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of the company, it is not necessary to con- will be found a reference to some of the more sider the question of the value of the prop-recent of those statutes.† erty of the company at the time of the abandonment."

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[448] *From the judgment of the court of claims the present appeal was prosecuted.

In the light of this history of the claim of [451]the La Abra Company we proceed to the consideration of such of the principal questions presented in argument as are essential to the disposition of the case.

I. If, as insisted by the appellants, the above act of December 28, 1892, was not so approved by the President as to become under the Constitution a law, it would be unnecessary to consider any other question raised by the pleadings; for that act is the only basis of jurisdiction in the court of claims to render a judgment that would be conclusive between the parties and which could be reviewed by this court. We must therefore first consider whether that act is liable to the constitutional objection just stated.

Do the words of the Constitution, reasonably interpreted, sustain the views advanced for appellant?

That instrument provides:

"The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day." Art. I. § 4.

"Neither House, during the session of Congress, shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting." Art. I. § 5.

not be returned by the President within ten

I. PUBLIC ACTS: 1862, 12 Stat. at. L. 632,

"Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approves, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on the journal, and proceed to consider it. If after such reconsideration two thirds of that *House[453] shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the The ground of this contention is that havnames of the persons voting for and against ing met in regular session at the time ap- the bill shall be entered on the journal of pointed by law, the first Monday of Decem-each House respectively. If any bill shall ber, 1892, and having on the 22d day of that month (two days after the presentation of the bill to the President) by the joint action of the two Houses taken a recess to a named day, January 4, 1893, Congress was not actually sitting when the President, on the 28th day of December, 1892, by signing it, formally approved the act in question. The proposition, plainly stated, is that a bill passed by Congress and duly presented to the President does not become a law if his approval be given on a day when Congress is in recess. This implies that the constitutional power of the President to approve a bill so as to make it a law is absolutely suspended while Congress is in recess for a fixed time. It would follow from this that if both Houses of Congress by their joint or separate action were in recess from some Friday until the II. JOINT RESOLUTIONS: 1869, 16 Stat. at succeeding Monday, the President could not L. 368, No. 5; Id. No. 6; 1872, 17 Stat. at L exercise that power on the intervening Satur-637, No. 1; 1878, 20 Stat. at L. 487, No. 1; Id. day. Indeed, according to the argument of No. 2: Id. No. 3; 1883, 23 Stat. at L. 265, No. counsel the President could not effectively ap-3: 1885. 24 Stat. at L. 339, No. 2: Id. No. 3; prove a bill on any day when one of the 1893, 28 Stat. at L. 577, No. 7; 1894, 28 Stat. Houses, by its own separate action, was at L. 967, No. 2. legally in recess for that day in order that necessary repairs be made in the room in which its sessions were being held. Yet many public acts and joint resolutions of great importance, together with many private acts, have been treated as valid and en

forceable, which were approved by the President during the recesses of Congress cover[452]ing the Christmas holidays. In the margin

c. 4; Id. c. 5: Id. c. 6; 1866, 14 Stat. at L. 374, c. 5; 1868, 15 Stat. at L. 266, c. 4; 1869, 16 Stat. at. L. 61, c. 4; Id. c. 5; 1872, 17 Stat. at L. 400, c. 12; Id. c. 13; Id. c. 14; Id. c. 15; Id. c. 17; 1873, 18 Stat. at L. 1, c. 3; 1874, 18 Stat. at L. 293, c. 7; Id. c. 8; Id. c. 9; Id. c. Stat. at L. 1, c. 1; 1879, 21 Stat. at L. 59, c. 1; Id. c. 2; 1880, 21 Stat. at L. 311, c. 4; Id. c. 5; Id. c. 6; 1d. c. 7; Id. c. 8; Id. c. 9; Id. c. 10; 1884, 23 Stat. at L. 280, chap. 7; 1886, 24 Stat. at L. 353, c. 9; 1887, 24 Stat. at. L. 354, c. 11; Id. c. 12; Id. c. 13; Id. C. 14; Id. c. Id. c. 8: 1889, 25 Stat. at L. 639, c. 18; 1892, 15; Id. c. 16; 1888, 25 Stat. at L. 638, c. 7; 27 Stat. at. L. 409, c. 14; Id. c. 15; Id. c. 16; 1894, 28 Stat. at. L. 595, c. 8; Id. c. 9; Id. c. 10; Id. c. 11; Id. c. 12; Id. c. 14; Id. c. 15; 1897, 30 Stat. at L. 226, c. 3.

10; 1875, 18 Stat. at L. 294, c. 12; 1875, 19

III. PRIVATE ACTS: 1873, 18 Stat. at L.

529, c. 2; 1874, 18 Stat. at L. 529, c. 4; 1879, 21 Stat. at L. 531, c. 3; 1880, 21 Stat. at L. 601, c. 11; Id. c. 12; Id. c. 13; Id. c. 14; 1884, 23 Stat. at L. 615, c. 6; 1885, 24 Stat. at L. 653, c. 1; Id. c. 2: 1886, 24 Stat. at L. 881, c.

10; 1887, 24 Stat. at L. 882. c. 17; Id. c. 18;

d. c. 19: Id. c. 20: 1888, 25 Stat. at L. 1251,

c. 9 Id. c. 10; Id. c. 11: Id. c. 12; Id. c. 13; Id.
c. 14; Id. c. 15; Id. c. 16; Id. c. 17; 1894, 28 Stat.

at L. 1022, c. 13; Id. c. 16; Id. c. 17.

days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law." Art. I. § 7.

proval of bills, so that the fact may be recorded. But the essential thing to be done in order that a bill may become a law by the approval of the President is that it be signed within the prescribed time after being presented to him. That being done, and as "Every order, resolution, or vote to which soon as done, whether Congress is informed the concurrence of the Senate and House of or not by message from the President of the Representatives may be necessary (except on fact of his approval of it, the bill becomes a a question of adjournment) shall be pre-law, and is delivered to the Secretary of sented to the President of the United States; State as required by law. and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill." Art. I. § 8.

Much of the argument of counsel seems to rest upon the provision in relation to the final adjournment of Congress for the session whereby the President is prevented from returning, within the period prescribed by the Constitution, a bill that he disapproves and is unwilling to sign. But the Constitution places the approval and disapproval of bills, as to their becoming laws, upon a different basis. If the President does not approve a bill, he is required within a named time to send it back for consideration. But if by its action, after the *presentation of a bill to the[455] President during the time given him by the Constitution for an examination of its provisions and for approving it by his signature, Congress puts it out of his power to return it, not approved, within that time to the House in which it originated, then the bill falls, and does not become a law.

Whether the President can sign a bill after the final adjournment of Congress for the session is a question not arising in this case, and has not been considered or decided by

us.

of the case adjudge nothing more-that the
We adjudge and touching this branch
act of 1892, having been presented to the
President while Congress was sitting, and
having been signed by him when Congress
was in recess for a specified time, but within
ten days, Sundays excepted, after it was so
presented to him, was effectively approved,
and immediately became a law, unless its
provisions are repugnant to the Constitu-
tion.

It is said that the approval by the President of a bill passed by Congress is not strictly an executive function, but is legislative in its nature; and this view, it is argued, conclusively shows that his approval can legally occur only on a day when both Houses are actually sitting in the performance of legislative functions. Undoubtedly the President when approving bills passed by Congress may be said to participate in the enactment of laws which the Constitution requires him to execute. But that consideration does not determine the question before us. As the Constitution, while authorizing the President to perform certain functions of a limited number that are legislative in their general nature, does not restrict the exercise of those functions to the particular days on which the two Houses of Congress are actually sitting in the transaction of public business, the court cannot impose such a restriction upon the Executive. It is made his duty by the Constitution to examine and act upon every bill passed by Congress. The time within which he must ap: [454]prove or disapprove a bill is prescribed. If he approve a bill, it is made his duty to sign it. The Constitution is silent as to the time of his signing, except that his approval of a bill duly presented to him-if the bill is to II. It is said that the present proceeding become a law merely by virtue of such ap- based on the act of 1892 is not a "case" withproval-must be manifested by his signature in the meaning of that clause of the Constiwithin ten days, Sundays excepted, after the tution declaring that the judicial power of bill has been presented to him. It neces- the United States shall extend to all cases sarily results that a bill when so signed be- in law and equity arising under that instrucomes from that moment a law. But in ment, the laws of the United States, or treaorder that his refusal or failure to act may ties made or which shall be made under their not defeat the will of the people, as expressed authority. Art. III. § 2. This article, as has by Congress, if a bill be not approved and be been adjudged, does not extend the judicial not returned to the House in which it origi- power to every violation of the Constitution nated within that time, it becomes a law in that may possibly take place, but only "to like manner as if it had been signed by him. 'a case in law or equity,' in which a right, unWe perceive nothing in these constitutional der such law, is asserted in a court of jusprovisions making the approval of a bill by tice. If the question cannot be brought into the President a nullity if such approval oc- a court, then there is no case in law or curs while the two Houses of Congress are equity, and no jurisdiction is given by the in recess for a named time. After a bill has words of the article. But if, in any controbeen presented to the President, no further versy depending in a court, the cause should action is required by Congress in respect of depend on the validity of such a law, that that bill, unless it be disapproved by him and would be a case arising under the Constituwithin the time prescribed by the Constitution, to which the judicial power of the tion be returned for reconsideration. It has United States would extend." Cohen v. Virproperly been the practice of the Presidentginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 405, 5 L. ed. 257, 291. to inform Congress by message of his ap- In the same case, Chief Justice Marshall de

ties, unless Congress should at some future time sanction it and pass a law authorizing the court to carry its opinion into effect. Such is not the judicial power confided to this court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; yet it is the whole power that the court is allowed to exercise under this act of Congress." In a more recent case this court dismissed an appeal from a final order made in the court of claims in virtue of a particular statute, observing: "Such a finding is not made obligatory on the department to which it is reported-certainly not so in terms, and not so, as we think, by any necessary implication. We regard the func tion of the court of claims, in such a case, as ancillary and advisory only. The finding or conclusion reached by that court is not enforceable by any process of execution issuing from the court, nor is it made by the statute the final and indisputable basis of action, either by the department or by Congress." Re Sanborn, 148 U. S. 222, 226, 37 L. ed. 429, 431, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 577; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 483, 38 L. ed. 1047, 1059, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 545, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1125.

clared a suit to be the prosecution by a party | final and conclusive upon the rights of the of some claim, demand, or request in a court parties. "The award of execution," Chief of justice for the purpose of being put in pos- Justice Taney said, "is a part, and an essensession of a right claimed by him and of tial part, of every judgment passed by which he was deprived. court exercising judicial power. It is no (456] *Referring to the provision defining the ju- judgment, in the legal sense of the term, dicial power of the United States, the court without it. Without such an award the in a subsequent case said: "This clause en- judgment would be inoperative and nugaables the judicial department to receive ju- tory, leaving the aggrieved party without a risdiction to the full extent of the Constitu- remedy. It would be merely an opinion tion, laws, and treaties of the United States, which would remain a dead letter, and withwhen any question respecting them shail as-out any operation upon the rights of the parsume such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it. That powers capable of acting only when the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law. It then becomes a case, and the Constitution declares that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States." Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819, 6 L. ed. 204, 223. In Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. 272, 284, 15 L. ed. 372, 377, this court said that Congress can neither "withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law or in equity or admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter which, from its nature, is not a subject for judicial determination." But in the same case it was observed by Mr. Justice Curtis, speaking for the court, that "there are matters involving public rights which may be presented in sach form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the Under the principles established in the courts of the United States, as it may deem cases above cited, the objections urged proper." Of like import was the judgment against the jurisdiction of the court of in Smith v. Adams, 130 U. S. 167, 173, 32 L. claims and of this court cannot be mained. 895, 897, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 566, in which tained, if the present proceeding involves a the court said that the terms "cases" and right which in its nature is susceptible of ju"controversies" in the Constitution em-dicial determination, and if the determinabraced "the claims or contentions of litigants tion of it by *the court of claims and by this[458] brought before the courts for adjudication court is not simply ancillary or advisory but by regular proceedings established for the is the final and indisputable basis of action protection or enforcement of rights, or the by the parties. prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs."

The money in the hands of the Secretary of State was paid to the United States by Mexico pursuant to the award of the commission. That tribunal dealt only with the two governments, had no relations with claimants, and could take cognizance only of claims presented by or through the respective governments. No claimant, individual or corporate, was entitled to present any demand or proofs directly to the commission. No evidence could be considered except such as was furnished by or on behalf of the re

The principles announced in the above cases are illustrated by the opinion prepared by Chief Justice Taney for the case of Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. 561, 17 L. ed. 921, and printed in 117 U. S. 697, appx. That case was brought to this court from the court of claims, and related to a demand asserted against the United States. The principal question was whether this court had jurisdiction to review the final or[457] der made in the court *below. The chief jus-spective governments. While the claims of tice died before the case was decided, and the opinion prepared by him in recess was not formally accepted. But if the court approved his views, as it undoubtedly did, the appeal was dismissed upon the ground that Congress could not authorize or require this court to express an opinion on a case in which its judicial power could not be exercised, and when its judgment would not be

individual citizens presented by their respective governments were to be considered by the commission in determining amounts, "the whole purpose of the convention was to ascertain how much was due from one gov ernment to the other on account of the demands of their respective citizens." And "each government, when it entered into the compact under which the awards were made,

relied on the honor and good faith of the other for protection as far as possible against frauds and impositions by the individual claimants." Frelinghuysen v. Key, above cited. As between the United States and Mexico, indeed as between the United States and American claimants. the money received from Mexico under the award of the commission was in strict law the property of the United States, and no claimant could assert or enforce any interest in it so long as the government legally withheld it from distribution.

means it possessed, and declared that Con-
gress by its "plenary authority" ought not
only to decide whether such an investigation
should be made, but provide an adequate pro-
cedure for its conduct, and prescribe the con-
sequences to follow therefrom. The sugges
tion that the question of fraud be committed
to the determination of a judicial tribunal[460]
first came from the executive branch of the
government. Undoubtedly Congress, having
in view the honor of the government and the
relations of this country with Mexico, could
have determined the whole question of fraud
for itself, and by a statute approved by the
President, or which being disapproved by him
was passed by the requisite constitutional
vote, have directed the return to Mexico, the
other party to the award, of such moneys as
had been paid into the hands of the Secretary
of State. It is also clear that in the ab-
sence of any statute suspending the distribu-
tion of such moneys, the President could
have ignored the charges of fraud and or-
dered the distribution to proceed according
to the terms of the treaty and the award.
But it does not follow that Congress was
without power, no distribution having been
made, to control the whole matter by plenary
legislation.

When the La Abra Company asked the in-
tervention of the United States it did so on
the condition imposed by the principles of
comity recognized by all civilized nations,
that it would act in entire good faith, and
not put the government whose aid it sought
in the attitude of asserting against the Mexi-
can Republic a fraudulent or fictitious claim;
consequently the United States, under its
duty to that Republic, was required to with-
hold any sum awarded and paid on account
of the company's claim, if it appeared that
such claim was of that character. As be-
[459]tween the United States and the *company,
the honesty or genuineness of the latter's
claim was open to inquiry in some appropri-
ate mode for the purpose of fair dealing with It has been adjudged that Congress by
the government against which such claim legislation, and so far as the people and au-
was made through the United States. We thorities of the United States are concerned,
so adjudged in the Key Case. The United could abrogate a treaty made between this
States assumed the responsibility of present-country and another country which had been
ing the La Abra claim and made it its own in
seeking redress from the Mexican Republic.
But from such action on its part no contract
obligations arose with the La Abra Company
"to assume their frauds and to collect on
their account all that, by their imposition
of false testimony, might be given in the
awards of the commission." United States
ex rel. Boynton v. Blaine, above cited.

negotiated by the President and approved by the Senate. Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 599, sub nom. Edye v. Robertson, 28 L. ed. 798, 804, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, 194, 31 L. ed. 386, 388, Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, 600, sub nom. Che Chan Ping v. United States, 32 L. ed. 1068, 1073, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 623; Fong Yue These considerations make it clear that the Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 721, 37 act of 1892 is not liable to the objection that L. ed. 905, 915, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016. It it subjected to judicial determination a mat- is therefore difficult to perceive any ground ter committed by the Constitution to the ex-upon which to question its power to make clusive control of the President. The sub- the distribution of moneys in the hands ject was one in which Congress had an inter- of the Secretary of State-representing in est, and in respect to which it could give di- that matter the United States and not rections by means of a legislative enactment. simply the President-depend upon the reThe question for the determination of which sult of a suit by which the United States the present suit was directed to be instituted would be bound and in which the claimants was whether the award made by the commission in respect to the claim of the La to the fund in question could be heard as Abra Company was obtained as to the whole parties, and which was to be brought in a sum included therein or as to any part there- court of the United States by its authority, of, by fraud effectuated by means of false for the purpose of determining whether the swearing or other false and fraudulent La Abra Company, its agents or assigns, had tices on the part of the company, or its been guilty of fraud in the matter of the agents, attorneys, or assigns. It cannot, we claim that it procured to be presented to the think, be seriously disputed that the ques- commission. The act of 1892 is to be taken tion whether fraud has or has not been com- as a recognition, so far as the United States mitted in presenting or prosecuting a de- is concerned, of the legal right of the command or claim before a tribunal having au-pany to receive the moneys in question unthority to allow or disallow it is peculiarly less it appeared upon judicial investigation judicial in its nature, and that in ascertain that the *United States was entitled, by rea-[461] ing the facts material in such an inquiry no son of fraud practised in the interest of that means are so effectual as those employed by corporation, to withhold such moneys from or in a court of justice. The executive it. Here, then, is a matter subjected to branch of the government recognized the in-judicial investigation in respect of which the adequacy for such an investigation of any parties assert rights-the United States in

prac

sisting upon its right under the principles of | respect of those claims was procured by
international comity to withhold moneys re- fraud practised on the part of that company,
ceived by it under a treaty on account of a and whether in that event the company
certain claim presented through it before the should be barred of any claim to the moneys
commission organized under that treaty in received from the Republic of Mexico. Up-
the belief, superinduced by the claimant, that on this question the legislative and executive
it was an honest demand; the claimant in branches of the government have acted in
sisting upon its absolute legal right under perfect harmony. The question arises under
the treaty and the award of the commission, the Constitution of the United States, and a
independently of any question of fraud, to treaty made by the United States with a for-
receive the money, and disputing the right eign country is judicial in its nature, and
of the United States upon any ground to one to which the judicial power of the Unit-
withhold the sum awarded. We entertain ed States is expressly extended. Both
no doubt these rights are susceptible of branches of the government were concerned
judicial determination within the meaning in the enactment subjecting that question to
of the adjudged cases relating to the judicial judicial determination, and it cannot prop-
power of the courts of the United States as erly be said that the President, by approving
distinguished from the powers committed to the act of 1892 or by recognizing its binding
the executive branch of the government. force, surrendered any function belonging to
him under the supreme law of the land.

It remains, in our consideration of the question of jurisdiction, to inquire whether It was also said in argument that the act the judgment authorized by the act of 1892 of Congress in some way-not clearly deto be rendered would be a final, conclusive fined by counsel was inconsistent with the determination, as between the United States principles underlying international arbitraand the defendants, of the rights claimed by tion, a *mode for the settlement of disputes[463) them respectively, or only ancillary or ad- between sovereign states that is now more visory. În our opinion the act of Congress than ever before approved by civilized naauthorized a final judgment of the former tions. We might well doubt the soundness character, and therefore the judgment of the of any conclusion that could be regarded as court of claims is reviewable by this court in weakening or tending to weaken the force the exercise of its appellate judicial power. that should be attached to the finality of an If our judgment should be one of affirmance award made by an international tribunal of then the La Abra Company, its legal repre- arbitration. So far from the act of Consentatives or assigns, are barred of all claim, gress having any result of that character, legal or equitable, to the money received by the effect of such legislation is to strengthen the United States from the Republic of Mexi- the principle that an award by a tribunal co on account of the award of the commission. acting under the joint authority of two Such a determination would rest upon the countries is conclusive between the governbroad ground that the United States in its ments concerned, and must be executed in efforts to protect the alleged rights of an good faith unless there be ground to impeach American corporation had been the victim the integrity of the tribunal itself. The act of fraud upon the part of that corporation, of 1892 is a recognition of the principle that "international arbitration must always proits agents or assigns, and was in law relieved from any responsibility to that corceed on the highest principles of national honor and integrity." Frelinghuysen v. Key, [462]poration touching the claim in question or the moneys received on account of it. If, above cited. By that act the United States on the other hand, this court should find declares that its citizens shall not through that the charges of fraud were not sustained its agency reap the fruits of a fraudulent de or were disproved, and reverse the decree of mand which they have induced it to assert the court of claims, then it would become the against another country. Such legislation absolute legal duty of the Secretary of State is an assurance in the most solemn and bindto proceed in the distribution of the moneysing form that the government of this counin his hands according to the terms of the award. It was competent for Congress by statute to impose that duty upon him, and he could not refuse to obey the mandate of

the law.

Much was said in argument about the interference by the act of 1892 with the discharge by the President of his constitutional functions in connection with matters involved in the relations between this country and the Republic of Mexico. For reasons already given this contention cannot be sustained. It is without support in anything done or said by the eminent jurists who have presided over the Department of State since the controversy arose as to the integrity of claim made by the La Abra Company. On the contrary, those officers have uniformly insisted that the authority of Congress was plenary to determine whether the award in

try will exert all the power it possesses to
enforce good faith upon the part of citizens
who, alleging that they have been wronged
by the authorities of another country, seek
the intervention of their government to ob-
tain redress.

We hold that the act of 1892 is not uncon-
stitutional upon any of the grounds adverted
to; that the court of claims had jurisdiction
to render the decree in question; that such
decree, unless reversed, is binding upon the
parties to this cause; and that this court, in
the exercise of its appellate power, has au-
thority to re-examine that decree and make
such order or give such direction as may be
consistent with law.

III. The court of claims did not make a finding of facts. It is therefore contended on behalf of the United States that the ap peal provided for by the act of 1892 does not

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