In what cases estates directed to next remainder man will go to the preserve. Doe d. Lumley v. Earl of Scarborough, 3 A. & E. 2, 897; It seems a shifting clause would not avoid jointures Where an estate devised by will is directed upon the devolution of settled estates to the devisee to go over to shift to the the next remainder-man, as if the tenant for life were dead, the estate will shift to trustees, to preserve contingent remainders where there are contingent remainders trustees to to unborn sons of the tenant for life whose life estate has ceased; though, strictly speaking, if the tenant for life were dead, the estate of the trustees to preserve would also be at an end. Doe v. Heneage, 4 T. R. 13; see the opinion of Fearne, C. R. App. No. 6; Stanley v. Stanley, 16 Ves. 491; Morrice v. Langham, 11 Sim. 260; 12 Sim. 615; and see 11 Cl. & F. 667; Lambarde v. Turton, 4 Dr. 553; 1 D. F. & J. 495; see Lord Kenlis v. Earl of Bective, 34 B. 587. Who is entitled to mediate rents. As to whether the heir or remainder-man is entitled to the inter- the rents during the period between the shifting of the estate to the trustees and the birth of issue to take, it seems that a direction that the rents may be applied for the maintenance of a remainder-man even during the lifetime of a tenant for life, would be sufficient to show that the rents were not to go to the heir. Turton v. Lambarde, 1 D. F. & J. 495, judgment of the L. J. Turner. D'Eyncourt v. Gregory, 34 B. 36. Estate directed to shift as if the devisee On the other hand, in the absence of some such inten- When the devised estate is directed to go over, as if i on the event happening. Morrice v. Langham, 8 M. & were dead W. 194. without issue. case trus And in such a case, if the next limitations in remainder In such are contingent, the estates will not go to trustees to pre- tees to serve contingent remainders during the life of the person preserve from whom the estate is shifted, since their estate would take. in any event be inadequate to support contingent remainders limited upon a failure of issue of such person after his death. Carr v. Earl of Errol, 6 East, 58. When the devised estates are directed to go to the next remainder-man, as if the person taking the benefit upon the accruer of which the estate is to shift were dead without issue, the construction will not be influenced by the fact that the younger children of the person from whom the estates shift may happen to take no benefit under the settlement. Doe v. Earl of Scarborough, 3 Ad. & E. 1. able of limitation But where estates were devised to several sons succes- Issue limited to sively in tail male, with remainder to the children of the issue capsons in tail general, with remainder over, and the estates taking were directed to go over upon the acquisition of settled under the estates (which could not go to any female issue of the of the testator's sons), as if the person taking the settled estates estate were dead without issue, the words "without issue" were preceding confined to issue capable of taking under the limitations remainder. of the devised estate preceding the next remainder. Gardiner v. Jellicoe, 12 C. B. N. S. 568; 11 H. L. 323. devised the next CHAPTER XLII. GIFTS BY REFERENCE, Bequest of A BEQUEST of chattels to go according to the same limi- ing to the limitations of real estate, far as the rules of law and equity permit" are inserted or vests in the not. The Court, in fact, refuses to treat such a bequest as in tail on executory. Vaughan v. Burslem, 3 B. C. C. 101; Row first tenant birth. Bequest of chattels to the person land v. Morgan, 6 Ha. 463; 2 Ph. 764; Carr v. Lord The same rule applies to policies of insurance upon the Where the chattels were bequeathed to A. for life and then to the person in actual possession of the freeholds under the will, it was held that the person who would have been tenant in tail at the death of A. was entitled to them, though the estate tail had been barred by a prior tenant in tail. Hogg v. Jones, 32 B. 45. But the chattels will not vest in a tenant in tail whose estate is liable to be divested by the birth of issue to take under prior limitations and who dies before his estate becomes indefeasibly vested. Hogg v. Jones, 32 B. 45. Similarly, chattels directed to go to the persons entitled in possession to estates will go to a tenant for life, unless possession they are directed to go as heirlooms or there is an inten- entitled in tion expressed that the personalty is to go along with the to real realty. Trafford v. Trafford, 3 Atk. 347; In re Johnson's Trusts, L. R. 2 Eq. 716. If there is such an intention, a tenant for life of the realty, or, where the personalty is to go with a title, the first possessor of the title, will take only an estate for life in the personalty. Trafford v. Trafford, 3 Atk. 347; Shelley v. Shelley, 6 Eq. 540; Montagu v. Lord Inchiquin, 23 W. R. 592; see Mackworth v. Hinxman, 2 Kee. 658. Chattels given as heirlooms and directed to go to such person as shall first attain twenty-one and be entitled to an estate tail in possession in the settled estate, will nevertheless vest absolutely in a tenant in tail in remainder who attains twenty-one. Foley v. Burnell, 1 B. C. C. 274; 4 B. P. C. 319; In re Johnson's Trusts, L. R. 2 Eq. 716; Martelli v. Holloway, L. R. 5 H. L. 532. estate. that no But a plain intention that no person shall take the Intention chattels who does not live to become entitled to the possession of the realty, will have effect. Trafford v. Trafford, in actual person not possession 3 Atk. 347; see per Lord Eldon in Countess of Lincoln v. is to take. the words law admit" on chattels When heirlooms are directed to go with real estates as Whether far as the rules of law and equity permit, with a proviso "as far as that they are not to vest absolutely in any tenant in tail the rules of dying under twenty-one, it seems doubtful whether, in will carry the event of a tenant in tail dying under twenty-one, the directed effect of the words as far as the rules of law and equity in a tenant permit" will be to carry on the property to the next suc- in tail ceeding tenant in tail, or whether the result would be an under not to vest dying twenty-one intestacy. to the next tail. The question arose in Harrington v. tenant in Harrington, but was not there decided, the opinion of Lord Cairns being in favour of an intestacy, and of Lord Westbury in favour of the transmission of the property within the limits of perpetuity. See L. R. 3 Ch. 564; ib., 5 H. L. 87. Bequests "in the ner" as prior When a bequest has been made to several persons as same man- tenants in common for life with remainder to their children and there is a subsequent gift to the same bequests. persons in the same manner as the prior bequest, the second bequest will be subject to the same limitations for life and remainders over. Milsom v. Audrey, 5 Ves. 465; Eames v. Anstee, 33 B. 264; Smith v. Greenhill, 14 W. R. 912; Giles v. Milsom, L. R. 6 H. L. 24. Gift by reference In Sweeting v. Prideaux, 2 Ch. D. 413, a subsequent gift for the life of the legatee only "in the same manner in every respect and subject to the same control" as the prior gift, was held on the language of the will to import the limitation in remainder of the prior gift to the children of the legatee. See Auldjo v. Wallace, 31 B. 193. If, however, the original gift is directed to fall into the residue in default of children and the residue is then given to the same persons "in the same manner," these words will be referred, if possible, to a tenancy in common or separate use. Shanley v. Baker, 4 Ves. 731. And where the original gifts are absolute, subject to executory gifts over, a subsequent gift to be held "in the same manner" as the prior gift will not import the executory gifts over if the words can be referred to a tenancy in common. Lumley v. Robbins, 10 Ha. 621; and see Hare v. Hare, 24 W. R. 575. The referential words may, however, be strong enough to import all the limitations and restrictions of the preport all the ceding gift. Ross v. Ross, 2 Coll, 269; Re Colshead, 2 |