Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub

pediente, offered in evidence as the basis of the claim, that on January 22, 1731, Bernardino de Sena, Tomas de Sena, and Luis Lopez presented a petition to Governor Juan Domingo Bustamente to grant them the surplus land in the abandoned pueblo of Cuyamungue as royal, public, and uninhabited, and described it as being situated on both sides of the river Tesuque (formerly Cuyamungue), and extending from a bluff of the pueblo of Cuyamungue to the hills of the Nambé road.

The oral testimony tended to show that the pueblo of Pojoaque had been in existence since 1710, and the pueblo of Nambé from a time immemorial.

Upon motion made by the government and upon the consent of all the parties to the proceeding, it was ordered on October 11, 1895, that these pueblos be made parties, and that the petition of the claimants be deemed amended accordingly. It did not appear that any copy of the petition was served upon these pueblos, or that they appeared or waived service; but the court on October 24, 1885, entered a decree against the United States confirming the entire grant as complete *and perfect as of the date [63] of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848, and further decreed that the confirmation should in no wise affect the rights of the pueblos of Pojoaque and Nambé, if any they have, as between them and the confirmees under their patents issued by the United States government.

The governor made the grant on the same day, directed the chief alcalde of the new village of Santa Cruz to notify the Indians of the pueblo of Tesuque, the heirs of certain adjoining property owners, and all other citizens of the vicinity to show cause, if any they had, why the tract should not be granted to the petitioners, and, if there were no objection, to put them in possession. Such notice having been given, the alcalde on January 22, 1731, put the petitioners in juridical possession of the lands, describing Subsequently to this decree, and on Nothe boundaries, and, after executing such vember 9, the Indians of the two pueblos act, returned the proceedings to the govern-above named entered their appearance, or, by whom they were approved and placed stated that the lands confirmed to the petiin the royal archives of the city of Santa tioners were almost entirely within the limFé, a testimonio thereof being delivered to its of the lands confirmed by the act of Conthe grantees, the original of which is now gress to these pueblos, and patented to them, a part of the archives of the United States and that, while they were made parties dein the custody of the surveyor general of the fendant to the petition, they were never territory. The grantees, their heirs and as-served with process, and had no opportunity [62] signs, have been in possession of the land grant up to the present time, a period of one hundred and sixty-four years. The petition further alleged that the claim had been examined and approved by the surveyor general of the territory, returned by him favorably to Congress with a recommendation that the same be confirmed to the legal representatives of the original petitioners; but that it had never been acted upon by Congress, or the authorities of the United States.

of making a defense, and therefore moved the court to vacate the decree of confirmation and allow them to be heard in opposition to the claim. This motion was subsequently, and on December 2, 1896, denied, whereupon the United States appealed to this court.

Mr. Matthew G. Reynolds argued the cause and, with Solicitor General John K. Richards, filed a brief for appellant.

Mr. John H. Knaebel submitted the cause for appellees.

The government made no answer to the petition, but the court proceeded to hear the cause upon petition and proofs under the last clause of section 6 of the court of pri- This case involves the proper disposition vate land claims act, notwithstanding the by the court of private land claims, under failure of the government to file an answer. the act of Congress constituting the court, Petitioners produced certain witnesses to the of overlapping grants. The facts are exeffect that portions of the land granted had tremely simple: Petitioners derived their been occupied and cultivated by persons title by purchase or inheritance from the claiming under the original grantees; while original grantees, who held under a royal the government showed that Indians of the grant made in 1731 by the then governor of pueblos of Nambé and Pojoaque had many New Mexico, and through which they had years before instituted proceedings before the been in possession of portions of the land surveyor general of New Mexico under the ever since. Their grant had been examined, act of July 22, 1854, for 4 leagues of land surveyed, and approved by the surveyor geneach; that the surveyor general had recom-eral of the United States in 1871, but had mended that the lands thus demanded be never been confirmed by Congress. It was granted to them, and Congress had confirmed not true, as stated in the petition, however, the grant to each of said pueblos for 4 leagues as recommended (11 Stat. at L. 874); that the grants to said pueblos were surveyed and patents for them issued; that such surveys covered the larger portions of the land of the old pueblo of Cuyamungue, which petitioners alleged were granted to the original grantees in this case.

*Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion [63] of the court:

that "no person or *persons, natural or arti- [64]
ficial, are in possession of the said land, or
any part thereof, or claim the same or any
part thereof adversely to your petitioners,
or otherwise than by their lease or permis-
sion," since it appears there were two Indian
pueblos within the limits of the grant, from
a time whence the memory of man and the

tion,

traditions of the several tribes ran not to the before it relative to the title to the land the contrary. It was shown that one of them, subject of such case; the extent, location, Pojoaque, had a bell originally cast for its and boundaries thereof, and other inatters church, which bore the date of 1710. These connected therewith fit and proper to be pueblos had instituted proceedings before heard and determined, and by a final decree the surveyor general under the act of July to settle and determine the question of the 22, 1854, for 4 leagues of land, which he validity of the title and the boundaries of recommended to be granted, and in com- the grant or claim presented for adjudicapliance therewith Congress confirmed a and all other questions propgrant to each of said pueblos, which grants erly arising between the claimants, or other were subsequently surveyed and patents is- parties in the case, and the United States." sued. 11 Stat. at L. 374. These surveys covered By section 8 persons claiming lands under all the land of the abandoned pueblo of a Spanish or Mexican title "that was comCuyamungue, granted to the petitioners, ex-plete and perfect at the date when the cept about 100 acres. It was insisted in the United States acquired sovereignty therein court below that the land covered by these shall have the right (but shall not be patents should be excepted out of the decree bound) to apply to said court in the manner of confirmation in this case; but it was held in this act provided for in other cases for that the pueblos had no just right or claim confirmation of such title; "but the confirmaat the date of the treaty to any part of the tion of such title "shall be for so much land land covered by the petitioners' grant; that only as such perfect title shall be found to the United States acquired no right or in- cover, always excepting any part of such terest in the land of a citizen in the ceded land that shall have been disposed of by the territory held by a complete and perfect title United States, and always subject to and at the date of the treaty; that Congress not to affect any conflicting private interdid not undertake to decide who was the ests, rights, or claims held or claimed ad- [66] rightful owner of the land confirmed to the versely to any such claim or title, or adpueblos, but, on the contrary, expressly versely to the holder of any such claim or stated that the patents were not to inter-title. And no confirmation of claims or fere with any prior right to the land which titles in this section mentioned shall have might be held by other parties. Said the court: "If the petitioners in this case have a complete and perfect title to the land in question under the grant of 1731, it necessarily follows that the pueblos of Nambé and Pojoaque have no right or title to any of the land within the boundaries of such complete and perfect grant. But the decree of this court does not in any way affect the right and title (if any) that the pueblos acquired by their patents from the United States, as between them and petitioners."

The court declined to except out of the decree of confirmation the lands covered by the pueblos' patents, but did adjudge that tho confirmation should in no wise affect the [65] rights of the pueblos as between them and the petitioners under their patents.

The case depends largely upon the construction given to the sections and parts of sections of the act constituting the court of private land claims. 26 Stat. at L. 854.

By section 6 the petitioner is required to set forth, among other things, "the name or names of any person or persons in possession of or claiming the same [the lands] cr any part thereof, otherwise than by the lease or permission of the petitioner; and a copy of such petition, with a citation to any adverse possessor or claimant, shall be served on such possessor or claimant in the ordinary legal manner of serving such process in the proper state or territory, and in like manner on the attorney of the United States," whose duty it is "to enter an appearance, and plead, answer, or demur, and in no case shall a decree be entered otherwise than upon full legal proof and hearing."

[ocr errors]

By section 7 the court has "full power to hear and determine all questions in cases

any effect other or further than as a release of all claim of title by the United States; and no private right of any person, as between himself and other claimants or persons in respect of any such lands, shall be in any manner affected thereby." It was under this section that the petition in this case was presented and a “complete and perfect title" claimed.

By section 13, defining the character of claims that shall be allowed as those that, "if not then complete and perfect at the date of the acquisition of the territory by the United States, the claimant would have had a lawful right to make perfect had the territory not been acquired by the United States," it is provided in the 2d subdivision that "no claim shall be allowed that shall interfere with or overthrow any just or unextinguished Indian title or right to any land or place;" and, by subdivision 4, that "no claim shall be allowed for any land the right to which has hitherto been lawfully acted upon or decided by Congress or under its authority."

Subdivision 5 provided: "No proceeding, decree, or act under this act shall conclude or affect the private rights of persons as between each other, all of which rights shall be preserved and saved to the same effect as if this act had not been passed; but the proceedings, decrees, and acts herein provided for shall be conclusive of all rights as be tween the United States and all persons claiming any interest or right in such land."

Subdivision 6 provides: "No confirmation of or decree concerning any claim under this act shall in any manner operate or have effect against the United States otherwise than as a release by the United States of its right and title to the land confirmed, nor

shall it operate to make the United States | own is a simple nullity. in any manner liable in respect of any such Wendell, 9 Cranch, 99, grants, claims, or lands, or their disposition, 5 Wheat. 293, 5 L. ed. otherwise than as in this act provided."

1. The decisive question in the case is [67] whether the lands confirmed by the act of Congress of December 22, 1858, pursuant to the recommendation of the surveyor general (11 Stat. at L. 374) to the Indian pueblos of Pojoaque and Nambé should have been excepted from the decree of confirmation. This act also contains a proviso similar to that contained in the court of private land claims act, that "this confirmation shall only be construed as a relinquishment of all title and claim of the United States to any of said lands, and shall not affect any adverse valid rights should such exist."

This act operated, then, to release to the Indians all the title of the United States to the land covered by it, and passed the title of the United States as effectually as if it contained in terms a grant de novo. Ryan v. Carter, 93 U. S. 78, 82, 23 L. ed. 807, 809. Nor is the action of Congress confirming such private land claim subject to judicial review. As was said by this court in Tameling v. United States Freehold & E. Co. 93 U. S. 644, 662, 23 L. ed. 998, 1002: "No jurisdiction over such claims in New Mexico was conferred upon the courts; but the surveyor general, in the exercise of the authority with which he was invested, decides them in the first instance. The final action on each claim reserved to Congress is, of course, conclusive, and therefore not subject to review in this or any other forum. It is obviously not the duty of this court to sit in judgment upon either the recital of the matters of fact by the surveyor general, or his decision declaring the validity of the grant. They are embodied in his report, which was laid before Congress for its consideration and action." See also Maxwell Land Grant Case, 121 U. S. 325, 30 L. ed. 949, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1015.

Polk's Lessee v. L. ed. 669; S. C. 92; Sabariego v. Maverick, 124 U. S. 261, 281, 31 L. ed. 430, 438, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 461; Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, 520, 30 L. ed. 1039, 1049, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 985; Doolan v. Carr, 125 U. S. 618, 625, 31 L. ed. 844, 847, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1228; Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co. 147 U. S. 165, 174, 37 L. ed. 123, 127, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 271.

It is true that the act of December 22, 1858, confirming these lands to the pueblos, may have been itself void by reason of petitioner's prior title thereto; but that is a question which is not necessarily involved in this case and upon which we express no opinion. It will occasionally happen that the government through accident or inadvert ence will patent the same land a second time; but when its attention is called to the fact that the land has been previously patented it cannot patent the same land a second time without virtually stultifying itself. A patent assumes that a patentor has certain rights to convey, and that, if those rights have already been conveyed with the knowledge of the grantor, a second patent carries with it a suspicion of a want of good faith.

Nor is the confirmation of this patent essential to the protection of the petitioner. The title set forth is one which was complete and perfect at the date of the treaty, and while he had the right, under section 8, he was clearly not bound to apply to the court for a confirmation of such title, but was at liberty to resort to the local courts for its establishment.

It is possible that the surveyor general, in recommending the grant of 4 square leagues to each pueblo, measured from the church as a center, allowed more than was proper; yet, as he acted according to the opinion at one time prevailing, and as Congress confirmed the grant to that amount, the propriety of such grant cannot be attacked here upon that or any other ground. [69; As was said in the case of Tameling v. United States Freehold & E. Co. 93 U. S. 644, 663, 23 L. ed. 998, 1003: "Congress acted upon the claim as recommended for confirmation by the surveyor general. The confirmation being absolute and unconditional, without any limitation as to quantity, we must regard it as effectual and operative for the entire tract."

The government having thus exhausted its power with reference to the land in dispute by granting all its title as sovereign proprietor to the pueblos, it is difficult to see upon what principle it is called upon to make or confirm another grant to a different person. Nothing can be plainer from the language of the private land claim act than that lands "that shall have been disposed of by the United States" should be excepted from the decree of confirmation (sec. 8); that no Nor is this the proper time to adjudicate claim shall be allowed which shall interfere upon the respective merits of the two titles. with or overthrow any just or unextin- We have only to consider whether the gov [68] guished Indian title (sec. 13); that no*claim ernment can properly be called upon to conshall be allowed for any land the right to firm that which it has already confirmed to which has been lawfully acted upon and de- another party. The court of private land cided by Congress (sec. 13); and that no pro- claims seems to have assumed that the grant ceeding under the act shall conclude or affect by Congress to the pueblos was absolutely the private rights of persons as between each void by reason of the fact that, the petitionother (sec. 13). Under these provisions, if ers having a complete and perfect title, the the court were to confirm this grant for United States had nothing to convey. lands already granted, such confirmation This may be entirely true, but it is would be void, as nothing is better settled by not perceived how the petitioners' title this court than that a patent issued by the can be aided by the government devesting United States to lands which they do not itself for a second time of a title which it

69-71

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

had already released. The duty of the court under section 8, "to hear, try, and determine the validity of the same" (the grant) "and the right of the claimant thereto, its extent, location, and boundaries," is discharged by determining the extent and validity of the grant as between the United States and the grantee, and it is not incumbent upon the court of private land claims to determine the priority of right as between him and another grantee. Such private rights are carefully preserved in the 8th and 13th sections.

only as between the United States and the
grantee, and was evidence that, as to them,
We do not think, there-
the claimants had established the validity of
the grant.
fore, that if defendant's survey and patent
are based upon a superior Mexican grant,
their rights are concluded by the prior sur-
vey of the plaintiffs."

We do not wish to be understood as hold-
ing that two claimants to the same land may
the two is entitled to a confirmation, and *the [71]
not litigate, as between themselves, which of
question thus becomes res judicatu; but
when the title has once been confirmed by
Congress it should be respected by the court
of private land claims as if it were a con-
firmation by the court itself, and conflicting
claimants are at liberty to resort to the or-
dinary remedies at law or in equity, accord-
Up-ing to the nature of the claim.

2. The appeal in this case was properly taken by the United States. While the government may have no interest in the result of the litigation, it is a proper and necessary party to the suit, and it would be a strange conclusion to hold that it could not follow the litigation through all the courts that are given jurisdiction of the case. on such appeal the government is at liberty to show that the petitioner is not entitled to a confirmation of his claim. Indeed, an appeal is expressly given by section 9, which enacts that "the party against whom the court shall in any case decide the United States in case of the confirmation of the claim in whole or in part, and the claimant [70] in case of a rejection of a claim in whole or in part-shall have the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States."

The main object of the court of private private propland claims is to ascertain and determine whether the land claimed as erty under the treaty is in fact private property, or, on the contrary, is public property. In the latter case, of course, a confirmation is refused; in the former case a confirmation is made if the claimant appears to have, as between himself and the United States, the who are at liberty to assert their superior right to it, but subject to the rights of others title in the local courts.

We are therefore of opinion that the decree of confirmation should have excepted the pueblo lands, and such decree is accordingly reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

3. That the Indian claim or title is a
"just and unextinguished" one within the
meaning of section 13, subdivision 2, of the
act, is shown by the fact that such title was
confirmed by Congress. By the word "just"
in this connection is meant only a title which
is good upon its face, or not manifestly
frivolous.-not one which shall ultimately
turn out to be valid. As already observed, White dissented.
it was not the object of the act to permit
private titles to be litigated in the court of

Mr. Justice Shiras and Mr. Justice

private land claims (although perhaps this TOWN OF REAL DE DOLORES DEL ORO,

may be done incidentally), but merely to de-
termine if and to whom the United States
ought to release its rights as sovereign
As was said by this
proprietor of the soil.
court in Adams v. Norris, 103 U. S. 591, 26
L. ed. 583:

"But the United States, in dealing with
the claimants of lands under Mexican grants,
which had come into the political control of
our government by the treaty of Mexico,
never made pretense that it was the owner
of the lands so granted by Mexico. When,
therefore, guided by the action of the tribu-
nals which the government had established
to pass upon the validity of these alleged
grants, it issued a patent to the claimant,
it was in the nature of a quitclaim, an ad-
mission that the rightful ownership had
never been in the United States, but at the
time of the cession it had passed to the claim-
ant. or to those under whom he claimed.
This principle has been more than once clear-
ly announced in this court. The leading
cases are Beard v. Federy, 3 Wall. 478, 18 L.
ed. 88; Henshaw v. Bissell, 18 Wall. 268,
21 L. ed. 840; Miller v. Dale, 92 U. S.
478, 23 L. ed. 738.

"Such a patent was therefore conclusive

Hipolito Montoya, et al., Appts.,

บ.

UNITED STATES et al.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 71-76.) Petition for confirmation of private land claim-prior confirmation by Congress and patent to other claimant.

1.

2.

A claim for lands within the limits of a grant which has been confirmed by Congress, and for which a patent has been issued to another party, is properly rejected by the court of private land claims.

An indemnity under the private land claim act, 14, cannot be adjudged when no such claim is made by the petition.

3. A personal judgment against the United
States for the Indemnity provided by the pri
vate land claim act, § 14, in case the lands
decreed to a claimant have been sold or
granted by the United States to any other
person, is authorized only when such lands
have been sold or granted as public lands for
a consideration which equitably belongs to
the owner of the land, and not where the
government has merely released its interest
to one apparently holding a good title under a
175 U.S.
Spanish or Mexican grant, which subsequent-

[72]

ly turns out to be invalid by reason of an old-
er or better title.

[No. 17.]

Subsequently an order was made by the court requiring petitioners to bring before the court, as parties defendant, certain adverse possessors and claimants to portions of the land claimed under what was known as

Argued and Submitted January 12, 1899. the San Antonio de las Huertas grant, then

Decided October 30, 1899.

PPEAL by petitioners from a decree by A the Court of Private Land Claims re fusing confirmation of their claim. Af firmed.

Statement by Mr. Justice Brown: *This was a petition filed by the town of Real de Dolores del Oro and Guadalupe Montoya against the United States, the New Mexico Mining Company, and a large number of other defendants, for the confirmation of a tract of land containing 4 square leagues, having for its center the center of the old Real de Dolores del Oro,-being the church situated therein,-with a prayer that the tract may be confirmed to the town, or to the petitioner Montoya in his own right, and

in trust for the benefit of the other owners of lands within its limits.

The petition set forth in substance that, in the year 1830, the governor of New Mexico founded the town of Real de Dolores del Oro according to the laws of New Mexico; that such town continued its existence from that time to the cession of said territory to the United States, having not less than forty residents, including not less than twenty householders and heads of families; that a church had been erected and maintained, and all of the requirements of the laws of the Republic of Mexico had been observed, and that the town had been fully recognized by public authority; that by virtue of such laws the town, in addition to the several allotments to its inhabitants, became and was entitled under the laws of Mexico to lands for the common use of the town, and in default of a grant for a larger quantity was entitled by law to a tract, including the lands held in severalty, of 4 square leagues from the center of the town, namely, the church; that

pending before the court.

The United States answered this petition, traversing the petitioners' allegations as to the origin, existence, and right of the town to the grant claimed, and denied generally all the other allegations. The answer further averred that, even if such grant had been made as set forth in the petition, the land claimed thereunder was entirely within the limits of a tract of land known as the Ortiz Mine grant, which, by virtue of the laws, usages, and customs, and mining ordinances of Mexico, was, on the 28th of December, 1833, made to José Francisco Ortiz and Ignacio Caño; that the claim for such land was presented by the successors in interest eral of New Mexico, under the provisions of of the original grantees to the surveyor genthe act of Congress of June 27, 1854, for his approval. That the surveyor general subsequently approved the claim; transmitted the same to Congress, recommended its confirmation; and that afterwards Congress, by act approved March 1, 1861, confirmed said claim. That subsequently a survey was made by the public authorities, and on May 20, 1876, letters patent for such confirmed grant were duly issued to the New Mexico Mining Company as owner thereof. such patent included the lands claimed in the petition, and that the action of Congress was and is conclusive and binding upon this

court.

That

To the allegation of the answer setting up the Ortiz Mine grant, the petitioners excepted upon the ground that the *answer did not [74} allege that the right of the petitioners to said land described in their amended petition had ever been lawfully acted upon or decided by Congress, or under its authority, and that said matter in said amended answer was insufficient in law to constitute a defense.

petitioners were imperfect at the time the sovereignty and jurisdiction were acquired by the United States, and that it appeared by the answer that the government had confirmed another grant and patented all the lands included in petitioners' claim.

there was no direct evidence or record of such These exceptions were overruled by the grant to the town; that the town was not in-court upon the ground that the claims of the corporated, but that the petitioner Montoya brought the petition on behalf of the town and himself, and of all other owners of land within the boundaries of the tract, and as the successors in part to the rights and title of the original grantee; that shortly after the acquisition of New Mexico by the United The petitioners elected to stand upon the States the town ceased to exercise the powers exceptions, and introduced no evidence; and and functions of a municipal government, or a decree was thereupon entered to the effect to elect municipal officers; that the tract is that petitioners' grant "was not a perfect and [73]*now held and claimed by a large number of complete grant thereof at or prior to the date persons under such grant, and it is not of the cession of New Mexico to the United known that any of the possessors or claim- States under and by virtue of the laws, ants thereof are adverse to the petitioners, usages, and customs of the Republic of Mexthough they are informed that the New Mexico, in force at the alleged date thereof, and ico Mining Company claims some title or interest therein by virtue of a private land grant, which is subordinate to their title; that no claim for such tract has ever been submitted to the authorities, and no survey of the tract has ever been made.

that the lands embraced within the said al-
leged grant to the petitioners lie wholly
within the exterior boundaries of the Ortiz
mining grant;
and that the right
to the said land having been thereby lawful-
ly acted upon and decided by Congress, and

« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »