What are the leading words. No property Though the estate is not described by a specific name, if the general description contains words which would not be satisfied if the reference to occupation is allowed to restrict the devise, the reference to occupation may be rejected. White v. Birch, 36 L. J. Ch. 174; see Doe d. Parkin v. Parkin, 5 Taunt. 321. For the purpose of ascertaining the leading words, it would seem that where a description is followed by restrictive words inconsistent with it, the earlier words will prevail, especially if the restrictive words are less clear and accurate than the earlier words. Cases suprà, and Doe d. Remow v. Ashley, 10 Q. B. 663. Where the more restricted description of property is followed by a wider description, which would include other property as well, it seems the more restricted description will prevail; for instance, under "my lands in Cokefield, called Hayes Lands," only so much of the Hayes Lands as were in Cokefield passed. Woodden v. Osbourn, Cro. El. 674; Hall v. Fisher, 1 Coll. 47. Of course, if the restrictive words can be looked upon as inserted for the purpose of giving the lands carved out of the devise to some one else, they will have their full force. Higham v. Baker, Cro. Eliz. 16; Press v. Parker, 10 J. B. Moo. 158; 2 Bing. 456. 3. Where there is nothing answering to any part of the answering description the devise fails. tion. descrip- Thus a devise of lands in a particular county or parish cannot be extended to lands in an adjoining county or parish, though those may be the only lands the testator possessed. Miller v. Travers, 8 Bing. 244; Barber v. Wood, 4 Ch. D. 885. Same rules apply to specific bequests. 4. The same rules are applicable to specific bequests of personal property. Therefore, if there is something which answers fully the words of description, that and that alone will pass. Slingsby v. Grainger, 7 H. L. 273; Ridge v. Newton, 2 D. & War. 239; Townend v. Townend, 1 L. R. some out 5. If the testator gives a certain number of specific Gift of things, and is possessed at the date of his death of a larger of more. number, the legatee is entitled to select which he will take. Hobson v. Blackburne, 1 M. & K. 571; Jacques v. Chambers, 2 Coll. 435; Millard v. Bailey, L. R. 1 Eq. 378; Tapley v. Eagleton, 12 Ch. D. 683; see Duckmanton v. Duckmanton, 5 H. & N. 219; 28 L. J. Ex. 132. The principle applies as well to a devise as to a gift of personalty. It is immaterial whether or not the devise is made in such words as to show that the testator was aware that he was possessed of more of the things in question than he devises. For instance, the devisee is entitled to elect whether the devise is of one of my closes called Whiteacre, or of my close called Whiteacre. Richardson v. Watson, 4 B. & Ad. 787, is not to be followed; see Tapley v. Eagleton, suprd. such parts Under a gift of such parts of certain property as a Gift of legatee shall signify her desire to possess, the legatee may as legatee take the whole, if the property is of such a nature that the selects. legatee might make a selection so as to leave only something of no value. Arthur v. Mackinnon, 11 Ch. D. 385. Probably a gift of such houses as a legatee may select would not entitle the legatee to take all the testator's houses. See, too, Kennedy v. Kennedy, 10 H. 438. and value of specific legacy before the 6. In the case of a specific bequest, even before the Increase in Wills Act, any increase between the date of the will the death of the testator in the value of the thing specifically given belonged to the legatee. Thus a gift of the testator's amount of a bond carried the accruing interest. Harcourt v. Morgan, 2 Kee. 274; All Souls' Coll. v. Codrington, 1 legatee, P. Wms. 597. death passes to unless the But if the description of the gift is such as to preclude description excludes it. the possibility of including in it any increase, such increase will not pass, as if the gift be of £300 due to me on a bond, interest will not pass. Roberts v. Kuffin, 2 Atk. 112; Hawley v. Cutts, 2 Freem. 24. Inaccurate 7. If there is a specific gift, as, for instance, of certain descripstock, and the testator at the date of his will possessed no tion. Specific gift of the testator has sold date of the will. stock nearly answering the Door v. Geary, 1 Ves. Sen. such stock, but possessed other 8. If a testator makes a specific bequest of something something which he has not at the date of the will, evidence is admissible to show how the mistake arose, and the fact that before the the thing in question has been exchanged for something else before the date of the will, will not avoid the legacy. In such a case the legatees are entitled to a sum equal in value to the specific legacy at the testator's death. Selwood v. Mildmay, 3 Ves. 306; Lindgren v. Lindgren, 9 B. 358; Goodlad v. Barnett, 1 K. & J. 341. Gift of something 9. On the other hand, if the testator makes a specific the testator gift of a thing he thinks he has, but never had, or of a thing which he intends to purchase, but does not, the gift is void. Waters v. Wood, 5 De G. & S. 717; Evans v. Tripp, 6 Mad. 91; Millar v. Woodside, I. R. 6 Eq. 546. thinks he has but has not. Effect of 10. If the testator bequeaths a specific thing, for insale by the testator of stance, a brown horse, which he afterwards sells and rea thing specifically places by another brown horse, there seems to be some bequeathed doubt whether the latter would pass by the effect of the and subse quent pur- 24th section of the Wills Act, which declares that a will similar shall be construed to speak from the death of the testator chase of a with reference to the real and personal estate comprised in thing. it. The negative was held in Re Gibson, L. R. 2 Eq. 669; see Sydney v. Sydney, 17 Eq. 65; but see Castle v. Fox, 11 Eq. 542, 551. It is at any rate clear that if the description in the will does not accurately apply to the fresh property, the latter will not pass. In re Lane; Luard v. Lane, 28 W. R. 764; 14 Ch. D. 856. tion by 11. If the testator sells the specific thing and buys Confirmaanother thing closely resembling the former, the subsequent codicil. confirmation of the will by a codicil will not have the effect of passing the fresh acquisition if the description in the will is not accurately appropriate to it. Pattison v. Pattison, 1 M. & K. 12; Macdonald v. Irvine, 8 Ch. D. 101; see Pilkington's Trusts, 6 N. R. 246; and see the Chapter on Ademption, post, p. 121. General and specific legacies distinguished. Legacy of stock is not specific. Nor of money in stock. CHAPTER XV. SPECIFIC, GENERAL, AND DEMONSTRATIVE LEGACIES. IN the case of bequests of personalty it is often a question of difficulty whether a legacy is general or specific. A general legacy is a legacy not of any particular thing, but of something which is to be provided out of the testator's general estate. If a particular fund is made primarily liable the legacy is demonstrative, but does not fail by the failure of the particular fund. On the other hand, a specific legacy is a gift of a severed or distinguished part of the testator's property. It does not abate till after the general legacies are exhausted, but it is liable to ademption by the testator in his lifetime. The most common, though not the only kind of specific legacy, is where the testator gives something which he possesses at the date of the will. In these cases there must be on the face of the will enough to show that the testator is referring to something actually existing at the time. Thus a mere legacy of stock in round numbers, though the testator may possess the exact amount of stock, is not specific. Partridge v. Partridge, 9 Mod. 269; Ca. t. Talb. 226; Simmons v. Vallance, 4 B. C. C. 345; Wilson v. Brownsmith, 9 Ves. 180. Similarly a bequest of 5000l. in the South Sea Company's Stock is general, though the testator may have the exact amount at the date of his will. Purse v. Snaplin, 1 Atk. 415; Bronsdon v. Winter, Amb. 57; Bishop of Peterborough v. Mortlock, 1 Bro. C. C. 565; Webster v. Hale, |