« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »
Sim. 602; Willes v. Davies, 1 Sm. & G. 475; see post, pp. 194-197.
So where there is an absolute direction to sell the testator's real estate and he disposes of the proceeds of his property, the appointment of a residuary legatee gives him the residue of the proceeds of sale of the realty. Singleton v. Tomlinson, 3 App. C. 404.
The word legacies includes annuities. Bromley v. Annuities Wright, 7 Ha. 334; Ward v. Grey, 26 B. 485; Mullins v. cies.
are legaSmith, 1 Dr. & S. 204; Heath v. Weston, 3 D. M. & G. 601; Sibley v. Perry, 7 Ves. 522.
And the term pecuniary legacies would also, it would seem, include annuities. Gaskin v. Rogers, L. R. 2 Eq. 284.
But if the testator expressly distinguishes between legatees and annuitants, legacies will not include annuities. Gaskin v. Rogers, supra; Weldon v. Bradshaw, I. R. 7 Eq. 168.
It seems the term legacy does not prima facie include a gift of residue, though legatee would include a residuary legatee. Ward v. Grey, 26 B. 483.
The term manor comprises the demesne lands, including Manor. the waste of the manor and the freehold inheritance of the customary lands held of the manor, the services of freehold tenants of the manor, and the right to hold a Court Baron and a customary Court.
There may also be included in the manor certain franchises, such as a Court leet, treasure trove, wreck of the sea, and the like. See Elton on Copyholds, p. 13.
The term of course includes allotments made to the lord under an Inclosure Act in respect of his right in the soil. Such lands are already parcel of the manor, and the effect of the inclosure is only to free them from customary and prescriptive rights. Hicks v. Sallitt, 2 W. R. 173; 3 D. M. & G. 782.
Further, the word manor includes copyhold tenements of the manor purchased by the lord, though the lord's equitable title may not be perfect. Hicks v. Sallitt, supra.
Freehold lands held of the manor may again become parcel of the manor by escheat. Delacherois v. Delacherois,
13 W. R. 24; 11 H. L. 62. Manor But freehold lands held of the manor and purchased by does not include
the lord do not thereby become parcel of the manor, so as purchased to pass by the description manor, though no doubt they
might become parcel of the manor by reputation. Delacherois v. Delacherois, supra; R. v. Duchess of Buccleuch,
6 Mod. 151. Rents from A devise under a power of the surface to A. and the mines.
mines to B. carries to the surface owner accumulations of rents down to the testator's death derived from the mines under a lease under the Settled Estates Act, the money being subject to investment in land under the Act. In re
Scarth, 10 Ch. D. 499. Advow. If an advowson is directed to be sold and the proceeds
invested for the benefit of a tenant for life, the tenant for life is entitled to present upon a vacancy occurring before sale. Briggs v. Sharp, 20 Eq. 317.
If the proceeds of sale are divisible among tenants in common, the right of presentation before the advowson is sold will be determined by lot. Johnstone v. Baber, 4
W. R. 827; 6 D. M. & G. 439. Living The word living is ambiguous, and may mean either the
advowson or the next presentation. If the devise is coupled with words showing that the testator contemplated personal enjoyment by the devisee, and there are no words of inheritance, the next presentation alone passes.
Webb v. Byng, 4 W. R. 657; 2 K. & J. 669.
Where there is a devise of lands and advowsons to trustees upon trusts to apply the rents, issues and profits during a given period to certain purposes, the proceeds of sale of a
next presentation during that period are not undisposed of so as to pass to the heir at law. Earl of Albemarle v. Rogers, 7 B. P. C. 522; Cust v. Middleton, 13 W. R. 249.
A devise of freehold or leasehold ground rents passes Ground the reversion. Maundy v. Maundy, 2 Stra. 1020; Kaye v. Lacon, 1 B. C. C. 76.
The term messuage or house will pass the orchard Messuage. garden and curtilage. Co. Lit. 5 b.; Carden v. Tuck, Cro.
b El. 89; 3 Leon. 214, pl. 283 ; see Lombe v. Stoughton, 18 L. J. Ch. 100.
It will also pass a piece of land or a cellar severed from the house, but near it and necessary for the convenient use of it. See Hibon v. Hibon, 11 W. R. 455; 32 L. J. Ch. 374; Doe v. Collins, 2 T. R. 498; Steele v. Midland Ry. Co., 1 Ch. 275, p. 289.
If the testator in one part of his will gives a house and lands, and in another part uses the word house only, probably the latter devise would not carry land occupied with the house. Buck d. Whalley v. Nurton, 1 B. & P. 53; see 1 Bing. 498; Roe d. Walker v. Walker, 3 B. & P. 375.
A devise of a house with its appurtenances probably Appurtehas no wider meaning than a devise of a house alone. Such a devise will pass everything naturally belonging to the enjoyment of the house, such as a garden and orchard and a small piece of land occupied with the house. Boocher v. Samford, Cro. El. 113; Doe d. Lemprière v. Martin, 2 W. Bl. 1148; Buck d. Whalley v. Nurton, 1 B. & P. 53.
But land will not pass as appurtenant to a house or to other lands. See Plowd. 169 a, 170; Co. Lit. 121 b.; Hearn v. Allen, Cro. Car. 57; Lister v. Pickford, 34 B. 576.
If the devise is of certain property with the lands appertaining or belonging thereto, this is not to be taken in the strict sense of appurtenant, but in the sense of usually occupied therewith. Hill v. Grange, 1 Plow. 170; Dyer,
130 b.; Ongley v. Chambers, 1 Bing. 483; Doe d. Gore v.
Langton, 2 B. & Ald. 680. Use and A gift of the use and occupation of a house does not occupation. involve a personal use so as to prevent the donee from
letting. Rabbeth v. Squire, 4 De G. & J. 406; Mannox v. Greener, 14 Eq. 456.
But a gift over, if the donee ceases to occupy the house, shows that the testator contemplated a personal use. Maclaren v. Stainton, 27 L. J. Ch. 442; 4 Jur. N. S. 199.
A gift of the use of plate following a gift of other plate.
articles to the same legatee in absolute terms has been held a gift for life only. Espinasse v. Luffingham, 3 J. & L. 186.
For the meaning of a gift of the use of book debts and
capital, see Terry v. Terry, 12 W. R. 66. Devise of A devise of a house as occupied by A. will not pass a a house as occupied merely occasional casement enjoyed by A. over other proby A.
perty of the testator, though the words “as enjoyed by A.” might. Polden v. Bastard, L. R. 1 Q. B. 156; Bodenham
v. Pritchard, 1 B. & C. 350. Right of Where a testator devises a piece of land to A., and another way.
piece of land to B., and the only access to the latter is over the former, B. is entitled to a right of way over A.'s land.
If the testator has himself used a certain way for purposes of access to B.'s land, that will be the way to which A. is entitled. Pearson v. Spencer, 1 B. & S. 571; 3 B. & S. 761.
If no way can be said to have been used by the testator for the purpose of access to the land-locked land, it would seem that the owner of the servient tenement would be entitled to set out the way, subject to the restriction that taking all the circumstances into consideration it must be a reasonable way. See Bolton v. Bolton, 11 Ch. D. 968; and as to the user of the way, see Corporation of London v. Riggs, 13 Ch. D. 798.
The proper legal meaning of “the premises” is proe- Premises. missa, but it may be used in a popular sense as a description of certain property, as in the phrase house and premises; in such a case it will only include property in connection with the particular property mentioned. Sunford v. Irby, 4 L. J. Ch. 23; Lethbridge v. Lethbridge, 3 D. F. & J. 523; 4 ib. 35 ; Read v. Read, 15 W. R. 165.
II, WORDS APPROPRIATE TO REALTY AND PERSONALTY
Under the words personal property, estate, and effects, personal property alone passes. Belaney v. Belaney, L. R. 2 Eq. 210; 2 Ch. 138; Jones v. Robinson, 3 C. P. D. 344.
And possibly the word property would not pass realty if it is coupled with explanatory words relating only to personalty, such as “both in stock, household furniture, cash, &c., &c." Mullally v. Welsh, I. R. 6 C. L. 314 ; see 3 L. R. Ir. 244.
1. The words estate or property alone are, however, Words sufficient to carry real estate. Mayor of Hamilton v.
property Hodsdon, 6 Moo. P. C. 76; 11 Jur. 193; Hawksworth v. alone will
pass realty, Hawksworth, 27 B. 1.
Where these words are coupled with other words which where would alone be sufficient to carry the whole of the personal with other
coupled property, the word estate will, primâ facie, carry realty, as words. it would otherwise be insensible. Tilley v. Simpson, 2 T. R. 659 n.; Edwards v. Barnes, 2 Bing. N. C. 252 ; Doe d. Walls v. Langlands, 14 East, 370; Jongsma v. Jongsma, 1 Cox, 362; Patterson v. Huddart, 17 B. 210; Hamilton v. Buckmaster, L. R. 3 Eq. 323; Sanderson v. Dobson, 7 C. B. 81, and 10 B. 47, overruling same case, 1 Ex. 141; and see Dobson v. Bowness, 5 Eq. 404; Loftus v. Stoney, 17 Ir. Ch. 178.
If there are any words in the gift accurately applic