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Moreton v. Fossick, 1 B. & Ad. 186; Doe d. Pell v. Jeyes, 1 B. & Ad. 593. 3. The fact that the limitations on which the reversion is though
some of dependent are such that some of the limitations of the the limita
tions are will cannot take effect upon the reversion, will not prevent inapprothe reversion from passing.
priate to If there are other lands besides the reversion the limi- sion. tations inapplicable to the reversion will be referred to the other lands reddendo singula singulis. Doe d. Earl Cholmondelcy v. Weatherby, 11 East, 322; William d. Hughes v. Thomas, 12 East, 141; Freeman v. Duke of Chandos, Cowp. 363; Doe d. Nethercote v. Bartle, 5 B. & Ald. 492; Morris v. Lloyd, 33 L. J. Ex. 202.
And under this head would come all wills since the Wills Act, where such of the limitations as can never take effect upon the reversion may be looked upon as intended to operate upon after-acquired lands.
And even if there are no other lands the reversion will pass if some of the limitations of the will are applicable to it. Church v. Mundy, 12 Ves. 426; Tennent v. Tennent, Dru. temp. Sugden, 161; 1 Jo. & Lat. 379; Ford v. Ford, 6 Ha. 486; Roe d. James v. Avis, 4 T. R. 605. Goodtitle d. Daniel v. Miles, 6 East, 494, must be considered overruled. 4. If, however, none of the limitations of the will could Whether a
reversion take effect upon the reversion, there seems no reason for passes if all
the limitasupposing the reversion would pass. Tennent v. Tennent, tions are supru, is not contra, since the devise of the reversion was inappro
priate. capable of taking effect so far as the life interest given to R. was concerned. Goodtitle d. Daniel v. Miles, supru, seems to have been decided upon this principle, though the facts did not justify its application.
5. And, of course, the reversion will not pass if the testator expressly treats it as undisposed of by his will; if, for instance, he treats the estates in which he has 'a
reversion as descendible on failure of the prior limitations. Strong v. Teatt, 2 Burr. 912; 3 B. P. C. 219.
III. LEASEHOLDS FOR LIVES.
The same rules are applicable to leaseholds for lives, for lives.
which, being freehold interests, pass under a general devise though some of the limitations are inapplicable. Fitzroy v. Howard, 3 Russ. 225; Weigall v. Broome, 6 Sim. 99.
Copyholds. By the statute 55 Geo. 3, c. 192, and sections 3 and 4
of the Wills Act, copyholds, whether surrendered to the use of the will or not, pass by a general devise. Doe d. Clarke v. Ludlam, 7 Bing. 275; 5 Moo. & P. 48.
The effect of section 3 of the Wills Act is only to dispense with the necessity for a surrender, and not to convey the estate into the devisee without admission. The estate therefore remains in the customary heir till
admittance. Garland v. Mead, L. R. 6 Q. B. 441. Equitable Before the statute of 55 Geo. 3, equitable estates of estates in copyholds. copyholds which could not be surrendered could be de
vised by words of direct reference: Allen v. Poulton, 1 Ves. sen. 121; but they did not pass by a general devise of lands; but now, as the evidence of intention to pass copyholds inferred from a surrender is unnecessary, it seems they would pass under a general devise. See per Lord Cran worth, in Torre v. Broune, 5 H. L. 555, 574.
And by the effect of the 3rd section of the Wills Act, a general devise of lands will pass copyholds, freed from the widow's right to freebench, as such right would have been barred prior to the passing of that section by a surrender. Lacey v. II il, 19 Eq. 316.
V. LEASEHOLDS FOR YEARS.
A general devise of lands before the Wills Act docs Leaseholds not carry leaseholds for years if there are any freeholds; before the on the other hand, if there are no freeholds, leaseholds may pass. Rose v. Bartlett, Cro. Car. 292 ; Thompson v. Lawley, 2 B. & P. 303; Gully v. Davis, 10 Eq. 562.
Leaseholds will, however, pass under the description Words of lands which the testator " then stood seised or possessed applicable of, or in any way interested in." Addis v. Clement, 2 to lease
holds. P. W. 456.
The word possessed is the important word, and leaseholds have been held not to pass under a similar devise without the word possessed. Pistol v. Riccardson, 2 P. W. 459 n.; Davis v. Gibbs, 3 P. W. 26.
The word farm will pass a leasehold as well as a free- Farm. hold portion, unless it is restricted by the addition of “all other my freehold lands.” Lane v. Stanhope, 6 T. R. 345; Arkell v. Fletcher, 10 Sim. 299; Holmes v. Sayer Milward, 47 L. J. Ch. 522. See ante, p. 97.
So, too, land held on lease and attached to a freehold house, passes under "messuages or tenements with the appurtenances.” Hobson v. Blackburn, 1 M. & K. 571; Doe v. Martin, 2 W. Bl. 1148.
And leaseholds pass where the devise is to certain persons to hold for ever, or otherwise according to the natures and tenures thereof. Hartley v. Hurle, 5 Ves. 540; Swift v. Swift, 1 D. F. & J. 160.
The same result follows if the lands are described by acreage, which can only be satisfied by including leaseholds. Goodman v. Edvards, 2 M. & K. 759.
Since the Wills Act, however, leaseholds pass under General a general devise of lands unless there is a contrary since the intention.
Such a contrary intention is not shown by the fact intention.
that the “ lands” in question are devised in strict settlement without any provision to prevent the leaseholds from vesting indefeasibly in the first tenant in tail at his birth. Wilson v. Eden, 11 B. 237, 5 Ex. 752, 14 B. 317, 18 Q. B. 474, 16 B. 153.
But if there is a direction to accumulate the rents and profits during the minority of a tenant for life or in tail, and if he attains twenty-one to pay the accumulations to him, or if he dies under twenty-one to invest them in freehold land, to be settled to the same uses—a direction inconsistent with the absolute vesting of the leaseholds in a tenant in tail at birth,—and a power of selling the “lands” and investing the proceeds in leaseholds, to be settled upon the same trusts, but so that they shall not vest in any tenant in tail dying under twenty-one, and there is a gift of the residuary personal estate upon trusts corresponding with the uses of the devised lands with the same proviso against absolute vesting, the testator by the provisions against the vesting of leaseholds in any tenant in tail dying under twenty-one shows that he would have inserted similar provisions in the devise of the “lands,” unless he had intended leaseholds not to pass under that name. Prescott v. Barker, L. R.
9 Ch. 174. Leaseholds A devise of “frechold ” lands, or of “real” estate is will not pass under not affected by the 24th section of the Wills Act. Stone the term freehold
v. Greening, 13 Sim. 390; Emuss v. Smith, 2 De G. & lands or
Sm. 722; Turner v. Turner, 21 L. J. Ch. 843. real estate.
Under such a devise, therefore, leaseholds will pass only if there are no freeholds. Day v. Trig, 1 P. W. 286; Doe d. Dunning v. Cranstoun, 7 M. & W.1; Gully v. Daris, 10 Eq. 562.
In this respect the Wills Act, since which after-acquired freeholds might pass, will not prevent leaseholds from passing where there are no freeholds. Nelson v. Hopkins, 21 L. J. Ch. 410; Gully v. Davis, 10 Eq. 562; Mouse v. White, 3 Ch. D. 763.
And where the testator was possessed of a leasehold interest, and also of the reversion in fee from the expiration of three years after the end of the term in certain premises, the whole interest has been held to pass under the word freehold. Matthews v. Matthews, 4 Eq. 278.
VI. BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN A MORTGAGE.
A general devise of lands will not without more Beneficial
interest in pass the beneficial interest in a mortgage. Strode v. a mortRussell, 2 Vern. 621, 624; Casborne v. Scarfe, 1 Atk. gage. 605; see 2 J. & W. 194. See Martin d. Weston v. Mowlin, 2 Burr. 969, where the testator was mortgagee in possession.
But a devise of particular lands of which the testator is only mortgagee to several persons in succession, would, it seems, pass the beneficial interest, as something was clearly intended to pass, and the limitations are inappropriate to a devise of the mere legal estate. Woodhouse v. Meredith, 1 Mer. 450. See, too, Knollys v. Shepherd, 1 J. & W. 499; Clarke v. Abbott, Barn. Ch. 457, 461.
Where the testator was owner in fee of a house subject to a lease, and at the same time mortgagee of the lease, the mortgage debt was held not to pass by a devise of “my freehold house." Bowen v. Barlow, 11 Eq. 454; 8 Ch. 171.
Rent charges upon a house which were conveyed on the occasion of the purchase by the testator of the lease to a trustee for him, would probably pass by a devise of the house. Vallance v. Vallance, 2 N. R. 229; see Wilkes v. Collin, 8 Eq. 338; Swinfen v. Swinfen, 29 B. 199, 204.