in error were. Whatever they were their remedy is gone, and the title and possession of the state, whatever may have been the defects in the proceedings of which they are the consummation, cannot now be disturbed. This was the ruling in Marsh v. Ne-ha-sa-ne Park Asso. 25 App. Div. 34, 49 N. Y. Supp. 384, where the cases were reviewed, and we think correctly interpreted.

In People v. Turner, 117 N. Y. 227, 22 N. E. 1022, the remedies of the landowner before and after a sale were considered, and the law defined as one of limitation. The court said: "Considered as an act of limitation, the only question in relation thereto is whether such limitation is just and gives the claimant a reasonable opportunity to enforce his rights. (See authorities, supra.) Under all the circumstances of the case it cannot, we think, be said, as a question of law, that the time afforded is unreasonable. Considered as establishing a rule of evidence,

the only question for examination is whether property is thereby necessarily taken without due process of law."

the regularity of the proceedings in which conveyance was made.

The case was taken to the court of appeals, which reversed the appellate division. The court said:

That case seems to have been qualified somewhat by Joslyn v. Rockwell, 128 N. Y. 334, 28 N. E. 604, where it was decided that the law was not conclusive against jurisdictional defects. But People v. Turner was reaffirmed in 145 N. Y. 451, 40 N. E. 400. If the cases are in conflict the latter must pre-proceeded. We are of opinion that the vail, but assuming their reconciliation to be in the character of the defects passed on, they are equally authoritative against plaintiff in error.

In Joslyn v. Rockwell two defects were said to be jurisdictional: The payment of taxes and the occupation of the lands. Of the latter it was said: "The act of 1885 (chap. 448) is one, by its title, relating to the collection of taxes on lands of nonresidents, and to provide for the sale of such lands for unpaid taxes.' It is provided that occupied lands are not the lands of nonresidents. (1 R. S. 389, § 3.) And where lands of a nonresident of a county are occupied by a resident of the town an assessment to the owner in the 'nonresident' part of the roll is illegal, and the lands should be assessed to the resident occupant. People ex rel. Barnard v. Wemple, 117 N. Y. 77, 22 N. E. 761. If the lands were occupied the act of 1885 would not apply." In the case at bar there is no such fact to preclude the application of

the law.

[329] *In the case of Meigs v. Roberts, recently decided by the court of appeals of New York, [162 N. Y. 371, 377, 56 N. E. 838] Joslyn v. Rockwell has been explained and limited, and People v. Turner again affirmed.

The action was ejectment, and the plaintiff Meigs traced his title by a chain of conveyances from an original grant by the state in 1798. The defendant justified his possession under deeds to the state in pursuance of sales for taxes. One of them was assailed on account of an alleged defect in the notice of redemption published by the comptroller. The defendant pleaded that the action was not brought within the time prescribed by the provision of chapter 448 of the Laws of 1885 and subsequent laws. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the land was in the occupation of the state, and suit could not be maintained against it without its consent. An appeal having been taken, the appellate division reversed the judgment and granted a new trial, holding that the action could be maintained, but also holding that the notice of redemption of the tax sale of 1881 was fatally defective, and that the deed made in pursuance of the sale did not pass title, and that the defect was not cured by the provisions of chapter 148 (subsequently re-enacted in part in 1891 and 1893), which makes the conveyance of the comptroller upon tax sales, after the two years from its record in the county in which the lands are situated, conclusive evidence of

"We do not find it necessary to pass upon many of the questions which have been elaborately argued before us, or even the one upon which the decision of the trial court lapse of time between the record of the conveyance of 1884 and the commencement of this action barred the right to the plaintiff to maintain it, even assuming the other questions in the case should be resolved in his favor. The learned appellate division held that the failure to publish a proper redemption notice was jurisdictional as to the conveyance of 1884, and, hence, not cured by chapter 448 of the Laws of 1885, and cited Ensign v. Barse, 107 N. Y. 329, 14 N. E. 400, 15 N. E. 401, and Joslyn v. *Rockwell, 128[330) N. Y. 334, 28 N. E. 604, as authorities for that proposition. We think the learned court took too narrow a view of the statute of 1885. This statute, though in some aspects a curative law, is primarily and essentially much more; it is a statute of limitation. It was distinctly held to be such in two decisions of this court (People v. Turner, 117 N. Y. 227, 22 N. E. 1022; People v. Turner, 145 N. Y. 459, 40 N. E. 400), and by the Supreme York, 168 U. S. 90, 42 L. ed. 392, 18 Sup. Ct. sense of that term is a retrospective law, actA curative act in the ordinary Rep. 38. ing on past cases and existing rights. The power of the legislature to enact such laws is therefore confined within comparatively narrow limits, and they are usually passed to validate irregularities in legal proceedings, or to give effect to contracts between parties which might otherwise fall for failure to comply with technical legal requirements. Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 454. A very full enumeration of the cases in which the legislature may properly exercise this power is to be found in Forster v. Forster, 129 Mass. 559. But there may be in legal proceedings defects which are not mere informalities or irregularities, but so vital in their character as to be beyond the help of retrospective legislation; such defects are called jurisdictional. This principle does not apply to a statute of limitations, for such a statute will bar any right, however high the source from which it may be deduced, provided that a reasonable time is given a party to enforce his right. Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 24 L. ed. 365; Turner v. New York, 145 N. Y. 451, 40 N. E. 400. Ensign v. Barse, 107 N. Y. 329, 14 N. E. 400, 15 N. E. 401. was strictly a case of a retrospective statute, for no period of time was given within which any party affected could assert his rights. The same is true of Cromwell v. MacLean, 123 N. Y. 474, 25 N. E. 932. In Joslyn v. Rockwell, 128 N. Y. 334, 28 N. E. 604, as well as in the two cases of People v. Turner, all of which arose under the statute

Court of the United States. Turner v. New

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