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enumeration of particulars, an et cætera will not restrict words fol.

lowed by the meaning of the large words. Kendall v. Kendall, an enu4 Russ. 360; Gover v. Davis, 29 B. 222.

of particuLarge words, such as goods, chattels or effects, when lars. they are followed by an enumeration of particulars, will not be limited to things ejusdem generis. Fisher v. Hepburn, 14 B. 627; Patterson v. I uddart, 17 B. 210; Ellis

; v. Selby, 7 Sim. 352; 1 M. & Cr. 286; Swinfen v. Swinfen, 29 B. 207; Avison v. Simpson, Jo. 43. The same is the case though the particulars are intro- Explana.

. duced by words intended to be explanatory of the former tory words. words, for instance, "namely,” “ consisting in,” “together with,” “such as,” “ both in,” or similar words. Bridges v. Bridges, 8 Vin. Abr. Devise, 295, pl. 13; Gover v. Davis, 29 B. 222. In bonis Goodyar, 1 Sw. & Tr. 127; 4 Jur. N. S. 1243; Mahoney v. Donovan, 14 Ir. Ch. 262, 388; Drake v. Martin, 23 B. 89; Dean v. Gibson, 3 Eq. 713; Maberley's Trusts, 19 W. R. 522; King v. George, 4 Ch. D. 435; 5 ib. 627 ; In re Fleetwood; Sidgreaves v. Brewer, 15 Ch. D. 594; Mullally v. Walsh, 3 L. R. Ir. 244; see Kendall's Trust, 14 B. 608. Timewell v. Perkins, 2 Atk. 103, is not to be followed.

And the words “ whether in money or in the public funds or other securities of any sort or kind whatsoever," have an enlarging rather than a restrictive force, so far as personal property is concerned. Cambridge v. Rous, 8 Ves. 14 ; see Reeves v. Baker, 18 B. 372. On the other hand, a gift of all the testator's property Property

in certain in certain securities is a gift of those securities only. securities. Enohin v. Wylie, 1 D. F. & J. 410; 10 H. L. 1.

But such a gift may be enlarged to a residuary gift, if the testator goes on to state, that it is his intention to dispose of all his property among the legatees in question. Patrick v. Yeatherd, 12 W. R. 304. It seems that the express inclusion in the large words of Express in

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things some particular property, which would have passed without which would have being expressly included, affords an argument for excluding passed without from the gift things ejusdem generis with that included. mention.

Steignes v. Steignes, Mos. 296. Enumera- General words following an enumeration of particulars tion of particulars will primâ facie have their full force whether introduced preceding large words by the word “other” or not, if a restricted construction

“ will not re-would cause an intestacy. Arnold v. Arnold, 2 M. & K. strict latter. 365; Swinfen v. Swinfen, 29 B. 207; Campbell v. Pres

cott, 15 Ves. 503; Michell v. Michell, 5 Mad. 69; Martin v. Glover, 1 Coll. 269; Parker v. Marchant, 1 Y. & C. C. 290; Nugee v. Chapman, 29 B. 290; Hodgson v. Jex, 2 Ch. D. 122 ; see, too, Re Lloyd's Estate, 2 Jur. N. S. 539; Everall v. Browne, 1 Sm. & G. 368.

The fact that specific and general legacies are given in later parts of the will is not sufficient to restrict the general words. In bonis Shepheard, 48 L. J. P. 62.

It is immaterial that certain things which would have passed under the previous words, if read in their large sense, are subsequently given to the same legatee. Bennett v. Batchelor, 1 Ves. jun. 63; 3 B. C. C. 27; Fleming v. Burrows, 1 Russ. 276.

It makes no difference, that the gift is not strictly residuary, so that there might possibly be property which it would be ineffectual to pass. Hodgson v. Jex, 2 Ch. D. 122.

The word article, however, has not the same large sense

as goods or effects. Collier v. Squire, 3 Russ. 467. Large But if it is clear that the gift was not meant to be words confined to

residuary, and the large words, if not confined to things things ejusdem

ejusdem generis, would carry the residue, they must be so generis, confined. if there is 1. This is the case, if there is an express residuary gift. another residuary

Woolcomb v. Woolcomb, 3 P. W. 112; Stuart v. Marquis gift,

of Bute, 1 Dow. 84; Lamphier v. Despard, 2 Dr. & War.

clear that

meant to

ary

59; Mullins v. Smith, 1 Dr. & Sm. 204; Campbell v. M Grain, I. R. 9 Eq. 397 ; Waite v. Morland, 13 W. R. 963; Smith v. Davis, 14 W. R. 942.

2. So when the residue has been given and the will is or it is then revoked so far as relates to the bequest to the residuary the gift in legatee of the testatrix's plate, linen, household goods, and was not

question other effects, these words would be confined to things

be residu. ejusdem generis. Hotham v. Sutton, 15 Ves. 319.

If, however, the revocation is of the same enumerated things and “other effects (except money),” the testatrix shows that she considered things not ejusdem generis would be included, and the large words will have their full force. Hotham v. Sutton, 15 Ves. 326; Ivison v. Gassiot, 3 D. M. & G. 958; see Steignes v. Steignes, Mos. 296.

& Fleming v. Brook, 1 Sch. & Lef. 318, is inconsistent with Hotham v. Sutton.

So, too, if something stated to be a portion of certain specific property, together with the testator's household furniture and effects of what nature or kind soever, is given to a legatee, and the testator then makes other gifts, the earlier gifts being clearly not residuary will only pass things ejusilem generis with those enumerated. Rawlings v. Jennings, 13 Ves. 39.

And it would seem that where there is a gift of certain articles and all other goods of whatever kind to a legatee at the commencement of a will, followed by dispositions of other portions of the testator's property, and the remainder of the latter property is given to the same legatee, it is clear that the first gift was not meant to be residuary. Wrench v. Jutting, 3 B. 521.

So, too, a gift of the remainder of the testator's money and effects to be expended in purchasing a suitable present for his godson must be read as limited to things ejusdem generis with money. Borton v. Dunbar, 1 Giff. 221 ; 2 D. F. & J. 338; 30 L. J. Ch. 8.

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3. Or, again, the testator may show by subsequent reference or explanation that he meant only things ejusdem generis to pass. Sutton v. Sharp, 1 Russ. 149;

see A.-G. v. Wiltshire, 16 Sim. 38. Bequest of In the case of a bequest of things in a house where the things in a house. house is also given to the legatee, general words following

an enumeration of particulars will more readily be limited so as to pass only things ejusdem generis.

The mention of one particular class of things, coupled with general words, will not cut down the general words.

Thus under a bequest of furniture and other movable goods in a house, money will pass. Swinfen v. Swinfen, 29 B. 207; Mahony v. Donovan, 14 Ir. Ch. 262, 388; Cole v. Fitzgerald, 3 Russ. 301.

On the other hand, if there is a long enumeration of particulars, such as furniture, plate, linen, and the like, followed by general words, the general words will be confined to things ejusdem generis; so that, for instance, money in the house would not pass. Trafford v. Berrige, 1 Eq.

.

, Ab. 201, pl. 4 ; Boon v. Cornforth, 2 Ves. sen. 278; Campbell v. M Grain, I. R. 9 Eq. 397; Watson v. Arundel, I. R. 10 Eq. 299; see Dutton v. Hockenhul, 22 W. R. 701.

The argument in favour of a restricted construction of the general words is strengthened, if there is anything to show that the testator intended the chattels in question to be enjoyed with the house. Gibbs v. Lawrence, 7 Jur. N. S. 137; 30 L. J. Ch. 171; Bradish v. Ellames, 13 W. R. 128; 10 Jur. N. S. 1170, 1231.

The same is the case, if the things given are annexed to the house as heirlooms, a term implying durability. Hare v. Pryce, 12 W. R. 1072; Fitzgerald v. Field, 1 Russ. 427.

And in a similar gift the fact that a pecuniary legacy is given to the same legatee will prevent money in the house from passing as goods and chattels. Roberts v. K'uffin, 2 Atk. 113; Anon. Prec. Ch. 8. See, too, ante, pp. 150, 151. II. WHAT PASSES UNDER A RESIDUARY GIFT.

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Gifts of residue may be either gifts of the residue of a Residue

distinparticular fund or they may be general residuary gifts. guished. Gifts of the residue of a particular fund may be either gifts of the residue of a fund over which the testator has a power of appointment, or of a fund created by the testator for the purposes of his will.

1. As to the residue of an appointed fund : A gift of the residue of a fund over which the testator Residue of

appointed has a power of appointment, if not specific (see ante, pp. fund. 112, 113), passes shares in the fund the gift of which lapses or fails. Falkner v. Butler, Amb. 514; Oke v. Heath, 1 Ves. sen. 134.

This is the case, though the share in question may be directed to fall into the residue in certain events, which do not happen. In re Meredith's Trusts, 3 Ch. D. 757. It appears to be immaterial that the residue is given Residue

“after only after deducting or after payment of the sums already

payment” appointed. Falkner v. Butler, Amb. 514; Carter v. Tag- of legacies. gart, 16 Sim. 423; In re Harries' Trust, Joh. 199.

If it can be shown, that by the word residue the testator Specific means no more than the precise sum which remains after the other gifts are provided for, the gift of the residue is in effect the gift of a specific sum, and will not carry lapsed shares. In re Jeaffreson's Trusts, 2 Eq. 276.

The case of Easum v. Appleford, 10 Sim. 274; 5 M. & Cr. 56, if it can be supported at all, must be supported on these grounds. See, too, Lakin v. Lakin, 13 W. R. 704.

2. As to the residue of a particular portion of the Residue of testator's own property:

specific Where a testator disposes of part of his lands in

testator's par

own proticular parish to A. and devises the residue of those lands perty. to B., the devise to B. is specific, and will not carry a lapsed

residue.

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