within the limits of the present treatise. For the sake of convenience, however, it may be useful to notice a few of the more important points arising with reference to this subject.

tion of

vances.

I. A bequest to a child or person to whom the testator Ademphas placed himself in loco parentis is adeemed by a sub- legacies sequent gift to the legatee in the testator's lifetime, unless by adthe nature of the two gifts is so different as to rebut the presumption. Leighton v. Leighton, 18 Eq. 459; see Boyd v. Boyd, 4 Eq. 305; Taylor v. Taylor, 20 Eq. 155.

A gift of less amount than the legacy is an ademption pro tanto. Pym v. Lockyer, 5 M. & Cr. 29.

For the purposes of ademption the value of the advance is to be taken as at the time it was made. Watson, 33 B. 576.

Watson v.

For the mode of valuing annuities, see Hatfield v. Minet, 8 Ch. D. 136.

tion in the

case of a

residue.

Ademption applies as well to a gift of residue as to Adempgeneral legacies, though in the case of residue it will be applied only between children against a child in favour of a child, and not in favour of a stranger. Montefiore v. Guedalla, 1 D. F. & J. 93; Meinertzagen v. Walters, 7 Ch. 670.

Differences in the time of payment of the legacy and the portion are immaterial. Hartopp v. Hartopp, 17 Ves. 184; Stevenson v. Masson, 17 Eq. 84.

vances for

will not

Advances, however, for some particular purpose, as to Small albuy a wedding outfit or small occasional presents, or even a particua small annual allowance, will not adeem legacies by will. lar purpose Ravenscroft v. Jones, 32 B. 669; Watson v. Watson, 33 adeem a B. 574; Schofield v. Heap, 27 B. 93; see Hatfield v. Minet, 8 Ch. D. 136.

As in the case of satisfaction the presumption of ademption may be repelled by the difference in the subjectmatter of the two gifts.

legacy.

Legacy of money not

Thus there will be no ademption if the legacy is money and the gift is stock-in-trade. Holmes v. Holmes, 1 B. by a gift C. C. 555. See Davis v. Boucher, 3 Y. & C. Ex. 411;

in stock

in-trade. Pym v. Lockyer, 5 M. & C. 48.

Vested

Nor if the legacy is certain and the gift is contingent. legacy and Spinks v. Robins, 2 Atk. 493; Crompton v. Sale, 2 P.

contingent

advance. Wms. 553.

by a sub

sequent

settle

A legacy is A bequest of a sum of money to a child absolutely is adeemed adeemed by the subsequent settlement of that or a larger amount on the marriage of the child; if a smaller amount is settled, it is an ademption pro tanto. Lord Durham v. Wharton, 3 Cl. & F. 146; Stevenson v. Masson, 17 Eq. 78; Edgeworth v. Johnston, I. R. 11 Eq. 326.

ment.

Advance

to a child will not adeem a substitu

And even if the legacy be given to the child for life with remainder to her children, a subsequent gift to her absolutely is an ademption. Kirk v. Eddowes, 3 Ha. 509.

But where there is a substitutional gift to the issue of a child dying in the testator's lifetime, a subsequent advancement to a child who dies in the testator's lifetime tional be- leaving issue will not operate as an ademption of the gift to the issue. Rose v. Rogers, 39 L. J. Ch. 791; Hewitt v. Jardine, 14 Eq. 58.

quest to his issue.

Gift to the husband for the

purposes of

the marriage

adeems a

legacy to the daugh

ter.

An absolute gift

And a sum given to a daughter's husband in consideration of his making a settlement upon her, or for the purposes of the marriage, is an ademption of a legacy to the daughter. Lord Durham v. Wharton, 3 Cl. & F. 146; see Nevin v. Drysdale, 4 Eq. 517.

But a gift to the husband absolutely, though expressed to be a portion for a daughter, is not an ademption of a legacy to the daughter and her children. Ravenscroft v. Jones, 32 B. 669; Cooper v. Macdonald, 16 Eq. 258; see M'Clure v. Evans, 6 W. R. 428.

The fact that the legacy to the child is given over in mayadeem certain events will not prevent a subsequent gift to the a legacy child absolutely, or a settlement upon her marriage from

executory

adeeming the legacy, both as regards the child and the given with persons interested under the gift over. Twining v. Powell, gifts over. 2 Coll. 262; Dawson v. Dawson, 4 Eq. 504; Cooper v. Macdonald, 16 Eq. 258.

adeemed

An adeemed legacy is not revived by a codicil repub- An lishing the will. Powys v. Mansfield, 3 M. & Cr. 376; see Ravenscroft v. Jones, 4 D. J. & S. 228.

legacy is not revived by a

An advance made before the date of the will will not codicil. Advances operate as an ademption in the absence of a special agree- dances ment that it shall. Upton v. Prince, Cas. temp. Talb. 71; In re Peacock's Estate, 14 Eq. 236; Taylor v. Cartwright, will. 41 L. J. Ch. 529.

fore the date of the

given for a purpose are

Where a legacy is given for a particular purpose, Legacies whether to a stranger or not, and the testator afterwards in his lifetime satisfies that purpose, the legacy is adeemed. adeemed if Debeze v. Mann, 2 B. C. C. 519; Monck v. Monck, 1 Ba. tor satis& Be. 298; Powys v. Mansfield, 3 M. & C. 359.

But it must appear on the face of the will that the legacy is for a particular purpose. Pankhurst v. Howell, 6 Ch. 136.

the testa

fies the purpose.

as to advances.

recited to have been

II. In some cases the will contains directions that Directions advances are to be deducted from the shares of legatees. Where the testator recites that he has advanced a cer- Advances tain sum to a legatee and directs it to be deducted from the legacy, or directs entries in his ledger to be taken as made or the amounts of advances, the legatee is bound by the recital, ledger. or the entries, though the advances may be incorrectly stated. In re Aird's Estate; Aird v. Quick, 12 Ch. D. 291; Quihampton v. Going, 24 W. R. 917.

entered in

subse

quent to

But entries made subsequent to the date of the will Entries cannot be incorporated into it, and made binding on the legatee, though they are admissible as evidence that date of advances were made by the testator. Smith v. Conder, 9 Ch. D. 170; Whateley v. Spooner, 3 K. & J. 542.

Where advances are directed to be brought into account

will.

Sum due

after testa

evidence is not admissible to show that the testator, some time after an advance, had written off a portion of the advance as a gift. Smith v. Conder, 9 Ch. D. 170.

A direction to deduct advances from shares of residue does not affect a residuary legatee's right to a general legacy given him by the will. Smith v. Crabtree, 6 Ch. D. 591.

A sum not payable to the testator till after his death is tor's death, not within a direction to bring advances into hotchpot. Auster v. Powell, 1 D. J. & S. 99.

Legatee bankrupt.

If the legatee has become bankrupt and the testator proved in the bankruptcy for a debt due from him, so much of the debt as remains unpaid must be brought into account. Auster v. Powell, 1 D. J. & S. 99; see Silverside v. Silverside, 25 B. 340.

Where the income of a legatee was directed to be made up to a certain amount, the legatee to certify her income from all sources, it was held that the legatee was not bound to bring into account an annuity given by a subsequent testator with a direction that it was not to be taken into account, but was to be a clear beneficial addition. In re Hedges's Trust Estate, 18 Eq. 419.

A direction to deduct a sum from the share of a legatee as an equivalent for an estate given to him fails if the estate is not purchased. Nugee v. Chapman, 29 B.

288.

Under a direction to deduct advances made to a legatee by her brothers or sisters, debts owing from the legatee to her brothers and sisters may be deducted though barred by the statute. Poole v. Poole, 7 Ch. 17.

Where the testator directed his sons to pay or account for debts owing to him before they should receive their shares, and the share of a son was settled by a codicil, it was held that a debt due from the son was to be brought into account for the purpose of division, but not for the

purpose of increasing the amount to be settled.

Turner, 25 B. 505.

White v.

hotchpot

operate.

Where the residue was given to the testator's children When by a first and second wife to vest at twenty-one, with a clause direction that if the children by the first wife should be- ceases to come entitled to another fund they should bring it into hotchpot, it was held that the hotchpot clause ceased to operate when the eldest child attained twenty-one. Stares v. Penton, 4 Eq. 40.

share.

Where the testator directed his children, who were his Lapsed residuary legatees, to bring advances into hotchpot, and a share given to one of the children was revoked and lapsed, it was held that the hotchpot clause applied to the lapsed share, and that the son, whose share was revoked, could not claim as next of kin without bringing advances into hotchpot, but not so as to increase the widow's share. Stewart v. Stewart, 15 Ch. D. 539.

advances.

In the case of direct gifts where advances made by the Interest on testator are directed to be deducted from a legatee's share, interest at 4 per cent, on such advances must be computed from the testator's death. Andrewes v. George, 3 Sim. 393; Hilton v. Hilton, 14 Eq. 468; Field v. Seward, 5 Ch. D. 538; see Poole v. Poole, 7 Ch. 17.

If the testator directs the advances to be deducted with interest at 5 per cent., interest at that rate will be computed down to the testator's death and at 4 per cent. from that date. Stewart v. Stewart, 15 Ch. D. 539.

In the case of gifts in remainder interest must be computed from the death of the tenant for life. In re Rees; Rees v. George, 29 W. R. 301.

Under the ordinary hotchpot clause life and reversionary interests must be brought into account. Eales v. Drake, 1 Ch. D. 217.

In the case of appointments under powers, hotchpot clauses will not be implied.