Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub

[673]answer should not be stricken from the files as irregular. On October 4, 1897, the plaintiff filed a general replication to the answer of the other defendants.

On December 17, 1897, Huntington, as plaintiff in the case at bar, filed a petition in the circuit court of the United States for a rule against Laidley and against his attorneys, Ž. T. Vinson and William R. Thompson, to show cause why they should not be fined and attached for contempt in violating the injunction granted by that court in February, 1891, by undertaking to sell the lots described in Laidley's actions of ejectment against Remley and others. On December 20, 1897, Laidley and Thompson filed answers to this rule, and annexed thereto as exhibits copies of the proceedings in those actions of ejectment.

nied by the complainant; and it appearing from such examination to the satisfaction of this court, upon consideration thereof, that this suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of this court, because of the pendency in the state court, prior to the commencement of this suit, of the action of ejectment in which John B. Laidley was plaintiff and the Central Land Company of West Virginia was defendant, which was begun in the circuit court of Cabell county, West Virginia, on the first Monday of April, 1882, and of the other actions in ejectment brought in said state court by the said John B. Laidley as plaintiff in relation to the property in question in this suit, prior to the commencement of this cause, and of the chancery cause in said state court in which the Central Land Company of West Virginia was plaintiff and John B. Laidley and others were defendants, which was brought in said state court prior to the commencement of this cause; and this court be

On December 20, 1897, on motion of the
plaintiff, the court extended the time for
taking the testimony in the cause until nine-
ty days after the hearing on the motion to
strike out Laidley's plea and answer.
On March 3, 1898, the rule for an attaching therefore, for the aforesaid reason, of the
ment for contempt was argued. On June opinion that it is required to dismiss this
25, 1898, the court entered an order dis-suit by the 5th section of the act of Congress,
charging that rule, because, as the order
stated, the court found that the circuit court
of Cabell county, West Virginia, had taken
jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-
matter, prior to the institution of this suit,
and the cause was still pending in that
court, and therefore the circuit court of the
United States had no jurisdiction to grant
the injunction restraining the sale of the
property under decrees of the state court.

approved March 3, 1875, and entitled 'An
Act to Determine the Jurisdiction of Circuit
Courts of the United States, and to Regulate
the Removal of Causes from State Courts,
and for Other Purposes,' it is now, therefore,
on this court's own motion, adjudged and
decreed that this suit and the bill and
amended bills therein be, and they hereby[675]
are, dismissed and stricken from the docket
of this court, without costs."

On the same day, the following proceedings took place, and were filed in the circuit court of the United States, namely: The plaintiff presented a petition for an appeal from that decree to this court, under the act of March 3, 1891, chap. 517, § 5, alleging that he was aggrieved by the final decree by which the circuit court of the United States, notwithstanding that it had the first actual physical possession of the land involved in this cause, dismissed the suit on the ground that it had no jurisdiction thereof, because of the pendency of the suits in the state court, begun prior to the commencement of this cause. And the district judge signed an order "that the appeal be allowed as prayed for," approved an appeal bond, and signed a citation to the appeilees, as well as a certifi

On the same day, and without any further hearing in the cause, the court, of its own motion, entered a final decree, as follows: "This cause having come on this 25th day of June, 1898, to be considered by this court upon a petition filed by the complainant herein on the 17th day of December, 1897, praying that a rule be issued requiring that John B. Laidley, one of the defendants herein, and his attorneys, Z. T. Vinson and W. R. Thompson, should appear and show cause why they should not be fined and attached for contempt for violating the injunction order heretofore entered in the above-entitled cause, and upon the answer and exhibits [674]attached thereto of the said *defendant, John B. Laidley, to said peution, and upon the answers and exhibits attached thereto of his attorneys, Z. T. Vinson and W. R. Thomp-cate in these terms: "A final decree having son, thereto, and upon the bill and the answers to said bill; and the court having considered the matter, and having duly ex-amended bills therein: Now therefore this amined the bill and amended bills herein, and the answers of the defendant and the exhibits attached thereto, and the records in the ejectment suits in the circuit court of Cabell county, in which John B. Laidley was plaintiff and the Central Land Company of West Virginia and others were defendants, and the record in the chancery cause in the circuit court of Cabell county, in which the Central Land Company of West Virginia was plaintiff and John B. Laidley and others were defendants, which said records in said state court actions were not disputed or de

been entered herein on the 25th day of June,
1898, dismissing this suit and the bill and

court, in pursuance of the second paragraph of the fifth section of the act of Congress, approved March 3, 1891, and entitled 'An Act to Establish Circuit Courts of Appeals, and to Define and Regulate in Certain Cases the Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States, and for Other Purposes,' hereby certifies to the Supreme Court of the United States for decision the question of the jurisdiction alone of this court over this cause as follows: Is this court without jurisdiction of this cause, because of the pendency in the state court, prior to the commencement of

this suit, of the action of ejectment in which | court, and for that reason the court was of John B. Laidley was plaintiff and the Cen- opinion that it was required by § 5 of the tral Land Company of West Virginia was de- act of March 3, 1875, chap. 137, to dismiss fendant, which was begun in the circuit the suit; and it was therefore, upon the[677] court of Cabell county, West Virginia, on court's own motion, adjudged and decreed the first Monday in April, 1882, and of the that the suit be dismissed. The act of March other actions in ejectment brought prior to 3, 1875, chap. 137, § 5, referred to in that this cause in said state court by the said decree, provides that if, in any suit comJohn B. Laidley as plaintiff in relation to menced in a circuit court of the United the property in question in this suit, and of States, it appear to the satisfaction of that the chancery cause in which the Central court, at any time after the suit is brought, Land Company of West Virginia was com- "that such suit does not really and substanplainant and John B. Laidley and others tially involve a dispute or controversy propwere defendants, which was brought in said erly within the jurisdiction of said circuit state court prior to the commencement of court," that court shall dismiss the suit. 18 this cause?" Stat. at L. 472. And such dismissal for want of jurisdiction is reviewable by this court under the act of March 3, 1891, chap. 517, § 5. Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U. S. 115, 42 L. ed. 682, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293. The final decree, therefore, clearly shows that the question decided below was a specific question of jurisdiction only. This dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction was the only ground assigned for the appeal; and the appeal was allowed "as prayed for."

[676] *The appeal in this case is taken under that clause of the act of March 3, 1891, chap. | 517, § 5, which provides that appeals or writs of error may be taken from the circuit court of the United States directly to this court "in any case in which the jurisdiction of the court is in issue; in such cases the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certified to the Supreme Court from the court below for decision." 26 Stat. at L. 827.

The appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal, upon the ground that the decree of dismissal involved the consideration and determination of the legal effect and conclusiveness of the several judgments and decrees of the state courts, and therefore the appeal should have been to the circuit court of appeals, and not to this court; and upon the further ground that the district judge could not certify a question decided by the circuit judge, or allow an appeal from his decree.

In order to maintain the appellate jurisdiction of this court under this clause, the record must distinctly and unequivocally show that the court below sends up for consideration a single and definite question of jurisdiction. This may appear in either of two ways: by the terms of the decree appealed from and of the order allowing the appeal; or by a separate certificate of the court below. Maynard v. Hecht, 151 U. S. 324, 38 L. ed. 179, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 353; Re Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co. 156 U. S. 322, 39 L. ed. 438, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375; Shields v. Coleman, 157 U. S. 168, 39 L. ed. 660, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570; Interior Constr. & Improv. Co. v. Gibney, 160 U. S. 217, 40 L. ed. 401, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272; Van Wagenen v. Sewall, 160 U. S. 369, 40 L. ed. 460, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370; Chappell v. United States, 160 U. S. 499, 40 L. ed. 510, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397; Davis v. Geissler, 162 U. S. 290, 40 L. ed. 972, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 796. In the case at bar it appears in both ways.

The final decree of the circuit court of the United States recited that, at the hearing upon the petition for a rule for an attachment for contempt, the court examined the bill and amended bills and the answers thereto, and the undisputed records of the suits in the state court; and that from such examination it appeared to the satisfaction of the court that this suit did not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within its jurisdiction, because of the pendency of those suits in the state

The same question is also distinctly stated in the certificate made and filed by the district judge on the same day on which the final decree was entered, and on which he allowed the appeal and signed the citation. It does not appear from the record, and is immaterial, whether the final decree was rendered by the circuit judge or by the district judge. The district judge was a judge of the circuit court of the United States, and as such had authority to allow the appeal and to sign the citation, even if the decree was rendered by the circuit judge. Rev. Stat. §§ 999, 1012; Rodd v. Heartt, 17 Wall. 354, 21 L. ed. 627. We can have no doubt that the district judge, who as a judge of the circuit court lawfully allowed the appeal and signed the citation, was authorized also to certify to this court the question of jurisdiction determined by that decree.

The question of jurisdiction then, appearing by the decree itself and by the order allowing the appeal therefrom, as well as by the distinct and contemporaneous certificate, to have been the only question on which the decree below was based, is rightly before this court for determination.

The condition of the cause, at the time when the circuit court of the United States entered a final decree dismissing it for want of jurisdiction, was as follows: An injunction *had been granted upon the filing of the[678] bill. The court had overruled a demurrer to the bill, as well as a plea of all the defendants setting up the judgments in the state courts as res judicata; and had given leave to the defendants to answer the bill. Thereupon the defendant Laidley filed a plea and answer setting up substantially the same defenses as before; and the plaintiff obtained an order to show cause why this plea and answer should not be stricken out as irregular. The other defendants answered the bill, and the plaintiff filed a general replication to their answer. The court extended the time for taking testimony in

the cause until ninety days after hearing the motion to strike out Laidley's plea and answer. That motion was never heard; the time allowed for taking testimony had not expired; and the cause was not heard, or ready to be heard, as between the plaintiff and any of the defendants, except upon a rule (which had been obtained by the plaintiff and argued by both parties) for an attachment against Laidley and his attorneys for contempt in violating the injunction previously granted. Yet the court not only discharged the rule for an attachment for contempt, but at the same time, of its own motion, and without any further hearing of the cause, or of any matter therein, entered the final decree dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction. This action of the court was irregular. The defendant, as the case stood, was not entitled to present any objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the principal cause; and the plaintiff was entitled to be heard upon any such objection taken by the court of its own motion. Hartog v. Memory, 116 U. S. 588, 29 L. ed. 725, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 521; Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 315, 327, 32 L. ed. 690, 694, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289; Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U. S. 115, 122, 123, 42 L. ed. 682, 684, 685, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293.

Independently of that consideration, the decree dismissing this suit for want of jurisdiction was erroneous. It may be that the order discharging the rule for an attachment for a contempt in violating the injunction by proceedings under orders of the state court was correct. Rev. Stat. § 720; Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch, 179, 2 L. ed. 587; Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166, 195, sub nom. United States ex rel. Riggs ▼. Johnson County Supers. 18 L. ed. 768, 776; Central Nat. Bank v. Stevens, 169 U. S. 432, 460, 42 L. ed. 807, 817, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403. But it by no means follows that the circuit

suit, all the proceedings between Laidley and the Central Land Company in the state court, which affected the whole tract of 240 acres, had been brought to an end-Laidley's action of ejectment against the Central Land Company, by a judgment and a writ of possession in Laidley's favor, and the Central Land Company's bill to restrain Laidley from proceeding with that action, by a decree dismissing the bill. And Laidley's proceedings in ejectment in the state court against Remley and others concerned only the legal title in parts of the tract of 240 acres.

tion affecting the jurisdiction of that court,
but was a question affecting the merits of the
cause, and as such to be tried and deter-
mined by that court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The circuit court of the Unit-
ed States cannot, by treating a question of
merits as a question of jurisdiction, enable
this court, upon a direct appeal on the ques-
tion of jurisdiction only, to decide the ques-
tion of merits, except in so far as it bears
upon the question whether the court below
had or had not jurisdiction of the case.

In any aspect of the case, the decree of
the circuit court of the United States, dis-
missing the suit for want of jurisdiction,
must be reversed, and the cause remanded
to that court for further proceedings there-
in.

The case of Blythe v. Hinckley, 173 U. S. 501, 43 L. ed. 783, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 497, cited by the appellees, has no tendency to support the opposite conclusion. In that case, this court dismissed the appeal, because the decree below was not founded solely upon a want of jurisdiction in the circuit court of the United States, but also upon the *grounds that the plaintiff's remedy[680] was at law and not in equity, and that certain judgments of the state courts could not be reviewed on the reasons put forward. And of the last ground this court, speaking by the Chief Justice, said that it "was not in itself a decision of want of jurisdiction, because the circuit court was a Federal court, but a decision that the circuit court was unable to grant relief because of the judgments rendered by those other courts." 173 U. S. 507, 43 L. ed. 785, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499.

Decree reversed, and eause remanded for further proceedings.

Mr. Justice Brewer dissents:

I dissent from the opinion and judgment [679] court of the United States had no jurisdic-in this case. In a purely technical sense it tion to entertain this suit for any purpose. may not be open to criticism. But when, Before the commencement of the present as disclosed, it appears that in the state courts by final determinations, beyond any opportunity of review, the legal and equitable title to the tract in controversy has been adjudged to be in Laidley (even if there be question of the correctness of those decisions), it seems to me that under the act of March 3, 1875, referred to in the opinion of the majority, the Federal court not only may rightfully, but also should, hold that whatever may be the state of the pleadings the litigation in that court must stop. Of course, everybody knows that when there has been in separate actions in courts of law and equity final determination as to both the legal and equitable title there is no excuse for further litigation, and I think that we sacrifice substance to form when we hold that the Federal court should not, when these facts are disclosed, act promptly, but must wait until the issues presented by pleadings have been attempted to be supported by testimony and the case is ready for final hearing. Interest reipublicæ ut sit finis litium.

The present suit seeks to charge the whole tract with a trust in favor of the plaintiff as receiver of the Central Land Company. Under the circumstances of this case, the question whether the proceedings in any or all of the suits, at law or in equity, in the state court, afforded a defense-either by way of res judicata, or because of any control acquired by the state court over the subject-matter-to this bill in the circuit court of the United States, was not a ques

MEMORANDA

OF

CASES DISPOSED OF WITHOUT OPINIONS,

[681]*COUNTY OF COCONINO, Appellant, v. COUNTY | NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Pe

[No. 110.]

OF YAVAPAI. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona.

Mr. Edward M. Doe for appellant. No counsel for appellee.

January 29, 1900. Decree affirmed with costs, on the authority of Utter v. Franklin, 172 U. S. 416, 43 L. ed. 498, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep.

183.

EDWARD S. DREYER, Appellant, v. James PEASE, Sheriff, etc. [No. 117.]

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.

Mr. Levy Mayer for appellant. Mr. Charles S. Deneen for appellee.

January 29, 1900. Order affirmed with costs, on the authority of Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U. S. 184, ante, 124, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76; Baker v. Grice, 169 U. S. 284, 42 L. ed. 748, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 323; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101, 43 L. ed. 91, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 805, and cases cited.

KITTANING COAL COMPANY, Appellant, v. J. L. ZABRISKIE et al., Executors, etc. [No. 120.]

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York.

Mr. John B. Uhle for appellant. Messrs. Henry P. Wells and Henry Crofut White for appellees.

January 29, 1900. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction, on the authority of Smith v. McKay, 161 U. S. 355, 40 L. ed. 731, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 490, and Blythe v. Hinckley, 173 Ū. S. 501, 43 L. ed. 783, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 497.

FARMERS' NATIONAL BANK OF ARKANSAS CITY, KANSAS, Plaintiff in Error, v. GEORGE W. ROBINSON, Receiver, etc. [No. 191.]

In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.

Messrs. E. L. Hamilton and Carroll L. Swarts for plaintiff in error. Messrs. John C. Pollock and F. C. Bryan for defendant in

error.

[682] *March 5, 1900. Judgment affirmed with costs, on the authority of Conde v. York, 168 U. S. 642, 42 L. ed. 611, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234, and Leyson v. Davis, 170 U. S. 36, 43 L. ed. 939. 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500.

titioner, v. FRANK E. DINGLEY, Administrator, etc. [No. 325.]

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Messrs. E. J. McCutchen, Charles Page, G. W. Hubbell, G. H. Durham, and F. D. MoKenney for petitioner. Mr. Henry P. Blair for respondent.

January 15, 1900. Denied.

MECHANICS' SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner, v. FIDELITY INSURANCE, TRUST, & SAFE DEPOSIT COMPANY, Administrator, etc. [No. 463.]

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

Mr. Russell Duane for petitioner. No opposition.

January 15, 1900. Denied.

ANNIE T. BOWEN, Petitioner, v. NEEDLES NATIONAL BANK et al. [No. 440.]

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Mr. Walter S. Carter for petitioner. Mr. Henry C. Dillon for respondents. January 15, 1900. Denied.

TURRET STEAM SHIPPING COMPANY (LIMITED), Claimant, etc., Petitioner, v. A. G. HALL et al. [No. 484.]

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

January 15, 1900. Granted. FARMERS' LOAN & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner v. W. H. WHITEHEAD et al. [No. 485.] Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

Messrs. E. 0. Wolcott and Joel F. Vaile for petitioner. Mr. John F. Shafroth for respondents.

January 15, 1900. Denied.

« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »