LETTER OF ALEXANDER MITCHELL, President C., M. & St. P. R. R. Co. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY, His Excellency, W. R. TAYLOR, Governor, etc.: SIR: On the 28th of April last, I, as President of this company, sent you a communication on the subject of the so-called "Potter Law," and advising you of the course which the company had determined to pursue in relation to it, and the reasons therefor. In that communicatton, I stated that "the Board of Directors have caused this act to be carefully examined and considered by our own counsel, and by some of the most eminent jurists in the land, and after such examination, they are unanimous in their opinion that it is unconstitutional and void. The Board of Directors are trustees of this property and are bound faithfully to discharge their trust, and to the best of their ability protect it from spoliation and ruin. They have sought the advice of able counsel, and, after mature deliberation, believe it their duty to disregard so much of said law as attempts arbitrarily to fix rates of compensation for freight and passengers." The "Potter Law" was without precedent in the history of any state or country, disastrous in its effects and wholly uncalled for by anything this company had done or failed to do. Under these circumstances, the officers of this company not only believed they were justified, but that it was their duty to decline to conform to its requirements until its validity and binding force were declared by the courts. That decision has now been made. The act by its terms embraces all the lines operated by this company within this state, and all of its business except "for carrying freight which comes from beyond its boundaries and to be carried across or through the state." As to so much of said act as relates to interstate business, that is, passenger and freight business crossing a state line, the counsel for the state appear to have regarded it as so manifestly unconstitutional that they have not asked the court to enforce it. But as to our local business, they hold it valid and binding upon the company. We shall, therefore, as law abiding citizens, at once conform our action to said decision, and endeavor to obey it in good faith until it is reversed by the supreme court of the United States, or until the law is repealed by the legis lature of the state. Since my communication to you, before referred to, I have discovered no reason to change the views therein expressed with respect to the" Potter Law," aside from the question of its validity. To deal arbitrarily with a question of such magnitude, and to attempt under form of law to coerce the railroads to serve the public for inadequate compensation, must necessarily result in failure, and be productive of consequences no less unfortunate to the people of the state than to the railroad companies themselves. As an example of the reasons given in support of this law, I may refer to statements recently made, apparently on official authority, as to the value of the roads of this company, based on the cost of the half-built and half-equipped lines of twenty years ago. With equal justice and propriety might the farming lands of to-day, the value of which these roads have done so much to enhance, he estimated with reference to their original cost of ten shillings per acre thirty years ago. No more money can now be obtained from any one, anywhere, for the construction of railways in Wisconsin, or for the providing of equipment for existing lines, and a stoppage of many contemplated improvements has become a matter of necessity. All objects and motives on the part of the stockholders in our railroads to improve the value of their property by further advances of money, are now obviously cut off, for looking at the "Potter Law," and the arguments by which it is sustained, what security is there that a future legislature may not appropriate to the public use without equivalent, all the benefits new outlays may have created. We do not seek the advancement of the interests of our company at the expense of other interests of the state, and I have no doubt it will soon be found that any law which discourages the investment of private capital in incorporate undertakings cannot but eventually be highly prejudicial to the prosperity and development of the state at large. If it be the case when a number of individuals join their capital and combine in a corporation for some great public work they have no constitutional rights which the legislature is bound to respect, but that the very existence of their capital is subject to the caprice of a majority of those annually elected to the legislature, it behooves, to say the least of it, those holding this unlimited power to exercise it with the greatest prudence and care, and it requires no great_sagacity to see that such ill-advised, hasty and reckless measures as the "Potter Law," must forever stop the investment of capital both by our own people and strangers in those great public enterprises so essential to the development of our state. In view of the fact that the income to which this company is fairly and honestly entitled will, so long as the present law remains in force, be seriously impaired, the question presents itself, what course it ought to pursue. Two courses are open: Either to cut down its train service in respect to both quantity and kind to an extent made necessary by its diminished income, thereby withdrawing from the public the full facilities and accommodations to which they have been accustomed in transacting their business, or continue something near the present service and submit to the loss thereby entailed. It would be with extreme reluctance that the Directors would adopt the former course, and rather than do so they have decided to make, for the present, large sacrifices. They the more readily come to this conclusion because the legislature of the state will meet in few months, and, believing as they do, that the "Potter Law" does not embody the real sentiments of the people of the state, in regard to railroads, they feel confident that wiser and better counsels will then prevail, than those which dictated that law-and that legislation alike just to the people and the roilroads will be enacted. I deeply regret that your excellency saw fit to regard the communication of April last as in any manner a defiance of the authority of the state, or that our positon should have been represented as one of rebellion against law. It was not so intended, but simply to notify you and through you the people of the state, of the course we felt compelled to pursue as the representatives of the property and interests committed to our charge, in order to obtain a ju. dicial determination of the questions involved at the earliest possible moment. The decision of the court now demonstrates that had we submitted to the law as passed, we should have needlessly sacrificed the rights and property of our stockholders as to the inter-state business of our road. While I have no doubt that your action in attempting to enforce this law was prompted by a desire to discharge your duty to the state, I trust you will find sufficient ground in what has occurred to accord to me equal honesty of purpose in discharging the duties of my position. Very respectfully, [Signed] ALEX. MITCHELL, President. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT. In the case of HENRY M. ACKLEY and GEORGE VILAS, Respondents, vs. THE CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant. The facts of this case all appear by the following stipulation entered into by the parties: It is hereby stipulated and admitted 1st. That plaintiffs are the partners and general owners of the lumber, as alleged in the complaint. 2d. That the defendant is a corporation duly organized under and by virtue of the laws of Wisconsin, and engaged in operating a railroad, and that one part of its railroad extends from Oshkosh to Milwaukee, and thence through Oconomowoc to Watertown Junction, and to La Crosse, a distance of about one hundred and thirty miles. 3d. That the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company is a corporation duly organized under and by virtue of the laws of Wisconsin, engaged in operating a railroad, and that its line extends from Oshkosh to Watertown Junction, and thence to Chicago, and that said road intersects and connects at said Watertown Junction. 4th. That the distance from Oshkosh to Watertown Junction, over the road of the Chicago & Northwestern Railway, is sixty-three miles, and the distance from said Watertown Junction to Oconomowoc, over the road of the defendant, is twelve miles. 5th. That on the 10th day of May, 1874, the said plaintiff shipped said two car loads of lumber at Oshkosh, over the Chicago & Northwestern Railway to Oconomowoc. That said company transported said two loads of lumber over its line of road from Oshkosh to Watertown Junction; and at said Junction, on the 11th day of May, 1874, delivered said two car loads of lumber to the defendant, to be transported by the said defendant to Oconomowoc, subject to the payment of the sum of thirty dollars for the charges of said Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company as its compensation for transporting said lumber from Oshkosh to said Watertown; and that said last named company had no line of road from Watertown Junction to Oconomowoc. 6th. That said defendant on the 11th day of May, 1874, received said two car loads of lumber from said Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, at said Watertown Junction for transportation to Oconomowoc, and then and there paid to said last named company the aforesaid said sum of thirty dollars demanded by it as its compensation for transporting said lumber. The action was brought to recover the lumber. The court instructed the jury that chapter 273 of the Session Laws of 1874 was constitutional and binding upon the railroad companies, that the amount fixed by said act for the transportation of freight was all that the companies were entitled to charge, and that as the distance from Oshkosh to Oconomowoc was only seventy-five miles, the said railroad companies were only authorized to charge fifteen dollars per car load for said lumber, and that as the plaintiffs tendered that amount to the defendant before bringing suit, and the defendant refused to receive the same, the plaintiffs were entitled to said lumber, and that their verdict should be for the plaintiffs. Due exception was taken on behalf of the defendant to such instructions. The plaintiffs had a verdict upon which judgment was duly entered for a return to them of the property and for costs. The defendant appeals. LYON, J. This action was commenced before the late decisions of the railway injunction cases were announced and was probably brought to test the validity of chap. 273, laws of 1874, known as the Potter act. In those cases the court did not pass upon that act in detail, but held, generally that the legislature has authority under the constitution, to limit the rates which rail 6-R. R.-App. way companies may charge and receive for carrying persons and property in this state. This case raises the question of the validity, in a certain contingency, of specific provisions of the act. Premising that the railways of the defendant company and of the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company are included in Class A, and the car loads of lumber in controversey in Class G, the provisions of the act applicable to the case are as follows: No individual, company, or corporation, owning, operating, managing or leasing any railroad or part of a railroad designated in section one as class A or B, shall charge for or receive a greater or higher rate for carrying articles named in the several special classes herein designated than is hereinafter provided, namely, Class G, not exceeding eight dollars per car load for the first twenty-five miles, and not exceeding two dollars per car load for each additional twenty-five miles or fractional part thereof, unless the fraction be less than thirteen miles, in which case the rate shall not exceed one and one-half dollars per car load for such fractional part. In computing the rates for carrying any freights according to the provisions of this act, the distance for carrying such freights shall be computed from where it is received, notwithstanding it may pass from one railroad to another. (Sections 4 and 5.) * ** * * * * * Under the foregoing provisions, it is apparent that the maximum rate for carrying the lumber or the plaintiff from Oshkosh to Oconomowoc, is the same as it would have been, had the carriage terminated at Watertown Junction. From this fact it is contended on behalf of the defendant company, that the act seeks to compel it to transport the lumber from Watertown Junction to Oconomowoc without compensation, and it is agreed that such an enactment is not a valid exercise of legislative power. We do not so understand the act. It is true that had the lumber been consigned to Watertown Junction, the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company would have been entitled under the act to demand and recover fifteen dollars per car load for the carriage thereof. But the lumber was consigned to Oconomowoc, and that company received it so consigned. It received the same with full knowledge that the maximum legal rates for the whole carriage was fifteen dollars per car load, and that the defendant company was to perform a portion of the service. We are aware of no statute which assumes to give the whole freight to one company and thus compel the other to render services without compensation. We are of opinion that fifteen dollars per car load is the highest rate of freight that can lawfully be demanded for the whole carriage, and that the same should be divided between the two railway companies, on some equitable principal to be determined by the courts in case the companies invoke the aid of the courts in the premises. Because the act does not require the defendant to transport the plaintff's lumber without compensation, we are relieved from the duty of deciding what the effect would be, did the act so require. The plaintiffs having tendered to the defendant the full amount of freight which the statute permits to be charged, were entitled to the lumber, and the judgment of the circuit court awarding to them the possession thereof, is and must be approved. DECREES CONFIRMING SALES. DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN. DAVID R. MARTIN AND LUCIEN D. COWAN VS. THE MINERAL POINT RAILROAD COMPANY, SAMUEL D. HASTINGS, TREASURER OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN, JOHN M. KEEP, GEORGE L. SCHUYLER AND THOMAS MCFARLAND. In Equity. Deed of trust or mortgage dated January 1, 1856. The Mineral Point Railroad Company to Daniel R. Martin and Lucian D. Coman, trustees. Amount, $320,000. All their said road from the village of Mineral Point, Wisconsin, to the vil lage of Warren, in the state of Illinois, being thirty-two and two-third miles of road constructed and to be constructed, together with all and singular the railway, land procured or occupied for right of way, together with bridges, fences, privileges and real estate owned by said company, for the purpose of said road, or which may hereafter be acquired or owned by them, and all the tolls, income, issues and profits to be had from the same, and all lands used for and occupied by depot or stations, with all buildings standing thereon or which shall be procured therefor, together with all locomotives, engines, tenders, passenger cars and freight cars, shops, tools and machinery now owned or hereafter to be acquired by said company and in any way belonging or appertaining to said railroad now constructed and to be constructed, including all its property, real and personal, pertaining to said railroad, and all its rights, credits and franchises thereunto appertaining; all and singular the corporate property, tolls, issues, profits, rights, credits and franchise. Also the locomotives, passenger cars and freight cars as follows; Three locomotives, named the John C. Fremont," the "Mineral Point" and the "Warren; "alo three passenger cars and forty-eight cars used upo said railroad, and particularly all the property acquired by the said party of of the first part subsequent to January 1, A. D. 1856. Report of sale filed November 12, 1861. Property above described bid off by James C. Carter for the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000), on the 6th day of November, 1861, at Milwaukee. November 12, 1861. Report of sale confirmed. |