A lease for 99 years, dependent on three lives, of the value of 150l. per annum, though neither a lease for life, nor a lease for 99 years certain, has been holden to be a sufficient qualification within this statute; because there is not any reasonable probability of any life in being extending beyond 99 years; and the legislature, in admitting leases for 99 years, of a certain value, to be a qualification, did not mean to require that they should positively endure so long; it was sufficient if they might extend to that period, subject to the contingency of the party's so long living. Doubts had been entertained whether the words other person in this statute should be taken to be in the nominative or in the genitive case; but it was solemnly determined in R. v. Utley, 24 G. 3. B. R. recognised in Jones v. Smart, 1 T. R. 44. that these words must be taken to be in the genitive case, in the same manner as if the word "of" had been actually inserted, and that the meaning of the statute is "other than the son and heir apparent of an esquire, or the son of any other person of higher degree." It follows, as a necessary consequence from this interpretation of the statute, that although the son and heir apparent of an esquire, or of other person of higher degree, be qualified by virtue of this statute, yet an esquire or person of higher degree, as such, is not qualified. A diploma conferring the degree of doctor of physic3, granted by either of the universities in Scotland, does not give a qualification to kill game under this statute. A commission of captain of volunteers, signed by the lord lieutenant of a county, does not confer the degree of esquire; and consequently the son of such captain is not thereby qualified to kill game". f E. of Ferrers v. Henton, 8 T. R. 506. g Jones v. Smart, 1 T. R. 44. b Talbot v. Eagle, 1 Taunt. 510. ance, but for his life only; consequently such estate must be of the value of 1501. per annum, in order to exempt him from the penalties of these statutes. Lowndes v. Lewis, Cald. 188. II. Of the Appointment and Authority of Gamekeepers. The stat. 22 & 23 C. 2. c. 25. s. 2. authorises lords of manors, or of other royalties (5) not under the degree of an esquire, to appoint by writing under their hands and seals, gamekeepers within their manors or royalties, who may seize guns, dogs, nets, and other engines used for the destruction of the game by unqualified persons within the precincts of their manors, and the said gamekeepers, or other persons authorized by a warrant from J. P. may search in the day-time the houses of unqualified persons, upon good ground of suspicion, and seize for the use of the lord, or destroy such guns, dogs, nets, &c. The preceding statute does not limit the number of gamekeepers, which may be appointed for each manor. But by stat. 9 Ann. c. 25. s. 1. lords of manors can appoint (6) only one gamekeeper with power to kill game for one manor; and further, the name of each gamekeeper must be entered with the clerk of the peace, &c. Such gamekeeper, by stat. 3 Geo. 1. c. 11., must have been either a person qualified, or a servant of the lord, or a person immediately employed to kill game for the sole use of the lord. But now by stat. 48 G. 3. c. 93. s. 2. any lord or lady of a manor may depute any person, whether acting as a gamekeeper to any other person or not, or whether retained and paid for as the male servant of any other person or not, or whether a qualified person or not, to be a gamekeeper to any such manor, with authority to such person as gamekeeper, to kill game within the same, for his own use, or for the use of any other person, to be specified in such appointment or deputation, whe-ther qualified or not. The preceding statutes, authorizing the appointment of (5) i. e. Royalties of the same nature with manors. If royalties of a higher nature had been meant, the statute would have begun with them. Per Lord Mansfield, C. J. in E. of Ailesbury v. Pattiso, Doug, 28, (6) "A lord of a manor cannot convey to another the power of appointing a gamekeeper, without a conveyance also of the manor itself. Such a power is a mere emanation of the manor, and inseparable from it." Per Lord Kenyon, C. J. 5 T. R. 20. gamekeepers, do not extend to the lords of a wapentake or hundred1. By stat. 25 G. 3. c. 50. s. 2. deputations of gamekeepers must be registered with the clerk of the peace, &c. and certificates thereof (stamp duty one guinea, that is, 10s. 6d. by this statute, and 10s. 6d. by stat. 31 G. 3. c. 21.) must be taken out annually; and a penalty of 201. is imposed on gamekeepers neglecting to register their deputations within 20 days after they are granted, and neglecting to take out their certificates. By stat. 52 Geo. 3. c. 93. Sched. (L.) VII. On an appointment of a new gamekeeper within the year, the certificate of the former gamekeeper may be renewed free of duty or fee. A deputation to a gamekeeper, who is neither himself qualified to kill game, nor is a servant to the lord of the manor, need not state on the face of it, that he is appointed to kill game for the use of the lord; and it will be presumed, that whatever game he kills is for the lord's use till the contrary is proved. N. This case occurred before the stat. 48 G. 3. c. 93. The stat. 4 and 5 W. & M. c. 23. s. 4. gives to lords of manors, or their gamekeepers, the same protection in resist ing offenders within the precincts of their manors in the night-time, as the law affords to the keepers of ancient chases, parks, or warrens. It is no defence to actions of debt for penalties on the game laws', that the defendant acted bonâ fide as gamekeeper of the manor, in which the offence was committed, under a deputation from a person claiming a right to appoint the gamekeeper, there not being any ground for such claim. A question respecting the boundaries of a manor, or the right to a manor, cannot be tried in an action on the game laws. Trespass for killing a dog. Plea by King, that Ld. Cawdor was possessed of a close within and parcel of the manor of K. of which he was lord, and the defendant King was the gamekeeper, and because the dog was hunting hares in the close, King, as gamekeeper, for the preservation of the hares, killed the dog. On demurrer this plea was holden bad; Ld. i E. of Ailesbury v. Pattison, Doug. 28. 1 Calcraft v. Gibbs, 5 T. R. 19. n Blunt v. Grimes, per Buller, J. Wiltshire Lent Ass. 1789, cited in Calcraft v. Gibbs, 4 T. R. 681. o Vere v. Lord Cawdor, and King, 11 East, 568. Ellenborough, C. J. observing, "The question is, whether the plaintiff's dog incurred the penalty of death for running after a hare in another's ground? There is no question here as to the right to the game. The gamekeeper had no right to kill the plaintiff's dog for following it. The plea does not even state that the hare was put in peril, so as to induce any necessity for killing the dog in order to save the hare." III. Of the Statutes 5 Ann. c. 14.-9 Ann. c. 25.— 28 G. 2. c. 12. relating to the Preservation of the Gume; the Penalties imposed for Offences against these Statutes; the Modes of recovering the Penalties, 1st, By Distress, 2dly, By Action of Debt, and herein of the Stat. 8 G. 1. c. 19. -26 G. 2. c. 2.-2 G. 3. c. 19. By stat. 5 Ann. c. 14. (made perpetual by stat. 9 Ann. c. 25.) s. 2. “every higgler, chapman, carrier, inn-keeper, victualler, or alehouse-keeper, (7) who shall have in his custody or possession any hare, pheasant, partridge, moor, heath-game, or grouse, or shall buy, sell, or offer to sell, any hare, &c. unless such game in the hands of such carrier p See Kearle v. Boulter, Say. R. 191. * (7) By a subsequent stat. 28 G. 2. c. 12. (reciting the stat. 5 Ann. c. 14.) "Persons, qualified or not qualified, selling, exposing, or offering to sale, any hare, pheasant, partridge, moor, heath-game, or grouse, are for every such offence made liable to the same forfeitures and penalties as are inflicted by the recited act upon higglers," &c. And, "if any hare, pheasant, partridge, &c. shall be found in the shop, house, or possession of any poulterer, salesman, fishmonger, cook, or pastry-cook, the same shall be adjudged to be an exposing thereof to sale within the meaning of this act, and the recited act, or any other act; the forfeitures to be recovered and penalties inflicted to be applied in manner prescribed by the recited act, or by any other act since made for the preservation of the game." * S. 2. be sent up by a person qualified to kill the game, shall, upon every such offence, be carried before some J. P. for the county, city, &c. where the offence is committed, and being convicted upon view, or upon the oath of one or more credible witnesses, shall forfeit for every hare, &c. the sum of 51.; one half to the informer, and the other half to the poor of the parish where the offence is committed; (the subsequent part of this section directs, that the penalty shall be levied by distress, and for want of distress, the offender shall be punished by three months imprisonment for the first, and by four months for the second offence, and that before the allowance of any certiorari to remove conviction under this statute, the party convicted shall enter into a recognizance, with sureties, conditioned for the payment of costs to the prosecutor within fourteen days after conviction or procedendo granted, and in default thereof, J. P. may proceed to execution, &c.) And for the better discovery of offenders," any person who shall destroy, sell, or buy any hare, &c. and shall within three months make discovery of any higgler, &c. (who hath bought or sold, or offered to buy or sell, or had in his possession, any hare, &c. so as the of fender shall be convicted), shall be discharged of all penalties, and entitled to all the advantages of an informer under this statute." "If any person', not qualified, shall keep or use any greyhound, setting dogs, hayes, lurchers (8), tunnel or other engines (9) to kill and destroy the game, and shall be thereof (8) A hound is not within this statute, not being expressly mentioned, and the words "other engines" coming after tunnels, are applicable to inanimate things only. Hooker v. Wilks, Str. 1126, 66 (9) As greyhounds, setting dogs, hayes, lurchers, and tunnels are expressly mentioned, in this statute, it is not necessary to allege that any of these have been used for killing or destroying the game; and the rather, as they can scarcely be kept for any other purpose than to kill or destroy the game; but as guns are not expressly mentioned, and as a gun may be kept for the defence of a man's house, and for other lawful purposes, it is necessary to allege, in order to its being comprehended within the meaning of the words, any other engines to kill the game," that the gun had been used for killing the game." Per Lee, C. J. in Wingfield v. Stratford, Say. R. 15. N." If a person go in pursuit of game with a dog and gun on the same day, he can only be convicted in one penalty." Per Ld. Kenyon, C. J. in R. v. Lovet, 7 T. R. 153. In Molton v, |