as neither the mortgagors nor any one claiming under them were in possession, such would not be the ef- fect of proceeding with the suit for foreclosure merely, and that the de- murrer must be overruled. id.
See BANKRUPTCY, 25. LIEN, 7.
1. B. registered as a voter, on the pro- duction of a certificate of his natural- ization, which had been issued by a State Court without his presence in Court, and without any oath having been taken by him. The certificate was regular on its face. On an in- dictment against B., under § 5426 of the Revised Statutes, for using, for the purpose of registering as a voter, a naturalization certificate, knowing the same to have been unlawfully issued: Held, that the mere fact that B. knew that the certificate had been issued without his presence in Court, and without any oath being taken by him, was not sufficient to warrant a conviction. United States v. Burley,
2. It is provided by § 2165 of the Re- vised Statutes of the United States, that an alien may be admitted to be a citizen of the United States by "a Court of record of any of the States, having common law jurisdiction, and a seal and clerk." A City Court, which is a Court of record and has a seal and a clerk, and has conferred upon it, by a statute of New York, all the power and jurisdiction of jus- tices of the peace, and all jurisdiction and power, within the city, of the Marine Court in the city of New York, and whose judge is clothed with all the powers of a county judge and of a judge of the Supreme Court of the State at chambers, and which has civil jurisdiction in all actions for the recovery of money, when the amount recovered does not exceed $1,000, is a Court having common law jurisdiction, within the meaning
The sailing vessel has a right to rely on the observance of the rules of navigation by the tug, and cannot herself safely depart from them. id.
Judgment as to the motion, or direc- tion of motion, of one vessel, made from another, possesses the utmost uncertainty; for, the tendency is nearly irresistible for the observer to transfer to the other vessel the motion of that on which he stands, and thus to regard the compounded motion of the two as belonging to that one which he is observing.
1. A steam-tug, having a canal-boat in tow astern, going up the Hudson river, was hailed by the canal-boat to land her, and that she was leaking. The tug ran in towards a dock, and stopped and hailed the canal-boat to cast-off. She was cast-off by her hands, but one of the lines jammed. She had made no preparation of lines by which to reach the shore, and she had no anchor. She drifted up the river, and sank an hour or more after she was cast-off. The tug went on and gave no aid to the canal-boat: Held, that both vessels were in fault, and that the tug was liable for one- half of the damages. The J. L. Has- brouck, 30
12. Damages, (20 to 25.) 13. Profits, (26 to 29.) 14. Particular Patents.
(1.) Metropolitan Washing Ma- chine Co.-Clothes-wring- er, (30.) (2.) Lippmann-Corset-clasp, (31.) (3.) Clark-Manufacture of bolts, (32 to 34.)
(4.) Severance - Rock-drill, (35, 36.)
(5.) Schillinger-Concrete pave- ment, (37, 38.)
(6.) Miller's Falls Mfg. Co.-Bit- brace-Amidon-Bit-brace,
(7.) Bruff-Auger machinery, (43, 44.)
(8.) Miller & Co.—Lamp, (45, 46.) (9.) Deuchfield-Cooling and dry- ing meal, (47, 48.)
(10.) Eppinger-Plug and bunch tobacco, (49 to 51.)
(11.) Hopkins & Dickinson Mfg. Co.-Sash-lock, (52.)
(12.) Black-Tempering umbrella ribs, (53 to 55.)
(13.) Pinner-Tin-can, (56 to 62) (14.) Bailey-Plane, (63.)
1. Patents Generally.
1859. The application was rejected in February, 1859. No appeal was taken. In February, 1860, the application was withdrawn, and the
contained in the combination originally claimed. Herring v. Nelson,
balance of the fee was refunded. In 6. The decision in Gill v. Wells, (22
May, 1868, C. filed a new application, which was rejected on the ground of abandonment. This decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of Patents, and his decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The Commissioner then declined to issue the patent. After the passage of the Patent Act of July 8th, 1870, (16 U. S. Stat. at Large, 198,) a new application was filed, and the patent was issued, it being for "improvements in breech loading guns." During the 8 years from 1860 to 1868, C. obtained 22 patents on his own application, 9 of them relating to breech-loading firearms, and though, during a part of the time, he was poor, and in debt, and in ill health, he prosecuted his other inventions with energy. During the same interval patents were granted to others embodying his inventions: Held, that, under § 35 of said Act of 1870, which provides that, upon the hearing of the renewal, provided for by that section, of an application before rejected or withdrawn, "abandonment shall be considered as a question of fact," the decision of the Commissioner on the
question of abandonment is not final, 9. but may be reviewed in a suit brought on the patent;
That no laches could be imputed to C. after May, 1868;
That his invention was abandoned be- fore May, 1868. United States Rifle Co. v. Whitney Arms Co.,
4. The use of an invention for mere competitive examination, experiment and test, is not a public use. id.
5. A patent for a combination of old elements may be reissued for a combination of fewer elements than were VOL. XIV.-38
The conditions in the instrument executed by B. to S. were held to be conditions subsequent, and it was held that such right as passed to S. remained till a forfeiture was enforced. id.
A constructor of a machine infringes,
if he makes his machine with express reference to a result which he knows will happen when the machine is put to its use, and which result, if originally introduced in the machine, is an infringement. American Boring Co. v. Sullivan Machine Co., 119
10. Where a patented invention is merely a combination subordinate to pre-existing devices, and has been limited to such sub-combination by the language of the claim, the patentee cannot successfully insist that he is entitled to cover by such claim the pre-existing devices; and this is true where one of the joint inventors of the junior invention is also the inventor of the senior inventions. Hopkins Mfg. Co. v. Corbin, 896
See 7, 11, 19, 34, 42, 52, 54, 58, 61 to 63.
13. Twenty days before the expiration of a patent for self-raising flour, mo- tions for injunctions, in over 50 suits, to restrain the infringement of the patent, were made. All of the suits but one were against grocers who were selling the flour. One was against a manufacturer. The patent had been sustained, on final hearing, in other suits, but had been much litigated, and until recently. Since then there had been no unnecessary delay: Held, that no laches could be imputed to the plaintiff. Rumford Chemical Works v. Vice,
16. An application was made for a pre liminary injunction, to restrain a cemetery corporation from using a stone-breaking machine, in infringe- ment of a patent. The machine was used to break stone to keep in repair the roads of the cemetery. The de. fendant set up a license. The plaint- iff exercised his monopoly by grant- ing licenses to use his machine. The defendants offered to pay into Court the amount of the license fee on its machine, to abide a final decision on the question of the existence of a
17. P. obtained a patent, as inventor, in March, 1874, for an "improvement in bungs for casks." In June, 1876, B. applied for a patent, as inventor, for the same invention. An inter- ference was declared, and proofs were taken. The examiner decided
in favor of P. On appeal, the board of examiners decided in favor of B On further appeal, the Commissioner of Patents decided in favor of P After the issue of the patent to P., B and F. were in partnership with P., and the firm made the bungs and ad- vertised them as secured by patent. After the dissolution of such part- nership, B. and F continued to make the bungs: Held, that P. was entitled to a preliminary injunction to re- strain B. and F. from so doing. Pentlarge v. Beeston,
was arrived at, by taking $75, the price for which the plaintiff sold his time-detectors, and deducting there- from $21 75, composed of $18, cost of making, and $3 75, commission paid for selling. The defendant was manufacturing under a patent, and was not a willful infringer. It was not made to appear that those who purchased from the defendant would have purchased from the plaintiff: Held,
(1.) That the basis adopted by the mas ter for computing the damages was erroneous, in assuming that those who bought from the defendant would have bought from the plaint- iff;
(2.) That it was also erroneous in in- cluding in the $53 25 the manufac turer's profit;
(3.) That the amount of the defendant's
profits was an adequate compensa- tion for the injury which it had been shown the plaintiff had suffered. Buerk v. Imhaeuser,
21. The rule of damages for the in- fringement of a patent, considered. Magic Ruffle Co. v. Elm City Co.,
22. In the case of a patent for an or- namental chain, as a new article of manufacture, where there is a differ- ence in kind between the patented chain and prior chains, and where what was open to the public could not make a chain like the patented article in its peculiar characteristics, the patentee is not, in ascertaining the damages sustained by him by the infringement of his patent, limited to the advantage derived by the de- fendant from using the peculiar fea- tures of the patented chain over what advantage he would have had from using what was so open to the public. Mulford v. Pearce, 141
23. In Goulds M'f'g Co. v. Cowing, (12 Blatchf. C. C. R. 243,) it was held, that the invention covered by the plaintiff's patent was of an im- provement in a pump, and that, as the plaintiff had failed to show the profits or damages arising to the defendants from the use of such improvement, it was entitled to only nominal dam- ages. On further evidence being
24. Where a patentee claims, in a suit, damages for a reduction of his prices, caused by the defendant by infring- ing the patent, he must establish, by satisfactory evidence, not only that a reduction of his prices was caused by the in ringement, but how much such reduction was, and how much of it was occasioned by the acts o. the de- fendant, and how much was due to the fact that the infringing articles contained the invention patented. Such evidence must not be estimate, conjecture and opinion, but must be such as to afford a sound and safe basis of calculation. Ingersoll v. Musgrove,
25. Where a patentee claims, as dam- ages, a loss of profits caused by a loss of sales, resulting from infringement, he must establish, by satisfactory evidence, that he would have sold more of the patented articles than he did sell if the infringing articles had not been sold, and what profit he would have made on them, and what part of such profit is to be assigned to the invention patented. Such evidence must not be conjecture and speculation. id.
See EQUITY, 1 to 3. 13. Profits.
26. In ascertaining the profits derived by a defendant from the use of a pat- ented improvement in a furnace for burning wet tan as fuel, the plaintiff must show, before the master, the particular profits which accrued to the defendant from using such im- provement, and is not entitled to the entire profits arising from the use of the furnace. Black v. Munson, 265
27. Where the plaintiff fails to give
evidence as to such particular profits, the Court will not consider excep- tions taken by the plaintiff to what
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