Sawyer v. The Switzerland Marine Insurance Company. must be one in which there is a controversy between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, or else must be one in which there is a controversy between citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens or subjects. Under that construction, this case was properly removed. There is nothing in the decision in the case of Gold Washing and Water Co. v. Keyes, (6 Otto, 199,) which sanctions the ground taken on the part of the plaintiff. The ground of removal in that case was not diversity of citizenship, but was that the suit arose under certain specified Acts of Congress, and the decision was that, in such a case, it must appear by the record that the suit arose, in part, at least, out of a controversy between the parties in regard to the construction or effect of the statutes, on the facts involved. The motion to remand is denied. Benjamin Low, in person, for the motion. Frank & Weiss, opposed. SAMUEL A. SAWYER, DAVID L. WALLACE AND THOMAS MILLER v8. THE SWITZERLAND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY. Where the defendant removed a suit into this Court, under § 2 of the Act of March 3d, 1875, (18 U. S. Stat. at Large, 470,) on the ground that the defendant was a Swiss corporation, and that the plaintiffs, three in number, were citizens of the State of New York, and it appeared that two of the plaintiffs were, when the suit was commenced, aliens and British subjects, and the third was a citizen of New York, the cause was, on the applications of the plaintiffs, remanded to the State Court, on the ground that the requisite jurisdictional citizenship must exist as to each individual plaintiff. (Before BLATCHFORD, J., Southern District of New York, May 18th, 1878.) Sawyer v. The Switzerland Marine Insurance Company. BLATCHFORD, J. The plaintiffs, as copartners, brought this suit against the defendants, a corporation created by the Republic of Switzerland, in the Supreme Court of New York, on a policy of insurance issued to the plaintiffs as copartners, by their copartnership name. The defendants instituted proceedings, under the 2d section of the Act of March 3d, 1875, (18 U. S. Stat. at Large, 470,) to remove the suit into this Court, on a petition alleging that, when the suit was brought, the plaintiffs were citizens of the State of New York. An order of removal was made by the State Court, and, a copy of the record having been entered in this Court, the plaintiffs now move to remand the suit to the State Court, on the ground that, when the suit was commenced, Wallace and Miller were aliens, and subjects of Great Britain, while Sawyer was a citizen of the State of New York. The statute provides, that, when the suit is a suit in which there is "a controversy between citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens or subjects," either party may remove the suit into the proper Circuit Court. I think that the views laid down in the various decisions of the Supreme Court, from Strawbridge v. Curtiss, (3 Cranch, 287,) to the case of The Sewing-Machine Companies, (18 Wallace, 553,) and which views were applied by this Court in Petterson v. Chapman, (12 Blatchf. C. C. R., 395,) to the case of a removal under the clause of the same 2d section which provides for the removal of a suit in which there is" a controversy between citizens of different States," require that this application should be granted. The plaintiffs must all of them be citizens of a State, and the defendants must all of them be foreign citizens or subjects. The plaintiffs are not all of them citizens of a State. Two of the plaintiffs are aliens. The requisite jurisdictional citizenship must exist as to each individual plaintiff. The party on each side, though consisting of several individuals, is, for the purpose of removal, to be considered as one individual. It is the "party" who alone can remove the suit. This case stands in no different position from that which it would occupy if Sawyer had not been a member of the copartnership, in which case, the suit being one 318 Tons of Coal. between foreign citizens on the one side, and foreign subjects on the other, the case would not be removable under the section in question. The rule is especially applicable to a case like this, where the alien members of the copartnership are necessary parties to the suit. An order must be entered remanding the case to the State Court. Clarence A. Seward, for the motion. Simon Sterne, opposed. 318 TONS OF COAL. The New Haven and Northampton Company, a railroad corporation, owning a dock at New Haven, refused to receive coal on its cars, on said dock, from a canal-boat lying thereat, unless the master of the canal-boat would employ shovellers designated by the company, at a price fixed by the company, which was intended to be, and generally was, the ordinary market price, to shovel the coal on board of the canal-boat into tubs belonging to the company, which tubs were then to be hoisted, by means of a derrick on the dock, so that the coal could be dumped into such cars. The canal-boat paid ten cents per ton to the company for the use of the tubs and machinery: Held, that the requirement of the company was not a reasonable one and could not be enforced. (Before BLATCHFORD, J., Connecticut, May 20th, 1878.) THIS was an appeal from a decree of the District Court in a suit in rem, in Admiralty. The decision of the District Court, (SHIPMAN, J.,) was as follows: "The New Haven and Northampton Company is a railroad corporation duly incorporated by the Legislature of the State of Connecticut, and owning and operating a line of railroad, for the transportation of persons and goods, from New Haven, Connecticut, to Northampton, Massachusetts. Said 318 Tons of Coal, corporation is a common carrier, and a considerable portion of its regular business is the transportation of coal from New Haven to the various places upon the line of its railroad. This coal is brought from different coal ports to the port of New Haven, in coal barges, or in coal vessels, and is delivered to said railroad company upon its dock in said city, commonly called the Canal Dock. About 140,000 tons of coal are annually received at this dock. By the universal custom of the port of New Haven, which custom was known, understood and assented to by the libellants, and in conformity with which custom the contract evidenced by the bill of lading hereafter recited was entered into by them, coal consigned to a railroad company, or to consignees upon the line of a railroad company, and which coal is to be transported by the railroad company, as an intermediate carrier, must be delivered to said company in its coal cars, unless some other place of delivery is expressed in the bill of lading. The said New Haven and Northampton Company, for the convenient, speedy and economical delivery of said coal, has erected upon the Canal Dock derricks furnished with buckets or tubs, which derricks and buckets are operated by steam power. The buckets, being lowered upon the deck of a coal barge lying alongside of the dock, are filled with coal by shovellers upon the vessel, who are paid by the owners of the barge, and the buckets are moved by steam power over the coal car, and the contents are dumped into the car. For the use of this machinery and these appliances, the railroad company receives ten cents per ton from the barge owner. This method of delivery is the ordinary one, and is the method which the railroad company has provided, both for its own accommodation and for that of the barge owners. In the present condition of the wharf, which is traversed on one side with railroad tracks, which are being occupied with cars and engines, the only practicable method of delivery, and the only practicable place from which delivery can be made, is under the derricks. The duty of the shovellers is swiftly to fill the buckets from the vessel. Prior to September 4th, 1871, the shovellers were always selected 318 Tons of Coal. by the captains of the barges, and were paid directly by them. On that day said railroad company established the following rule, printed copies of which were posted conspicuously upon the wharf New Haven and Northampton Company. Special notice. All coal vessels discharging at the Dock of the New Haven and Northampton Company will be under control of the dock-master from time of arrival till discharged, and he will furnish men to discharge their cargoes. Chas. N. Yeamans, Vice-Pres't and Supt. M. C. Parker, Gen. Freight Agt.' Under this notice, the railroad company has claimed the exclusive right to furnish, at the regular price, shovellers to discharge coal cargoes, and to refuse to receive coal unless these shovellers, so furnished at such regular price, were employed by the barge captains; and, if this latter rule is not embraced in the notice, there has been such a rule, in addition to the notice, well understood by the owners of barges generally, and by the libellants. The libellants have known that the railroad company would not allow coal to be discharged at their wharf, except by shovellers whom they selected and furnished to the captains. The company has derived no pecuniary benefit from furnishing the shovellers, who were paid nothing except for shovelling, and who performed no service for the company. They were paid from September 4th, 1871, to the date hereafter mentioned, uniformly ten cents per ton, which sum was paid by the captains of the barges to the dockmaster, with the amount of the bill for hoisting and dumping, and by him paid to the shovellers. This rule was adopted by the company because they deemed its adoption to be a convenience and benefit to the freighting public. Previous to the time of its adoption, a strike had occurred among the shovellers, and delays had occurred arising from the shovellers absenting themselves, or deserting after they had been hired. Since the adoption of the rule, delivery of coal has been more rapidly conducted, and fewer delays have occurred. The consignees of coal deem the rule a reasonable one. From September 4th, 1871, until a short time prior to April 22d, 1876, the uniform price for shovelling, in New Haven, had been ten |