What will entitle the As to what is sufficient evidence of intention that tenant for the property left by the testator was to be specifically life to spe- enjoyed: cific enjoy ment. Interests successive takers not antagonistic. Cases where the residue is given to the testator's widow of the for the maintenance of herself and her children, and after her death to the children, are of course less strong in favour of conversion, than when the interests of tenant for life and remainderman are conflicting. Wearing v. Wearing, 23 B.99; Marshall v. Bremner, 2 Sm. & G. 237. So, too, where there is an absolute gift to a daughter, which is afterwards cut down by way of settlement to a life interest, there is a strong argument against conversion. Vachell v. Roberts, 32 B. 140. Settlement of an ab. solute interest. Discretionary power The fact that the residuary gift includes real estate, the devise of which is specific, does not entitle the tenant for life to specific enjoyment of the residuary personalty. Howe v. Lord Dartmouth, 7 Ves. 137. A discretionary power to convert, when trustees may to convert think fit, does not entitle the tenant for life to the enjoywhen trus- ment of the property in specie in the meantime. Wilkinson think fit. v. Duncan, 23 B. 469; Llewellyn's Trust, 29 B. 171; tees may Yates v. Yates, 28 B. 637; Caldecott v. Caldecott, 1 Y. & Nor does a direction to convert from time to time for payment of debts imply that there is to be a conversion for no other purpose. Caldecott v. Caldecott, 1 Y. & C. C. 312, 737. But an absolute discretion to sell "such parts and so much as should be necessary" to pay debts, affords an argument that the tenant for life is to enjoy specifically such parts as the trustees do not sell. In re Sewell's Estate, 11 Eq. 80; see In re Leonard; Theobald v. King, 29 W. R. 234. And if a discretion to convert is given, "notwithstanding" the gift to the tenant for life, the tenant for life will be entitled in specie till conversion. Burton v. Mount, 2 De G. & Sm. 383. The tenant for life is entitled in the meantime, if there is a direction to pay the produce of any portion not converted to him. Johnston v. Moore, 27 L. J. Ch. 453; Mackie v. Mackie, 5 Ha. 70; Wrey v. Smith, 14 Sim. 202; Morley v. Mendham, 2 Jur. N. S. 998; Lean v. Lean, 23 W. R. 484; Miller v. Miller, 13 Eq. 263. An express power to sell realty affords no argument for the specific enjoyment of wasting securities. Jebb v. Tugwell, 20 B. 84. A power to retain investments would not entitle the tenant for life to specific enjoyment. Porter v. Baddeley, 5 Ch. D. 542. But a power to retain investments, or to sell and invest the proceeds on such securities as the trustees think proper, has been held sufficient to give the tenant for life specific enjoyment. Gray v. Siggers, 15 Ch. D. 74. due simply but of spe merated The tenant for life will be entitled to enjoy the pro- Where the gift is not perty in specie as it existed at the death of the testator, of a resiwhere the gift is not merely of a residue, but there is an enumeration of certain specific things. Lord v. Godfrey, cific enu4 Mad. 455; Vaughan v. Buck, 1 Ph. 75; Vincent V. things. Newcombe, Young, 599; Blann v. Bell, 2 D. M. & G. 775; Hood v. Clapham, 19 B. 90; Bowden v. Bowden, 17 Sim. 65; Boys v. Boys, 28 B. 436; Pickering v. Pickering, 4 M. & Cr. 289; Thursby v. Thursby, 19 Eq. 395. Mills v. Mills, 7 Sim. 501, is not easily reconcilable with the other authorities. And in such a case the fact that a discretionary power to convert is given makes no difference. Simpson v. Lister, 4 Jur. N. S. 1269; Bethune v. Kennedy, 1 M. & Cr. 114; Hubbard v. Young, 10 B. 203; Thursby v. Thursby, supra. When the gift is of residue simply there may be an intention to The argument, however, in favour of specific enjoyment of things expressly enumerated is less strong where the gift is through the medium of a trust. Craig v. Wheeler, 29 L. J. Ch. 374; 8 W. R. 172. On the other hand, notwithstanding a partial enumeration of specific things, the gift may in effect be merely residuary. Sutherland v. Cooke, 1 Coll. 894, where the gift was of "all my money in the Long Annuities, and in all or any other of the public stocks or funds, ready money and securities for money, outstanding debts, and all the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate and effects, whatsoever and wheresoever, and of what nature or kind soever the same shall or may consist at the time of my decease, not herein before herein before specifically disposed of," to trustees, who were directed by sale thereof, or of so much as should be necessary to pay debts, &c. Again, though the gift may be of a pure residue, the testator may show that he contemplates specific enjoy ment. In a will before the Wills Act, if the tenant for life is give speci- to take the rents, issues, and profits, he will be entitled to fic enjoyment. the specific enjoyment of leaseholds, if there are no freeholds to which the term rents may apply. Goodenough v. Tremumondo, 2 B. 513; Cafe v. Bent, 5 Ha. 24. Use of the words rents and profits. Gift over perty in But in wills since the Wills Act the word rents, by itself, will not have this effect where it is used with other words, none of which have the same specific force. Pickup v. Atkinson, 4 Ha. 624; see, too, Booth v. Coulton, 7 Jur. N. S. 207. If the property is specifically given over at the death of of the pro- the tenant for life, he is entitled to enjoyment in specie. House v. Way, 12 Jur. 958; 18 L. J. Ch. 22; Harris v. the tenant Poyner, 1 Dr. 174; Collins v. Collins, 2 M. & K. 703; specie at death of for life. Daglie v. Fryer, 12 Sim. 1. A gift of a specific part of the residue at the death of the tenant for life will entitle the tenant for life to the specific enjoyment of that part. Holgate v. Jennings, 24 B. 623; Macdonald v. Irvine, 8 Ch. D. 101. But this is not the case if the gift at the death of the tenant for life is a mere general gift, though it may be of something which forms part of the residue at the testator's death. Lichfield v. Baker, 2 B. 481; 13 B. 447. trust to An express trust to convert at the death of the tenant Express for life entitles the tenant for life to specific enjoyment. convert at Alcock v. Sloper, 2 M. & K. 699; Harvey v. Harvey, 5 B. the death 134; Daniel v. Warren, 2 Y. & C. C. 290; Rowe v. Rowe, tenant for 29 B. 276. And where the conversion of a portion is expressly postponed for a certain time, the tenant for life is entitled to specific enjoyment in the meantime. Green v. Britten, 1 D. J. & S. 649. of the life. sell with Similarly the tenant for life is entitled where there is a Power to power to sell with his consent, or to renew leaseholds. consent of Hinves v. Hinves, 3 Ha. 611; Hind v. Selby, 22 B. 373; for life or Skirving v. Williams, 24 B. 275; Crowe v. Crisford, 17 B. to renew 507. the tenant leaseholds. got in. Where the tenant for life is entitled to the enjoyment Debts in specie of the property of the testator as existing at his must be death, the debts must nevertheless be got in. Holgate v. Jennings, 24 B. 623. VI. CONVERSION BY EVENTS EXTRANEOUS TO THE WILL. upon the Where there is a devise of lands, whether by words of Effect specific or general description, and the testator afterwards will of a sells the lands, the purchase-money falls into the personal contract residue. And an option to purchase, given by the testator after the date of his will and exercised after for sale. Contract for sale tor's death, though subse his death, has the same effect. Weeding v. Weeding, 1 J. & H. 424. And where the option to purchase is given before the date of the will, the effect is the same. Lawes v. Bennett, 1 Cox, 167; Townley v. Bedwell, 14 Ves. 591; Goold v. Teague, 7 W. R. 84; 5 Jur. N. S. 116; Collingwood v. Row, 26 L. J. Ch. 649; see Edwards v. West, 26 W. R. 507. Drant v. Vause, 1 Y. & C. C. 580; Emuss v. Smith, 2 De G. & Sm. 722, are not easily reconcilable with the other authorities. See Dart. V. & P. 263, and Cooper v. Martin, L. R. 3 Ch. 47. It makes no difference that the purchase-money is payable to the testator, his heirs, or assigns. Bedwell, supra; Weeding v. Weeding, supra. Townley v. The case would be different, if the purchase-money is made payable to the owner of the land. In re Graves' Minors, 15 Ir. Ch. 357. The principle of the cases above cited would probably not be extended to a bequest of leaseholds where the lease is determinable upon notice and payment of compensation. In such a In such a case the legatee has been held entitled to the compensation awarded Coyne v. Coyne, I. R. 10 Eq. 496. On the same principle, if there is a contract to purchase binding at realty, which is binding on the testator at his death, the the testa purchase-money is converted into realty, and the heir or devisee is entitled to it, though the vendor may retain a quently power of rescission which is actually exercised after the rescinded testator's death. Whittaker v. Whittaker, 4 Bro. C. C. 30; Garnett v. Acton, 28 B. 333; Hudson v. Cook, 13 Eq. 417. effects a conver sion. If, however, the contract is not binding on the testator there is no conversion. Broome v. Monck, 10 Ves. 597. If the heir adopts and carries into effect a parol contract |