be able to live; but all consumers would be compelled to pay a higher price for shoes, by the difference between the price of foreign shoes before the duty was laid, and the price afterwards.

But, it must be remarked, here, that if we have no manufactures among us, foreigners, knowing that we must have a supply from some quarter or other, will have it in their power to compel us to receive goods of whatever quality, and at whatever price, they please.

Suppose then our shoemakers have abandoned their business, and left the market to foreigners, what will the consequence be? Shoes of the worst quality will immediately be sent here, and if we are not compelled to pay a higher price for them, than we refused to pay our own shoemakers, we may think ourselves fortunate. In all such cases, therefore, we must choose between the two evils; and, if we wish to have manufacturers among us, we must lay such a duty on foreign goods, as will enable our own, to meet them fairly in our own market. But, we must not take off such a duty on the vain supposition, that goods will remain permanently cheaper; for, as soon as we have broken up our own manufacturers, we shall, in this respect, immediately become at the mercy of foreigners.

2. Is it disadvantageous to the interests of any non-manufacturing state, that foreign manufactures usually consumed within it, and of a similar kind to goods manufactured in some of the other states, should be either wholly or partially excluded from it, by the operation of protecting or prohibitory duties?

An absolute prohibition of foreign goods, would seem to compel the non-manufacturing state to purchase such articles as it needed, even though inferior in quality to the foreign ones, at whatever price, the home manufacturer saw fit to demand. There would be two checks, however, to any exhorbitant increase of price. 1. The manufacturers having principally to depend upon the market of the United States, would be under as great a necessity to sell, as the consumers would be to purchase. 2. The competition among the manufacturers themselves, which, on account of their increase of numbers, would be continually growing greater, would keep the prices of their

goods down, to an average with the products of other kinds of labor.

But there would remain two disadvantages. 1. As long as the price of labor and of subsistence, are so much lower in a foreign country than here, as to outweigh the freight, insurance, &c. for transporting foreign goods to this country, the foreign manufacturer will always be able to undersell ours in our own market, if not protected by a duty. Consequently, if the foreign goods should be excluded, no competition among the home manufacturers, will ever reduce their goods to as low a price, as those of foreign goods would be, if there were no duty.

2. If foreign goods are prohibited, the nonmanufacturing state will suffer a loss by the prohibition, precisely equal to the difference in price, between what the same goods could be bought for before the prohibition, and what must be given for them afterwards. The consequence of this loss, will be that the non-manufacturing state will not be able to sustain as great a population by so many persons, as that difference would support. For example, let it be supposed, that the non-manufacturing state before the prohibition paid $50,000 per annum for foreign goods, and afterwards paid for similar goods, to a manufacturing state $60,000; then it is plain, that so many persons as derive their subsistence from the difference, viz. ; $10,000 per annum, are gained by the manufacturing state, and lost by the non-manufacturing state. This is evident, because, whatever tends to increase the consumption of a state, without tending also to increase the population, not only checks population, but diminishes the capability of the state, so long as the cause exists.

To counterbalance these disadvantages, there are some circumstances which deserve consideration. 1. The increase of population in the manufacturing state, will increase the home trade between the two states, not only in relation to the sale and purchase of the particular goods of the manufacturing state, but, in all articles which may be received in barter for them; in this way, it is not unlikely, that the manufacturing state may be the customer of the non-manufacturing state, to an amount equal to the price of the manufactures.

This compensation would be much more complete and direct, if the raw material used by the manufacturing state were the growth of the other, and was bartered for the manufactured goods. But, on the other hand, if the non-manufacturing state were compelled by the prohibition to purchase goods of a manufacturing state, which either could not or would not purchase the raw material in return, it would operate very injuriously to its interests. Because, 1. The non-manufacturing state would more or less lose its market for its raw material with the foreign manufacturer, in consequence of not buying of him; 2. Would be compelled to pay to the manufacturing state a higher price in money, for whatever goods it purchased. 3. Its raw material would fall in price on account of the difficulty of finding a market for it. Under these circumstances, a prohibition would be entirely to the advantage of the manufacturing state, and to the disadvantage of the other.

The effect, which duties imposed on articles of foreign manufacture, for the purpose of protecting the manufacture of similar goods in a manufacturing state, would have on the interests of a non-manufacturing state, must be analogous to a probibition. Some consequences, however, would be more savorable in the latter. 1. Though the protecting duty would naturally tend to, raise the price of the manufactures to the consumer; yet, it would by no means have so great an effect, in this respect, as a prohibition. The rise probably would not be so great as the whole amount of the duty. For, by encouraging the domestic manufactures of another state, though by the supposition, it would not wholly expel the foreign manufacture, yet a competitor would be introduced into the market, who would lessen the sales of the foreign article. The diminution of the sale, would, for a time, at least be accompanied with an accumulation of the foreign goods. It is very possible, that this might become so great, as to compel a sacrifice at a price below the usual one before the duty was laid. The duty of course would cease to be a protection for a season. For, large sales of foreign goods, would bring down the price of the manufactures intended to be protected, so low, that they could not be manufactured and sold in their own state and, with greater reason, could not pay for freight

&c. to the non-manufacturing state, with any reasonable expectation of profit. This effect, however, would be only temporary. The foreign manufacturer, or merchant, after so great a sacrifice, would send fewer goods; and fewer would be ordered from this country. It is very possible, however, that any person, not knowing the nature of the cause of the disturbance of the market, might suppose it to be permanent, and conclude that the various manufacturing establishments would be ruined, unless heavier duties were imposed.

2. During this struggle for the market, the consumers in the non-manufacturing state, would enjoy the advantage of purchasing goods at extremely low prices. The public revenue also would be levying a heavy contribution, which would fall either on the merchant, in whose hands they happened to be at the time of the pressure, or else on the foreign manufacturer, but not on the consumer, as some imagine. It is true, when foreign goods, subject to duty, are imported in the regular course of trade, the duty is added to the cost of production and the freight, &c., and the whole constitutes the price, all of which in ordinary cases is paid by the consumer, and the duty goes to the government. But, where the duty is laid to protect a domestic manufacture, the foreign manufacturer is obliged to reduce his price, to the importer, as much as possible; otherwise the protecting duty will drive him from the market as effectually as a prohibition would do. This reduction of price goes to pay the duty, and, in case of a glut of the market arising in the manner before suggested, may amount to more than the whole duty. The cheapness of the price in this case, notwithstanding the duty, clearly shows that the duty is in effect paid by the foreign manufacturer. But, as the foreign manufacturer, in consequence of his loss, or the low price of his goods, arising from the accumulation of them, would afterwards receive orders for fewer goods; the price of such articles, whether manufactured abroad or at home, would soon rise again in the market of the non-manufacturing state, until they settled at that price, at which the home inanufacturer could afford to sell them and make an average profit with other kinds of business. To this price the foreign manufacturer must cofnorm, or otherwise his goods must leave the

market. Whether such a protecting duty would or would not be a disadvantage on the whole to a non-manufacturing state, no infallible criterion appears, applicable to all cases. It must depend in every case upon the balance of the various advantages and disadvantages necessarily involved in it. In some cases, there can be no doubt. For instance, if the effect of a protecting duty is to create a permanent rise in the price of the manufactured articles, in comparison with the products of the non-manufacturing state, which either directly or indirectly must pay for them, it would be a disadvantage equal to the difference of price; because it would be a proportionate check to an increase of population. But, though the price in money should be raised, it does not follow, from. this circumstance alone, that the protecting duty must necessarily be disadvantageous to the non-manufacturing state; because the produce of such state may also have risen in price, in proportion.

So, if the non-manufacturing state, in consequence of the protecting duty, should be placed in a dilemma, where it either must lose the market for its raw material, with the foreign manufacturer, by purchasing of the manufacturing state which does not purchase the raw material in return; or, otherwise must pay an increased price for the foreign articles, in order to sell its raw material to the foreign manufacturer, the protecting duty will be proportionally injurious to the non-manufacturing state.

3. Is it, on the whole a national advantage to the United States, that duties should be laid on foreign goods of a sinilar kind with goods manufactured in some of the states, for the purpose of securing either a monopoly, or equal competition for the products of the industry of the manufacturing states, against those of foreign industry?

A few remarks have already been made, to show that the encouragement of manufactures by a protecting duty, is advantageous not only to the manufacturers themselves, but, independently of their particular interest, to the whole of a manufacturing state; it has also been shown that, in some cases, the imposition of such a duty is injurious to a non-manufacturing state; that where it is not so, it is because incidental circumstances sometimes afford an indirect compensation; the