Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub

tates and territories of the United States and to enforce these orders he immediately and of Mexico, beyond the state of Texas, placed, and now maintains, armed guards, with the inhabitants of which states and ter- acting under the authority of the state of ritories the citizens of New Orleans are also Texas, on all the lines of travel from the engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, state of Louisiana into the state of Texas, such commerce largely following the lines of with instructions to enforce the embargo desaid railroads and their many connections. clared by him vi et armis, which instructions "That the state of Texas, by her Revised these armed guards are carrying out to the Civil Statutes, adopted at the regular ses- letter; that about six days later he modision of the Twenty-fourth Legislature, held fied his order so as to permit the government in the year 1895, being Title XCII. thereof, of the United States to carry and deliver has granted to her governor and her health the mails, and also modified his order so as officer extensive powers over the establish to permit persons and their baggage to enter ment and maintenance of quarantines the state of Texas, after ten days' detention against infectious or contagious diseases, at the quarantine detention camps estabwith authority to make rules and regula-lished by him, and after fumigation of their tions for the detention of vessels, persons, baggage; but that he now maintains, and and property coming into the state from announces his intention to maintain indefiniteplaces infected, or deemed to be infected, ly, his absolute prohibition of all interstate with such diseases. commerce between the city of New Orleans and the state of Texas; that he has refused to permit the introduction of sulphuric acid in iron drums, unpacked hardware, machinery, and other articles coming from localities in the city of New Orleans far removed from the places where the sporadic cases of fever have occurred, and which by their nature are concededly incapable of conveying infection; that he had established *no system [5] of classification or inspection of the articles of interstate commerce coming from the city of New Orleans, to determine whether they are or may be infected, or whether they are capable, or not, of conveying infection, no period of detention for such articles, no place or method of disinfection thereof; his

"That Joseph D. Sayers, a citizen of the state of Texas, is now, and has been for some time past, governor of said state.

"That William F. Blunt, a citizen of the state of Texas, is now, and has been for some time past, the state health officer of the state of Texas.

"That the ports of said state, situated on the Gulf coast, are engaged in commerce with the ports of Mexico, Central and South America, and Cuba, known to be permanently infected with yellow fever; said commerce being largely competitive with similar commerce coming to the port of New Orleans. "That on the 1st day of March, 1899, Joseph D. Sayers, governor of the state of Texas, under the provisions of the said laws, is-only method being absolute and unconditionsued his proclamation establishing quarantine on the Gulf coast and Rio Grande border against all places, persons, or things coming from places infected by yellow fever, etc., a copy of which proclamation is hereto annexed and made part of this bill and marked Exhibit 'A.'

"That the rules and regulations established in said quarantine proclamation permit trade and commerce between such infected ports and the state of Texas, and pro[4]vide for the *fumigation and reasonable detention of ships and cargoes from infected ports.

al prohibition of such interstate commerce; that it is a notorious fact, and well known to said Blunt, that all of the interstate commerce between New Orleans and Texas is carried on by railroads, and none by water communication between the port of New Orleans and the Texas ports, and that the effect of his orders is to destroy all such commerce, to take away the trade of the merchants and business men of the city of New Orleans, and to transfer that trade to rival business cities in the state of Texas.

"That while Joseph D. Sayers, governor of the state of Texas, has issued no formal "That on or about the 31st day of August, proclamation of quarantine, as provided by 1899, a case of yellow fever was officially de-law, to wit, article 4324 of the Revised Civil clared to exist in the city of New Orleans, in a part of the city several miles away from the commercial part thereof, and from that time to this several other sporadic cases have been reported in similar parts of the city.

"That as soon as said first case was reported the said William F. Blunt, health officer of the state of Texas, claiming to act under the provisions of article 4324 of the Revised Civil Statutes, under the pretense of establishing a quarantine, placed an embargo on all interstate commerce between the city of New Orleans and the state of Texas, absolutely prohibiting all common carriers entering the state of Texas from bringing into the state any freight or passengers, or even the mails of the United States, coming from the city of New Orleans;

Statutes, defining the rules and regulations of such quarantine so declared by said Blunt, your orator charges that the rules and regulations established by said Blunt have the full force of law until modified or changed by the proclamation of the governor, and that the governor knows all these facts, and approves and adopts the same, and permits these rules and regulations to stand and to be executed in full force and effect as established by said Blunt.

"Now, your orator recognizes the right and power of the state of Texas and the public officials thereof, to take prudent and reasonable measures to protect the people of said state from infection, to establish quarantine and reasonable inspection laws, but your orator denies that said state, or its officials acting under its laws, under the cov

er of exercising its police powers, can pro- | health officer, and the governor of the state hibit or so burden interstate commerce as to make such commerce impossible.

"Your orator avers that it is a recognized and acknowledged fact by all the sanitarians and health officials of the various states exposed to infection by yellow fever, and by the health officials of the United States, and [] by all scientific students of infection and sanitation, that commerce can be conducted between infected and noninfected points, with small inconvenience and without any danger of infection, by classifying the articles of commerce, and by pursuing certain well-recognized rules and precautions with reference to the articles and vehicles of com

merce.

of Texas, established a similar embargo on all interstate commerce between the state of Louisiana and the state of Texas, on the 18th day of September, and refused to remove or modify the same until the 1st day of November.

"That in pursuance of the same policy, the said William F. Blunt, because a single case of yellow fever was declared in the city of New Orleans, did on May 30, 1899, estabsh a similar embargo on interstate commerce between the city of New Orleans and the state of Texas, which he refused to modi. fy or to remove until June 9, 1899, and then only under great pressure, although he was advised on June 2d, 1899, by the represen"That after the yellow fever outbreak of tatives of the health authorities of the states 1897 a quarantine convention was held in of Alabama and Mississippi, of the United Mobile, Ala., and, on the advice of that con- States Marine Hospital Service, and of the vention, a conference of the health officials Louisiana state board of health, who had of Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Flor- been for some days in the city of New Or. ida, Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, and the leans, making a personal inspection of her United States Marine Hospital Service met sanitary and health conditions, that they at Atlanta, Ga., and formulated such regu- deemed it 'unnecessary and unwise for any lations, which were adopted by the boards of state or city to quarantine against New Or. health of all said states, and, as subsequent-leans under present conditions.' ly revised, are now in full force and effect "Your orator avers that the state of Texbetween the said states; that additional ex-as, her governor, and her health officer, as perience having been gained by the reap shown by the rules and regulations estabpearance of yellow fever in the fall of 1898, lished by them in the proclamation aforesaid a revising conference was held in the city of for the quarantine on the Gulf coast, admit New Orleans on February 9, 1899, at which the truthfulness of the claim of your orator conference the Atlanta regulations were in that commerce can be carried on with insome respects modified. A copy of the said fected places and ports, under reasonable regulations, original and as modified, are rules and regulations as to inspection, fumihereto annexed, and made part of this bill,gation, and detention, and admit that there and marked Exhibit 'B.'

"Your orator avers that said William F. Blunt, or his predecessor in office, was health officer of the state of Texas at the time these conferences were held, that he and his predecessor in office refused or neglected to at tend them in person or by representative, and he has continually refused to adopt the Atlanta regulations, or any of them, or any regulations similar to them, and insists, as his predecessor in office insisted, upon being law to himself, and upon using no means of dealing with yellow fever infection in the city of New Orleans, or elsewhere in the state of Louisiana, real or imaginary, except an absolute embargo upon interstate commerce, to be established at his pleasure and to last as long as he chooses to maintain it. "That in pursuance of this policy, in the year 1897, his predecessor in office established a similar embargo on interstate commerce between New Orleans and other points in Louisiana, supposed by him to be infect17]ed, and the state of Texas, on the 10th day of September; and refused to remove or to modify said embargo until the day of December, 1897, during which period he even refused to permit railroad cars that had been in the city of New Orleans to enter or even pass through the state of Texas, on their way to the countries, states, and territories beyond.

"That in pursuance of the same policy, in the year 1898, the said William F. Blunt,

are articles of commerce incapable of conveying infection, and actually permit such commerce in all articles to be so carried on to the advantage and benefit of the commerce of the ports of Texas and her merchants engaged in commerce in said ports.

"Your orator avers that the effect of the [8] embargoes imposed by the state of Texas leans with Texas is to build up and benefit upon the commerce of the city of New Or the commerce of the city of Galveston, in Texas, and the commerce of other cities in Texas, all of which are commercial rivals of merce of the state of Texas and the adjoinne city of New Orleans for the large coming states and territories.

"That prior to the embargoes aforesaid of the years 1897 and 1898 the city of New Or leans was the greatest cotton exporting port of the United States, and a very large portion of the cotton grown in Texas was exported through the port of New Orleans; for instance, for the season of 1894-5 more than 31 per cent thereof; for the season 1895-6 more than 30 per cent thereof; for the season 1896-7, 25 per cent thereof.

"That as consequence of the two trade embargoes aforesaid the percentage of the Texas cotton crop exported through the port of New Orleans for the season of 1897-8 was only 19 per cent; and for the season of 18989 was only 15 per cent; and for the season of 1898-9, ending September 1, 1899, the city of Galveston handled more export cotton than the city of New Orleans.

"That the effect of said embargoes is all "Now, your orator avers that the absolute the more disastrous to the commerce of prohibition *against the movement and opera- [10] your orator and of her cities and towns, be- tion of interstate commerce between the city cause declared and made operative during of New Orleans and the inhabitants thereof the months of September, October, Novem- and the state of Texas and the inhabitants ber, and the early part of December, the pe- thereof, established by said William F. Blunt, riod of the greatest activity and the largest health officer of the state of Texas, and now movement of commerce among the states of maintained and enforced by him, the governor, the south, and between the state of Louisi-and the other officials of the state of Texas, is ana, the city of New Orleans, and the state in direct contravention of the provisions of the of Texas. Constitution of the United States, and particularly of that clause thereof which grants to the Congress power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with the Indian tribes, and is null, void, and of no effect, and the continuance thereof ought to be restrained by the order of this honorable court.

"Now your orator avers that in view of the unreasonable, harsh, prohibitive, and discriminating character of the pretended quarantines declared and maintained by the state of Texas and her health officer against the city of New Orleans and other localities in the state of Louisiana, is nothing less than a commercial war declared against your orator, her ports, cities, and citizens; not for the bona fide purpose of protecting the health of the state of Texas, but for the pur[9] pose of increasing the trade and commerce of the state of Texas and of her ports, cities, and citizens, to the great damage and injury of your orator and her citizens; that such embargoes on interstate commerce injure and impoverish your orator's citizens, reduce the value of her taxable property, diminish her revenues, retard immigration, reduce the value of her public lands, and deprive her citizens of their rights and privileges as citizens of the United States.

"Your orator avers that the embargo upon interstate commerce between the city of New Orleans, in the state of Louisiana, and the state of Texas, established by said Blunt on or about the 1st day of September, 1899, and now maintained by him and the other officials of the state of Texas, will be continued by them for an indefinite period, to the great damage and injury of your orator's ports, commerce, and revenues, and to the commerce of her citizens and to the rights of her citizens under the Constitution of the United States, unless they be enjoined and restrained by order of this court.

"Your orator further avers that the various cities, counties, and towns in the state of Texas have authority, under the statutes aforesaid, to establish quarantines, but all such quarantines are by statute subordinate to, subject to, and regulated by the rules and regulations prescribed by the governor and the state health officer, and that therefore all such quarantines are dirigible and controllable by the governor and the health officer of Texas.

"Your orator is informed and believes, and so charges, that it is the intention of certain counties, cities, and towns along the lines of the railroads aforesaid, in case your honors should restrain the operation of the embargo established as aforesaid by William F. Blunt, state health officer, to severally establish the same embargo on their own account, and to prevent the passage of trains on said railroads carrying interstate commerce from the city of New Orleans through them to other parts of the state of Texas and to other states, and to so hinder, obstruct, and delay the transportation of said commerce along the lines of railroad running through their limits as to render its conduct impossible; that in case it should be considered that the public authorities of such counties, towns, "Your orator avers that, from the past and cities are not personally bound by any conduct of the state of Texas, and of her gov-order your honors may issue in this cause, ernors and health officers, your orator is justified in averring and charging, and does aver and charge, that it is the fixed purpose and intention of the said state, and of her governors and health officers, whenever in the future any case of yellow fever, or other infectious disease, occurs in any parish, city, or town within your orator's borders, to immediately declare, set up, and maintain an absolute prohibition of interstate commerce between said supposed infected parish, city, or town, and the state of Texas, and to keep the same in force during the pleasure of such officials, or to make and establish discriminative rules and regulations covering quarantines on such interstate commerce, different from and more burdensome than the rules and regulations concerning quarantines on interstate commerce with other states and foreign commerce with countries also infected with yellow fever, or other infectious diseases, and thereby to injure and oppress your orator and her citizens.

and in case they should attempt to carry out any such illegal plan, your orator reserves the right hereafter to make such officials parties to this bill, so as to subject them to the control of the court.

The bill then prayed for answers under [44] oath; that the court decree "that neither the state of Texas, nor her governor, nor her health officer, have the right, under the cov er of an exercise of police or quarantine powers, to declare and enforce against interstate commerce between the state of Lou. isiana, or any part thereof, and the state of Texas, an absolute embargo, prohibiting the movement and conduct of said commerce, or to make, declare, and enforce against places infected with yellow fever, or other infectious diseases, in the state of Louisiana, discriminative quarantine rules and regulations affecting interstate commerce between the state of Louisiana, or any part thereof, and the state of Texas, different from and more burdensome than the quarantine rules

and regulations affecting Interstate or for- face that this suit is in reality for and on eign commerce between the state of Texas behalf of certain individuals engaged in inand other states and countries infected with terstate commerce, and while the suit is atyellow fever, or other infectious diseases, tempted to be prosecuted for and in the name and that the embargo and prohibition upon of the state of Louisiana, said state is in efinterstate commerce between the city of Newfect loaning its name to said individuals, Orleans and the state of Texas, declared by and is only a nominal party, the real parties William F. Blunt, health officer of the state at interest being said individuals in the said of Texas, on or about the 1st day of Septem-city of New Orleans, who are engaged in inber, 1899, and now maintained and enforced terstate commerce. by the state of Texas under the guise of a quarantine against yellow fever, is contrary to the Constitution of the United States, null, void, and of no effect and validity;" that a preliminary injunction be issued "prohibiting, enjoining, and restraining the state of Texas and all of her officers and public officials, and prohibiting, enjoining, and restraining Joseph D. Sayers, governor of the state of Texas, and William F. Blunt, health officer of the state of Texas, their successors in office, and all of their subordinates, assistants, agents, and employees, from establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, or attempting to establish, maintain, and enforce, under the guise of a quarantine against yellow fever, any embargo or absolute prohibition upon interstate commerce between the state of Louisiana, or any part thereof, and the state of Texas, or from establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, or attempting to establish, maintain, and enforce against interstate commerce between the state of Louisiana, or any part thereof, and the state of Texas, discriminative and [12] burdensome quarantine *regulations other and different from the regulations established by such authorities against foreign|tion. and interstate commerce between the state of Texas and other countries and states infected with yellow fever, or other infectious diseases, and particularly enjoining, prohibiting, and restraining them, and each of them, from maintaining or enforcing, directly or indirectly, the prohibitory embargo on interstate commerce established against the city of New Orleans on or about the 1st day of September, 1899, under the guise and pretense of a quarantine regulation;" and that such injunction be made perpetual on final hearing; for costs; and for general relief.

"Fourth. Because it appears from the face of said bill that the state of Louisiana, in her right of sovereignty, is seeking to maintain this suit for the redress of the supposed wrongs of her citizens in regard to interstate commerce, while under the Constitution and laws the said state possesses no such sovereignty as empowers her to bring an original suit in this court for such purpose.

*"Fifth. Because it appears from the face [18] of said bill that no property right of the state of Louisiana is in any manner affected by the quarantine complained of, nor is any such property right involved in this suit as would give this court original jurisdiction of this cause."

The demurrer assigned the following

causes:

Messrs. Milton J. Cunningham, Edgar H. Farrar, Benjamin F. Jonas, Ernest B. Kruttschnitt, and E. Howard McCaleb submitted the cause for complainant:

The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States in a controversy between two states is as broad as that given to Congress under the articles of Confedera

Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 719, 9 L. ed. 1258.

The words "controversies between two or more states," used in the Constitution, cover every right of persons and property of a civil nature that can be made the subject of judicial cognizance.

Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 821, 6 L. ed. 204, 224; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 721, 9 L. ed. 1259.

The extent of the judicial power is as broad as all the other powers granted in the Constitution.

Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 384, 5 L. ed. 286; The Federalist, No. 80.

Equally broad and untrammeled is the "First. That this court has no jurisdic-grant of judicial power over "all cases in tion of either the parties to or of the subject-law and equity" arising under the Constitumatter of this suit, because it appears from tion and the laws and treaties of the United the face of said bill that the matters com- States, whoever may be the parties thereto plained of do not constitute, within the Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 382, 5 L. ed meaning of the Constitution of the United 285. States, any controversy between the states of Louisiana and Texas.

"Second. Because the allegations of said bill show that the only issues presented by said bill arise between the state of Texas, or her officers, and certain persons in the city of New Orleans, in the state of Louisiana, who are engaged in interstate commerce, and which do not in any manner concern the state of Louisiana as a corporate body or state.

"Third. Because said bill shows upon its

The power of the Federal government to enforce the Constitution and protect interstate commerce from all ferms of unlawful obstruction resides in the judicial, as well as in the executive and in the legislative branches.

Re Debs, 158 U. S. 581, 39 L. ed. 1101, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900.

So far as concerns the right of a state to sue in this court for an injunction to prevent an obstruction or interference with a highway of interstate commerce tending_to

injure her revenues, ports, and commerce, it is settled by authority.

Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. 13 How. 518, 14 L. ed. 249; South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4, 23 L. ed. 782; Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U. S. 381, 24 L. ed. 669. If the state of Louisiana were an absolutely independent foreign sovereign, she would have the right to sue in the courts of the United States to restrain the unlawful act of persons which, if not prevented, would damage the trade and property of her citi

zens.

Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 DeG. F. & J. 217; The Sapphire, 11 Wall. 167, sub nom. The Sapphire v. Napoleon, III. 20 L. ed. 130. The state of Louisiana has not surrendered so much of her sovereignty as would prevent her, at least in a court of the United States, from suing to protect the trade rights and property rights of the mass of her citizens against the unlawful acts of another state. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 719, 9 L. ed. 1258.

In every respect, except in so far as she has surrendered her sovereignty to the national sovereign, the state of Louisiana is a sovereign state.

Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 325, 4 L. ed. 102; Buckner v. Finley, 2 Pet. 590, 7 L. ed. 528; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 719, 9 L. ed. 1258; Ohio Life Ins. & T. Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 428, 14 L. ed. 1002; Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. 94 U. S. 541, 24 L. ed. 151; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 722, 24 L. ed.

568.

Messrs. Thomas S. Smith and Robert H. Ward submitted the cause for defendants:

A state is not sovereign as to its citizens or as to another state, and is under no obligation to collect the debts of its citizens or to otherwise redress their private wrongs; the state cannot loan its name to its citizens or sue in their behalf.

New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 91, 27 L. ed. 662, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 176.

Notwithstanding the comprehensive words of the Constitution, the mere fact that a state is the plaintiff is not a conclusive test that the controversy is one in which this court is authorized to grant relief against another state or her citizens.

Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. 127 U. S. 287, 32 L. ed. 242, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1370.

No state can be sued either in its own courts or those of any other state or nation without its consent, and states can only be sued in proper cases in this court by reason of their agreement in the Constitution that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases arising under the Constitution and laws.

United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 646, 36 L. ed. 293, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488.

The controversies existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution were the cause and origin of extending the judicial power of the United States to controversies between the states. and the only purpose of such constitutional provision was to provide a tribunal for settlement of such controver352

sies as to boundaries and other like controversies.

United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 639, 36 L. ed. 291, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488.

It was not the intention of the states in adopting the Constitution to give their consent to be sued whenever a dispute arises between citizens of different states in regard to commerce or any property right affecting such citizens.

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 15, 33 L. ed. 847, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 504.

*Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the [13. opinion of the court:

The 9th of the Articles of Confederation of 1778 provided that the Congress should be "the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting, or that hereafter may arise between two or more states concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever;" the authority to be exercised through a tribunal to be created by the Congress as prescribed, and whose judg ment should be final and conclusive; and also that "all controversies concerning the pri vate right of soil claimed under different grants of two or more states" should be determined in the same manner.

In the Constitutional Convention, the committee of detail, composed of Rutledge, Randolph, Gorham, Ellsworth, and Wilson, to which the resolutions arrived at by the Convention and sundry propositions had been referred, reported on the 6th of August, A. D. 1787, a draft of a constitution, consisting of twenty-three articles.

The 2d section of the 9th article provided that as to "all disputes and controversies now subsisting, or that may hereafter subsist, between two or more states, respecting jurisdiction or territory," the Senate should have power to designate a special tribunal to finally determine the same by its judg ment; and by the 3d section, "all controversies concerning lands claimed under different grants of two or more states" were to be similarly determined.

*The 3d section of the proposed 11th arti- [14] cle provided, among other things, that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court should extend "to controversies between two or more states, except such as shall regard territory or jurisdiction; between a state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different states; and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects."

On the 25th of August Mr. Rutledge said in respect to sections 2 and 3 of article 9: "This provision for deciding controversies between the states was necessary under the Contederation, but will be rendered unneces sary by the national judiciary now to be es tablished;" and on his motion the sections were stricken out.

The words "between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states" were subsequently inserted in the 3d section of the 11th article, and the words "except such as shall regard territory or ju risdiction" omitted. 1 Elliot, 223, 224,

« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »