6. The law imposes duties impossible of accomplishment.

Under the old law of Wisconsin, not yet repealed, railroad companies are required to report to stockholders, in February, a statement of affairs for the year ending on the 31st day of December of the previous year, and a copy of this statement is required to be filed with the Secretary of State. Under the law of last year, the Railroad Commissioners are required to report, in January, a far more complete statement of railway affairs for the year ending on the 31st day of the preceding month. The incongruity and impracticability of the duty thus imposed upon the commissioners, admits of no explanation more charitable than that of undue haste and misapprehension in the enactment of the law.

7. The law inadequately provides for enforcement. Experience has shown this to be a weak point-one responsible for much useless trouble to the public concerned, and entailing heavy aggregate expenses upon both people and companies. Trusting to this element of weakness in the law, the leading railway companies were at first regardless of its provisions; and it is safe to say that, but for the unusual course finally resorted to by the executive, the law would have been practically a useless instrument in the hands of the people.

It is now manifest, both from experience, and from the nature of the conditions, that any law seeking the ends proposed by the "Potter law" should not only be enforced by the state, and at the expense of the state, but that it should make adequate provision for enforcement through the agency of some branch of the state government duly authorized and reqnired to commence prosecutions whenever the public interests require it.

The deficiencies of the law, as seen from the commissioners' present point of view, will appear from the discussions under the head of remedial measures.

REMEDIAL MEASURES.

The conditions which are to characterize the relative position of railroads and governments, seem already to be indicated. While experience everywhere has demonstrated the necessity of interposing public authority to protect the interests of the public, the char

7-R. R.

acter and extent of that interference is also clearly defined and established by the pre-existing character of the relations between people and governments.

In those foreign countries where the practice of the government is to manifest its authority by prompt and decided measures, crushing out at once the first indication of an opposing element, we find that the circumstances which developed the necessity for its interference with railroad corporations found ready response, and the strong arm of the superior power stretched forth to withold, to regulate, to control, and finally possess, if deemed essential for the public interest. Such seems to have been the case in many continental European states, while in Great Britain the practice presents features more in harmony with the character of that government; and while no governmental ownership or control interferes or competes with citizens in their business enterprises, it at the same time exercises a regulating supervision intended to protect the public.

STATE OWNERSHIP INAPPLICABLE.

It is hardly worth while to give any extended consideration to what may be termed the "ownership theory." However practicable such a system may be under continental European governments, and within the limits of their national lines, it is obviously far less practicable in this country than even in Great Britain. While the public reports of Great Britain upon the subject of railroads, announce dissatisfaction at every method which had been attempted, yet they in nowise recommend the adoption of whole or partial ownership, considering it not in consonance with the spirit of that government.

Brief allusion to the main points of the ownership theory and the general principle tried in Great Britain, may perhaps serve to make apparent where the advantages or disadvantages lie.

The principal object ostensibly aimed at by the state control of railways is the regulation of charges; and the argument used in favor of state ownership is, that the state could regulate the charges not only of the road or roads that it owned, but also, by competition, regulate them upon others which the state did not own. This being the theory, ownership in Europe, wherever employed, is only partial, as will appear from the following tabular statement, showing the mileage of European railways owned and operated by

NAME OF COUNTRY.

the state, operated by the state under contract, and owned and operated by corporations:

Setting aside the question as to what number of roads, or number of miles of roads, a state or nation should own to give practical effect to the theory, we are brought to consider what rule is to govern the state itself in determining charges. The testimony seems to be that national roads are not run as economically as private ones, and certainly the actual cost cannot be less.

There is no design to subject competing railroad corporations to loss, nor would the government desire to run its own trains at a

loss; we must therefore conclude that the charges fixed would be such as would afford a fair per centage of profit upon the capital invested. Now, in owning a road and running it, the government is necessarily put in possession of positive facts as a basis to enable it to regulate charges. Granting that the power to establish rates is inherent in the state, and that for no other purpose does the state undertake the business of railroading, we are led to the conclusion that this actual ownership is necessitated for the purpose of arriving at the facts by which to regulate charges. Is this so? Are there no other relations between railway corporations and governments which are proposed to be remedied by state ownership, looking to the protection of the public, and which are assumed to be beyond the control of legislative enactment? If not, the inquiry is reduced to the simple one named,-the regulation of charges.

A committee of investigation in England reports that "it is difficult to provide any fixed or self-acting rules which will, through the medium of self-interest, or of the ordinary action of law, do what is necessary to protect the public."

These conclusions do not appear to have been considered as a final bar to experiment, as the commissioner system was at the same time recommended and is now on trial in that country.

The very able reports of the Massachusetts Commissioners, however, take a rather positive position in this respect, and advance and advocate the theory that a "natural law of political evolution governing transportation by rail may now be formulated."

This theory assumes that the practice adopted in Europe, of control through state ownership, is the final result of "natural law." The different phases of experience through which this ultimatum is reached, are presented as being

1st. Non-interference of government.

2d. Legislative regulation.

3d. Executive supervision.

4th. State ownership.

The condition of state ownership being held to be the inevitable result which will be reached; and it is assumed to have "been more clearly illustrated in the experience of America than in that of any other single country." We think that further experience will prove the fallacy of the conclusions set forth, or we shall also be constrained to admit that the same "natural law" would oblige government to conform itself to suit the requirements of railroads.

As already stated, the investigations in England have not led to the adoption of this theory, and the objections which apply in that country exist to a much greater degree in the United States.

Executive supervision, or the commissioner system, seems now more likely to lead to the establishment of conditions approximating non-interference than state ownership.

Agreeing that the law, as it stands, is not an adequate remedy for the evils it was intended to cure, and that state ownership cannot be adopted as a remedy, we come now to consider such measures as do commend themselves to cur attention.

RAILWAY COMPETITION TO SOME EXTENT AVAILABLE.

That competition between railway companies is not of itself a sufficient reliance has been fully shown; as also that it has been long since abandoned throughout the world. It is, nevertheless, everywhere operative to some extent, and under favorable circumstances may be employed with advantage; e. g.: where two great corporations forbidden to consolidate are yet so located and otherwise circumstanced as to be natural competitors.

As has been the case so often in the past, they may weary of the contest, from time to time, and come to an agreement as to rates. But if they are really natural competitors, they will at least compete as to facilities and accommodations.

WATER-ROUTES A PERMANENT THOUGH PARTIAL RESTRAINT.

All experience in every country testifies to the truth of the above statement. It is also a teaching of experience, now confirmed by every authority on transportation, that the influence of water-routes extends far beyond the regions of country immediately bordering on their lines.

In 1872, persons considered competent authority, stated before the British Joint Select Committee on Railroad Amalgamations, that sea compeittion had the effect to lower the tariff rates at about three-fifths of all the railway stations in the United Kingdom. In this country, the influence of lake and river competition is felt at long distances. Indeed, there is little doubt but that the great chain of lakes affording, in connection with the Erie Canal and the Hudson river, water communication between the sea board and the northwestern states, save, and will always continue to save