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along the lake by a sand beach averaging 1
chain in width and 3 feet in height.'
"That concerning the portion of said sur-
vey in town 9 south, range 10 east, reciting,
to wit:

""The surface of this fractional township is covered with a deep marsh of grass, canes or reeds, wild rice, etc. Much of the south part can be mown for marsh hay, being in a measure drained by a canal that has been constructed in the township south. Other parts are filled with bogs and pond holes that do not dry in summer. It receives the drainage from woods on the south and west, which spreads over the entire surface and without any positive channel finds its way

to the lake.

"Again the township is subject to inunda tions from the lake during heavy gales of wind, which, upon the termination of the gale or a change in the direction of the wind, lowly finds its way back into the lake.

Mr. Thomas Emery argued the cause, and Messrs. Potter & Emery filed a brief for appellee.

Contentions of counsel sufficiently appear in the opinion.

*Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opin-[305] ion of the court:

But little can be added to the opinion of the court of appeals, whose conclusions we approve. The meander line *run by surveyor[306] Rice along the northern borders of the tracts patented to Margaret Bailey may not have been strictly a line of boundary (St. Paul & P. R. Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272, 19 L. ed. 74; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 380, 35 L. ed. 428, 432, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808 and 838; Horne v. Smith, 159 U. S. 40, 40 L. ed. 68, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 998), but it indicated that there was something which had stopped the survey, which limited the area of the land which the United States was proposing to convey, and left to subsequent measurements the actual determination of the line of separation between the land conveyed and that which the government did not propose to convey. Generally, these meandered lines are lines which course the banks of navigable streams or other navigable waters. Here, it appears distinctly from the field notes and the plat that the surveyor, Rice, [808 ""*The description for this township must stopped his surveys at this "marsh,' 99 as he necessarily be similar to that of the two called it. These surveys were approved and preceding townships. The surface of that a plat prepared, which was based upon the part of the township comprised in this sur- surveys and field notes, and showed the limvey is one large swampy marsh, land, gen-its of the tracts which were for sale. The rally very wet and boggy, Its surface is covered with grass, canes (or joint grass), wild rice, and such like marsh productions, reaching to a height of 10 or more feet. Some parts, especially on sections 10 and 11, can be pastured, but the larger portion is filled with bogs and pond holes, connected by narrow and tortuous channels.

""This fractional township is bounded on the northeast by Lake Erie; between the lake and the marsh proper is a sand beach, averaging 3 feet high and 1 chain in width, generally covered with bushes and small trees of oak, poplar, willow, and cottonwood.' "That concerning the portion of said surrey in town 10 south, range 10 east, reciting, to wit:

"It receives the drainage from the woods on the south and west, and is subject to inundations from the lake. On the prevalence of strong southwest winds this water flows from the marsh into the lake, and upon the occurrence of northeast winds the lake floods the marsh. The principal outlets and inlets are Crane creek and Ward's canal. This eanal is an improvement made by C. B. Ward, of Detroit, Michigan, on section 4, and running across section 5 for the purpose of getting vessels and ship timber from his shipyard on section 5. It is built without locks and is really only a great ditch. Waterway, 50 feet; depth, 7 feet. The buildings (or sheds) at the fishing stations 4 and 11 are the only other improvements.

"A comparison of the survey made by Ambrose Rice in 1834 and 1835 with that made by John B. Marston in 1881 indicates that Sandy and Crane islands washed somewhat shoreward during the period intervening be tween the making of said respective surveys."

Mr. Henry T. Niles argued the cause and, with Mr. Frank O. Daugherty, filed a brief for appellant.

patents, referring in terms to the survey and plat, clearly disclose that the government was not intending to and did not convey any land which was a part of the marsh. "The patent itself does not contain all the particulars of the survey, but the grant of the lands is recited to be according to the official plat of the survey of said lands, returned to the General Land Office by the surveyor general, thereby adopting the plat as a part of the instrument." Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 35 L. ed. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808 and 838. In James v. Howell, 41 Ohio St. 696, 707, the supreme court of Ohio, speaking of these very patents and this marsh, said: "The 'meander' line along the southerly border of the marsh was, in fact, intended to be the boundary line of the fractional sections."

It may be that surveyor Rice erred in not extending his surveys into this marsh, but his error does not enlarge the title conveyed by the patents to the surveyed fractional sections. The United States sold only the fractional sections, received only pay therefor, an amount fixed by the number of acres conveyed, and one receiving a patent will not ordinarily be heard to insist that by reason of an error on the part of the surveyor more land was bought than was paid for, or than the government was offering for sale.

*It may be true that under his contract,[307] the requirements of the statute, and the reg. ulations of the land department, Rice should have extended his surveys to the shores of Lake Erie, but he did not do it; he stopped at the borders of this marsh, and the land

department, in effect, approved his action. or less subject to overflow-would not alter
He evidently thought that the marsh was to the fact that the rights of Margaret Bailey,
be treated as a body of water, a conclusion the patentee, were limited to the very lands
not unwarranted in view of the finding of which were conveyed to her, and for which
excessive high water at that time, but a con- she paid, and did not extend over the me
clusion which other findings show was not ander line into the territory north.
correct. And it may be remarked in passing But it is urged that the fact that a mean-
that the letter of the statute would not limit, dered line was run amounts to a determina.
the surveys to the shores of the lake, for §tion by the land department that the sur-
2395, Rev. Stat., declares that surveys shall veyed fractional sections bordered upon a
be by running lines at right angles "so as to body of water, navigable or non-navigable,
form townships of 6 miles square unless and that, therefore, the purchaser of these
where the line of an Indian reservation, or fractional sections was entitled to riparian
of tracts of land heretofore surveyed or pat- rights; and this in face of the express dec-
ented, or the course of navigable rivers, may laration of the field notes and plat, that that
render this impracticable; and in that case which was lying beyond the surveyed sec-
this rule must be departed from no further tions was "flag marsh," or "impassable marsh
than such particular circumstances require." and water." But there is no such magic in
But Lake Erie is not an Indian reserva- a meandered line. All that can be said of
tion, nor a tract of land heretofore surveyed it is that it is an irregular line which bounds
and patented, nor a navigable river. It is a body of land, and beyond that boundary
true 2396, which provides how the bound- there may be found forest or prairie, land or
aries and contents of the several sections, water, government or Indian reservation.
half sections, and quarter sections of the
public lands of the United States shall be as-
certained, says, after stating the rule where
all the corners are established, that "in those
portions of the fractional townships where
no such opposite corresponding corners have
been or can be fixed, the boundary lines
shall be ascertained by running from the es-
tablished corners due north and south or
east and west lines, as the case may be, to
the watercourse, Indian boundary line, or
other external boundary of such fractional
township."

With respect to the contention that the character of this marsh, as it was found to have been, shows that it should have passed to the state of Ohio under the swamp land act, it is enough to say that the state of [309] Ohio applied for it as such, that the application was denied, that this denial was made in 1852, that the land was never patented to the state and without such patent no fee ever passed (Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U. S. 589, 42 L. ed. 591, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208), that subsequently the land department treated it as land subject to its If this recognizes any other external control, as public land of the United States, boundary than that which is indicated in had it surveyed, sold and patented. What 2395 it does not prescribe what that external boundary shall be; and if the land department treats either a marsh or a lake as such external boundary, who can declare that its action is void?

It is impossible to hold that the lower courts erred in the conclusion that this [308]marsh was not to be regarded as land *continuously submerged, either under Lake Erie, a navigable lake, and in that case belonging to the state of Ohio (Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 11 L. ed. 565; Weber v. Harbor Comrs. 18 Wall. 57, 21 L. ed. 798; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. ed. 248), or under a pond or other similar body of nonnavigable inland waters, and therefore generally the property of riparian owners. was called a marsh by Rice, the first surveyor, is so styled on the plat, and the conditions as disclosed by the agreed statement indicate that it was a body of low, swampy land, partly boggy and partly dry, sometimes subject to inundations from Lake Erie or the overflow of the adjacent streams, but not permanently covered with water.

It

Of course, if the fractional sections patented to Margaret Bailey did not border on some body of water there were no riparian rights, and if the conclusion of the trial court that this marsh was land (for swamp and boggy land is to be treated as land) was correct, then whatever changes may have come to the marsh-whether it became more

ever claims the state of Ohio may have cannot be litigated in this suit. The legal title passed by the patent to the appellee's grantors, and that title is certainly good as against a stranger with no equities.

We see no error in the decree, and it is affirmed.

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, Board of Assess-
ors for the Parish of Orleans, and George
B. Penrose, Treasurer of the City of New
Orleans, Appts.,

v.

MARY G. T. STEMPEL (Wife of Edward
Stempel), Guardian of the Infants Fannie
Tobin McCan et al.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 309-323.)

Injunction against collection of tax on property of nonresident-situs of money in bank, notes, and mortgages owned by nonresident.

1.

The fact that an assessment for taxes was In the name of "the estate of" a decedent, while the administration of his estate had been finally closed and the property put into possession of the heirs, will not justify equiNOTE.-Situs for taxation of debts evidenced by notes or mortgages held by agent residing in different state from principal.

Where the investment of funds of a nonresdent is controlled by his agent, who loans and

table relief by injunction, though it was tech- | their property thus inherited. The order of nically in the wrong name.

2. Moneys collected as interest and principal of notes, mortgages, and other securities kept within the state for use or reinvestment, though the owner is domiciled in another state, and the moneys are deposited in a bank to his credit. are subject to taxation under La. Acts 1890, chap. 106, providing for taxation of credits arising from business done in the state, at the business domicil of a nonresident owner, his agent, or representative. 3. Notes and mortgages, the owner of which is domiciled in another state, when they are kept within the state by an agent, may be subjected to taxation by the laws of the state in which they are held.

[No. 65.]

Argued October 25, 1899. Decided ber 4, 1899.

the court, in this respect, was rendered February 14, 1896, and the taxes which were sought to be restrained were those for that year. The assessment, as appears by the assessment roll, was in the name of "the eswas of $15,000, tate of D. C. McCan;" "meney in possession, on deposit, or in hand," and of $800,000, "money loaned on interest, all credits and all bills receivable for money loaned or advanced, or for goods sold; and all credits of any and every description." The principal contentions of the plaintiff were: First, that included within this personal property was some $228,000 of bonds of the state of Louisiana, *taxation of which[311] by the state or any of its municipalities was void, as impairing the obligation of a conDecem-tract made by the state. Second, that the situs of the loans and credits was in New and wards, and, therefore, being loans and York, the place of residence of the guardian credits without the state of Louisiana they were not subject to taxation therein.

PPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court A of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana in favor of the plaintiff in a suit to restrain the collection of taxes. Reversed.

Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: [310] *This case comes on appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana. It is a suit brought by the appellee to restrain the collection of taxes levied upon certain personal property which she claims was exempt from taxation. The important facts are these: The plaintiff, as well as the infants whose guardian she is, and for whose benefit she brings this suit, are residents of the state of New York, in which state she has been duly appointed the guardian of their estates. The infants inherited certain property from their grandfather, a resident of Louisiana, whose estate was duly settled in the proper court of that state. By regular proceedings these infants had been adjudged his legal heirs, and she, as guardian, had been put in possession of

reloans them to citizens of the state, the notes and securities taken and held in the possession and under the control of the agent have a situs within the state that makes it competent for the state to subject them to taxation. Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. 152; Finch v. York County, 19 Neb. 50, 56 Am. Rep. 741, 26 N. W. 589; Walker v. Jack, 60 U. S. App. 124, 88 Fed. Rep. 576, 81 C. C. A. 462, Reversing 79 Fed. Rep. 138; Billinghurst v. Spink County, 5 S. D. 84, 58 N W. 272; NEW ORLEANS V. STEMPEL.

This is called a "business situs," and is an exception to the rule that the situs of credits Is at the domicil of the owner. Re Jefferson, 85 Minn. 215, 28 N. W. 256.

So, contracts for the sale of land which are In the possession of the agent of a nonresident vendor are taxable at the agent's domicil. People es rel. Westbrook v. Ogdensburgh, 48 N. Y. 890.

But contracts for the sale of land which are In the possession of an agent are not taxable at the agent's residence where his principal has a residence within the same state. Lord v. Arnold, 18 Barb. 104.

While, in this case, no stress is laid on the fact that the principal resided within the same state, and in fact the language used indicates that the same rule would apply were he a non

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Mr. F. C. Zacharie argued the cause and, with Mr. J. J. McLoughlin, filed a brief for appellants:

will only govern where its invocation does The doctrine Mobilia sequuntur personam not conflict with the positive law of the state where the movables are actually situated.

Story, Confl. L. 8th ed. chap. 9; Wharton, Conf. L. 2d ed. p. 414, § 334; United States v. Bank of United States, 8 Rob. (La.) 414; Railey v. Board of Assessors, 44 La. Ann. 770, 11 So. 93; Bluefields Banana Co. v. Board of Assessors, 49 La. Ann. 43, 21 So. 627; Parker v. Strauss, 49 La. Ann. 1173, 22 So. 329.

The decision in Meyer v. Pleasant, 41 La. Ann. 646, 6 So. 258, that a judgment could only be taxed at the domicil of the owner, for there alone was it located, was correct under the then existing law, which in resident, it is only with this limitation that the decision harmonizes with the others of New York state.

Under a statute taxing credits and investments within the state, in the possession or under the control of an agent of the owner, notes for the purchase price of land secured by the land, which are actually within the state, are taxable there though the owner be a nonresident. Redmond v. Rutherford Comrs. 87 N. C. 122.

In this case it is said: "The theory of taxation is that the right to tax is derived from the protection afforded to the subject upon which it is imposed. The debts due to the plaintiffs upon their land contracts are personal estate, the same as if they were due upon notes or bonds; and so far as they have any substantial existence they are in this state, and not elsewhere. Their validity and protection, and the remedies for their enforcement, all depend upon the laws of this state, and in neither respect (or in any other that we can now think of) do they take any benefit from the laws of the plaintiffs' domicil. It is but just, therefore, that they should contribute toward the support of the only government which affords them protection, and help to defray the expenses incurred in so doing."

But before a nonresident can be taxed for

no wise conflicted with the doctrine Mobilia | 25; Billinghurst v. Spink County, 5 S. D.
sequuntur personam.
84, 58 N. W. 276.

Mr. E. Howard McCaleb argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees:

The fact that the evidences of debt, choses in action, or "incorporated rights" were, at the time the assessment was made, in the possession of an agent in New Orleans, does not affect the principle that they could only be taxed at the domicil of the owner, under the maxim Mobilia sequuntur personam.

The proviso of the Louisiana act of 1890 only puts in force a principle which has long been established in the other states of the Union and maintained as constitutional. Alvany v. Powell, 55 N. C. (2 Jones, Eq.) 51; Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. 161; Smith v. Burley, 9 N. H. 428; State v. St. Louis County Ct. 47 Mo. 600; People v. Home Ins. Co. 29 Cal. 533; St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co. 40 Mo. 580; Wilcox v. Ellis, 14 Kan. 602, 19 State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. Am. Rep. 107; Tazewell County Supers. v. 300, sub nom. Cleveland, P. & A. R. Co. v. ed. 179; Murray v. Davenport, 40 Ill. 198; Douglas v. New York, Pennsylvania, 21 L. 2 Duer, 110; People ex rel. Westbrook v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 24 L. ed. 760; Ogdensburgh, 48 N. Y. 390; Poppleton v. Clason v. New Orleans, 46 La. Ann. 1, 14 Yamhill County, 18 Or. 377, 7 L. R. A. 449, So. 306; Meyer v. Pleasant, 41 La. Ann. 645, 23 Pac. 253; McCutchen v. Rice County, 76 So. 258; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Fed. Rep. 561, 2 McCrary, 337; Dundee New Orleans, 41 La. Ann. 1015, 6 So. 794; Mortg. Trust Invest. Co. v. School Dist. No. | Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Board of As1, 19 Fed. Rep. 360; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 496, 25 L. ed. 561; Savings & Loan Soc. v. Multnomah, 169 U. S. 431, 42 L. ed. 806, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 392, 60 Fed. Rep. 31; Price v. Hunter, 34 Fed. Rep. 356; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 35 L. ed. 613, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 595, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 876.

The contrary doctrine is not sustained by Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268; De Vignier v. New Orleans, 4 Woods, 207, 16 Fed. Rep. 11; Herriman v. Stowers, 43 Me. 497; People ex rel. Mygatt v. Chenango County Supers. 11 N. Y. 563; Phelps v. Thurston, 47 Conn. 477.

These cases present the same facts as the Meyer Case, 41 La. Ann. 646, 6 So. 258; that is, that there was no positive law modifying the rule.

The situs of personal property owned by a nonresident, but employed in business in the state and under control and management of an agent, is at the residence of such agent for the purposes of taxation.

Goldgart v. People ex rel. Goar, 106 111.

credits it must be shown that they are actually at the place where they are assessed, under the actual control of his agent, and it is not enough to show that an indebtedness to him, evidenced by a promissory note, was negotiated through an agent at the place. People use of Christian County v. Davis, 112 III. 272.

Nor is connection with loans in the way of clerical aid rather than as agent in possession and control for investment and reinvestment sufficient, but the resident agent must have an actual and effective control over the credits in order to give them a tax situs. Jack v. Walker, 96 Fed. Rep. 578.

A note and account in the hands of attorneys for collection and bonds deposited for safe keeping belonging to a nonresident are not taxable. Herron v. Keeran, 59 Ind. 472, 26 Am. Rep. 87.

And a statute requiring every person to list for taxation "all moneys invested, loaned, or otherwise controlled by him as agent or attorney, or on account of any other person," does not warrant taxing mortgages of a nonresident held by a resident agent for the purpose of collection and transmission to his principal. Myers v. Seaberger, 45 Ohio St. 232, 12 N. E. 796: Williams v. Wayne County Supers. 78 N. Y. 561.

sessors, 44 La. Ann. 760, 16 L. R. A. 56, 11
So. 91; Railey v. Board of Assessors, 44 La
Ann. 765, 11 So. 93; Parker v. Strauss, 49 La.
Ann. 1173, 22 So. 329; Kirtland v. Hotch-
kiss, 100 U. S. 496, 25 L. ed. 561.

*Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opin-13111 ion of the court:

A preliminary question made by the plaintiff is that she had applied to have the assessment in the name of the estate of D. C. McCan stricken off on the ground that the administration of the estate had been finally closed and the property put into the possession of the heirs, which application was denied; that, therefore, the assessment was in the wrong name and could not be sustained. We are of the opinion, however, that there was no error in the ruling of the circuit court in this respect, for, conceding that as a matter of fact the assessment was technically in the wrong name, the error is not one that will justify the equitable relief by injunetion.

The important question is whether the In Lee v. Dawson, 8 Ohio C. C. 365, it was held that under the Ohio statute the fact that promissory notes are jointly owned by three persons, one of whom is a nonresident of Ohio, does not make the interest of the nonresident subject to taxation in that state, although it appears that under the general directions of the nonresident owner the resident joint owner manages the fund evidenced by the notes.

But this construction of the Ohio statute was disapproved in Walker v. Jack, 60 U. S. App. 124, 88 Fed. Rep. 576, 31 C. C. A. 462, in which on the authority of dicta in Grant v. Jones, 39 Ohio St. 506, and Myers v. Seaberger, 45 Ohio St. 232, 12 N. E. 796, it was held that the statute warrants the taxation of moneys and credits owned by a nonresident which are held, invested, and controlled for him by an agent residing in the state.

Notes given for the purchase price of lands in another state and left there with an agent for collection, and which have never been in the state where the owner resides, cannot be taxed there. Wilcox v. Ellis, 14 Kan. 588. 19 Am. Rep. 107. To the same effect is Fisher v. Rush County Comrs. 19 Kan. 414.

So, notes and mortgages taken by a nonresident agent for loans made by such agent at the latter's residence, which are held by him there,

passed an act amending the revenue statutes
of prior years, and the questions, therefore,
are whether, under that statute, as inter-
preted by the supreme court, these properties
were subject to taxation, and, if so subjected,
whether any rights secured by the Federal
Constitution were thereby infringed. That
act is chapter 106 of the Statutes of 1830
(La. Acts 1890, 121).

property was subject to taxation. With re- correct the omission and adjudge the omi gard to the contention that certain bonds ted property to be subject to taxation. We were included in the assessment which were need not extend our inquiries back of the not subject to taxation on account of the sup-year 1890, for in that year the legislature posed contract of the state of Louisiana, it is sufficient to say that the assessment does not purport to include any bonds. The assessment roll is prepared so as to show in separate columns the different kinds of property included in the assessment. One col umn is entitled "bonds of all kinds, specify. ing each kind and their value," and under this heading there is no mention of any property. So, while it would seem probable from the testimony as to the amount of personal [312]property belonging to the estate that the assessor may have in fact included the bonds. yet upon the face of the record the only as sessment is of credits and money. It may be a case of overvaluation of assessable property, but under the issue presented by the pleading that question was not before the

court.

Section 1 enumerates among the property subject to taxation "all rights, credits, bonds, and securities of all kinds, promissory notes, open accounts, and other obligations; all cash.”

Section 7 (p. 124), after declaring "that it is made the duty of the tax assessors throughout the state to place upon the assessment list all property subject to taxation," closes with this provision:

Under the circumstances disclosed by the *"And this shall apply with equal force to[313] testimony, were the money and credits sub- any person or persons representing in this ject to taxation? It appears that these state business interests that may claim a credits were evidenced by notes largely se- domicil elsewhere, the intent and purpose becured by mortgages on real estate in New ing that no nonresident, either by himself or Orleans; that these notes and mortgages through any agent, shall transact business were in the city of New Orleans, in posses- here without paying to the state a corresion of an agent of the plaintiff, who col-sponding tax with that exacted of its own lected the interest and principal as it became citizens; and all bills receivable, obligations, due and deposited the same in a bank in New or credits arising from the business done in Orleans to the credit of the plaintiff. The this state are hereby declared assessable question, therefore, is distinctly presented within this state, and at the business domiwhether, because the owners were domiciled cil of said nonresident, his agent, or reprein the state of New York, the moneys so de- sentative." posited in a bank within the limits of the state of Louisiana, and the notes secured by mortgages situated and held as above described, were free from taxation in the latter state. Of course, there must be statutory warrant for such taxation, for if the legislature omits any property from the list of taxables the courts are not authorized to and which have never been in the state in which the principal resides, are not taxable there. Poppleton v. Yamhill County, 18 Or. 377, 7 L. R. A. 449, 23 Pac. 253.

Nor is such an assessment warranted by Hill's (Or.) Ann. Code, § 2731, providing that personal property shall include money, notes, or mortgages "either within or without this state: all debts due or to become due from solvent debtors." The "debts" mentioned in elude only domestic debts, since the latter clause does not contain any words similar to those of the previous clause relating to property and interests outside the state. Poppleton v. Yamhill County, 18 Or. 377, 7 L. R. A. 449, 23 Pac. 253.

So, securities taken by a nonresident agent for loans made by him in foreign states, and beld by such agent, are not taxable in the state of the owner's domicil. People ex rel. Jefferson v. Gardner, 51 Barb. 352; People ca rel. Jefferson v. Smith, 88 N. Y. 576. This rule is changed by statute in New York.

This statute came before the supreme court in Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 44 La. Ann. 760, 16 L. R. A. 56, 11 So. 91, where the question was whether a foreign insurance company could be taxed for the amount of the premiums due from its insured living in Louisiana, and it was held that those premiums were simply credthe three trustees are residents thereof. People ex rel. Darrow v. Coleman, 119 N. Y. 137, 7 L. R. A. 407, 23 N. E. 488, Reversing 53 Hun, 482, 6 N. Y. Supp. 285.

But under Vt. Rev. Laws, § 270. exempting personal property situated in another state, a debt evidenced by a promissory note owned by an inhabitant of Vermont is taxable there, although secured by a mortgage on lands in another state, and the note and mortgage are in the possession of an agent living where the land is situated. Bullock v. Guilford, 59 Vt. 516.

So, notes secured by mortgages on land in a foreign state, in the hands of an agent, there to be collected and reloaned, are property of the owner within the state of his residence for the purpose of taxation, under a statute subjecting "all debts due from solvent debtors." unless such notes are expressly exempted. State ex rel. Dwinnell v. Gaylord, 73 Wis. 316, 41 N. W. 521.

The court said: "When, as here, there is an absence of any statute prescribing a different rule, and an absence of any evidence of any injustice by reason of double taxation, we must hold, under our statutes cited, that for the purposes of taxation a debt has its situs at the residence of the creditor, and may be taxed

Under the statute it is held that securities in the actual possession and control of a nonresident trustee, the beneficiaries also being nonresidents, are not "due and owing to persons residing within the state," so as to be subject to taxation within the state, although two of there." 175 U. S. U. S., Book 44. 12

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