Bedford, 2 Ch. Rep. 146; Griffith v. Jones, ib. 394, anno 1694; Widmore v. Woodroffe, Amb. 636. On the other hand, relations were not so restricted in A.-G. v. Buckland, cit. Amb. 71; 1 Ves. sen. 231; and Mahon v. Savage, 1 Sch. & Lef. 111. In Edge v. Salisbury, Amb. 70; S. C. nom. Goodynge v. Goodynge, 1 Ves. sen. 230; Belt, 128, where the words nearest relations," of course only next of kin could were take. b. In Brunsden v. Woolridge, Amb. 507; 1 Dick. 380, where the will was dated in 1757, and was therefore, since the Mortmain Act, a gift of realty to such poor relations as A. should think objects of charity, was held valid, and therefore not charitable; and see Thomas v. Howell, 18 Eq. 198. But quære whether these cases are satisfactory, and whether a gift to poor relations would not now be considered charitable. annual sum. 2. If, however, the gift is not of a sum distributable at 2. Of an once but of an annual sum, or if the testator has contemplated a perpetuity, the gift is charitable and not confined to statutory next of kin. Isaac v. Defries, Amb. 595; 17 Ves. 373, n.; A.-G. v. Price, 17 Ves. 371; White v. White, 7 Ves. 423; Hall v. A.-G., 2 Jarm. on Wills, 114; Gillam v. Taylor, 16 Eq. 581. If the gift is charitable only members of the class who are objects of charity, as defined by the statute of Elizabeth, can claim under it. Persons are not entitled to the benefit of the gift merely because they are the poorest of a wealthy class. A.-G. v. Duke of Northumber land, 7 Ch. D. 745. A direction to distribute rents among certain named families as they may need has been held not to be a charity. Lilley v. Hay, 1 Ha. 580; sed quære. In some cases the question arises, whether a bequest is Gifts in regiven in respect of a certain office, and is therefore charit- spect of an office. Gift to trustees of able, or whether the office is merely used to describe the person. Thus, a gift to A., minister of a certain church, is not charitable. Doe d. Phillips v. Aldridge, 4 T. R. 264; Donnellan v. O'Neill, I. R. 5 Eq. 523. But a gift to A., minister of a chapel, and his successors for ever, is charitable. Thornber v. Wilson, 3 Dr. 245; see Robb v. Bp. Dorian, I. R. 9 C. L. 483; ib. 11 C. L. 292. Similarly, a gift for the benefit of Roman Catholic priests in or near London is charitable. A.-G. v. Gladstone, 13 Sim. 7; 1 Ph. 290. It has, however, been held that a gift to ten poor clergymen to be selected by a trustee, is not charitable. Thomas v. Howell, 18 Eq. 198; and see A.-G. v. Baxter, 1 Vern. 248; 2 Vern. 104; explained in 7 Ves. 76. A bequest to the trustees of a charity for a purpose to a charity be declared, which the testator never does declare, affords without no inference that the purpose was charitable, and is therenot charit- fore void. Corporation of Gloucester v. Wood, 3 Ha. 131; 1 H. L. 272; Aston v. Wood, 6 Eq. 419. more is able. by lapse. II. THE DOCTRINE OF CY PRÈS. Gift to a 1. If there is a gift to a particular charitable society by particular charitable name, and the society has existed, but at the time of the society testator's death has ceased to exist, the legacy fails. Clark may fail v. Taylor, 1 Dr. 642; Marsh v. Means, 3 Jur. N. S. 790 ; Russell v. Kellett, 3 Sm. & G. 264; Langford v. Gowland, 3 Giff. 617; Fisk v. A.-G., 4 Eq. 521; Makeown v. Ardagh, I. R. 10 Eq. 445. General If, however, the charity exists at the testator's death, but expires before the estate is administered, the legacy goes to charitable purposes cy près. Hayter v. Trego, 5 Russ. 113. And, if the bequest to the society is expressed to be for intention. a charitable object, the failure of the trustee will not charitable destroy the charitable gift. Templemoyle School, I. R. 4 Eq. 295; Carbery v. Cox, 3 Ir. Ch. 231; Marsh v. A.-G., 2 J. & H. 61. ritable If the society is misdescribed, the Court will, if possible, Misdescription discover from surrounding circumstances what society was of a chaintended. Wilson v. Squire, 1 Y. & C. C. 654; Bunting society. v. Marriott, 19 B. 163; Kilvert's Trusts, 12 Eq. 183; 7 Ch. 170; see Coldwell v. Holme, 2 Sm. & G. 31; Makeown v. Ardagh, I. R. 10 Eq. 445. If, however, there is no existing charitable society sufficiently, or there are several equally, answering the description, the gift will not be void, but will be applied cy près to charitable purposes, or be divided among the several claimants. Simon v. Barber, 5 Russ. 112; Re Clergy Society, 2 K. & J. 615; Loscombe v. Wintringham, 13 B. 87; Re Maguire, 9 Eq. 632; Re Alchin's Trusts, 14 Eq. 230. definite if the ob 2. A gift for a clearly-defined and particular charitable Gift for a object, as to build a church in a particular place, will fail charitable if the object becomes impossible. A.-G. v. Bishop of object fails Oxford, 1 B. C. C. 444 n.; Cherry v. Mott, 1 M. & C. 123; ject is impossible. Russell v. Kellett, 3 Sm. & G. 264; see, however, as to the limits of this doctrine, A.-G. v. Bowyer, 3 Ves. 724; Abbott v. Fraser, L. R. 6 P. C. 96. possibility In such a case it seems the Court will retain the fund The Court will direct for a time and direct an inquiry as to the possibility of an inquiry carrying out the bequest. A.-G. v. Bishop of Chester, 1 as to the B. C. C. 444; Baldwin v. Baldwin, 22 B. 419; Sinnett v. of effecting the object. Herbert, 7 Ch. 232: Chamberlayne v. Brockett, 8 Ch. 206; see, too, Abbott v. Fraser, L. R. 6 P. C. 96. Though, on the other hand, if the gift to the charity Gift to charity is expressly made upon some event which is too remote, upon an the gift would be void: as, for instance, a gift of a sum of money to build almshouses, when land should be given. void. Chamberlayne v. Brockett, supra. event too remote is Discretion to trustees to apply the whole to charity or other indefinite objects. If part must be 3. Where a discretion is left to trustees, which would empower them to apply the whole of the gift either to charitable or other indefinite purposes, the whole gift is void, as it does not appear that the chief object was charity, and, on the other hand, the other object is void for uncertainty. Williams v. Kershaw, 5 L. J. Ch. 84; 5 Cl. & F. 111; Jumes v. Allen, 3 Mer. 17; Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399; 10 Ves. 521; Ommaney v. Butcher, T. & R. 260; Vezey v. Jumson, 1 S. & St. 69; Kendall v. Granger, 5 B. 300; Thompson v. Thompson, 1 Coll. 398; Boyle v. Boyle, I. R. 11 Eq. 433. It has recently been decided, that the trustees cannot exercise their discretion and appoint the whole to charity. In re Jarman's Estate; Leavers v. Clayton, 8 Ch. D. 584. Whether the result would be the same, where the whole might have been applied by the trustees either to charity or some other definite and ascertained object, seems uncertain. Down v. Worrall, 1 M. & K. 561; a case of very doubtful authority. But, if the bequest is such, that a portion must be apapplied in plied to charity, the gift is good, although the charitable trust may be coupled with other trusts, which are void for will ascer- uncertainty. charity, the Court tain the amount. In such a case, if it cannot be ascertained how much ought to be applied to each object, the gift will be equally divided among the several objects, including those which are void, as to which the gift will fail pro tanto. Doyley v. A.-G., 4 Vin. 485; 7 Ves. 58 n.; Salusbury v. Denton, 3 K. & J. 529; Crafton v. Frith, 20 L. J. Ch. 198; Hoare v. Osborne, L. R. 1 Eq. 585; In re Rigley's Trusts, 36 L. J. Ch. 147; see, too, Re Hall's Charity, 14 B. 115. If it is possible to estimate how much ought to be given to each object, an inquiry will be directed. Adnam v. Cole, 6 B. 353; Champney v. Davy, 11 Ch. D. 949. 4. If it is clear that the testator intended to give to Where charity generally, the bequest will not fail : there is a general intent, the a. by the failure of the testator to appoint the particular charitable objects he intends to benefit, though the bequest may be gift is applied cy to such charitable uses as he shall appoint. Mills v. près. Farmer, 1 Mer. 55; Commissioners of Charitable Donations v. Sullivan, 1 D. & War. 501; Gillan v. Gillan, 1 L. R. Ir. 114; Pocock v. A.-G., 3 Ch. D. 342. b. or by reason of the death, revocation of the appointment, or refusal to act of persons in whom a similar power has been vested. Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36; 13 Ves. 416; White v. White, 1 B. C. C. 12; 4.-G. v. Boultbee, 2 Ves. jun. 380; 3 Ves. 220. c. or by the failure or non-existence of the particular objects he has pointed out. Loscombe v. Wintringham, 13 B. 87; Hayter v. Trego, 5 Russ. 113; Reeve v. A.-G., 3 Ha. 191. d. or even by the fact that some of the objects specified are void. Fisk v. A.-G., 4 Eq. 521; Dawson v. Small, 18 Eq. 114. e. or by the fact that the bequest is to be applied to a particular object at a future time beyond the limits of perpetuity. Chamberlayne v. Brockett, 8 Ch. 206. particular fail fall 5. Where there is a general charitable intention, par- Whether ticular gifts to charity will be applied cy près, and will not charitable fall into the residue, though the residue itself may be gifts which given to a charitable object, unless the particular gifts are into the expressly directed to fall into the residue upon failure of which is also given the charitable objects to which they are given. Lyons v. to charity. Advocate-General of Bengal, 1 App. C. 91. residue 6. Where a bequest is void as contravening the policy of a Gift constatute, it will not be carried out cy près. Thrupp V. policy of a trary to Collett, 26 B. 125; Sims v. Quinlan, 16 Ir. Ch. 191; 17 statute. ib. 43; Walsh v. Walsh, I. R. 4 Eq. 397. 7. Where the whole of the rents and profits of land are Increase |